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2ABSTRACT
The study is a multidimensional analysis of regional economic integration with special 
reference to the Economic Community of West African States( ECOWAS ). It looks at the 
interaction between economics, politics and society in the context of integration and asks if the 
predominantly economic and mainly a priori advantages postulated by integration theory are 
feasible in West Africa.
The thesis is both descriptive and analytical. First it paints the political and social landscape of 
West Africa in broad strokes. Using the picture thus created, it analyses integration in the 
sub-region by measuring the extent of integration achieved by ECOWAS since its formation in 
1975. A heuristic paradigm, originally proposed by Leon Lindberg, is used to measure and 
explain the level of integration achieved so far. Field research, of a preliminary kind, is also 
used to examine the impact of society on national politics and intra-regional relations, and 
hence on regional co-operation and integration.
The conclusions of the thesis include: the need for a revision of the dynamic theory of regional 
integration to formulate process mechanisms that can be implemented by developing countries; 
regional collective decision making is extremely difficult in unstable political systems; the need 
to tone down the exaggerated expectations of regional integration among developing 
countries; that tribes across borders have both positive and negative implications for 
integration; and that the ideology of the dynamic theory of integration is rapidly becoming 
obsolete in that dirigisme is no longer a viable policy option for most governments.
Despite the need for higher levels of economic interaction among developing countries there 
is no reason, from our study, to believe that such relations will be different from those that 
pertain in international relations generally. The issues of national interest are just as salient in 
the interaction between developing countries as they are in the relations between the 
developed and developing countries. The study did not find any overwhelming desire among 
West African countries to co-operate. Neither did it find a cosmopolitanism that puts the 
regional good over the national interest. It therefore calls into question the premise on which 
integration among developing countries is based; that states ought to rationalise their 
industries.
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4INTRODUCTION
The evolution of development theorising and the subsequent proliferation of 
paradigms, each advocating a different way to the economic development of third world 
countries is indicative of the complexity and near elusiveness of the economic goals that 
such countries have sought since independence.
Much of the recasting of development paradigms and the changes in emphasis in 
development theorising is a response to systemic political and economic changes and 
mirror the strivings of the developing countries to cope with such changes. Thus the 
changes in emphasis from the missing component and linear growth paradigm of the 
Rostow1 years when developing countries were expected to replicate the development path 
of the West, through the delinking theories of the dependency school,2 to the mutuality of 
interests3 and the calls for a new international economic order, have been attempts by both 
theoreticians and practitioners to adjust to the changing economic and political milieu at 
the systemic, regional and national levels and the realities of implementing theoretical 
concepts.
A method which became more and more popular as modernisation and import 
substitution industrialisation at the national level failed to yield the goals envisaged for
To Rostow all societies pass through a single unique sequence of 
stages. The five stages he identified were based on an analysis of the 
British industrial revolution and felt that an increase in the rate of 
capital investment was essential for transition from traditional to 
modern society. See W. W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth: A 
Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge University Press, 1960.
2 See Frank, A.G., 'Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America', New York: Monthly Review, 1967.
3 See Brandt, W., North-South - A Programme for Survival: Report of 
the Independent Commission on International Development Issues. Pan 
Books, London, 1980, also known as the Brandt Report.
5them has been regional economic integration. This method gained emphasis, first, in Latin 
America (where most of the developmental theorising by third world scholars originated) 
as autarky became more and more difficult to sustain,4 and eventually in Africa after 
independence.
We must emphasise, though, that we are not suggesting that regional integration theories 
came to replace national centred methods. What they did was to become more and more 
popular as an alternatives to the more narrow national plans. Indeed in pre-independent 
Africa the colonial administration had integrated the individual territories and achieved a 
certain amount of interaction between them. Post-independent Africa emerged with the 
dilemma of what independence should entail in terms of such services as, for example, the 
West Africa Currency Board. The resulting debate that followed this dilemma has 
persisted to today even though many of the common services have been dismantled, 
especially those among the former English colonies. Indeed the West Africa Chamber of 
Commerce for instance, has as since 1992 been calling for a re-establishment of the 
services that had been dismantled.5
The debate in Africa about co-operation has never been about whether it was desirable 
but about what form it should take and the geographical area it should cover. Whilst some 
thought it ought to be limited to a loose co-operation at the regional level initially before
Sakamoto, J., 'Industrial Development and Integration of 
Underdeveloped Countries', in Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol.
VII, No.4, June 1969.
5 The President of the Federation of West African Chamber of
Commerce stated in an interview in 1990 that '...we want to have those 
old institutions that united us resuscitated , such as the West African 
currency, West African airlines, and the Maritime Agency, as well as the 
re-insurance co-operation'. Contact, A Publication of ECOWAS, Vol. 2,
No. 3, November 1990.
6eventually expanding to fuse the various regions on the continent, others saw anything 
short of continental federation as undesirable.
The former view prevailed and inherited colonial structures that previously linked the 
various possessions of the imperial powers came to provide the foundation, both in terms 
of form and scope, for integration and co-operation schemes among the newly independent 
countries. This was especially so amongst the former French colonies and the East African 
protectorates and colonies. The English speaking countries of West Africa, on the other 
hand dismantled their common services.6
Many of the schemes that were initially based on the structures that were inherited from 
the colonial system have failed and been replaced by others. In general most schemes have 
remained essentially symbolic. Despite this general failure integration schemes continue to 
proliferate to the extent that a continental scheme, the African Economic Community was 
formed in Abuja, Nigeria in June 1991. A question that arises from the paradox of failed 
schemes and increasing proliferation of new ones is why they continue to be formed when 
those already existing have had such little success in their substantive aims. A second 
question which relates specifically to the African Economic Community, is how a 
continental scheme can be expected to succeed where regional ones have failed. The more 
immediate and relevant question to us, and which guides the thesis, is why regional 
schemes have had such little success.
Mazrui, A.A., and Tidy, M., Nationalism and New States in Africa. 
Heinemann, London, 1984, p. xv.
7Though integration schemes continue to proliferate in both the developing and developed 
regions of the world7, and old ones are being enlarged8, the paradox is that since the late 
1960s integration theorising has stagnated and most current writings on the subject have 
been policy oriented. It has meant that sustained critical appraisals of existing theories have 
been limited. The broad assumptions contained in the movement from a free trade area 
through a custom union and a common market to an economic union with a final outcome 
of, hopefully, a totally integrated area is almost universally accepted as the economic 
model for regional economic integration. This model continues to inform the 
implementation of most schemes.
The political aspects have also been predominantly neo-functional and have not been 
replaced by any newer models that take account of, for example, the shortcomings that 
have resulted from the empirical evidence of the EEC's difficulties at arriving at a 
consensus about federation, much less of the failed attempts in the developing countries.
What the failure of theory to keep up with practice has resulted in is a reliance on 
theoretical frameworks that are sometimes not appropriate for the region concerned.
It is hoped that this study will serve a dual purpose. First it will look critically at both the 
economic and political theories of regional integration in the context of West Africa. It will 
thus examine the validity of the arguments for integration in the region, and also the 
potential viability of the Economic Community of West African States. Secondly, it will, it
7 See Taylor, P., 'Regionalism: The Thought and the Deed' in
Frameworks for International Co-operation, Taylor, P., and Groom,
A.R.J., (ed.)r Pinter, London ,1990, p. 161.
8 The recent conclusion of accession agreements between the European 
Union and Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden in May of the year (1994) 
is an example.
8is hoped, contribute to a reviving of a dormant area of international relations research and 
hopefully stimulate interest in integration theorising to match its proliferation in practice.
Insofar as writers have concentrated on policy oriented research without much 
revision of existing theories means little has been done to advance the study of the field. 
What, for example, are the aspects of regional integration need revising? How universally 
applicable are the propositions of the various theories? These and other related questions 
need examination by students of integration.
The Economic Framework for Integration
Regional economic integration among developing 
countries, such as that between the members of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) is rationalised on the prospective gains that can be derived from the 
so-called dynamic effects. These include; industrialisation, increased bargaining power in 
international trade, economies of large scale production and efficiency9. These gains rather 
than those derived from static advantages form the basis of the argument for the 
desirability of such schemes.
The conclusions of orthodox economic integration theory are rejected by those who 
advocate such schemes amongst developing countries as being irrelevant. This, they point 
out, is because the underlying assumptions apply mainly to developed countries. The main 
argument for this position being that trade creation and trade diversion which are used as 
the main measures of the viability of a prospective integration scheme are based on static
9 Balassa, B., 'Toward a theory of Economic Integration' in Latin
American Integration: Experience and Prospects. Wionczek, M.S., (ed.), 
Praeger, New York, 1966.
equilibrium analysis which use as their criterion the reallocation of existing resources to the 
most efficient producer within the region.10
Development economists have argued that such static analysis overlooks the 
potential dynamic effects that market enlargement can have on industrialisation through 
the opportunities for exploiting internal economies of scale. Proponents of regional 
integration in West Africa, as in other parts of the developing world, therefore justify the 
desirability of such schemes on the prospective gains to be derived from them; the 
so-called dynamic theory of regional economic integration.
The economic arguments underlying regional integration have thus been extended 
in order to incorporate developing countries as candidates for integration schemes. Trade 
diversion, which according to traditional integration theory is a sign that regional 
integration will not be beneficial, has been rationalised on the basis that it can act as the 
foundation for a policy of import substitution industrialisation at the regional level to 
replace national level policies which had failed to yield the expected results.11
Even though these arguments have been proposed as a justification for regional 
economic integration in developing regions, what has not happened is the proposal of a 
framework within which the process of change can occur. The process of change from a 
situation of very low economic interaction among prospective partners to a situation of 
relatively high integration is still expected to occur within the traditional framework of
10 ibid.
11 Two other reasons: (1) the impossibility of accelerating the rate
of economic growth by improving the foreign sector because of its 
frequent deficit position among developing countries; (2) that such a 
deficit situation exits together with unemployment and under-utilisation 
of resources. See Sakamoto, J., op. cit., p. 283.
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moving through a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic union 
to hopefully, total integration. This framework is clearly demonstrated by the stages that 
are usually listed in the treaties of such schemes.
The rationale for moving from lower to higher levels of integration are found in the 
benefits that can be derived from increasing and intensifying trade among members as the 
free movement of factors increase. However replacing static reallocational arguments with 
dynamic arguments does not change the fact that such advantages need as a minimum 
requirement, a free trade area which in turn needs a fair amount of pre-integration trade 
among the participants.12 Whether regional integration among developing countries can be 
justified on the basis of regional import substitution industrialisation or not, does not 
detract from the implications of using a process mechanism that assumes that trade is 
going to be the driving force behind the capacity to derive those gains. In a region where 
tradable goods of domestic origin are limited, the question to ask, therefore, is how 
attainable the gains of integration are.
The fitting of the dynamic theory of regional integration into traditional process 
mechanisms is therefore, to us, like 'putting new wine into old wineskin'. This is because 
the old framework and process mechanism remain the same.
It is erroneous to use the supposedly high level of informal trade 
that takes place in West Africa, for example, before and after the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed as an 
indication of a high level of pre-integration trade within the region. 
This is because such trade is a result, among other things, of 
overvalued currencies by some of the countries. Moreover such trade is 
in imported goods that originate from outside the region and cannot act 
as the basis for increased trade or become formalised because it is 
categorised as trade deflection.
11
Despite the arguments of development economists, static gains still need to 
accompany and indeed act as the basis for dynamic gains. Though it might be useful to 
distinguish between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency for analytical purposes, the 
former is actually a necessary precondition for the latter.13 Since the economic theory of 
regional integration does not see much scope for developing regions deriving static 
benefits from regional economic integration, the basic misfit, the fitting of dynamic 
arguments into a static framework may be a major reason why integration schemes have 
failed to yield any so-called dynamic advantages so far.
The Political Framework for Integration
In addition to the economic framework within which regional economic integration 
is expected to occur, the whole process also has a political dimension. In fact, the setting 
up of an integration scheme is a political decision. What the economic arguments do is to 
provide grounds for the desirability of a scheme that has tremendous political implications.
The political implications of regional integration are described in the various 
theories of international political integration.14 As with its economic counterparts, 
international political integration theories expect a qualitative evolution from low to high 
regional collective decision making.15
Killick, T., Policy Economics. Heinemann London, 1981, pl6.
14 The main theories include neo-functionalism, federalism and 
transactionalism. Refer to Groom & Heraclides, 'Integration and 
Disintegration' in International Relations: A Handbook of Current 
Theory Light, M., and Groom, A.J.R., (eds.), Pinter, London, 1985, pp 
174-193.
15 Taylor, P., 'Conceptual Typology of International Organisation' in
Frameworks for International Co-operation. Groom, A.J.R., & Taylor, P., 
(eds.), Pinter, London, 1990.
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The regional decision making process that is expected to evolve is essentially a projection 
of decision making at the national level to the regional level.16
This therefore implies certain implicit general assumptions. At the national level it 
assumes a decision making process which is bureaucratic and participatory. It also assumes 
an independent policy formulation and policy choice environment in which national 
economic decisions are formulated by governments independently of external influence 
such as the IMF, World Bank, or GATT, or even foreign governments. At the regional 
level it assumes that decisions are taken on an impersonal basis where foreign policy 
transcends the personal idiosyncrasy of and disagreement between national leaders. It also 
assumes that citizens of the community are able to interact freely despite personal 
differences between leaders; furthermore that national borders between neighbouring 
countries do not get closed. At the global level the individual countries are assumed to 
have a high level of independence in determining their political and economic relations. 
Individual countries are therefore supposed to be able to choose whom they trade with and 
to retain flexibility in foreign policy orientation. It is also assumed that their collective 
impact on international political economics is large enough to influence decisions in their 
favour or at least leave them at a pareto optimum position.
The open social and political systems assumed at both the national and regional
level do not exist in developing regions. In West Africa, for example, regional coalitions
have been quite rigid since independence and are largely shaped around former colonial
16 Issue areas listed by Lindberg for measuring the extent of 
regional political integration are mainly issues that are usually the 
prerogative of national parliaments or decision making machineries.
Refer to Lindberg, L., ' Integration as a Multidimensional 
Phenomenon...' in Integration: Theory and Research. Lindberg L., and 
Scheingold S.A. (eds.), Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge mass., 1971.
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ties. The anglophone/francophone17 divide is therefore very significant in determining 
interaction between states and also their foreign policy orientation.18
The desire to outdo each other in developing their individual countries and 
competition for external assistance also means that no cosmopolitan desire for overall 
regional development exists and decisions are taken mainly with the national interest in 
mind. If this is the case, it implies that a strategy which depends on a prospective 
rationalisation of industries at a regional level19 and in which the effects might be a further 
impoverishment of certain members because of polarisation20 and backwash effects is 
unlikely to succeed. Secondly a process which encroaches on sovereignty in a situation 
where they are still very fragile makes national leaders very reluctant to implement 
regionally derived decisions. Also, preoccupations at the national level, make regional 
goals secondary despite the assumption that regional integration is a panacea for 
industrialisation. Moreover, not only is there not an overriding sense of the regional good 
over national interest, but its lack is exacerbated by the regular closure of common borders 
as accusations of sedition are levelled against neighbouring countries. West African 
countries are also highly dependent economies with political structures that are vulnerable 
to external influence, and lack the collective impact to influence international economic 
and political relations in their own favour.
John Chipman gives a very detailed account of the extent of 
francophone dependence on France in French Power in Africa. Blackwell, 
oxford, 1989.
18 Mazrui, A.A., and Tidy, M., op. cit., p. xvii.
19 Robson, P., The Economics of International Integration. Allen & 
Unwin, London, 1987, pp. 194-196.
20 For a comprehensive treatment of this concept and backwash effect 
see (1) Hirschman, A.O., The Strategy of Economic Development. New 
Haven, Conn: Yale University, 1958. (2) Myrdal, G., Economic Theory and 
Underdeveloped Regions, Methuen, London, 1963.
On the basis of the above, are the dynamic advantages of regional economic 
integration achievable? To what extent will it, for example, be able to increase the 
bargaining position of West African countries and help them to overcome the constraints 
on development? Will increased opportunities for trade result in improved trade relations 
among member countries and thus reduce their dependence on Western markets? What are 
the chances that integration will result in economies of scale? Are there any grounds for 
believing that the theoretical assumptions of a rationalisation of prospective industries are 
valid? If there is no region wide desire to federate, can we assume that national goals will 
be submerged while regional goals that benefit some countries at the expense of others will 
be supported? Can West African countries formulate a compensatory and redistributive 
mechanism that helps those states who are affected adversely by regional policies to 
continue being members of the scheme?
Hypothesis and Research Questions
It is our belief that unless the political and social milieu of West Africa (and their 
implication for integration) are taken into consideration when the prospective economic 
advantages are being considered, regional integration in West Africa will eventually either 
become defunct or at best remain symbolic, as has happened elsewhere in the developing 
world. The hypothesis guiding this research is, therefore, that economic integration as it is 
envisaged in the charter of ECOWAS is not achievable unless the political and social 
milieu are taken into consideration when policies are being formulated.
15
The bases of this hypothesis can be found in the following questions:
1) What are the theoretical foundations of ECOWAS , and how sound are they in 
relation to the political and social environment of the region?
2) Are the goals envisaged for regional economic integration compatible with the 
individual aspirations of member states?
3) Can a process that assumes supranationality succeed in the political environment 
of West Africa?
4) To what extent are national governments willing to fund a regional organisation 
whose prospects are uncertain? Are they willing to risk being overthrown because of a 
lack of concentration on national goals?
5) Can the low level of capacity utilisation in West Africa be explained by an 
absence of a large market or are there more immediate reasons? If there are, then how 
does that affect the theoretical arguments for regional integration in the region?
5) Should West African countries be aiming at total integration? Would they not 
achieve more through project and functional co-operation?
6) How does the foreign policy orientation of West African states affect their 
willingness to participate in a regional organisation?
The need to examine the theoretical basis of regional integration among developing 
countries means chapters devoted to the theory will need to go beyond the conventional 
treatment of the predominantly economic literature. We will instead analyse in detail both 
the economic and political theories of regional integration. Our contention has been that 
the framework for regional economic integration is provided by the political structures
that member states build to facilitate the achievement of goals. However apart from the 
framework, the process itself is highly dependent on the interaction between sovereign 
states, as well as interaction with an organisation which aims to control national 
processes. Such interaction can result in the development of strong ties between the states. 
On the other hand it can result in friction. Normally both outcomes go side by side with 
each other. But the extent of friction or harmony depends on the political milieu.
States in any circumstance seek to limit the influence of an international 
organisation on their domestic policies as much as possible. The political, economic and 
social environment therefore need to be assessed to see how integration will fare. The first 
four chapters are devoted to a thorough examination of the theoretical framework of 
integration, as well as a detailed description and analysis of the West African political and 
social environment. These will lay the foundation of our analysis in later chapters.
The first chapter will discuss the economic arguments and assumptions for regional 
integration. It will examine the relationship between international trade and economic 
development and the resulting arguments for the formation of regional integration 
schemes. We will attempt to analyse the validity of the argument that economic integration 
is a necessary means of promoting economic development.
Chapter two is devoted to an examination of the international relations theories on 
regional integration. Again the theoretical assumptions and a priori postulations will be 
examined to indicate their applicability to West Africa. This chapter is of crucial 
importance because the theories lay the basis for the modality of interaction between the
17
states. As we have indicated above how do the assumptions they make match the West 
African environment? This necessitates more than a brief review of the literature. It also 
necessitates an examination of individual theories in order to glean the individual insights 
they give to the functioning of regional integration. At the end of the chapter we will list 
the generalisations that integration theorising has come up with so far. These will be tested 
to see how west African integration conforms or deviates from them.
The third chapter covers the political context of West African integration. It details 
the historical development of intra-regional relations and how this affects integration. It 
also looks at the foreign policy orientation of the countries and how these impact on the 
underlying ideology of regional integration- cosmopolitanism. The historical antecedents 
of West African politics, systemic influences and sub-national actors are all looked at with 
the aim of gauging their impact on national politics and hence on regional integration.
Chapter four looks at the social structure of West Africa, especially the existence 
of tribes across political borders and their effect on intra-regional relations and hence on 
regional integration. For this purpose we use the Ewes of Ghana and Togo as an example. 
The Ewes are chosen because among the various tribes that were divided by international 
boundaries during the colonial period they had been the most active in fighting for 
reunification. The failure of the colonial powers to grant this desire at independence led to 
expectations of irredentism and secessionist activities among them. Since independence 
they have settled in the countries of which they now form a part. There have been no overt 
desire or extensive campaigning for separation. Does this mean that the straddling of tribes 
across borders does not pose any problems for the territorial integrity of states in the
18
region? Does the straddling of tribes across borders affect national integration? Another 
aspect of ethnicity that is examined is how the diverse ethnic composition of states affects 
national unity and hence regional integration.
In chapter five we attempt to gauge the extent of integration that has been attained 
among ECOWAS countries since the organisation was formed. In this attempt we use 
three measures. In order for states to work together in an integration scheme they agree 
to work together by taking decisions together regularly on areas of mutual interest. The 
first measure is therefore collective decision making. To attempt to measure the extent of 
decision making among ECOWAS countries, we will use a heuristic model proposed by 
Lindberg. He operationalises decision making into level, animators and consequences. In 
chapter five we use the various properties of level of collective decision making to gauge 
the extent of co-operation in ECOWAS. Animators and consequences are used in chapter 
six as explanation variables to attribute reasons for the extent of integration attained in the 
region since the organisation was formed. In addition to measuring the extent of collective 
decision making we also look at the impact integration has had on the substantive goals of 
the organisation, i.e., trade diversification from external to the regional markets, and 
industrialisation. Decision making creates the framework which facilitates trade and 
industrialisation. The three measures are therefore complementary.
Based on the conclusion of chapters five, chapter six looks at the reasons for the 
level of integration that has been achieved.
The reasons for using Lindberg's model are many and are explained in chapter five. 
One of the reasons is the fact that it gives the most comprehensive list of variables 
available. This helps in describing the extent of integration and explaining the factors 
necessary for the process to move forward. As discussed in chapter five, even though it 
has its limitations, the model provides a good yardstick for gauging the extent of regional 
integration and a systematic way of accounting for progress, stagnation or failure. The less 
restrictive definition of integration makes it possible to apply his model to West Africa. To 
him, the 'sure sign of political integration is in a system which can make authoritative 
decisions for the entire community regardless of whether these are military, economic, or 
social welfare decisions'.21 Thus the actual content of collective decision making may differ 
from scheme to scheme without any significant impact on the variables needed for 
effectiveness.
In the summary and conclusion we assess our findings and see how they validate or 
disprove the empirical generalisations that were listed at the end of chapter two. The 
conclusions include the implications of the study for the theory and practice of regional 
integration. It also attempts to answer the question about whether a customs union is an 
appropriate model of integration for West African countries, and whether the fundamental 
issue of restriction of Western markets and hence of the need for integration is not 
exaggerated in the context of international provisions such as the Lome Convention and 
the General System of Preferences.
Lindberg, N.L and Scheingold S.A,, Europe's Would-Be Polity, 
Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1970, p32.
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CHAPTER ONE
REASONS FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: A GENERAL
OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction:
Countries in West Africa are poor, and are beset by numerous problems. Since the 
attainment of independence from the late 1950s to the present time they have adopted and 
attempted various economic models and policies geared toward achieving growth in their 
economies and improving the standard of living of their people.
However more than 30 years later, all these countries are faced with huge balance 
of payment deficits, massive foreign debt burdens, and social as well as political problems 
that together seem to make the prospects of development more elusive than ever. The 
numerous models that have been tried by the individual countries in the attempt to remove 
themselves from the 'horns of economic, political and social difficulties on which they seem 
to be impaled' have not yielded the desired results and the search for that elusive method 
for development continue.
One such model, which has and is still being tried, is regional economic integration. 
The treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has 
as its objectives;
...to promote co-operation and development in all fields of 
economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, 
transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural 
resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, and 
social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the 
standard of living of its members and of contributing to the 
progress and development of the African continent.1
E C O W A S  Treaty signed in 1975.
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Tied within this broad consensus position were the individual national objectives. 
Some of these objectives were more obvious than others. National goals ranged from the 
predominantly economic to a mix of motives, such as Nigeria's desire to stabilise her 
external environment after the Biafran war. Through regional economic integration, 
Nigeria did not only hope to create a market for her nascent industries, but also to 
neutralise her regional opponents, and reduce French influence in the region.2
Apart from Nigeria's concern for her national security3, there were no other very 
obvious political reasons for wanting to embark on a regional economic integration 
scheme except perhaps the desire of Heads of State to be seen to be attempting to 
restructure international economic order4. Unlike the European Community which, among 
other things, sought to solve the Franco-German problem through regional economic 
integration, the West African Economic Community was established as a means of 
developing the industrial capacity of the countries within the region, and to promote 
self-sufficiency in their economies.
An assessment of ECOWAS must, therefore, be done on the basis of the economic 
objectives that the member countries had for setting it up. Political objectives have always 
posed problems for regional integration. As will be examined in chapters three and six, it 
was the political implications of the formation of ECOWAS that were largely responsible
2Bach, D.C., 'The Politics of West African Economic Co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS', in 
The Journal of Modem African Studies. 21, 4,(1983).
3 See pp 209-211 in Chapter Three.
4 This was a predominant theme at the time ECOWAS was formed. In the 1970s'Collective 
self-reliance' was a major policy alternative to the redistributive philosophy of the Group of 77 led new 
international economic order.
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for its initial rejection by the French speaking countries within the region. They, among 
other things, feared Nigerian preponderance and hegemonic potential5 in the region and 
even went to the extent of pre-empting the formation of ECOWAS by their own 
linguistically based regional economic group, the Commimaute Economique de VAfrique 
de VOuest (CEAO), to counteract Nigeria's potential influence in the proposed 
organisation.
It was also the political overtones of previously proposed integration schemes that 
had been responsible for their not being formed. Pan Africanism, for example, failed to 
take root because the newly independent countries wanted to retain their sovereign 
prerogatives. Political integration was not part of their agenda for development. Economic 
co-operation was what the countries were interested in. The fight between those who 
favoured political integration and economic co-operation was particularly intense in West 
Africa between Ghana's Nkrumah, on the one hand, and Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and 
Liberia, on the other.6
If a political reason should be sought for the formation of ECOWAS, it is that 
economic development is itself an overriding political theme and preoccupies the mind of 
leaders within the region. To that extent the economic reasons themselves become 
pseudo-political.
The point being made here is that an overtly political organisation would not have 
gained support. The increasing nationalistic perspective on economic and political
5 See Chapter Three, pp. 199-201.
6For a more detailed account sec Chapter Three, pp. 181-184.
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development in the region after independence meant that a region wide consensus on a 
politically oriented organisation would have been difficult to form. This does not, 
however, preclude hidden political reasons for participation by some potential members. 
Insofar as the political reasons are not known we will be second guessing if we imputed 
them to the formation of ECOWAS. What we can say with a high degree of certainty is 
that ECOWAS was formed to help overcome some bottlenecks in economic development 
just as the EEC was formed to solve the main problem facing Europe at the time - 
maintaining peace.
Though economically motivated, subsequent years have seen new goals, of a 
political nature, such as non-aggression and mutual military co-operation added to the 
treaty of the community.7 The treaty, however, remains an economic formula for industrial 
development. Thus our analysis of the validity of the reasons for integration will be 
economic. Politics and society will be looked at, not as motives for integration, but rather 
for the opportunities and constraints they provide for the achievement of the goals 
contained in the treaty.
Economic integration is seen as an imperative, a sine qua non, for industrial 
development. The poor performance and failure of earlier attempts at integration within 
the West African region and the collapse of the East African Community did not deter the 
formation of ECOWAS in 1975. Since the leaders were aware of the failure of earlier 
attempts at regional integration8, not only in the region but in other parts of the developing 
world, they must have been confident of being able to overcome the difficulties that had
7 See Appendices 1 and 2.
8 See pp. 184-186 in Chapter Three.
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plagued those earlier attempts. It cannot be suggested, as Davies does, that no lessons had 
been learnt from the East African Community's experience.9
The treaty establishing ECOWAS, signed in Lagos in 1975, stipulated that the 
implementation of the protocols would result in a customs union by the year 1990.10 
Eighteen years on, the region has not been able to form a free trade area let alone a 
customs union. Like earlier attempts it has failed to keep to its schedule or to realise the 
expectations its advocates had for it as a tool of industrial development and trade 
diversification.
Despite this failure, governments, international organisations, and prominent 
individuals continue to assert that the countries within the region cannot develop without 
regional economic integration.
In this chapter we will examine the reasons why West African countries and those 
who advocate regional integration feel it is an imperative for development. The purpose 
will be to see if the reasoning behind the formation of such schemes are valid. If they are 
valid then the obvious question will be why they fail. Failure will then have to be attributed 
to the background conditions and the process mechanisms. This will confirm the assertion 
made by those who say that developing countries do not have the background conditions 
for forming regional integration schemes. This confirmation will not only be because 
ECOWAS has failed to keep up to schedule but rather that it has joined an already 
existing list of failures in regional integration among developing countries. If on the other
9Davies, A., 'Cost-Benefit Analysis within ECOWAS' in The World Today, vol. 39, no 5, May
1983 .
10 Article 12 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States.
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hand the reasons are not valid then we will have to conclude that regional economic 
integration may be necessary but not a sufficient condition for the industrial development 
of West African countries, or that it may not be a necessary condition at all.
Since the second world war, industrialisation, especially manufacturing has 
experienced faster growth than any other sector of economic activity.11 It has also 
increased its share of internationally traded goods, and the inability of developing 
countries, especially those in sub Saharan Africa, to share in the gains from such growth, 
has been cited as a major factor accounting for their slow growth.12
This assertion presupposes that resources that were earned through other means 
were invested optimally by the developing countries and therefore that they would have 
developed even faster if they had shared in the growth that occurred in industry. It also 
presupposes that the level of primary exports was maintained and export earning 
capabilities maximised. Additionally, unless primary export levels were maintained and 
earnings used properly connections between primary goods exportation and low economic 
performances are spurious.
However, regardless of the validity or otherwise of such presuppositions, 
industrialisation is seen as a channel by which the growth potential of West African 
countries can be realised. Integration is seen as the path to becoming industrialised.
uBegg, D., Fischer, S., and Dombusch, R., Economics. McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead, 1987.
12Iyoha, M.A., 'Economic Development and Trade Theories: Relevance and Implication for 
ECOWAS' in Trade and Development in Economic Community of West African States. Orimalade, A., 
and Ubogu, R.E., (ed.), Vikas, Delhi, 1984.
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The argument used by developing countries to justify the need for industrialisation, 
and hence integration schemes, are found in the arguments about the asymmetrical 
distribution of the gains of international trade in favour of manufactured goods relative to 
primary goods.13
The importance of this issue to the development debate makes a thorough 
examination of the arguments necessary, because they underpin the validity of embarking 
on integration as a strategy for industrialisation.
1.2 Primary goods and Deteriorating Terms of Trade
The four main issues seen as affecting the export earning capacity of primary goods 
are; deteriorating terms of trade, unstable prices, agricultural protectionism in developed 
countries, and the over dependence on a narrow range of commodities.
Before the pioneering but separate works of Prebisch and Singer, it was believed 
that diminishing returns in agriculture and mining would lead to rises in the prices of 
primary goods compared to those of manufactures.14 This phenomenon was expected to 
lead to an equalisation of factor prices.
13 In a keynote address to the Nigerian national seminar entitled the 'ECOWAS Trade 
Liberalisation Scheme', held in Kano, Nigeria, in June 1992, the Nigerian Minister of Trade and Tourism 
said '...efforts to encourage the development of intra-regional trade, is a positive counter measure to our 
unfavourable terms-of- trade with the developed countries....' quoted in The Trade Liberalisation Scheme 
of the Economic Community of West African States. Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, Industiy and 
Agriculture, Spring Communications, 1992.
14MacBean, A., and Nguyen, D.T., Commodity Policies: Problems and Prospects. Groom Helm, 
London, 1987.
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However, according to the Prebisch and Singer thesis the reverse was the case. 
Prebisch, for example, based his conclusions on statistical computation he did using the 
merchandise trade figures of the United Kingdom between 1876-80 to 1938. He inferred 
that the falling prices in the imports of the United Kingdom and the rising prices of her 
exports over the period implied a secular deterioration in the net barter terms of trade of 
primaries. He considered that because the UK's export of manufactures constituted the 
major proportion of total trade in manufactured goods, and was also the main importer of 
primary goods over the relevant period, trends in the terms of trade could be inferred from 
its import and export prices.
For the purpose of his study Prebisch divided the countries of the world into two 
analytical categories; the Centre, representing the industrialised countries , and the 
Periphery, representing the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The 
argument he used was that trade unions in the Centre were more able to secure for 
themselves the benefits of increases in productivity by demanding higher wages. Thus in 
periods of increasing productivity they bargained for higher wages, but in periods of slow 
growth were unwilling to accept wage cuts. This resulted in increasing prices of the goods 
they produced. This, together with the fact that income and price elasticities of demand 
for primary goods were much lower than that of manufactures, implied that the increase in 
wages in the Centre was not reflected in increased demand for primary goods from the 
Periphery.
Singer, also, felt that whilst increases in productivity accrued to manufactured 
goods as higher incomes, oligopolistic market clearing mechanisms for agriculture
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resulted in lower wages for producers of agricultural goods. As a consequence of this, 
technological progress and productivity increases resulted in price rises for manufactured 
goods but led to falling prices for agricultural goods. As importers of primary goods and 
exporters of manufactured goods therefore, the developed countries reaped the benefits of 
rising prices for their exports and falling prices for their imports thus resulting in the 
asymmetrical response of prices to productivity increases.15
Much controversy was generated by the Prebisch/Singer thesis. MacBean and 
Nguyen give a good listing of some of the economic arguments levelled against Prebisch in 
particular.
One widely held criticism was that a good inference could not be made from using 
the trade figures of one country as a proxy for all industrial countries, and therefore that 
the United Kingdom's trade figures were unrepresentative. Another one was that primary 
commodities imported by the UK over the relevant period included commodities produced 
and exported by other industrialised countries. Others have pointed out that since exports 
were valued f.o.b. and imports valued c.i.fi, the deterioration in the net barter terms of 
trade of primaries could be, wholly or to a significant extent, explained by the reduction in 
freight costs and not to falling prices. It was also criticised on the grounds that the 
improvement in the quality of manufactures and the introduction of new ones were not 
taken account of. It was argued that because improvements in quality resulted in an 
upward bias of the price index of manufactures the secular improvement in the United 
Kingdom's terms of trade could be explained this way.
15 ibid.
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Despite these criticisms recent studies of the secular movement of prices by 
Sproas16 and Sapsford17 seem to corroborate the declining terms of trade thesis which 
asserts that exporters of manufactures benefit more from international trade than primary 
producers.
In an attempt to resolve the issues raised by the deteriorating terms of trade 
controversy, Spraos, for example, concluded that a deteriorating terms of trade for 
primaries was indeed detectable in the data but that its magnitude was smaller than had 
been suggested by Prebisch. Even though Spraos found no statistically significant 
deterioration in the terms of trade over the 70 year period between 1900-70, Sapsford did 
find statistically significant figures for the sub periods 1900-30 and 1950-70. This 
underlines the effect disaggregation of the data can have in the conclusions that are drawn. 
Most studies on the trend in the net barter terms of trade indicate the need to be careful in 
drawing conclusions from aggregated figures. However, constructions by Kindleberger 
suggest that the primary goods exported mainly by developing countries have experienced 
a bigger fall in their terms of trade over the 1872-1938 period.18
Other arguments that were levelled against the Prebisch/Singer hypothesis were not 
altogether valid. The argument that the c.i.f. and f.o.b. valuations of imports and exports, 
for example, may be the explanation of the deterioration was not sufficient. As Macbean
16 Spraos, J., 'The Statistical Debate on the net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary 
Commodities and Manufactures: A Comment and Some Additional Evidence', in Economic Journal .vol. 
90, 1980.
17 Sapsford, D., 'The Statistical Debate on the Net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary 
Commodities and manufactures: A Comment and some Additional Evidence', in Economic Journal, vol. 
95, 1985.
18MacBean and Nguyen, op. cit.
and Nguyen argued, unless the fall in freight cost is proportionately greater than the 
decrease in f.o.b. prices, decreases in c.i.f. prices will not lead to a deterioration in the net 
barter terms of trade. They also considered it a fallacy to assume that the qualities of 
commodities do not improve over time. Quoting Krug and Poerch, and the US 
Department of Trade figures they pointed out the proportion of the highest grade of coffee 
(AA) had improved from 0.2 per cent in 1957-8 to 16.3 per cent in 1964-5. Secondly, the 
proportion of Greek cotton output with a staple length of 28mm or more was only 11.3 
per cent in 1954 but rose to 97.3 per cent in 1970. Thus if quality improvements were to 
be taken into consideration no presumption can be made a priori concerning a bias in the 
terms of trade from this source.
More recent studies by Grilli and Yang also support the Prebisch/Singer thesis. 
They used newly constructed index of commodity prices and the modified indexes of 
manufactured goods prices and found that from 1900 to 1986 the relative prices of 
commodities fell on trend by 0.5 per cent a year. They therefore concluded that:
Our results strongly support the inference made by Spraos about 
Prebisch's original data: the price series he used exaggerated 
the adversity of the trends in the relative price of all 
primary products. Yet our data indicate, from the beginning of 
the present century to date, a cumulative trend fall of about 40 
percent in the market prices of nonfuel primary commodities 
relative to those of manufactured products and a cumulative 
trend decline of about 36 percent in the market prices of all
primary commodities.19
Data compiled by the Department of Economics of Princeton University on African 
countries and adapted in Table 1 suggests that generalisations cannot be made for all
19
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CHAPTER ONE
REASONS FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: A GENERAL
OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction:
Countries in West Africa are poor, and are beset by numerous problems. Since the 
attainment of independence from the late 1950s to the present time they have adopted and 
attempted various economic models and policies geared toward achieving growth in their 
economies and improving the standard of living of their people.
However more than 30 years later, all these countries are faced with huge balance 
of payment deficits, massive foreign debt burdens, and social as well as political problems 
that together seem to make the prospects of development more elusive than ever. The 
numerous models that have been tried by the individual countries in the attempt to remove 
themselves from the 'horns of economic, political and social difficulties on which they seem 
to be impaled1 have not yielded the desired results and the search for that elusive method 
for development continue.
One such model, which has and is still being tried, is regional economic integration. 
The treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has 
as its objectives;
...to promote co-operation and development in all fields of 
economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, 
transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural 
resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, and 
social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the 
standard of living of its members and of contributing to the 
progress and development of the African continent.1
‘ECOWAS Treaty signed in 1975.
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Tied within this broad consensus position were the individual national objectives. 
Some of these objectives were more obvious than others. National goals ranged from the 
predominantly economic to a mix of motives, such as Nigeria's desire to stabilise her 
external environment after the Biafran war. Through regional economic integration, 
Nigeria did not only hope to create a market for her nascent industries, but also to 
neutralise her regional opponents, and reduce French influence in the region.2
Apart from Nigeria's concern for her national security3, there were no other very 
obviou political rea on for wanting to embark on a regional economic integration 
cheme except perhap the de ire of Head of State to be een to be attempting to 
re fracture international economic order4. Unlike the European Community which, among 
other things, sought to solve the Franco-German problem through regional economic 
integration, the West African Economic Community was established as a means of 
developing the industrial capacity of the countries within the region, and to promote 
self-sufficiency in their economies.
An assessment of ECOWAS must, therefore, be done on the basis of the economic 
objectives that the member countries had for setting it up. Political objectives have always 
posed problems for regional integration. As will be examined in chapters three and six, it 
was the political implications of the formation of ECOWAS that were largely responsible
2Bach, D.C., 'The Politics of West African Economic Co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS', in 
The Journal of Modem African Studies. 21, 4,(1983).
3 See pp 209-211 in Chapter Three.
4 This was a predominant theme at the time ECOWAS was formed. In the 1970s'Collective 
self-reliance' was a major policy alternative to the redistributive philosophy of the Group of 77 led new 
international economic order.
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for its initial rejection by the French speaking countries within the region. They, among 
other things, feared Nigerian preponderance and hegemonic potential5 in the region and 
even went to the extent of pre-empting the formation of ECOWAS by their own 
linguistically based regional economic group, the Commimante Economique de I'Afriqtie 
de VOuest (CEAO), to counteract Nigeria's potential influence in the proposed 
organisation.
It was also the political overtones of previously proposed integration schemes that 
had been responsible for their not being formed. Pan Africanism, for example, failed to 
take root because the newly independent countries wanted to retain their sovereign 
prerogatives. Political integration was not part of their agenda for development. Economic 
co-operation was what the countries were interested in. The fight between those who 
favoured political integration and economic co-operation was particularly intense in West 
Africa between Ghana's Nkrumah, on the one hand, and Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and 
Liberia, on the other.6
If a political reason should be sought for the formation of ECOWAS, it is that 
economic development is itself an overriding political theme and preoccupies the mind of 
leaders within the region. To that extent the economic reasons themselves become 
pseudo-political.
The point being made here is that an overtly political organisation would not have 
gained support. The increasing nationalistic perspective on economic and political
5 See Chapter Three, pp. 199-201.
6 For a more detailed account see Chapter Three, pp. 181-184.
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development in the region after independence meant that a region wide consensus on a 
politically oriented organisation would have been difficult to form. This does not, 
however, preclude hidden political reasons for participation by some potential members. 
Insofar as the political reasons are not known we will be second guessing if we imputed 
them to the formation of ECOWAS. What we can say with a high degree of certainty is 
that ECOWAS was formed to help overcome some bottlenecks in economic development 
just as the EEC was formed to solve the main problem facing Europe at the time - 
maintaining peace.
Though economically motivated, subsequent years have seen new goals, of a 
political nature, such as non-aggression and mutual military co-operation added to the 
treaty of the community.7 The treaty, however, remains an economic formula for industrial 
development. Thus our analysis of the validity of the reasons for integration will be 
economic. Politics and society will be looked at, not as motives for integration, but rather 
for the opportunities and constraints they provide for the achievement of the goals 
contained in the treaty.
Economic integration is seen as an imperative, a sine qua non, for industrial 
development. The poor performance and failure of earlier attempts at integration within 
the West African region and the collapse of the East African Community did not deter the 
formation of ECOWAS in 1975. Since the leaders were aware of the failure of earlier 
attempts at regional integration8, not only in the region but in other parts of the developing 
world, they must have been confident of being able to overcome the difficulties that had
7 See Appendices 1 and 2.
8 See pp. 184-186 in Chapter Three.
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plagued those earlier attempts. It cannot be suggested, as Davies does, that no lessons had 
been learnt from the East African Community's experience.9
The treaty establishing ECOWAS, signed in Lagos in 1975, stipulated that the 
implementation of the protocols would result in a customs union by the year 1990.10 
Eighteen years on, the region has not been able to form a free trade area let alone a 
customs union. Like earlier attempts it has failed to keep to its schedule or to realise the 
expectations its advocates had for it as a tool of industrial development and trade 
diversification.
Despite this failure, governments, international organisations, and prominent 
individuals continue to assert that the countries within the region cannot develop without 
regional economic integration.
In this chapter we will examine the reasons why West African countries and those 
who advocate regional integration feel it is an imperative for development. The purpose 
will be to see if the reasoning behind the formation of such schemes are valid. If they are 
valid then the obvious question will be why they fail. Failure will then have to be attributed 
to the background conditions and the process mechanisms. This will confirm the assertion 
made by those who say that developing countries do not have the background conditions 
for forming regional integration schemes. This confirmation will not only be because 
ECOWAS has failed to keep up to schedule but rather that it has joined an already 
existing list of failures in regional integration among developing countries. If on the other
9Davies, A., 'Cost-Benefit Analysis within ECOWAS' in The World Today, vol. 39, no 5, May
1983 .
10 Article 12 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States.
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hand the reasons are not valid then we will have to conclude that regional economic 
integration may be necessary but not a sufficient condition for the industrial development 
of West African countries, or that it may not be a necessary condition at all.
Since the second world war, industrialisation, especially manufacturing has 
experienced faster growth than any other sector of economic activity.11 It has also 
increased its share of internationally traded goods, and the inability of developing 
countries, especially those in sub Saharan Africa, to share in the gains from such growth, 
has been cited as a major factor accounting for their slow growth.12
This assertion presupposes that resources that were earned through other means 
were invested optimally by the developing countries and therefore that they would have 
developed even faster if they had shared in the growth that occurred in industry. It also 
presupposes that the level of primary exports was maintained and export earning 
capabilities maximised. Additionally, unless primary export levels were maintained and 
earnings used properly connections between primary goods exportation and low economic 
performances are spurious.
However, regardless of the validity or otherwise of such presuppositions, 
industrialisation is seen as a channel by which the growth potential of West African 
countries can be realised. Integration is seen as the path to becoming industrialised.
"Begg, D., Fischer, S., and Dornbusch, R., Economics. McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead, 1987.
12Iyoha, M.A., 'Economic Development and Trade Theories: Relevance and Implication for 
ECOWAS' in Trade and Development in Economic Community of West African States. Orimalade, A., 
and Ubogu, R.E., (ed.), Vikas, Delhi, 1984.
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The argument used by developing countries to justify the need for industrialisation, 
and hence integration schemes, are found in the arguments about the asymmetrical 
distribution of the gains of international trade in favour of manufactured goods relative to 
primary goods.13
The importance of this issue to the development debate makes a thorough 
examination of the arguments necessary, because they underpin the validity of embarking 
on integration as a strategy for industrialisation.
1.2 Primary goods and Deteriorating Terms of Trade
The four main issues seen as affecting the export earning capacity of primary goods 
are; deteriorating terms of trade, unstable prices, agricultural protectionism in developed 
countries, and the over dependence on a narrow range of commodities.
Before the pioneering but separate works of Prebisch and Singer, it was believed 
that diminishing returns in agriculture and mining would lead to rises in the prices of 
primary goods compared to those of manufactures.14 This phenomenon was expected to 
lead to an equalisation of factor prices.
13 In a keynote address to the Nigerian national seminar entitled the 'ECOWAS Trade 
Liberalisation Scheme1, held in Kano, Nigeria, in June 1992, the Nigerian Minister of Trade and Tourism 
said '...efforts to encourage the development of intra-regional trade, is a positive counter measure to our 
unfavourable terms-of- trade with the developed countries....' quoted in The Trade Liberalisation Scheme 
of the Economic Community of West African States. Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture, Spring Communications, 1992.
14MacBean, A., and Nguyen, D.T., Commodity Policies: Problems and Prospects. Groom Helm, 
London, 1987.
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However, according to the Prebisch and Singer thesis the reverse was the case. 
Prebisch, for example, based his conclusions on statistical computation he did using the 
merchandise trade figures of the United Kingdom between 1876-80 to 1938. He inferred 
that the falling prices in the imports of the United Kingdom and the rising prices of her 
exports over the period implied a secular deterioration in the net barter terms of trade of 
primaries. He considered that because the UK's export of manufactures constituted the 
major proportion of total trade in manufactured goods, and was also the main importer of 
primary goods over the relevant period, trends in the terms of trade could be inferred from 
its import and export prices.
For the purpose of his study Prebisch divided the countries of the world into two 
analytical categories; the Centre, representing the industrialised countries , and the 
Periphery, representing the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The 
argument he used was that trade unions in the Centre were more able to secure for 
themselves the benefits of increases in productivity by demanding higher wages. Thus in 
periods of increasing productivity they bargained for higher wages, but in periods of slow 
growth were unwilling to accept wage cuts. This resulted in increasing prices of the goods 
they produced. This, together with the fact that income and price elasticities of demand 
for primary goods were much lower than that of manufactures, implied that the increase in 
wages in the Centre was not reflected in increased demand for primary goods from the 
Periphery.
Singer, also, felt that whilst increases in productivity accrued to manufactured 
goods as higher incomes, oligopolistic market clearing mechanisms for agriculture
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resulted in lower wages for producers of agricultural goods. As a consequence of this, 
technological progress and productivity increases resulted in price rises for manufactured 
goods but led to falling prices for agricultural goods. As importers of primary goods and 
exporters of manufactured goods therefore, the developed countries reaped the benefits of 
rising prices for their exports and falling prices for their imports thus resulting in the 
asymmetrical response of prices to productivity increases.15
Much controversy was generated by the Prebisch/Singer thesis. MacBean and 
Nguyen give a good listing of some of the economic arguments levelled against Prebisch in 
particular.
One widely held criticism was that a good inference could not be made from using 
the trade figures of one country as a proxy for all industrial countries, and therefore that 
the United Kingdom's trade figures were unrepresentative. Another one was that primary 
commodities imported by the UK over the relevant period included commodities produced 
and exported by other industrialised countries. Others have pointed out that since exports 
were valued f.o.b. and imports valued c.i.fi, the deterioration in the net barter terms of 
trade of primaries could be, wholly or to a significant extent, explained by the reduction in 
freight costs and not to falling prices. It was also criticised on the grounds that the 
improvement in the quality of manufactures and the introduction of new ones were not 
taken account of. It was argued that because improvements in quality resulted in an 
upward bias of the price index of manufactures the secular improvement in the United 
Kingdom's terms of trade could be explained this way.
15 ibid.
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Despite these criticisms recent studies of the secular movement of prices by 
Sproas16 and Sapsford17 seem to corroborate the declining terms of trade thesis which 
asserts that exporters of manufactures benefit more from international trade than primary 
producers.
In an attempt to resolve the issues raised by the deteriorating terms of trade 
controversy, Spraos, for example, concluded that a deteriorating terms of trade for 
primaries was indeed detectable in the data but that its magnitude was smaller than had 
been suggested by Prebisch. Even though Spraos found no statistically significant 
deterioration in the terms of trade over the 70 year period between 1900-70, Sapsford did 
find statistically significant figures for the sub periods 1900-30 and 1950-70. This 
underlines the effect disaggregation of the data can have in the conclusions that are drawn. 
Most studies on the trend in the net barter terms of trade indicate the need to be careful in 
drawing conclusions from aggregated figures. However, constructions by Kindleberger 
suggest that the primary goods exported mainly by developing countries have experienced 
a bigger fall in their terms of trade over the 1872-1938 period.18
Other arguments that were levelled against the Prebisch/Singer hypothesis were not 
altogether valid. The argument that the c.i.f. and f.o.b. valuations of imports and exports, 
for example, may be the explanation of the deterioration was not sufficient. As Macbean
16 Spraos, J., 'The Statistical Debate on the net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary 
Commodities and Manufactures: A Comment and Some Additional Evidence', in Economic Journal .vol. 
90, 1980.
17 Sapsford, D., 'The Statistical Debate on the Net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary 
Commodities and manufactures: A Comment and some Additional Evidence', in Economic Journal, vol. 
95, 1985.
18MacBean and Nguyen, op. cit.
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and Nguyen argued, unless the fall in freight cost is proportionately greater than the 
decrease in f.o.b. prices, decreases in c.i.f. prices will not lead to a deterioration in the net 
barter terms of trade. They also considered it a fallacy to assume that the qualities of 
commodities do not improve over time. Quoting Krug and Poerch, and the US 
Department of Trade figures they pointed out the proportion of the highest grade of coffee 
(AA) had improved from 0.2 per cent in 1957-8 to 16.3 per cent in 1964-5. Secondly, the 
proportion of Greek cotton output with a staple length of 28mm or more was only 11.3 
per cent in 1954 but rose to 97.3 per cent in 1970. Thus if quality improvements were to 
be taken into consideration no presumption can be made a priori concerning a bias in the 
terms of trade from this source.
More recent studies by Grilli and Yang also support the Prebisch/Singer thesis. 
They used newly constructed index of commodity prices and the modified indexes of 
manufactured goods prices and found that from 1900 to 1986 the relative prices of 
commodities fell on trend by 0.5 per cent a year. They therefore concluded that:
Our results strongly support the inference made by Spraos about 
Prebisch's original data: the price series he used exaggerated 
the adversity of the trends in the relative price of all 
primary products. Yet our data indicate, from the beginning of 
the present century to date, a cumulative trend fall of about 40 
percent in the market prices of nonfuel primary commodities 
relative to those of manufactured products and a cumulative 
trend decline of about 36 percent in the market prices of all
primary commodities.19
Data compiled by the Department of Economics of Princeton University on African 
countries and adapted in Table 1 suggests that generalisations cannot be made for all
19Grilli E.R., and Yang, M.C., Primary commodity Prices, Manufactured Goods Prices, and Terms 
of Trade of Developing Countries: What the Long Run Shows' The World Bank Economic Review, vol 2, 
no 1, 1988, p9.
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countries. The, figures also imply that even for the same country care has to be taken in 
suggesting the connection between primary goods exportation and underdevelopment. 
However, from the figures above it can be concluded that the countries forming the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have experienced deteriorating 
terms of trade, though some more than others.
From these conclusions on the secular trend of the relative terms of trade of 
primaries and manufactured goods, to what extent can the slow growth and lack of 
economic development in the less developed countries be attributed to declining prices of 
primaries, and how do these support the calls for industrialisation?
1.3 Export of Primary Goods and Economic Growth
Even though the figures in Table 1 below suggest that West African countries on 
average are disadvantaged in international trade, such figures alone are not sufficient for 
conclusions of the sort the question asks. To arrive at a conclusion that shows a positive 
correlation between deteriorating terms of trade and slow growth one will have to prove 
that the countries involved would have fared better if they had not been participating in 
international trade. It would also be necessary to demonstrate the ways in which the 
declining trend has affected their development goals. Some of these goals include 
economic ones such as: growth in per capita income or product; domestic distribution of 
income, and wealth; and economic power; utilisation of production capacity and cyclical 
stability in real output; price or nominal stability; and international economic position.20
20 Adams, G.F. and Berhman, Commodity Exports and Economic Development Lexington Books,
1982 .
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Furthermore, whilst aggregate price trends may indicate a particular trend, different 
commodity groups and commodities within such groups differ in their performance over 
the long term.
According to MacBean and Nguyen21, a breakdown of the principal nonfuel 
commodities prices into; food prices, nonfood prices and raw materials, would indicate 
that over the 1900 to 1986 period the last two categories experienced a much stronger 
decline in their prices relative to manufactures.
Table 1
INDEXES OF TERMS OF TRADE OF TRADE FOR ECOWAS 
COUNTRIES (1960-73 = 100)
Country Terms-of-Trade 
1974-79 1980-81 1982-85
Benin 85 62 57
Burkina-Faso 102 89 92
The Gambia 100 85 97
Ghana 150 106 81
Ivory Coast 131 116 118
Liberia 63 43 45
Mali 105 93 97
Mauritania 66 53 53
Niger 85 60 55
Nigeria 332 583 526
Senegal 159 112 101
Togo 234 141 124
Source: Adapted from The Economies of Africa and the Prices of their 
Exports, by Gersovitvz, M., and Paxson, H., C., Princeton Studies of 
International Finance, no. 68 Oct 1990, p7 .
21 op. cit.
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While food prices declined at 0.36 per cent a year, that of metal and nonfood 
agriculture raw materials declined at 0.82 percent and 0.84 per cent respectively.
However within the aggregated negative trend of food prices, tropical beverage raw 
materials (coffee, cocoa, and tea) experienced a positive trend of 0.63 percent a year 
whilst agricultural foods experienced a negative trend of 0.54 percent relative to 
manufactures. The larger weight of other foods in the aggregate index, however, 
swamped the effect of secularly rising prices of tropical beverage raw materials relative to 
manufactures.22The divergences indicated between and within commodity groups imply 
that before conclusions can be drawn about the policy effects of international trade 
consideration will have to be given to the export mix of a particular country. This is 
because while the prices of some of its exports may be declining those of others may be 
rising, in which case the foreign exchange earning capacity may remain unchanged, be 
improving or declining depending on the relative price changes. Thus unless earnings can 
be shown to have been affected, arguments about the effects of deteriorating 
terms-of-trade will only be partially true. A constant level of earnings implies that the 
country will be able to maintain its level of investment and services provision if population 
remains constant. The need to disaggregate overall figures becomes even more important 
if one considers that between 1960-69 cocoa prices experienced a growth rate of 4.1 per 
cent and 5 per cent between 1970-81 whilst coffee experienced a growth of 3.4 per cent 
over the 1960-69 period and a decline of 4.1 per cent over the 1970-81 period. Tea on the 
other hand experienced a decrease of 3.4 per cent and 2.9 percent over those two periods. 
Over the 1950-81 period tea experienced the worst trend of 3.1 per cent decrease,
22 Grilli and Yang, op. cit.
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followed by coffee with an annual decrease of 1.3 per cent with cocoa prices remaining 
constant.23
Furthermore, even though overall figures indicate falling trends for cereal, in 1950 
the real price of maize grew at 6.7 per cent per annum, whilst those of rice and wheat 
decreased at 2.9 per cent and 4.5 per cent respectively. In the 1960's the real price of 
maize fell to a growth rate of 1.1 per cent, whilst rice increased at 4.6 per cent and wheat 
remained constant.24
The volatile movement in the figures above and the effects of the disaggregation 
of commodities on the trend they experience justify the need for caution in drawing broad 
based inferences from overall figures.
Apart from the differences that may exist between different commodities, another 
point worth noting is the effect of price movements on different regions within the 
developing world. This point is relevant because of the tendency to sometimes lump 
countries together under the label of "underdeveloped" and then proceed to make 
generalisations based on this categorisation. Such categorisation may lead to wrong 
conclusions because while, for example, over the 1953-83 period the non-oil export 
commodity prices remained important in the net barter terms of trade for Southeast Asia 
and Africa, it did not for Latin America. Additionally, while the relative importance of 
non-oil commodity prices increased for Africa over the period, they seem to have declined
23MacBean and Nguyen, op. cit., p62.
24 ibid.
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in importance for Southeast Asia because of the increasing importance of manufactures in 
their exports.
At the country level, countries such as the Republic of Korea and the former 
Yugoslavia have a negative relationship between nonfuel commodity prices and net barter 
terms of trade because of the importance of manufactures in their exports. They therefore 
experience improvement in their net barter terms of trade when prices of primaries are 
falling.25
Since developing countries export different mixes of primary products with 
differing price trends and fluctuation rates, and the net barter terms of trade of primaries is 
of more significance to some than others, generalisations cannot be made to cover them 
all. Moreover, because developing countries are net exporters of the raw materials 
tropical beverages and net importers of other foods, the net effect of price trends of 
cereals, for example, on the purchasing power of their exports must also be taken into 
account.26
Conclusions as to whether trends in the net barter terms of trade have affected the 
growth potential of any particular country or group of countries must also show whether 
there is an aggregate relationship between net barter terms of trade and lower purchasing 
power if quantity increases fail to compensate for the fall in prices.
25 Grilli and Yang, op. cit.
26 ibid.
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Table 2
INDEXES OF EXPORT QUANTITIES OF ECOWAS COUNTRIES
(1960-73=100)
Country Exnort Ouantities 
1974-79 1980-81 1982-85
Benin 85 100 81
Burkina Faso 159 189 157
Gambia 149 71 109
Ghana 78 71 60
Ivory Coast 159 154 146
Liberia 172 166 141
Mali 210 288 278
Mauritania 177 196 290
Niger 335 795 487
Nigeria 161 123 87
Senegal 91 71 92
Sierra Leone 69 67 51
Togo 108 156 128
Source: Adapted from The Economies of Africa and the Prices of their
Exports, by Gersovitz & Paxson ibid., p7.
From tables 1 and 2 above, it is clear that some countries in West Africa were able 
to maintain their export earnings over the periods quoted. Between 1974 and 1979 
Burkina Faso, for example, experienced an average 2% rise in its terms-of-trade and a 
59% increase in the quantity of exports. Her merchandise trade increases from 18 million 
dollars in 1965 to 161 million dollars in 1980 and to 198 million dollars in 1987.27 Increase
27 Sub-Saharan Africa. From Crises to Sustainable Growth. The World Bank, Washington D.C., 
1989, Table 1, p221.
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in export quantities more than compensated for deteriorating terms-of-trade 
between 1980 and 1985. The low growth rate of 2.5% over the 1973 to 1987 cannot be 
attributed to lower export earnings. A corollary to the fact that price trends differ for 
different commodities is the fact that price changes are inevitable in a market situation as a 
response to supply and demand conditions. Thus for any particular product, falling prices 
may only be a reaction to supply and demand conditions ( whether competitive, 
oligopolistic or monopolistic ). It is only when price trends follow a declining path over 
time and supply and demand elasticities are such as to make increases in supply unable to 
compensate for falling prices that conclusions can be made for unprofitability in that 
particular commodity. Evidence shows that between 1900-13 the purchasing power of all 
primary commodities in terms of manufactures increased at a rate of 4.5 percent a year. 
This fell to 0.4 percent between 1921-38. From 1955 to 1983 growth was 4.2 percent a 
year. The purchasing power of nonfuel prices also increased at 2.8 percent a year between 
1955 and 1983 even though terms of trade declined at 0.4 percent a year. This negative 
trend was compensated for by a 3.2 percent increase in export volumes.28
In view of the increase in the overall purchasing power of commodity exports, and 
the income terms of trade of nonfiiel exporting developing countries, one cannot conclude 
that trade per se or trade in nonfuel commodities has been harmful to countries specialising 
in their production. Any conclusions that one draws must be country and commodity 
specific. Growth must also take account of factors such as government pricing and 
investment policies and their effect on output in the export sector, autonomous factor 
supply growth, and market structures.
28 ibid.
A positive correlation between declining net barter terms of trade and growth 
cannot therefore be assumed a priori because there are large differences in the net barter 
terms-of-trade of developing countries and between commodities. It is difficult to make 
useful generalisations between world primary products and world manufactured products. 
The only valid generalisation that can be made is that trends tend to be against 
underdeveloped countries and in favour of developed countries.29
Though it has been suggested above that deteriorating terms of trade alone cannot 
explain the poor economic growth of developing countries in West Africa, the political 
strength such arguments hold are very significant. Table 1 does indicate that West African 
countries have on average experienced deteriorating terms of trade. Even if increased 
export quantities compensated for the fall in prices relative to manufactures, the point still 
remains that they are disadvantaged. More significant to West African countries, is that 
terms of trade have deteriorated for the majority of them since independence. The past 
thirty or so years are the years that are important to these countries, not the period from 
the nineteenth century. The politically significant years have been form the 1960s which 
have been shown by Spraos, Sapsford, and Grilli and Yang, among others ,to have been a 
period of deteriorating terms of trade for nonfiiel exports especially.
Another generalisation that can be made is that if such a general decline in the 
terms of trade of primaries continues, then the import capabilities of the countries 
exporting such commodities concerned will be impaired. For such countries, especially
29Kindleberger, C.P., 'The Terms of Trade and Economic Development', in Review of Economic 
and Statistic Supplement, vol 40, 1958.
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those specialising in a narrow range of primaries the solution might be to diversify. 
However, diversification does not necessarily result in a steady or increasing trend in the 
terms of trade. If it results in a widening of the range of primary exports, the effect might 
be an overall steadying of export earnings if the new products do not experience declining 
trends themselves. In this case the new products will be compensatory in their effect. On 
the other hand if the new products have declining or stable trends then they will either 
aggravate the situation or leave it unchanged.
We can conclude, from the above arguments, that volatility in the export earnings 
of developing countries does not necessarily derive from economic factors, although it 
might. Neither does poor economic performance derive from deteriorating terms of trade 
alone. Secondly, diversification will not necessarily alleviate the problem through less 
concentration on a single product, although it might because the new product might be an 
unstable crop and therefore additive in its effect or compensatory if it is not unstable.
The experience of independent West Africa has been one of fluctuating earnings 
from export of primary products. It is, however, important to ascertain whether the 
instability in the export earnings of a particular country is really a result of economic forces 
or whether political forces are the real reason. If one of the reasons for integration is to 
increase the bargaining position of member countries in international trade, a country 
whose problems are mainly political is unlikely to benefit from concerted bargaining efforts 
of the integrated bloc. This is because advantages derived from such bargaining will not by 
themselves result in increased economic performance of that country. Even if more stable 
prices were negotiated, domestic policies may hinder the ability to take advantage of the
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new opportunities. However, for those countries that face unstable market conditions, 
economic integration may be a way of regulating the market if many producers of the 
commodity are within the integrating area. Even then, since price stabilisation involves 
substantial capital, the ability of the participating countries to regulate the market may 
prove to be very difficult and expensive, and may indeed be beyond their financial 
capabilities.30
Even though export diversification and price stabilisation methods being used as a 
way of overcoming the difficulties and uncertainties posed by exporting primaries, many in 
the developing countries feel that the best way to move forward is by industrialising. This 
would the advantage of restructuring their economies and therefore tackle the fundamental 
problem of dependence on primary exports. A policy of industrial development does not 
imply an entire shift from agricultural production to industrial production. Indeed it need 
not be zero-sum. The continuing exportation of primaries is necessary to provide income 
and provide employment as industrialisation proceeds. Industrialisation is expected to help 
overcome the over dependence on the exportation of a limited range of export products. It 
is also expected to enable the developing countries to overcome the difficulties of primary 
producers not being able to respond to changing demand conditions. Because the ability 
to reallocate national resources in response to international exchange opportunities and to 
new technological possibilities is necessary for competitive advantage, this would imply 
that developing countries, including those in West Africa cannot fully exploit the 
advantages of international trade. This is because of the rigid supply and demand
30 The International Cocoa Agreement had to curtail buffer stock operations owing to lack of funds. 
West African countries are unlikely to be able to fund the cost of infrastructure, and operational costs that 
price stabilisation entails.
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conditions they face. Expanding, reducing or changing from the production of one primary 
good to another is therefore very difficult.
The flexibility needed to respond to market signals by combining factors in 
different proportions according to price signals and profit incentives can only be achieved 
by removing the excessive rigidity in the economic structure of the developing economies. 
Because the industrialised countries seem to be able to respond more quickly and to take 
advantage of opportunities more easily, developing countries feel that by emulating the 
developed countries they will be able to escape from instability and uncertainties.
As was shown above, even though the connection between primary products 
exportation and poverty cannot be made without careful analysis, the point remains that 
most policy makers in the third world tend to assume that their difficulties are a result of 
not being industrialised. Industrialisation therefore tends to be a major policy objective of 
all primary goods producers.
1.4 Terms-of-Trade and Industrialisation
In addition to its being a policy objective of most developing countries, 
industrialisation has also been a policy advocated by those who subscribe to the 
conclusions of the deteriorating terms of trade argument. It was also an argument which 
was both overtly and tacitly accepted by African political leaders and referred to in their 
speeches. Import substitution industrialisation was therefore embarked upon by quite a 
few countries of West Africa after independence.
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Even though West African countries, such as, Ghana embarked upon import 
substitution industrialisation in the early 1960s, the policy did not succeed for several 
reasons. Among the well known factors, in the case of Ghana, were the heavy dependence 
on foreign inputs and the lack of linkages with the domestic economy. The high 
dependence on suppliers credit, neglect of the traditional foreign exchange credit, neglect 
of the traditional foreign exchange earning sector as a result of the diversion of funds to 
industry, high infrastructural investment requirement and the installation of output 
capacities that were far in excess of what the domestic market could support, lack of the 
entrepreneurial, management and labour skills, shortage of raw material inputs, together 
with a lack of co-ordination led to an industrialisation programme, laced with a heavy dose 
of modernisation which proved wasteful, unsuccessful and positively detrimental to the 
balance of payment position of the country.31
Even though not all West African countries embarked upon industrialisation and 
modernisation with the same vigour as Ghana did,32 there is no doubt that many would 
have faced similar problems, partly as a result of the inherent problems of the import 
substitution paradigm itself and because of other problems internal to the countries 
themselves. The failed case of Latin American import substitution industrialisation attest 
to this.
Structural change in developing countries, therefore has its problems. As the 
experience of import substitution industrialisation has shown, the diversion of funds from
31 Berg, E.T., Structural Transformation Versus Gradualism: Recent Trends in Ghana and the Ivory 
Coast in Foster, Philip, J., and Zolberg, Aristide, R., Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on 
modernisation, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971.
32 ibid.
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other sources and uses to the new industrial sector results in a neglect of those sectors and 
also to huge balance of payment deficits. As Roxborough pointed out,33 the 
"quasi-capital" character of the neglected sectors was usually not taken into account, so 
that eventual deterioration in foreign exchange earning capacity resulted in the heightened 
inability to sustain the industrialisation programme.
From the above we can conclude that despite what is seen as the unfavourable 
distribution of the gains of trade for primary producers, trade with developed countries is 
strategically important to developing countries because it enables them, among other 
things, to import goods that they cannot produce themselves, but are necessary for the 
maintenance and expansion of production.34 However the combination of demand and 
supply conditions, coupled with agricultural protectionism, discovery of synthetic 
substitutes, decrease in raw material input requirements per unit of output as a result of 
increasing technological development, together with increased agricultural productivity in 
the developed countries mean that the developing countries cannot expand their exports to 
the level that will help maintain their present import needs and finance new industrial 
programmes.35 The experience of developing countries has been a foreign exchange gap 
which results from their needs and their capacity to earn foreign exchange.36
The graduated nature of tariffs in the developed countries also means that even if 
the developing countries tried to improve the market conditions of their products by
33 Roxborough, I., Theories of Underdevelopment Unwin, 1978.
34Linder, S., 'Custom Unions and Economic Development', in Latin American Integration: 
Experience and Prospects. Wionczek, M.S., (ed), Praeger, 1964.
35MacBean and Nguyen, op. cit. See also Balassa, B, Economic Development and Integration, op.
cit.
36Linder, S., Op.cit.
44
exporting processed goods they will meet formidable barriers which will make them 
uncompetitive. West African countries however have preferential access to the EEC 
market through the Lome Convention and under the General System of Preferences. As 
Linder pointed out, the real constraint faced by developing countries' exports of 
manufactured goods are shortcomings such as quality, design, degree of standardisation, 
and compliance with contracted delivery dates. Such shortcomings make it difficult for 
them to be able to compete effectively for consumer choice in the markets of the 
developed countries.37 This poses an important question for West African integration. Will 
integration result in a better trading regime for the members than what they have under the 
Lome Convention and the various GSPs? This issue will be examined later.
To overcome the dilemma posed by the constraint of foreign exchange through 
import substitution industrialisation, it is suggested that industrialisation would be more 
feasible if it is done on a regional basis within the context of a custom union.38 This, it is 
hoped will create a regional market of sufficient size to make the setting up of industries 
possible without the need to rely on the markets of the developed countries. It is, also, 
expected to help in the realisation of economies of scale, and make it possible for the 
countries to conserve foreign exchange through the imposing of prohibitive tariffs on 
"luxury" goods.39 From these perspectives it is felt that industrialisation would be more 
sustainable and viable within the context of regional integration.
Whether the enlarged market that results from regional integration is to the 
advantage of member states or is exploited by multinationals depends on the rules of origin
37 ibid.
38 ibid.
39Balassa, B., op. cit.
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that guide trade between member countries. As is pointed in chapter three, regional 
integration schemes among developing countries seek to avoid creating enlarged markets 
for multinational corporations. This is because local industries are unable to compete with 
the might of such companies. The growth of local industry will therefore be hampered by 
unfair competition from foreign investment. Additionally, developing countries believe that 
without the rules of origin their desire to reduce dependence on foreign direct capital will 
not be fulfilled. This is one of the reasons why ECOWAS, for example, has elaborate 
guidelines about rules of origin. It is to prevent the re-exportation of imported goods and, 
as previously explained, to ensure that local participation is adequate before goods are 
eligible for preferential treatment.
To examine whether regional integration is able to act as a tool for development 
through regional level import substitution industrialisation, we will need to first look at 
how such schemes are supposed to function. In the next section , we will look at the 
economic framework of regional integration.
1.5 Economic Framework Of Regional Integration; Traditional Theory
Economic integration has been defined as a process and a state of affairs.
Regarded as a process, it encompasses various measures abolishing discrimination between 
economic units belonging to different national states. Viewed as a state of affairs, it can be 
represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national 
economies.140 There are various degrees of economic integration, and depending on the
40Balassa, B., 'A Theory of Regional Integration' in Latin American Economic Integration. 
Experience and Prospects'. Wioncek, M. S., (ed.), op. cit.
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extent to which the partners are willing to work with each other, it can vary from a free 
trade area to total integration with supranational institutions.41
Economic integration schemes are usually categorised according to the level of 
integration achieved, and there are five main stages. The first of these is the free trade 
area. Within a free trade area, members agree to remove tariffs against the products from 
each others' country. However, each member remains independent in setting the tariff 
level on goods imported from non-member countries.
The second stage is the custom union. The main features of this stage are; the 
elimination of tariffs of the imports from non member countries and the adoption of a 
common external tariff on the imports from the rest of the world, togethp apportionment of cust
differences between a free trade area and a custom union. The first of these is that 
whereas members of the former retain independence in fixing external tariffs, members of a 
custom union adopt a common one. Secondly, a free trade area is equipped with rules of 
origin designed to confine intra-union free trade to products originating mainly within the 
area. The rules of origin are meant to operate against trade deflection which might result 
from the redirection of imports through the country with the lowest tariff to partner 
countries in order to exploit the tariff differential.
The third stage of economic integration is the common market. In addition to the 
characteristics of the custom union, a common market allows for the free movement of the
41Robson, P., The Economics of International Integration. Allan and Unwin, London, 1987.
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economic objective hides the political implications of such scheme. Development goals are 
not purely economic. The desire to participate, more actively, in international relations is 
seen as being enhanced by economic development, because it will create the freedom with 
which the countries can act. Despite the latent political goals that underlie economic 
objectives, regional integration can only help in fulfilling such goals if it is successful.
Failure of an integration scheme may be a result of political, social or economic factors and 
can have negative effects on relations between member countries and retard development 
objectives. Positive attitudes toward regional integration are more likely to be enhanced by 
achieving the stated objectives of the treaty setting up a scheme. Since such treaties are 
essentially economic, it is valid to assume that economic success can make the 
achievement of other objectives that are not purely economic possible.
Orthodox theory judges the probable effectiveness of a custom union in meeting 
these development objectives in terms of the trade creation or trade diversion that may 
result from the formation of the union.
42 Balassa. op. cit.
\48
Trade creation refers to a union induced shift from the consumption of higher-cost 
domestic products to lower-cost domestic products from a partner country. This causes 
the reduction or elimination of domestic high-cost production. Secondly, it results in 
increased consumption of the good as it becomes cheaper because of the switch from 
home produced to cheaper sources within the integrated area.
The reduction or elimination of high-cost production gives rise to savings in real 
cost of goods produced domestically and is called the production effect. Consumers' 
surplus also result from the substitution of cheaper imports for high-cost means of 
satisfying wants, and gives rise to what is called the consumption effect. Both the 
production effect and the consumption effect constitute the trade creation effect of a 
union. Trade diversion on the other hand is a union induced shift from lower-cost external 
sources of supply to higher-cost partner sources. Just like trade creation, trade diversion 
also has two aspects to it. The first of these is the increase in the cost of imports that 
result from switching importation of goods from abroad to higher-cost partner goods. The 
second is the loss in consumer surplus resulting from the substitution of higher-cost for 
lower-cost imports. These two effects constitute the trade diversion effect of a union.
Traditional theory of custom union bases the viability of economic integration 
schemes on the welfare gains and losses deriving from trade creation or diversion that arise 
as a result of the reallocation of resources following the formation of the union. Welfare 
gains are also expected to derive from other sources such as; economies of scale, 
improvement in the terms-of-trade of the group, forced efficiency due to increased
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competition, and a change in the rate of economic growth.43 Inward investment, another 
possible source of gain, is, as has been pointed out in the previous section, defeated by the 
rules of origin in the West African case. Thus though this was seen as an important source 
of gain in the East African Community, it became of diminished relevance to the 
ECOWAS scheme. The gains from industrialisation are expected to derive from 
indigenous activity rather than from foreign companies.
The foregoing implies that for economic integration to be beneficial to West 
African states it must be a trade creating one. To what extent can this be expected in the 
ECOWAS case?
Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in West Africa
A recourse to orthodox theory will help lay the outline for assessing this. It is only 
after we have examined the laid down framework according to existing theory that we can 
begin to judge the appropriateness of the criteria used within the context of West Africa.
Market size
According to the traditional theory of custom unions certain general conditions are 
conducive to trade creation. The first of these is that a union is likely to be a trade creating 
one the larger is the economic area it covers, and the larger the membership of the union, 
the greater will be the scope of its trade creating abilities. The logic of this is that there 
would then be a higher probability of the least-cost producer being a member of the 
union.44
43Balassa, B., Economic Development and Integration, Centro De Estudios Monetarios 
Latinoamericanos, Mexico, 1965.
44Balassa, op. cit.
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The difficulty that arises though is how the size of the economic area is to be 
measured. Should it be by population or by geographical area? An economic area 
measured by the former criterion would suggest that India, and China are bigger than the 
United States of America.45 An appropriate measure should take account of gross national 
product exclusive of the subsistence sector, difference in taste, and the cost of 
transportation. The more diversified the tastes of a population, and the greater the cost of 
transportation, the smaller will be the effective size of the market for a given source of 
marketable output.46
Taste is fairly homogeneous in West Africa, and this is reflected in the kinds of 
staple food crops that are grown and the manufactured goods produced within the region, 
and imported from outside.
Taste as an indicator, therefore, does not subtract form the effective size of the 
market. On the other hand, transportation cost may be high because of the scanty network 
existing between and within individual West Africa states. The state and direction of the 
communication networks reflect to a certain extent, the extra-regional orientation of the 
commercial policy of countries within the region. It also reflects the recent history of the 
region as a parcelled out property of colonial Britain, France and Portugal. The major 
roads and railway networks are those that were built to link export goods producing areas 
to ports whilst the post and telecommunication network is more effective in linking the 
individual countries to their former metropolis. Though new roads have been built since
45 ibid.
46 ibid.
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The difficulty that arises though is how the size of the economic area is to be 
measured. Should it be by population or by geographical area? An economic area 
measured by the former criterion would suggest that India, and China are bigger than the 
United States of America.45 An appropriate measure should take account of gross national 
product exclusive of the subsistence sector, difference in taste, and the cost of 
transportation. The more diversified the tastes of a population, and the greater the cost of 
transportation, the smaller will be the effective size of the market for a given source of 
marketable output.46
Taste is fairly homogeneous in West Africa, and this is reflected in the kinds of 
staple food crops that are grown and the manufactured goods produced within the region, 
and imported from outside.
Taste as an indicator, therefore, does not subtract form the effective size of the 
market. On the other hand, transportation cost may be high because of the scanty network 
existing between and within individual West Africa states. The state and direction of the 
communication networks reflect to a certain extent, the extra-regional orientation of the 
commercial policy of countries within the region. It also reflects the recent history of the 
region as a parcelled out property of colonial Britain, France and Portugal. The major 
roads and railway networks are those that were built to link export goods producing areas 
to ports whilst the post and telecommunication network is more effective in linking the 
individual countries to their former metropolis. Though new roads have been built since
45 ibid.
46 ibid.
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independence and roads built in the colonial era are by no means entirely and rigidly 
utilitarian in the respect stated above, the major roads still either link production areas to 
the cities and ports and one administrative area to another. Transportation is therefore 
inadequate for fostering effective trade, and efficient location of industry within the 
region.47
Finally, GNP varies considerably for individual countries within the region. Nigeria 
for example, accounts for over 65 per cent of the region's GNP. At the same time, its high 
population of over 115 million people leads to a lower per capita income than the Ivory 
Coast48 Per capita GNP is generally very low in the region, and raises questions about the 
extent to which even the combined markets can support certain industries.
Regional Integration and Economies o f  Scale
As Brown has noted,49 'the most important single consideration about the 
development of manufacturing,... is the size of the market required to support production 
on an efficient scale'. What underlies import substitution industrialisation, and protection 
of infant industries at the regional level is the assumption that the partner countries are not 
able, generally, to compete efficiently on the world market for manufactured goods until 
they have leamed-by-doing within a sheltered regional market. The regional market is thus 
expected to be a sort of half-way house to full participation in the market for industrial 
goods. However, when industrialisation is referred to in the treaties establishing regional
47 Obadan, M.I., 'Regional Trade of the ECOWAS: Characteristics, Problems and Prospects', in 
Orimalade and Obogu, op. cit.
48Iyoha, M.A., op. cit.
49Brown, A.J., 'Separation versus a Common Market in Developing Countries', Yorkshire Bulletin 
of Economic and Social Research. 1961.
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integration schemes, they are referred to in rather general terms and a general assumption 
is made that the combined market of the member countries will support the industries once 
they are set up. Such a priori assumptions are made for ECOWAS also. It is assumed both 
in the treaty and rhetoric that once an integrated market is established, the combined 
market will be able to support industrialisation. However because industrialisation can 
range from simple manufactures to complex technologically based products, it is essential 
to specify what goods are being referred to. Since the reaping of economies of scale forms 
the major dynamic reason for forming such schemes in developing regions, it is important 
to pay particular attention to this issue.
The question which arises, therefore, in the ECOWAS context is whether the 
combined markets of the member states will help in supporting the industries that cannot 
be supported by the national markets. In other words, what should be the minimum size of 
a market before it is able to support the minimum level of efficiency in various branches of 
industry.
Using the rather old but very relevant point made by Brown in 1961 in his study of 
the defunct East African Community, prima facie a country offering less than one 
hundredth of the market which is available for goods such as blast furnace, butter and 
margarine, electric cookers and heating apparatus, machine tools, railway wagons and 
carriages, wholesale bespoke tailoring, iron and steel tubes, aircraft and prime movers, to 
mention a few examples, in Britain would find itself severely handicapped in establishing 
such industries. It will also be considerably handicapped in producing such goods as 
umbrellas, rolling and smelting, cocoa and sugar confectionery, even if it did not seek to
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establish more than one plant in each industry. Economies of scale are crucial to the 
survival of these industries.
Though the study is dated the general point it makes remains relevant. If anything 
at all, economies of scale have become even more important because of the improvement 
in technology. In high technology goods production no manufacturer depends solely on 
the home market for its survival. The market offered by the USA, for example, though 
large is not sufficient for the vast numbers of similar goods that are produced by different 
firms. In West Africa, the individual markets of the member countries cannot support most 
of the industries that derive from revealed comparative advantage. Compared to the UK's 
£14,610 GNP per capita, Sierra-Leone's is £220, Nigeria's is £250, Ivory Coast's £790 and 
Guinea's £430.50 The ratio of the GDPs of Sierra-Leone, Nigeria, Mali to the UK's is 
1/860, 1/24 and 1/345 respectively.51 The figures are not very different for the other 
countries that form ECOWAS. This indicates that none of the member countries offers a 
market of sufficient size to support those industries in which economies of scale are 
important. The combined markets do indeed offer a relatively larger market if we 
combined the GDPs of the member countries of ECOWAS and calculated the ratio of their 
GDPs to the UK's.
However this does not indicate that an effective regional market exists for 
manufactured goods. This is because even if trade is liberalised it does not automatically 
lead to individuals being able to afford goods that give competitive advantage in 
international trade- modern technologically based goods.
50 World Development Report, Table 1, 1991, p204.
51 Calculated from ibid., Table 3, p208.
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A comparison of the structure of consumption of some countries of the West 
African region with those of the developed countries indicates that whereas an average of 
between 78% of household consumption is made up of food, clothing and shelter in the 
former, the figure is 37% for the latter. Whereas an average of 1.5% is spent on the 
purchase of automobiles in the three West African countries cited above, a figure of 4.3% 
is spent in the developed countries. Compared to the 4% that is spent on consumer 
durables in West Africa, an average of 7% is spent by households in the developed 
countries.52
A consideration of these figures, together with absolute GNP per capita income 
figures indicate that not only are incomes much lower in West Africa but that the structure 
of demand is biased toward basic needs. The tentative conclusion can therefore be drawn 
that the manufactures that will succeed in West Africa are those that meet the demands for 
the narrowly defined three basic needs, food, clothing and shelter. The combined market of 
ECOWAS will not change the underlying consumption patterns within the region in the 
short to medium term. One therefore doubts the validity of the argument that trade 
liberalisation will create the market necessary for industrialisation. This is especially so if 
one considers that at the present time it is not always the size of the market that is causing 
the under-utilisation of capacity but rather the lack of inputs.
52 ibid., Table 10, p222.
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Hence a combined West African market will not necessarily result in an adequate 
demand for modem industrial goods or services although it will result in an expanded 
market for the goods that most West Africans normally spend their incomes on.
In addition, there is another aspect of economies of scale that needs to be 
considered. As Pratten and Dean53 pointed out, when economists are discussing 
economies of scale they usually think in terms of single product plants. However, firms and 
plants are multi-product and must have the appropriate number of each product produced 
to take advantage of economies of scale. In printing, for example, first copy costs need to 
be spread over an appropriate number of books for economies of scale benefits. Thus 
unless sufficient markets exist for the various models, styles or copies that a firm produces 
there will be no economies of scale. Regional integration seems to assume single-product 
lines. That would seem to suggest that the market would be supplied with the same 
good/product without variety. The reverse argument would suggest that in the situation 
where there is variety, the market will have to be supplied by very few firms or even a 
single firm in some instances. Such a situation is no more desirable than consumers having 
only one brand of a good to buy, because it will result in monopolistic or oligopolistic 
market condition with all it's attendant probabilities.
Finally, the dovetailing of firms within an industry is an important consideration in 
assessing the availability of conditions for economies of scale. Plants producing an 
intermediate product may not be able to get a sufficient market for their goods if the 
plants that use their goods are too small or too few to absorb all the of their output.
53 Pratten, C and Dean, R.M., The Economies of Large-Scale Production in British Industry. 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965.
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Intermediate goods producers might in such instances find that there is not a sufficient 
market in the final goods segment of the industry to absorb their products. There is 
therefore no guarantee that that firms within an industry will dovetail into each other as 
neatly as is taken for granted.
From the discussions above, we can conclude that a priori assumptions cannot be 
made about regional integration and economies of scale. Studies will have to be conducted 
on which industries can actually hope to gain from large scale production in the region.
Pre-Union Tariff levels and Integration
A second criterion that is used to judge whether a union will be beneficial or not is 
to look at pre-union tariff levels. If pre-union levels were high, then the union is likely to 
be a trade diverting one. On the other hand, low pre-union tariffs imply that the members 
are relatively efficient competitors in the world market, and the pre-union tariffs are not 
prohibitive tariffs set up to protect inefficient and high-cost internal production.
Since the removal of trade barriers in a union changes relative prices within it, 
trade that results from the removal of prohibitive tariffs between partner countries does 
result from high-cost partners buying goods from the cheapest source. They may indeed 
be buying from a cheaper source relative to its own production cost, but the exporting 
partner country only gains its comparative advantage because the common external tariff 
or positive discrimination in favour of its goods makes it difficult for non-members to 
compete. A high pre-union tariff between member countries means the removal of such
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tariff will lead to increased trade, but the net effect will depend on whether this trade 
results from diverting trade from non-member countries.
Other measures such as exchange rate policies, quotas, and other quantitative and 
qualitative, and administrative restrictions also need to be looked at in addition to tariffs to 
determine the effects of tariff levels on trade creation because they all compose the 
potpourri of measures used by governments to protect their domestic markets.
At an a priori level however, because costs of production in West Africa are high 
it can be assumed that trade that results from the formation of an integrated area will be 
diverted trade.
An important aspect of tariffs in West Africa is that they are used as a source of 
government revenue, and as a policy measure to protect infant industries. This means that 
integration will affect the income of participating countries very seriously. If integration 
results in imports quantities being reduced, that will mean a corresponding decrease in 
government revenue. The combined effects of higher tariffs on imports from non-member 
countries and a lower tariff rates for member countries will be reduced government 
revenue.
As the table below indicates, governments in West Africa depend heavily on 
exports and imports duties. This means that governments will be losing one of their main 
sources of revenue once external barriers are raised and regional ones removed. Thus in
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addition to integration resulting in trade diversion, an important source of government 
revenue will also be lost.
Table 3
Relationship Between Trade and Government Revenue (in percent)
Country
Share of
Trade Taxes Export Taxes Import Duties 
in Total in Total in CIF 
Revenue Export Import
Benin (1979) 61 5 25
Burkina Faso 38 3 18
Gambia (1982) 76 4 25
Ghana 46 25 25
Guinea (1983) 57 •  • • •  • •
Guinea-Bissau 32 •  • • •  • •
Ivory Coast 40 5 24
Liberia 31 0 18
Mali 23 5 5
Mauritania (1979) 35 1 14
N iger(1980) 43 3 19
Nigeria (1978) 26 0 16
Senegal(1983) 38 1 16
Sierra-Leone 42 3 18
Togo 31 1 15
Source: Adapted from Gersovitz and Paxson op. cit., p39. Note: Data are 
for 1984 unless indicated by date in parentheses.
The possibility that integration will result in the loss of revenue for member 
countries is a major difficulty for integration among developing countries. It will indeed be 
a severe test of the commitment of the member countries of ECOWAS when they get to 
the stage of a custom union. This will be because the benefits of integration will not be as
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immediate as its costs. It will mean setting up compensatory mechanisms for those who 
will lose most from regional integration. Such a fund will have to depend on a 
redistribution of revenue income generated from the resulting trade from integration. 
However this can be expected to be a very difficult issue to resolve.54 It is also one of the 
issues which will determine whether the scheme will succeed or not.
Competitiveness and Complementarity
It is also believed that trade creation is more likely if the member countries of an 
integration scheme have competitive economies. Competitiveness is defined as 
"correspondence in kind of high-cost industries between the different parts of the custom 
union which were protected by tariffs ... in member countries before custom union was 
established".55 It means that the higher the overlap in protected industries, the more likely 
it is that there will be trade creation. This is because since production in member countries 
had previously taken place behind high tariff protection, the possibility of a more efficient 
reallocation of resources is higher with the removal of tariffs. On the other hand, the 
smaller the overlap, the less likely it will be that there will be a reallocation of resources 
after integration.
If however, the economies are complementary, that is, they produce a different 
range o f goods, then there will be no reallocation of resources. After the removal of tariffs 
the more likely situation under such circumstances will be that trade will be diverted to a 
high-cost partner country. However complementarity will not lead to trade diversion if the 
region includes the lowest cost producer.56
54 The ECOWAS compensation scheme came into effect in January 1990 after years of negotiations 
between the member states.
53 Viner, J., The Custom Union Issue. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950, p51.
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Applying this to West Africa, it must be pointed out that even though the countries 
in the region are highly competitive in the goods they produce, such competitiveness does 
not necessarily lead to trade creation. This is because, like most developing countries,
West Africa countries export primary goods. Benin, Sierra-Leone, Togo, Ghana, Nigeria 
and Ivory Coast, for example, produce cocoa. Gambia, Mali, Niger, Senegal together with 
Nigeria produce groundnuts. The goods are not consumer goods but raw materials which 
are sold mainly in Western industrialised markets. These countries compete on the world 
market for the products. The quantities produced of the two examples mentioned above 
are more than can be processed and consumed within the region. They are also exported 
largely in unprocessed form. As Balassa pointed out, this type of competitiveness might 
lead to reallocation of resources only in instances where the production of the good is 
carried on with the aid of price supports. But since the producers of these primaries will 
not be competing for the internal market of the integrated area, there will be no need to 
reallocate resources.
Secondly, even where price supports are used as an incentive to produce, those 
policies are usually adopted to achieve goals such as product diversification. It is therefore 
unlikely that partner countries will be unwilling to specialise even further than they already 
did before integration policies were implemented. This would be because if they did, it will 
leave them exposed to the risks of over specialisation, a situation that they are trying to 
overcome with industrialisation. Reallocation will therefore be unlikely. Given that the 
member countries are striving to cushion themselves from the uncertainties of future
56 Balassa, op. cit.
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demand and price fluctuations of primary goods the conclusion can be made that 
reallocation of primary goods production will occur.
An additional factor that makes the reallocation of primary products difficult is that 
some of them are naturally endowed. Thus primary goods such as gold, phosphates, 
diamond and petroleum which are produced within the region cannot be reallocated no 
matter how inefficient their productions are within the individual countries.
Even though clear conclusions are difficult to come to about competitiveness, West 
African countries would seem to indicate a trade diversion situation. There is however the 
possibility of resource reallocation in the production of import substituting goods which 
have a high degree of overlapping in West Africa.
Pre-Integration level o f  Trade
Another criterion for determining the likely benefits of regional integration is the 
level of pre-integration trade between the member states. It is assumed by orthodox 
integration theory that the higher the level of intra-regional trade relative to extra-regional 
trade prior to integration, the higher will be the likelihood of trade creation.
There is an assertion made by many that the high level of unrecorded trade between 
West African countries indicates the potential for increasing intra-regional trade after 
integration. Though unrecorded trade may be high, official trade itself is low. It is official 
trade which is important to integration.
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The reason why official trade which acts as a barometer for future trade potential is 
because of the rule of origin. Since non-originating goods do not qualify for community 
treatment, they cannot act as an indicator for potential trade between the member 
countries.
The question that arises, therefore, is how much of such trade is in goods that 
originate from within the region? Most unofficial trade is in goods originating from outside 
the region. Thus it is trade deflection in which traders are taking advantage of tariff 
differentials, exchange rate differences, and other quota and quantitative as well as 
administrative restrictions that are imposed on imports by individual countries. These are 
prohibited under the ECOWAS treaty. Recorded intra-region trade of goods originating 
within the region is low. Once barriers are lifted and tariff barriers harmonised the 
profitability of such trade will diminish. Such trade can therefore not form the basis for 
integration.
From the above considerations, traditional theory seems to suggest that West 
Africa does not have the conditions needed for trade creation to occur. If these 
observations are true and the analysis used for illustrating the feasibility of economic 
integration indicate that this is the case, then why do so many scholars in both West Africa 
and elsewhere believe it is a sine-qua-non for the development of the region?
1.6 Dynamic Theory of Regional Economic Integration
Many see the emphasis on resource reallocation as a limiting feature to the 
usefulness of traditional economic integration theory. They instead emphasise the after
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effects which are barely considered in traditional analysis; terms of trade, economies of 
scale, faster rate of economic growth and increased productivity. These, they assert, are 
the issues relevant to developing countries. These so-called dynamic effects are, therefore, 
what justify such undertaking in less developed areas.
As Balassa, among others, has pointed out, the emphasis on reallocation of existing 
resources and the criterion of universal free trade, makes, the traditional theory of 
economic integration of limited relevance to developing countries whose main purpose for 
integrating is to change the existing structure of production, and not to take it as given.
The question to ask then is whether the desire of developing countries to change the 
structure of their economies through integration nullifies the conclusions of the traditional 
theory?
Traditional theory of integration is essentially a disguised argument for free trade 
and the fact that pre-union protection exists suggests that free trade is not viewed as 
desirable by many countries. What integration does is to lower trade barriers where they 
previously protected national markets in a region. However, the grounds on which a 
custom union is said to be superior to non-discriminatory protection are precisely those 
grounds on which a union is necessarily inferior to universal free trade.57
Thus even though certain economies might be able to adapt the orthodox theory of 
regional integration more easily than others. All countries contemplating integration will 
need to justify it on grounds other than trade creation. This is because the arguments that
57 Cooper, C.A., and Massell, B.f., Toward a Theory of Customs Union for Developing Countries', 
in Journal of Political Economy, vol 73, 1965.
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are used for indicating whether an integration scheme will be trade creating or trade 
diverting are the same arguments that would indicate that trade creation, itself, is inferior 
to international free trade.
As mentioned earlier, according to orthodox theory, trade creation as opposed to 
trade diversion as a way of of judging the feasibility and viability of custom unions would 
indicate that such schemes would be unfruitful in developing countries. However it has 
also been pointed out that this conclusion has been criticised because of the static 
equilibrium analysis on which the conclusions depend. To the extent that the objective 
function of orthodox regional integration is the reallocation of static efficiency, while that 
of such schemes among developing countries is the maximisation of economic growth, 
trade creation is of limited relevance to them.58
The preconditions for effective integration which were examined earlier on, and 
which would appear to indicate that of such schemes will not be viable are seen as 
irrelevant. Orthodox theory proposes, for example, that increased trade will be more likely 
the greater the pre-union trade. Efficiency and specialisation will also result more readily 
through reallocation if the individual countries are competitive rather than 
complementary. Even though it is true that the level of trade between West African 
countries is low, it is precisely this undesirable situation which, the argument goes, 
economic integration is expected to correct. Thus the objectives of regional integration are 
used as arguments to negate the conclusions of orthodox theory. Economic intercourse
38Balassa, B., A Theory of Regional Integration.
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between developing countries is low because of their low levels of development. This is 
expected to change with progressive levels of integration.59
It has been suggested that for a regional integration theory to be relevant to 
developing countries it must examine "the interrelationship of integration and the 
transformation of economic structure in the process of economic growth with 
consideration for large scale economies that can be obtained in an enlarged market".60 The 
question which arises is whether the results hoped for by developing countries from 
integration can be used as sufficient grounds for dismissing traditional theory.
Several factors indicate that this may not be so in the West African context. As was 
pointed out above the main expected result of integration among developing countries is 
that the larger market which results as a consequence of the removal of barriers will lead 
to expanded trade. This is based on the assumption that firms will be able to exploit 
economies of scale. This assumption would seem to imply that market size places an 
effective ceiling on the establishment of certain industries. However the main cause of 
existing under-utilisation of productive capacity in many West African countries is the 
lack of capital, raw materials, inadequate storage facilities, corruption, and sometimes 
inept policies of governments. In countries where these happen to be the case, integration 
will not result in expanded production.61
Secondly, most of the existing plants in the region are those which were installed 
very soon after independence. They are therefore, obsolete and inefficient. They will
59 ibid.
60ibid., p31.
61 Refer to pp 60-65 above for a discussion about economies of scale.
therefore would not be able to act as a strong base for the sustained effort that will be 
required over the usually long initial period before the impact of integration is spread 
throughout the other sectors of the region. The immediate impact of industries in the 
integration of West Africa will therefore be limited. If  the gains are to be derived from new 
and rationalised industries within the region, the question is where will the finance be 
coming from? How efficient will such industries be with such high level of government 
involvement? Where will the industries be located? Will such location be politically 
acceptable to all the governments? Will there be enough industries to go round? What will 
be the bases for locating industries? Will it be equity in distribution or efficiency? These 
are some of the questions which will need to be answered before the so-called dynamic 
theory of integration can be used as a basis for justifying integration in West Africa.
In addition to the issues raised in the questions above, another expected source of 
gain which needs to be questioned is the belief that integration that will make it possible to 
establish industries that would otherwise not be viable in within the small confines of the 
individual national boundaries. This expectation assumes a high level of cosmopolitanism 
among the member states. It elevates the regional interest above the national interest. It 
also implies a high level of dirigisme.
Additionally, the above expectation is contradictory to one of the sources which 
make it possible for economies of scale to operate. The absence of competition in such an 
industry leaves it with a monopoly situation. Production, in such circumstances, could be 
kept artificially low. Integration may therefore result in the protection of inefficient firms.
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Another factor that may affect effective competition is that the geographical spread 
of the economic area covered by the integration scheme. ECOWAS covers 16 countries 
and is quite large. This might make the setting up of several similar industries necessary. 
The low level of transportation between the members means there will not be an effective 
rationalisation of industries. Several sub-optimal firms will continue to exist throughout 
the region.
Even though regional trade liberalisation will increase productive investment 
opportunities it will also result in the factors of production moving to those areas which 
are already more developed. Unless there are such areas in most of the countries of the 
integrating region, this would lead to capital and skilled labour being concentrated in the 
more economically developed member states. Such polarisation could result in capital 
flight and labour flight from some of the member states. It may also lead to external 
investment being directed at the growth poles. Whether this will be economically and 
political acceptable to those states that stand to lose is debatable. Our opinion is that it will 
not be acceptable.
On the other hand, polarisation and the accompanying increased economic activity 
may result in higher incomes and therefore increased savings in those areas thus further 
reinforcing and perpetuating the disparities. It is argued that the spread effect that may 
results from such growth poles will outweigh the short-run backwash effect of capital and 
labour movement. Nevertheless, polarisation will make integration a politically very 
difficult decision to take. Because the adverse effects of integration may be immediate,
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national politicians may feel reluctant in advocating regional policies that may turn out to 
be politically suicidal.
From the above it becomes obvious that the dynamic effects of integration require 
huge sacrifices to be made by the member states in the short term in the hope that 
integration will eventually lead to regional development. The outcomes of such schemes 
are by no means certain. As has been shown throughout the chapter the assumptions made 
for integration among developing countries are a priori. Thus the dynamic analyses which 
are used as counters against the orthodox theory do not really offer very definite grounds 
for optimism.
1.7 Conclusion
The attraction of integration lies in the role it is seen as playing in the structural 
transformation of the individual countries of the region. Despite the difficulties enumerated 
above, industrialisation remains a policy goal for all countries within West Africa. It is seen 
as providing the opportunity for promoting that sector without diverting funds from other 
sectors and leading to a more hopeful situation of protected industries developing to the 
point where they might not need protection because they would have 'leamt-by-doing' 
within the region. Additionally because the developing countries are unable to meet the 
exacting standards demanded of manufactured goods in the markets of the industrialised 
countries, a regional market may offer them the opportunity to restructure their 
economies.
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There is no doubt that West African countries need to restructure their economies 
and also to diversify their markets. Whether regional economic integration can help in 
achieving these and other developmental goals will have to be assessed. As has been 
pointed out earlier, the a priori bases for justifying integration need to be put to the test. 
Results so far have not been encouraging.
Economic integration is needed most by the developing countries who do not seem 
to have the conditions that would make such schemes viable. The hope continues to be 
that the dynamic gains that might result from integration would lead to a transformation of 
the economies of the participating countries. Thus, many have proposed that trade 
diversion may be an undesirable but inevitable consequence of attempts to industrialise. 
Measures such as integration which might have short-run negative impacts on world 
welfare and severe problems for the participating countries, are considered as necessary 
and inevitable.
In the context of the above to what extent can such negative impacts be tolerated 
and such schemes be expected to contribute to the eventual development of West African 
countries?
In the next chapter we will look at the politics of international integration just as 
we have done for the economic theory. This is important because the economic dynamics 
of regional integration are not sufficient for analysing integration schemes. The political 
and social context are just as important. Hence the need to look at the political theory and 
to compare it to the political milieu of the West African region.
70
CHAPTER TWO 
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL, INTEGRATION
2.1 Introduction: Definition and Concents
There are several things that strike anyone doing a literature review of international 
integration theory. They are that the literature is dated, there is a lack of conceptual clarity 
regarding what integration is, and there are differences in how scholars conceptualise the 
terminal state1 of regional integration. Policy makers, also, use integration, co-operation 
and community, interchangeably. Intellectuals are also unable to agree on whether the 
word applies only to the end result of a process or to both the process and the end state.2
Amitai Etzioni, for example, defines integration as a self-sustaining mechanism and 
attribute that helps a community to maintain itself, its existence and its form by its 'own 
processes' without having to depend on external processes of its member units. Thus, he 
sees a political community as a community that possesses three kinds of integration.
These are namely; that 'it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence, it 
has a centre of decision making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of 
resources and rewards throughout the community, and it is the dominant form of political 
identification for a large majority of politically aware citizens'.3 From his definition, it can 
be seen that, Etzioni treats integration as a terminal state and not as a process.
1 See also Nye, J.S., 'Comparing Regional Integration' in International Organisations. Autumn,
1968.
2 Haas, E.B., 'The Study of Regional Integration', in Regional Integration: Theory and Research. 
Lindberg, L and Scheingold, S.A., (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.
3 Etzioni, A., Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces. Holt, Rinehart
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Karl Deutsch, on the other hand, sees integration as a process. He sums up the 
goals of integration as; maintaining peace, attaining peace, accomplishing some specific 
tasks, and gaining a new self image and role identity. The process, according to Deutsch, 
leads either to an amalgamated or a pluralistic security community depending on the main 
goals.4
Haas in defining integration sees it as a 'process for the creation o f political 
communities described in institutional and attitudinal terms.5
The three definitions cited above are examples o f the different meanings that 
individual scholars attach to the word.
In addition to the difficulties encountered in finding a universally accepted 
definition for integration, there is also, as has been mentioned, a lack o f conceptual clarity 
about the dependent variable. This, according to Nye has given rise to two problems. 
First, it makes it difficult to relate the concepts o f different scholars. This has the 
consequence that integration theorists tend to 'talk past each other'. Even in instances 
where theories have confronted each other, the differences in conceptualisation have made 
resolution o f differences unnecessarily difficult. The second problem that arises with the 
differences in conceptualisation is that it makes comparison o f different regional 
integration processes difficult. This is because differences in infrastructure, market 
mechanisms, external dependence, administration, national consciousness, and ideology,
and Winston, New York, 1965, p4.
4 Deutsch, K. W., The Analysis of International Integration. Prentice Hall, London, 1988.
3 Haas, op. cit.
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for example, make formulations and propositions made with developed countries in mind 
difficult to apply to developing countries.6
The difficulties caused by the imprecise usage o f the word are further exacerbated 
by the positive connotation that is assumed for it. Implicit in common parlance, and the 
theoretical literature is the assumption that integration leads to peace and prosperity. 
However, as some have noted, the high level o f trade in the former COMECON, for 
example, was achieved at the expense of the greater welfare which could have been made 
possible through greater participation in world trade.7
Despite the differences in approach and conceptualisation, all the theories have a 
common denominator. They all expect integration to result in a change in the context o f 
decision making. This is expected to be from the national to the regional level, and is 
expected to be brought about without coercion. The methods for achieving such change 
differs, however, from theory to theory. It will therefore be appropriate at this point to 
examine the main theories in detail to see the propositions they make, and how they 
propose integration can be achieved.
2.2 FUNCTIONALISM
Functionalism is a theory o f international organisation which was formulated by 
Mitrany. It proposes the organisation o f national and international life along functional 
lines. What this means is that individuals with common needs come together to perform 
the tasks that will help satisfy those needs. Thus, it sees groups and individuals as the
6 Nye, op. cit.
7 Pryor, F. L., The Communist Foreign Trade System. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1963.
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focus o f international organisation. In terms o f international relations theory it is akin to 
the Kantian perspective. The difference though is that while the Kantian perspective 
expects ideology to be the binding force in the relations between individuals and groups 
across international boundaries, functionalism sees the satisfying o f welfare needs as the 
cementing element o f such international cosmopolitanism.
Functionalism expects the form that such international organisations will take and 
the geographical area they cover to depend on the task they are expected to perform.
Mitranys work spanned many years, but the most significant and the one which 
details his thoughts on international organisations most comprehensively is A Working 
Peace System.8 first published in 1943. This work was essentially prescriptive and 
normative. It was a proposal on how to consolidate the unity that had grown between the 
allies during the second world war and how they could expand such collaboration.
The theory reflected the utopian9 perception that conflict between states was 
inevitable as long as the balance o f power system formed the basis o f order in international 
society. To him peace and unity were desirable goals for nations to aspire to. Such peace 
could only be found if the nation-state was not the primary unit o f interaction in the 
international system.
8 A Working Peace System, in The Functional Theory of Politics. Martin Robertson, 1975.
9 Utopian is used here as it is used in the literature to distinguish between the inter-war, mainly 
Wilsonian prescriptions for international relations and the post-world war two approaches to international 
relations.
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He considered three possibilities for the refashioning o f international society. The 
first could be an association of nations along the lines o f the League o f Nations. Such an 
association would leave the identity and policy o f states almost intact. The second method 
could be to form a federal system. This would have the advantage o f providing the 
cohesion that would have been lacking in an association o f nations. The third method 
could be a functional approach that sought to break away from the traditional link between 
a political entity and a definite territory as would have continued to be the case with the 
first two alternatives.
He discounted the first two on the basis that they would not be able to secure 
world peace. As Mitrany saw it, an association o f nations would merely suggest the need 
for a measure o f material integration without achieving it. On the other hand even though 
a federation would create the cohesion an association lacked it would do so within the 
limits o f  some new continental or regional group and so would divide the world into 
several potentially competing units.
The functionalist approach, on the other hand, would as he saw it, resolve both 
dilemmas o f either creating too loose or too narrow an international organisation. It would 
do this by building up authorities that would be both comprehensive and solid in selected 
fields o f common life.
By discounting federalism on the basis o f its inability to eradicate potential 
competition, possible consequences o f rivalry, and future wars, and proposing instead a 
scheme that is not limited to a region or continent Mitrany endorsed a universalist
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approach to international organisation as the only method that held any prospects for 
sustainable international peace. He therefore went beyond the Wilsonian perspective o f 
ensuring peace through international law, open diplomacy, national self-determination and 
the downgrading o f the balance o f power. This he does by proposing a world which did 
away with national boundaries and organised along functionalist lines, very much like the 
Marxist proposal o f ideology transcending national boundaries.
An obvious difficulty with such a proposal was how such a system would be 
regulated. As an anticipation to this question functionalists expected the organisations that 
are formed to be executive agencies with autonomous tasks, and powers. Such 
organisations would not only be discussing issues but implementing policies. By 
concentrating on specific needs, as for example, the Security Council o f the United 
Nations concentrates on law and order, such an approach to international collaboration 
would be free from dogma and would avoid the crippling limitations o f a more broadly 
designed association or a hard and fast system that a federation would provide.
An important prerequisite for the formation o f an international organisation, 
according to functionalism, is that those contemplating it must be ready for consensus. To 
be effective, substantive tasks would have to be entrusted to the organisation. However, 
such organisations cannot expect authority to be delegated to them freely - at least not 
while the nation-state remains the predominant actor in international relations.
What must therefore be hoped for in the transition period when such authority is 
being transferred is that national governments will be willing to act as agencies o f incipient
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international authority. However, until national boundaries and authorities are done away 
with, the elements o f power - raw materials and manpower, industrial potential and 
strategic positions, will remain within the domain o f national governments and therefore 
make it difficult to cede formal authority to an international body.
Hence though functionalists proposed that some form of task transference from 
governments to the new agency has to occur, it did not mean that a constitutional transfer 
o f the tasks o f government had to be entrusted to it. The new organisations would be 
expected to derive their strength from a gradual transfer o f authority from national 
governments according to social needs and political developments prevailing at the time. 
An accumulation o f such partial transfers would in time cause a translation o f the true seat 
o f authority.
Though functionalism was not proposed for regional integration and was actually 
against such formations, Mitrany's ideas about international organisation as outlined above, 
nevertheless have important conceptual implications for international integration. These 
are examined below.
First, it introduced the elements o f gradualism and incrementalism which were used 
later in neo-functionalist theories. Secondly, it recognised the unwillingness o f  
governments to transfer sovereignty to an international organisation. Thirdly, it indicated 
that there were differences between initiating conditions and the process mechanisms for 
maintaining the process. Fourth, it asserted that limiting an international organisation to a 
geographical area limited its ability to achieve optimum output. And finally, that the
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organisational structure and geographical extent o f an international organisation ought to 
fit a function and not be delineated or fashioned arbitrarily. These implications could be 
restated as questions. To what extent are regional integration schemes limitations on the 
universal approach to problem solving? Is the region a good geographical limit for 
international organisations? Are regions coextensive with problems ?
As has been pointed out above, the functionalist perspective envisages both a 
gradual and incremental approach to international organisation. It starts with people 
coming together to solve problems that are common to them. A specific organisation is 
formed to tackle a specific problem area. The efficiency with which the organisations 
solve problems, it is expected, will result in demands being made for more o f such specific 
purpose organisations.
The expansion o f both the roles and geographical extent o f an organisation is 
expected to be a result o f attitudinal changes - what Paul Taylor and others see as the 
development o f a social-psychological community.10 Such organisations, by concentrating 
on specific tasks and performing them efficiently are seen as generating supportive popular 
attitudes, thus modifying loyalties to the state in favour o f the international organisations.
This consolidates the international organisations and creates a group whose 
members are made up o f people from different countries. Such an organisation o f people 
on an international scale would impose restraints on the 'disruptive ambitions o f 
governments' through the supportive attitudes they engender. The cumulative effect of
10 Taylor, P. The Concept of Community and the European Integration Process', in Journal of 
Common Market Studies. Oxford, Blackwell, Dec. 1968, Vol. VII, No 2.
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demands for more and more international institutions to satisfy needs would result, in time, 
in sovereignty being transferred gradually from national governments to the international 
institutions.
Functionalism thus assumes that loyalty to the state is habitual and deeply 
entrenched, and therefore that once such loyalty is refocused, peace will prevail. It also 
takes it for granted that functional organisations are necessarily efficient and that such 
efficiency will, therefore, definitely underpin the attractiveness o f such organisations and 
thus make the transfer o f loyalty easier.
As is pointed out later in chapters three and four, individual and group loyalty to
*
the relatively young states o f West Africa is still incipient. Since loyalty to the state is 
neither entrenched nor habitual in the relatively young states o f West Africa, assumptions 
underlying the effects o f loyalty to the state are reversed. Functional organisations ought 
therefore to be easier to form in West Africa if the main impediment to them is loyalty to 
the state. However, functionalism requires more than the overcoming o f allegiance to the 
state. It requires, among other things, very advanced organisational capabilities.
As mentioned above, the incremental approach that functionalism proposes as a 
method for gradually augmenting the authority o f international organisations is not only 
because o f the difficulties of transferring individual loyalties but also because o f the 
reluctance by governments to transfer sovereignty to such organisations. However because 
no sudden transfer o f total authority occurs, national governments are not expected to feel 
threatened. Instead governments are expected to see sovereignty as being shared rather
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than being usurped by the emerging international organisations. This point is important 
because it highlights the unwillingness o f governments to endow an international 
organisation with supranationality. Empirical evidence suggests that governments are very 
reluctant to delegate authority to an international organisation if such action is perceived 
as being capable o f leading to an undermining o f their sovereign prerogatives. 
Functionalism recognised that instances which will indicate to governments that an 
empowered organisation might encroach on such domestic prerogatives will make the 
initiation and maintenance o f such organisations difficult.
This pragmatic assumption caused functionalism to approach the relationship that 
will develop between governments and international organisations in a rather circuitous 
way. The theory does not confront governments directly nor does it expect that they will 
make commitments that they do not approve of.11
In the early stages, pressure from and changes in popular attitudes are what are 
expected to promote integration. Since the areas tackled are issues that are expected to 
be concerned with welfare, and are therefore less contentious, governments are not 
expected to feel threatened. As integration proceeds there is expected to be the deepening 
realisation by citizens that national frameworks are an impediment to goal achievement 
and so institutions will emerge across frontiers according to the requirements o f the 
particular function. The expanding role o f the international organisations and the 
educative and reinforcing effect o f successful integration would in time result in a 
reduction o f the differences in the salience between high and low politics. Eventually,
11 Taylor, P.,'Functionalism: The Approach of David Mitrany', in Frameworks of International 
Co-operation. Taylor, P. and Groom A.J.R., (ed.), Pinter, London, 1990.
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perceived differences in the salience between high politics and low politics will diminish 
and governments themselves will become involved in the integration process. The issue o f 
whether or not to delegate authority to international organisations in matters to do with 
defence, and foreign policy would therefore have become irrelevant as welfare issues begin 
to be defined in their broadest sense.
Since authority is transferred incrementally to several functional international 
organisations in response to emerging collective needs, no single centre emerges to which 
sovereignty is transferred. Governments are therefore not threatened by an emerging 
supranational institution. The authority o f any particular organisation will be dependent on 
what it needs to be able to function efficiently. The initial steps toward integration could 
come from individuals, private groups, or national governments. However, once the 
process is started, the greater amity that results among the participants engender a 
community feeling. As people see the effectiveness with which tasks are performed by 
existing functional organisations they are expected to demand that more such similar 
organisations be set up to take care o f other issue areas, thus putting pressure on 
governments to co-operate.
Clearly, functionalism, sees early achievement in specific functional areas as an 
important incentive to further integration. Both the willingness to transfer popular loyalty 
and governmental prerogatives are dependent on tangible achievements by previously 
formed organisations. Both the gradual and incremental process, and the spill-over that 
occur as a result o f the expansion into functional areas, have implications for the initial 
stages as detailed above and also the maintenance o f the organisations that are formed.
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The dual results o f attitudinal change at the popular level that are expected to result from 
effective task performance and problem solving and benefits derived from participation in 
such institutions, and the enmeshment effects resulting from interpenetration o f national 
life are seen as important for the maintenance o f the organisations.
The interdependencies and interpenetration o f governments, which result from their 
eventual participation, are expected to be reinforced as functional integration continues.
As governments are enmeshed, they will come to regard the cost o f severance by war too 
costly and too high. Thus war would be eliminated from international society.
International society will instead be made up o f several functional institutions that form a 
web o f overlapping network whose geographical extents depend on the most efficient 
areas needed to guarantee efficient task performances.
Functionalism and Regional Integration in West Africa
From the above assumptions we can attempt to answer the three question we 
posed earlier about the relationship between functionalism, regionalism, and the 
appropriate geographical area for collective problem solving.
Functionalism, as has been indicated above, is a proposal that sees the emergence 
o f functional organisations whose geographical extension and competence are determined 
by the task that are to be performed. This means that the area covered by an organisation 
could be contained within or extend beyond the boundaries o f a country. If optimality is 
to be achieved, then flexibility would have to be the key in forming such organisations.
This also means that projects undertaken within the framework o f an international
organisation need not involve all the members at all times. Problems are therefore 
identified and solutions tailored according to the necessary geographical extent, whether 
within a state or across several states. This is in contradistinction to schemes such as 
ECOWAS where policies, such as trade liberalisation, are expected to be implemented by 
all member states. The inevitable effect o f this is that policies tend to contain compromises 
because o f the need to reach agreements acceptable to all parties concerned. Package 
dealing, reciprocity, and trade-offs tend to dominate the bargaining procedure and 
outcomes in such multi- purpose organisations which are formed to cover regions, and 
which contain states with differing and multiple objectives.
The functionalist idea of'form following function', therefore, implies that 
international organisations may not fulfil their full potential if confined to a region - a 
region here implying a geographical area such as West Africa. Functionalism is therefore 
opposed to regionalism because it sees it as imposing limitations on the ability for form to 
follow function, and therefore on efficiency. How, for example can one be sure that the 
countries that form ECOWAS cover the correct geographical extent needed for specific 
tasks that the treaty envisages for the Community? Regionalism may from the 
functionalist perspective result in sub-optimality. The main opposition to geographical 
limitation is because regionalism is seen as replicating the competitive tendencies among 
states at the regional level. This means that peace, which is the main objective o f  
functionalism, will not be eliminated because regions will take the place o f states but will 
not change the mode o f interaction. Moreover, because form is not allowed to follow 
function, the demonstrative effect which efficiency is expected to engender will not be 
forthcoming. This will mean that the method will fail to achieve its purpose.
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From a functionalist perspective, regional integration in West Africa with its 
emphasis on a defined geographical area is therefore an inappropriate structure for the 
solving o f problems. Determining the geographical extent o f ECOWAS was a problem for 
member countries in the initial stages o f the organisation. Senegal wanted Zaire to be a 
member o f the organisation,12 principally, because o f what was perceived as Nigeria's 
preponderance. Even though this was politically motivated rather than driven by efficiency 
considerations, it is nevertheless indicative o f the difficulties that arise when the region is 
being defined.
The difficulty o f assuming that governments will allow transnational organisations 
to take over the provision o f welfare services is also highlighted by ECOWAS. In a region 
where states are solidifying their boundaries, governments are unlikely to allow an 
undercurrent o f organisations to undermine their authority by demonstrating that they are 
not as competent as they should be, assuming that such organisations will indeed be more 
efficient.
Political considerations will have two effects if functionalism were to form the 
theoretical underpinning for international organisation in West Africa. The desire to build 
the nation will make it difficult for functional organisations to be acceptable forms o f  
economic and social organisation. Thus, even if loyalty to the state is not entrenched and 
therefore not an impediment to international organisation, the fact that West African 
governments see the state as the organising unit which must be protected from
12 For more detail see chapters three and six.
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interference, implies that functional organisations will have difficulty in taking off. 
Secondly, and deriving from the first reason, because governments will inevitably be 
involved, the issue o f foreign policy orientation will play a part in how the geographical 
area is determined. Traditional ties, such as those based on common colonial ties, will play 
an important role in this respect. The inevitability o f government involvement will not 
only be because functionalism expects the authority the organisations need to come from 
governments but also because o f the dirigiste approach to planning in the region. Added to 
this dirigisme, we may add that, the financial needs o f such organisations will be beyond 
the public and will therefore have to have governments financing. Thus governments will 
have to be involved.
Functionalism also holds that tasks can be solved better individually. Thus the area 
covered by various institutions are not seen, by the functionalists as being coextensive 
with each other even though they overlap in a cobweb fashion. Thus functionalism rejects 
the idea that functions should be lumped together and be solved by a single institution with 
a general competence within a single territory.13 Thus while functionalism lays emphasis 
on institutions geared toward single tasks, regionalism on the other hand emphasises the 
territory as being the space that is suitable for the attainment o f a range o f goals within a 
single institutions. Regionalism is therefore a compromise between the appropriate 
geographical area an organisation should cover and the need to perform multiple tasks 
within a single institutions. Regionalism takes the nation-state as it building block while 
functionalism seeks to undermine the state.
13 Taylor, P., 'Regionalism: The Thought and the Deed', in Frameworks of International 
Co-operation. Taylor, P., Groom A. J. R., (ed.), Pinter, London, 1990.
In addition to the above limitations o f the applicability o f functionalism in West 
Africa, it has also been criticised more generally. These general criticisms include the 
improbability that the eradication o f material wants will guarantee world peace.14 This 
criticism, it has been pointed out, is unjustified because it is a partial interpretation o f what 
Mitrany said. Mitrany, according to his sympathisers, did not say that the fulfilment o f  
material wants is a condition for peace. It is rather that functional response to felt needs 
within the framework o f an international institution with its resultant formation o f a 
psycho-social community and enmershment o f governments will prevent war.15 Whether 
this is true remains to be tested in the West African context. It can however be argued that 
co-operation in the European Community has to a certain extent mellowed the historical 
antagonism that characterised the classical balance o f power period. Though other reasons 
could be given for the peace that has prevailed since the second world war, the suggestion 
can nevertheless be made that co-operation has been a contributory factor. Even though 
the existence o f ECOWAS did not prevent the flare-ups between Burkina Faso and Mali in 
1985, or the degeneration o f relations between Ghana and Togo in 1986, it could be 
suggested that full and prolonged war was avoided because o f the mediation efforts o f  
ECOWAS and Accord de Non-Aggression et d ’Assistcmce en Matiere de Defense 
(ANAD)16. Thus though it cannot be asserted that a psycho-social community is 
responsible for the relative peace in the West African region, the participation in a 
common organisation has been helpful. Perhaps it is the attitudes o f leaders to each other 
that has changed rather than attitudes at the popular level.
14 Claude, I., Swords into Ploughshares. Third Edition, University of London Press, London, 1964
13 See Taylor, P., 'Functionalism: The Approach of David Mitrany', in Frameworks of International 
Co-operation, op. cit.
16 ANAD is the institution emanating from CEAO's Defence Protocol which was signed in April 
1977. The ANAD Accord set up a Conference of Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers 
and a Secretariat with each playing a different role in managing the organization. Chipman, J., French 
Power in Africa. Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 177-79.
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The difficulty in applying Mitranian functionalism in respect o f attitude changes 
suggested above is that it sees it as emanating mainly from the popular level. Governments 
are not really restrained in the Mitranian sense from war mainly because o f changed 
attitudes but because their enmeshment with each other makes recourse to war too 
expensive. Primary emphasis is therefore placed on attitude changes at the popular level. 
Critics have, however, asked whether participation in an international organisation, or 
experiencing the effects o f international institutions can bring about changes in attitudes.
As Paul Taylor, pointed out,17conventional wisdom does suggest that the worst forms o f  
hostility, usually based on ignorance or prejudice, tend to be less extreme when people 
associate with each other.18 Because regional integration in West Africa is not according 
to Mitranian functionalism it is difficult to say whether functionalism would have been 
successful or not. As we pointed out above, the inevitability o f dirigisme in the approach 
to regional organisation, in addition to being a criticism of functionalist theory, is also 
indicative o f the possibility that contrary to functionalist theory attitude changes will occur 
at the government level before changing at the popular level.
Another criticism about functionalist theory which applies to West Africa is the 
separation o f high and low politics. The politicised nature o f west African economic issues 
both at the international, regional and domestic levels make such dichotomy spurious.
Since this distinction is crucial to the gradualist approach, the functionalist process is
17 Taylor, P., ibid. See also Wolf, P., 'International organisation and Attitude Change: a 
Re-examination of functionalist Approach1, in International Organisation, vol. 27,no. 3 - Summer 1973, 
pp 347 - 372.
18 Taylor, ibid.
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therefore unlikely to start at all. This in turn means there will be no process dynamics that 
will lead to integration in other areas.19
Sympathisers o f functionalism have however countered this argument by pointing 
out that the issue is not so much between high politics and low politics, but rather the 
identification between less and more contentious political issues.
Other critics have pointed out that the issue o f the enmeshment o f governments is 
unlikely to occur. This as they pointed out, is because despite the increased interactions o f  
governments in economic and welfare issues in recent years, all that it has resulted in is 
that it has produced new arena for states to flex their muscles. The disputes that have 
arisen through such co-operation are as intractable as those that occurred in disputes over 
territory in earlier periods particularly since more issues in national life are becoming 
politicised.20
Though this criticism is valid to a certain extent, the fact that co-operation among 
states stresses economic or development issues rather than the acquisition o f territory is in 
itself a response to expectations at the popular level. Moreover, disputes centre more on 
acceptable international frameworks for co-operation than on pugnacious and jingoistic 
attitudes. Thus, as Professor Morse has pointed out, 'foreign policies under modernised 
conditions approach a pole o f co-operation rather than a pole o f conflict. Conflictual or 
political activities therefore take place within the context o f predominantly cooperative
19Haas, E. B., Bevond the Nation-State. Stamford University Press, 1964.
“ Puchala, D., and Fagan, S., 'International Politics in the 1970s: The Search for Perspectives' in 
International Organisation. Spring 1974, vol. 28, no 2.
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arrangements.'21 Functionalism therefore is not negated by bargaining methods that 
accompany international co-operation.
The relevance o f functionalism to ECOWAS lies mainly in the structure o f the 
institution. Because o f its universalist orientation, functionalism cannot be practised in its 
pure form within a regional context. Thus, though regional integration groups may use 
functional methods in their approach to tackling individual problems, the fact that the 
theory sees regionalism as insufficient for and even detrimental to the maintenance of  
peace and the efficient allocation o f resources means it is not applicable to ECOWAS or 
any other regional integration scheme.
In the first instance, pressure groups are not developed enough and neither are 
individual influences strong enough to act as the dynamics o f a functional institution. 
Popular awareness is usually minimal and is usually limited to the elite. Secondly 
ECOWAS is, to a large extent, expected eventually to be able help the member countries 
to countervail the economic and political power o f the developed countries and therefore 
has to be a clearly defined institution that functions in what is seen as an essentially 
competitive world. Thirdly territoriality is an imperative ingredient in an economically 
integrated area because o f the common external tariff which is expected to play such an 
important role in creating the enlarged market that is necessary for industrialisation. 
Finally, the political realities o f West Africa, such as, the jealously guarded newly won 
sovereignties, also make functionalism an unlikely basis for institution building.
21 Morse, E. L ., ' The Transformation of foreign politics: modernisation, independence and 
extemalisation' World Politics. April 1970, p382.
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On the basis o f the above, functionalism though an important contribution to the 
theory o f international organisation cannot be used as the organising concept behind 
integration in West Africa.
2.3 Neo-Functionalism
Neo-functionalism is a body o f theory that attempts to describe, explain and predict 
regional integration schemes. Its main architect was Ernest B. Haas22 who offered it as 'an 
academic rationalisation o f the strategy and goals' incorporated in the Treaty o f the 
European Coal and Steel Community.23
The main tenets o f neo-functionlism can be gleaned from M. Schuman's 
Declaration which he made on 9 May 1950 as an introductory proposal for the formation 
o f the European community:
Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single, 
general plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, 
which first create a de facto solidarity.... The pooling of coal 
and steel production will immediately provide for the setting up 
of common basis for economic development as the first step in the 
federation of Europe.24
From the above quotation we can identify important elements o f  
neo-functionalism.25 First, there is the gradualist and incremental approach that is adopted 
from functionalism. Secondly, the approach envisages that increases in the functional 
scope o f a community are to be consolidated by concrete achievements in earlier ventures.
22 The form in which Haas offered his theory in its original form is contained in The Uniting of 
Europe. Stanford, 1958.
“ Harrison, R. J., 'Neo-functionalism' in Framework for International Co-operation, op. cit.
“ Quoted in Harrison, ibid.
“ Our using the quotation as a basis for teasing out the elements within neo-functionalism derives 
from the fact, as stated earlier, that The Uniting of Europe is essentially an attempt to validate the method 
adopted by the ECSC.
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This proposition that achievements would act as proof that the pooling together o f  
resources in an attempt to solve common tasks will result in a de facto solidarity was also 
anticipated by the functionalists. Thirdly, regional integration must start with tasks that are 
important to national governments, and have expansive capacity. The choice o f coal and 
steel for the European Coal and Steel Community was therefore because o f its importance 
to the economic life o f France and West Germany. Additionally coal was chosen, as 
Lindberg pointed out, because integration in that product was expected to result in an 
integration sufficient to reduce the war making capacity o f either nation and thereby make 
war 'materially impossible' between them.26 This again would seem to have been 
anticipated by the idea o f enmeshment postulated by functionalism. Finally, the quotation 
specifically mentions federation as the goal being aimed at in the long run, a position 
opposed to functionalism because o f its inability to ensure peace.
Another part o f the same declaration points out that: 'The French government 
proposes that the entire French-German production o f coal and steel be placed under a 
common high Authority, in an organisation open to the participation o f the other countries 
of Europe.'27 This quotation implies a supranational institution, a structure which is almost 
taken for granted by neo-functionalism. This was a proposition Mitrany disagreed with 
very much because he felt this together with territorial demarcation would only lead to the 
creation o f supra-states with their attendant competitive outlooks, and tendency toward 
war.
“ Lindberg, L., and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1970. A 
major problem with neo-functionalism is its closeness to the European Communities and therefore the 
difficulty in separating the two.
27 Schuman Declaration quoted in Lindberg, ibid., p!4.
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To vindicate the close parallel we have drawn between neo-functionalist theory and 
the ideas expressed in the Schuman declaration we will now examine Haas' own definition 
of integration. To him, integration is,
...the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national states. The end result of a process of political 
integration is a new community, superimposed over the pre-existing 
ones.
The various elements referred to above, namely: supranationality and the shifting o f  
loyalties (achieved through the creation o f a de facto solidarity) are common to both the 
propositions in the Schuman declaration and in Haas' definition.
Neo-functionalism endorses regionalism. Thus whilst functionalism implies free 
trade and global liberalism with individuals and groups conducting trade and interacting 
with little interference from governments, neo-functionalism, on the other hand, would 
seem to suggest that such liberalism be limited to a region.
Another difference between the two approaches is that they differ in the process 
mechanism they propose and the agents they emphasise as important for community 
formation. Neo-functionalism lays emphasis on political actors, changes in their attitudes 
and centralised decision making capability o f a supranational organisation.
A basic philosophical premise upon which Haas' neo-functional theory is based is 
the parallel that is drawn between politics at the national level and the international level.
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The similarity between these two levels, as Haas pointed out, are found in the type o f  
actors who are active in both spheres. As he stated;
We assume that the ends of foreign policy are qualitatively 
similar to ends implicit in any other field of politics. Whatever 
'laws' of political behaviour, group conduct, and elite leadership 
that can be isolated and identified in the domestic field are 
therefore considered applicable to the international field as 
well. In both areas the agent of action is man acting within a 
group. We doubt that this group is necessarily identical with 
what is called the nation, hence we have attempted to synthesise 
the study of political behaviour and social action with an 
analysis of international relations as one manifestation of group 
aspiration.28
The assumption then is that the essential dynamics o f national political interaction 
can be transferred to and replicated at the regional level and therefore that group 
interaction provides the essential dynamics for regional integration. This is because they 
provide the pressures that lead from integration in one task area to another. However it is 
especially groups that are involved in the economic sector that provide the necessary 
impetus or takeoff for integration. They are seen as the groups that are in the forefront of  
those who clamour for the recognition o f common needs. Thus because economic issues 
are important in national life, an integration o f economic tasks also creates the necessary 
strains and distortions that need to be adjusted. Since the groups in the economic sphere 
are the most active, they clamour and demand adjustment. This adjustment results in 
further integration and therefore, leads to an expansion in the scope o f the supranational 
organisation's functions.
This mechanism provides the logic for what is called spill-over. The groups that 
interact, according to Haas, do not need to have coincidental aims. However, their aims
“ quoted in Harrison, op. cit. See also Taylor, P., The State in the European Community in the 
1970s: the limits International Integration. Ph.D. thesis presented to the University of London in 1982, pi.
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need to be compatible. This means that the satisfying and adjustment process that follows 
previous integrative steps may results in various groups within the sector asking for their 
interests to be satisfied. The satisfaction o f the different though compatible aims therefore 
is what leads to a spill-over in scope.
Spill-over from this perspective is therefore a harnessing o f pressures produced by 
competing groups within issue areas. However, this phenomenon is seen as occurring 
between issue area also. As Lindberg pointed out, Haas reasoned that because economic 
problems were interconnected, the solution o f one will necessarily lead to the need for 
joint action in the resolution o f other related areas. This kind o f spill-over, referred to by 
some as functional spill-over,29 also leads to an expansion in the scope o f the international 
organisation. An example o f such a spill-over will be one that results from the removal o f 
tariffs between members of a free trade area. The free trade area may however result in 
trade deflection and therefore necessitate policies that counteract it. These policies need 
to be made centrally at the supranational level and therefore extend the scope o f collective 
decision making at the regional level. The movement from negative integration i.e., the 
removal o f tariff barriers, to positive integration i.e., the adoption o f co-ordinated and 
common policies is a manifestation o f such a spill-over.
Thus the snowball effect that is expected to be created by the realisation that the 
inter-connectedness o f various aspects o f economic task will mean more and more issue 
areas will have to be integrated provides the essential dynamics or automaticity of the 
spill-over logic which is central to neo-functionalist theory.
29 See Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the light 
of the new dynamism of the EEC.’ Millennium. Spring 1991, vol. 20, no 1, pp 4-6.
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Though the process starts with the collective solving o f central economic tasks, it 
is expected to spill-over into the political sphere also. As Haas pointed out, 'economic 
integration, however defined, may be based on political motives and frequently begets 
political consequences.'30 It is the gradual extension o f the scope o f central collective 
decision making to 'take in economic pursuits not initially 'federated', which gives rise to 
the growth o f a political community.31 The movement from economic integration to 
political union is possible, because 'under modem conditions the relationship between 
economic and political union [are] b est... treated as a continuum'. The integrated tasks 
therefore spill-over automatically from welfare issues into political issues.
Additionally because the formation o f a political community, is expected to, 
depend on the expectations and loyalties o f political actors, the assumption that their 
values will change, and interest redefined in terms o f regional rather than national 
orientation is crucial to the maintenance o f the supranational organisation. The change in 
values, and loyalties is seen as possible because the existence o f multiple loyalties is 
assumed possible. Thus, though loyalty to the nation does not change drastically, 
participation in an international organisation which in the beginning demand a different set 
o f loyalties eventually and gradually supersede that to the individual nation.
Groups are however seen as the main elements who transfer loyalty to the 
supranational organisation. Through the necessity o f their working together in a
30 Haas, The Uniting of Europe, op. tit., pl2.
31 ibid.
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transnational institution their values and doctrines merge thus uniting groups across 
frontiers.
The gradual shifting o f loyalties together with concrete results o f former 
integration measures result in political actors turning to the supranational institution 
because o f their uncertainty about being able to achieve their political and economic 
interest from national frameworks.32
Once political actors are involved in decision making at the regional level, the 
method o f conflict resolution itself, it is suggested, can help in gauging the progress o f the 
integration process.33 Three conflict resolution methods have been identified for their 
increasing integrative potential. The first is 'an accommodation on the basis o f the 
minimum common denomination.' This is seen as the least demanding, and entails partners 
reducing their antagonism by demanding exchange concessions o f highly equal value. 
Gains and losses are easily identified but the impact o f the transactions do not go beyond 
what the least cooperative bargaining partner is willing to concede.
The second method is that which involves 'splitting the difference'. This also 
involves concessions being made to bargaining units but this time the conflict is not 
resolved by conceding to the least co-operative but is settled somewhere between the 
formal bargaining positions.
“ ibid.
“ Haas, E., 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process', in 
Organisation, vol. 15, no. 3, Summer 1961.
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The third, and the one with the most potential for increasing the level o f integration 
is that which upgrades the common interests o f the parties. This is seen as close to what 
happens in a national parliament Where full legislative and judicial jurisdiction gives the 
decision making body the clout it needs for such decisions. It implies that the parties 
succeed in redefining the conflict and are able to work out a solution at a higher level. 
However, to do so the mandate or task o f the international organisation will have to be 
expanded. The impact o f this method o f negotiating results in maximising the spill-over 
effect o f decisions.
With the necessary powers to make decisions binding, such a method o f  
negotiations indicates 'supranational' decision making, and therefore represents a high level 
o f integration.
Neo-Functionalism and Regional Integration in West Africa
Having examined neo-fimctionalism in some detail, the question to ask now is how 
relevant it is to regional integration in West Africa. To help us answer this question it will 
be useful to examine how it fared in Western Europe where the conditions for its success 
were present. This will then be compared to the West African region where presumed 
conditions such as pluralism are absent. W hy, for example did the automaticity of 
'spill-over' did not result in political community in the European Community within a 
decade o f its inception as Haas had predicted in 1958?
First, politicisation was checked by both institutional factors and the less than 
expected level o f group participation in the community. Second, sovereignty proved to be
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a very intractable and difficult characteristic to transfer or erode from national to the 
regional level. Thus Harrison, for example, pointed out that the European Community 
which was the concrete test o f neo-functionalist theory proved disappointing.
If institutional factors and group participation contributed to the failure o f  
neo-fimctionalism in the European Community, it is unlikely to fare any better in West 
Africa. This is because the institutional framework o f the EC is more sophisticated than 
that o f ECOWAS. Additionally interest group activity in the EC is more pervasive than in 
ECOWAS.
The structure of the Community has had an adverse effect on the achievement of 
incremental politicisation. The commission was supposed to play an important initiatory 
and creative role. This role was to create a dialogue between itself (the Commission) and 
the Council o f Ministers. In neo-functionalist conceptions it was to be the focus o f the 
'informal pressures o f the various national groups', and European wide 'umbrella' 
organisations. The activities of these groups and their demands for adjustment and redress 
for imbalances resulting from earlier integrative steps was to carry on the spill-over effect. 
The involvement in the commission would also ensure that the commissions initiatory role 
was conducted in a way that would maximise the involvement and support of as wide a 
range o f groups as possible.
The difficulty with this assumption is that it presupposes pluralism, a condition 
which is missing both at the state level in terms o f political participation and in terms of 
group participation in decision making in West Africa. The pluralistic assumptions indicate
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the difficulty o f applying Eurocentric postulates to other regions o f the world. The idea 
that regional integration could be embarked upon by extending national political 
frameworks and dynamics to the regional level is therefore limited to the extent that the 
building blocks underlying the theory are informed by a particular political structure or 
perspective. Thus the pluralism which neo-fimctionalism assumes makes the theory of 
limited relevance to West Africa which until recently was dominated by military regimes, 
and closed systems o f decision making. These issues are discussed in the next chapter.
Furthermore, the Commission in the neo-functionalist conception was expected to 
play a role similar to those played by national administrative machinery. Backed by the 
Treaty provisions the commission's administrations were expected to play their initiating 
role in the integration process. Being community, rather than national or state oriented, 
the Commission was also to play an arbiter and mediator role. Together with and using the 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committees, the Commission would then ensure 
that the pressures o f spill-over were worked out productively.34
These theoretical conceptions o f the role o f the Commission were not borne out in 
practice. The residing o f ultimate decision making with the Council o f Ministers curtailed 
the significance o f the initiating and amendment roles o f the Commission. In order to put 
forward proposals that would pass through the unit-veto procedure o f the Council, the 
Commission has had to consider the power configuration within the Council. Thus, 
proposals made by the commission have been mainly quasi-diplomatic sounding out o f
34 Harrison, R.J, op. cit.
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national governments' attitudes and opinions and the incorporation o f the appropriate 
concessions and compromises.35
Secondly, the administrative and bureaucratic competence o f the Commission 
which was based on the extrapolation from national level, proved to be incomplete. As 
has been pointed out by Harrision, bureaucratic competence without the support o f  
political leadership tends to be ineffective, incapable o f taking charge o f problem situations 
and giving direction and purpose to their solution.36
Thus political weight could not be provided by the Commission which had become 
subordinated to the Council.
ECOWAS has no organ that is equivalent to the Commission o f the EC. The 
ECOWAS secretariat has neither the capability nor the resources to enable it to play a role 
similar to the Commission's. Both in terms o f administrative capacity and treaty provisions 
the ECOWAS institutions are handicapped.
By assuming that the study o f regional integration was concerned with tasks, 
transactions, perceptions and learning, and not with sovereignty, military capability, and 
balance o f power, Haas seriously underestimated issues o f formal power and sovereignty 
in the process o f integration in the European Community. Leaders such as De Gaulle, and 
Margaret Thatcher have prevented consequential measures from being proposed, and
33 ibid.
36 ibid.
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fragmented public opinion on the issue of Europeanism'. The important role envisaged for 
the political parties and pressure groups has not materialised.
The main elements that were to be the engine of the spill-over were therefore, not 
quite as effective as the neo-functionalists had hoped. Another criticism that is levelled at 
neo-functionalism is that it does not give proper recognition to exogenous influences on 
the integration process. Based on his doctrine of the Logic of Diversity, Hoffman for 
example, in writing after the 1965-1966 crisis, intimated that differences in domestic 
determinants, geo-historical situations, and outside aims acted as countervailing influences 
on the logic of integration.37 Even though the effects of the global system impinged on 
nations differently, its overall impact was general, hence it will be impossible to insulate a 
particular region from its influence. External factors, and the sensitivity of high politics 
which were not carefully considered by neo-functionalism, according to Hoffman, impede 
integration and leave the hard core of sovereignty intact.
If neo-functionalism, which was tailored to fit Western European conditions failed 
to identify important process variables and to predict outcomes, can we expect it to work 
in West Africa where, as has been pointed out above, the political, social and economic 
systems are different? Additionally can ECOWAS with a much weaker institutional 
framework, less delegated legislative capacity, less resources and manpower succeed in 
implementing neo-functionalist tenets?
37Hoffnam, S., 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the case of Western 
Europe, Daedalus vol. 95, 1966.
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In addition to the underlying assumptions that there was internal political pluralism 
in the member countries, the theory also presumes that there is harmony of national 
interests at the regional level; incrementalism could not be reversed; that groups, political 
elite and governments would assume that interdependence between states is good for 
national and personal development; and that political evolution ought to result in larger 
units emerging from previously smaller ones- very much like the assumptions of social 
Darwinism.
Political pluralism was to make possible the participation of interest and pressure 
groups and political parties at the regional level. This, presumably, would have helped in 
legitimising regional institutions to the extent that demands emanate from a cross section 
of the population of the member states. The regional supranational institution would thus 
have a legitimacy which would have gone beyond governmental recognition to a de facto  
endorsement by groups representing popular interests. This, it can be suggested, is an 
attempt to by-pass the parochialism of statecentric international relations to a pluralistic 
approach which involves more than just states. This approach, we further suggest, is not 
primarily because of the recognition that units other than states are important in 
international relations. It is more because of the assumption that transnational activity is 
more likely to tone down the power politics of governments, and hence result in easier 
authority and legitimacy transfer. This would seem to suggest that the statesman qua 
statesman acted differently in his political behaviour from the individual qua individual. 
Indeed the suggestion that the loyalties that individuals would give to the regional 
organisation are qualitatively different from those that individuals direct at the state not 
only underlies this but complicates it by implying that loyalty that is engendered by
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economic expediencies are necessarily different from those that emanate from political 
affiliation.
Perhaps it is the difficulty of clinically transferring different aspects of loyalty to 
different centres that make it difficult for neo-functionalist postulates to be replicated in 
practice. Though it cannot be doubted that the European Community has achieved a 
certain amount of supranationalism, the degree of governmental subordination to the 
decisions of the European commission is far less than was expected by neo-functionalists.
I f , as we have suggested, supranationalism was supposed to be, essentially, a 
product of group and hence popular legitimization endorsed by elite activities, then it is 
possible to suggest that the low level of pluralism at the national level, and the virtual 
absence of region wide umbrella groups in West Africa will make supranationalism very 
difficult to achieve among ECOWAS countries. Parochialism of national governments can 
be expected to predominate regional decision making since there will be no strong and 
impartial body to allocate resources in an authoritative manner.
To assume that the active participation of groups would somehow have pushed 
forward the spill-over effect of integration and therefore resulted in an increased role for 
regional institutions takes for granted the assumption that members of groups share a 
common attitude toward regionalism and supranationalism. Political parties are identified 
as one of the groups that will push forward regional integration. Politicians were also 
expected to switch loyalties as the state proved to be less competent than the region at 
meeting their needs.
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As we have noted loyalty to the state predominates all across West Africa. 
Politicians have not switched sides but instead display varying levels of support for 
regional decision making according to the issue that is involved.
Groups in Europe have themselves, in certain instances, coalesced both at the 
national and at the regional level to impede supranationalism. Thus the assumption that 
groups share a collective desire to transcend the state overlooks the fact that some groups 
are based on an ideology of political and economic nationalism. It is indeed paradoxical 
that in Western Europe where the theory assumes that governments can only be trapped 
into integration, the governments are now sometimes even more enthusiastic about 
integration than groups and individuals within their countries. The belief that loyalty to the 
state is necessarily undermined by other poles of identification solely on the basis of 
welfare provision is therefore not tenable. Nationalism involves both tangible and 
intangible elements which neo-functionalism does not pay adequate attention to.
In addition to the difficulties inherent in the assumption made about group 
participation, neo-functionalists also assume that harmony of national interests coincides 
with the region. As has been shown in the case of the European Community, member 
states have interests that can drastically affect the framework of regional integration. 
France's interests, and later the UK's, resulted in the external tariff, that protects the 
economic interest of member states from non member countries, being altered to 
accommodate such interests. Thus the Younde and later, the Lome Convention give access 
47
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to the European market for goods originating from African Caribbean and Pacific 
countries.
In West Africa, external political and economic dependence makes external 
influence very important in the calculation of the benefits and costs of participation.
Another assumption that underlies neo-functional theory is that super states or a 
merging of states results in improved capabilities. Indeed, the reasons given for regional 
integration in all cases seem to subscribe to this position. In the case of Western Europe, 
the assumption was that integration would help increase the capability of ifs members 
vis-a-vis the United States and the former Soviet Union. Though it was not based on a 
questioning of the viability of the individual member states as national units, it nevertheless 
assumed that bigger states implied greater capability and influence.
In West Africa, regionalism is actually predicated on the supposed lack of viability 
of the states within the region. Size is often cited as the cause of such unviability. Unlike 
regionalism in western Europe, integration in west Africa is based not primarily on what it 
can help the members to achieve in terms of extra-regional actors, or in merely improving 
already existing capability, but instead on the very survival of the states as a viable unit. If 
founded on this assumption, then integration will only succeed if all the member states 
share the belief that integration is the most viable way of overcoming such a constraint. 
Disagreement on either the purpose or method will result in an in failure.
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In addition to questioning the idea that bigger states are more viable, a more 
specific question with regard to west African countries would be whether size is really the 
cause if the lack of development. Even though there is no doubt that a country should 
preferably be of a minimum size for economic and political viability, it must be pointed 
out that some of the countries in West Africa are bigger than some in Europe both in terms 
of population and geographical spread. Furthermore, the case of Japanese development 
and economic strengths suggests that size is not a sine qua non for development. More 
specifically, we could say that the difficulties faced by Nigeria in pursuing her 
development ambitions cannot be attributed to size.
Thus, though it might be true that a certain minimum size is desirable for a 
nation-state in order for it to function effectively in a competitive international system, it 
is equally true that size is not a necessary condition for success. Since viability of a state 
can be altered by, for example, the discovery of petroleum, the criterion for viability 
cannot be predetermined on population, size or the geographical spread of the country.
Neo-Functionalist Reactions to Criticisms
Faced with the empirical invalidation and theoretical criticisms, neo-functionalists 
reacted in various instances by improving independent variables for increasing integration 
and acknowledging the influences of external factors and the effects of political leaders.
Haas and Berrera, for example, improved on the operationalisation of an earlier list 
of independent variables produced by Haas and Schmitter. These variables were made up 
of: background conditions; conditions at the time of economic union; and process
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conditions. Background conditions was originally operationalised to include: size of the 
unit; rate of transactions; pluralism; and elite complementarity. To these was added a fifth; 
perceptions of dependence.
To the two operational variables; governmental processes, and powers of the 
union, which constituted 'conditions at the time of economic union', was added 'external 
pressures'. This same variable was also added to 'process conditions,' which was 
previously made up of; decision making style, rate of transactions, and adaptability of
■30governments.
All of these revisions do not really change the initial assumption of a fairly 
advanced political and economic structure within member states and a high level of pre 
integration interaction between them. Thus these revisions do not make the theory any 
more relevant to the countries of West Africa even though they improve our understanding 
of why integration would not be feasible in the region.
Schimitter also proposed a redefinition that focused on the relation between well 
defined variables, and suggested further that there could be the possibility of different 
outcomes to the process.39 By calling the dependent variable 'actor integration strategies' 
he related the outcome of the process to the desires of participants. He then proposed 
seven possible actor strategies that will determine the outcome of the process. These 
strategies and their possible effects are: (1) spill-over; these include strategies that increase
38'The Operationalisation of Some Variables Related to Regional Integration: A Casework Note', in 
International Organisation, vol. 23, no 1, Winter 1969, pl53.
39'A Revised Theory of Regional Integration', International Organization, vol. 24, no. 4, Autumn 
1970, pp 705 - 737.
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both the scope and level of commitment of the actor, (2) spill-around; these are strategies 
that are geared to increase the scope of the scheme while holding the level of authority 
constant, 3) buildup strategies - those that increase the decisional autonomy or capacity of 
joint deliberations but deny the entrance into new issue areas, 4) retrenching strategies - 
those that are meant to increase the level of joint deliberation but withdraw the 
institution(s) from certain areas, 5) muddle-about; these are strategies that let the regional 
bureaucrats debate, suggest, and expostulate on a wider variety of issues but decrease their 
actual capacity to allocate values, 6) spillback strategies - strategies that cause a retreat in 
both scope and level possibly returning to, the status quo ante, and finally 7) encapsulation 
- a situation in which the actors respond to crisis by marginal modification within the zone 
of indifference.
By relating outcomes to actor strategies, Schimmitter deviated from the 
automaticity of spill-over and the inevitable enmeshment of national governments that 
earlier formulations had suggested. However, whether member states deliberately set out 
to pursue the above policies or whether they happen fortuitously is a debatable issue. Their 
effect in promoting, stagnating or retrenching integration will depend on; whether the 
strategy is supported by a majority of members, what the voting procedure within the 
community are, and treaty provisions.
Other neo-functionalists such as Lindberg had always been more cautious about 
the inevitability of eventual politicisation. Indeed, his view that politics is defined by 
process rather than by substance gives his definition of'political integration' more latitude 
and therefore protects him from being backed into a corner as Haas was. As he stated, 'the
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sure sign of political integration is in a system which can make authoritative decisions for 
the entire community regardless of whether these are military, economic, or social welfare 
decisions.140 He therefore saw political integration in terms of the level of authority of the 
regional organisation which is in turn reflected in such variables as scope, range of decision 
making stages and the relative decisiveness of community decisions vis-a-vis national 
governments.
Haas, on the other hand, had by the mid 1970s grown disenchanted with 
integration theorising in general and neo-functionalism in particular for its failure in the 
context of the European Community. In the first instance he downgraded integration 
theories to the status of pre-theories and subsequently asserted that the familiar regional 
integration theories are obsolete in Western Europe and obsolescent though still useful in 
the rest of the world. Why it was still useful for the rest of the world when he considered it 
obsolete for Europe is not clear. But whether it was indeed obsolete for Europe is 
debatable given the new dynamism of the European Community and the desire of some to 
see a federal Europe. The proposals in 1991 for the formation of a federation seems to 
have propelled federal goals unto the agenda of the Community, and despite the different 
interpretations of what that might mean, has put a directly political element into the 
debate. Second, the collective response of the European Community to the crisis in 
Yugoslavia in June 1991, and the other trouble spots around the world, could be 
interpreted as a movement into collective decision making in foreign policy, an area 
normally regarded as the preserve of national governments.
40 Lindberg, N.L and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1970, p32.
109
Haas, it therefore could be suggested, may have been hasty in saying that 
integration theory is obsolete in Western Europe. What he should have suggested, was a 
revision of the theory to better describe and explain the integration phenomenon without 
predicting a definite outcome. Thus a revision of theory to incorporate the various 
postulates that had been arrived at by other students of integration would have been more 
helpful than abandonment.
Despite its shortcomings, the incremental and gradualist economic determinism 
with political minimalism which neo-functionalism entails continues to be the main method 
adopted by regional integration because it enables different aims to be brought to the 
collective decision making arena. Centralisation of decision making is a strategy that has 
been adopted by the ECOWAS. The prospective benefits of integration in West Africa are 
expected to be derived not only from negative integration but from the progressive 
intensification and co-ordination of decision making. The movement along the Balassa 
continuum which the Treaty proposes implies progressive inter penetration of economic 
activity, and the shaping of domestic politics to align with and make possible the 
realisation of Community goals. Neo-functionalism provides the framework that suits such 
a strategy. It makes possible the initial co-operation of sovereign states and enables them 
to postpone the taking of political decisions to the future.
2.4 The Communication Approach
This approach to regional integration lays emphasis on the changes that occur in 
attitudes and values at the popular level. Such changes provide the dynamics and stability 
of the emergent system.41
110
It uses as its principal indicator, the transaction between people, and postulates that 
the most promising general method of moving toward integration would be for there to be 
increasing and better communication.42 Such communication comprises not only greater 
exchange of goods, services, and persons but also ideas, and more institutions for 
carrying on consultations between governments and, where possible, for making joint 
decisions. It also includes the appropriate legal and institutional safeguards that will be 
needed when the mobility of persons increase.
From the historical study they conducted, they found that of two possible 
outcomes of integration, pluralistic security community and amalgamated security 
community, the former was more easily achieved. The conclusion they drew, therefore, 
was that pluralism offers the best method for regional integration. A pluralistic security 
community according to Deutsch is one that retains the legal independence of separate 
governments. On the other hand an amalgamated security - community involves the 
'formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with 
some type of common government after amalgamation'.43 This common government could 
be federal or unitary. According to their study the reason why pluralistic security- 
communities turned out to be easier to attain, and preserve was due to the larger number 
of background conditions and political processes required for the attainment of an 
amalgamated community. Indeed they go as far as to suggest that to pursue pluralism 
would not preclude amalgamation but to attempt a one-step amalgamation (as, for
41 Taylor, P. A., 'Conceptual Typology of International Organisations' in A Framework for 
International Co-operation, op. cit., pp 18-19.
42Deutsch, K. W., et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton University 
Press, 1957.
43 ibid., p8.
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example, suggested by federalism) might well postpone for a considerable time even the 
attainment of a pluralistic integration.
To sustain integration, Deutsch et. al. suggested that the responsiveness of 
governments and political elite of member countries to each others' need and desires was 
extremely important. Such responsiveness, they stated, requires increased attention, fuller 
and more accurate understanding and more rapid and effective action. The increased 
responsiveness would be brought about firstly by increased capabilities of the governments 
concerned in the areas of administration, policy formation, decision making, and action. 
They concluded that weak governments did not lead to stronger supranational institutions. 
This conclusion would seem to contradict the neo-functionalist thesis which suggests the 
opposite.
This contradiction is not so strong however if one realises that the federal outcome 
which Haas envisages entails a diminished role for national governments whilst the 
pluralistic security community which Deustch advocates requires very capable national 
governments.
A second and overlapping ingredient required for increasing responsiveness is 'a 
greater and wider range and volume of communications and other transactions between 
countries concerned.144 This should be made up of transactions associated with rewards 
and 'expectations of rewards.' Thirdly, responsiveness must include a strengthening of 
social groups, institutions, and organisations 'that functions as unbroken links of social
44 ibid. p200
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communication between the member countries. A final element of such a policy should be 
one which seeks to greatly increase the mobility of persons throughout the area.45
From the prescriptions above, they identified the following background conditions 
as essential for establishing a regional amalgamated security-community. These 
conditions are: (1) mutual compatibility of main values; (2) a distinctive way of life; (3) 
expectations of stronger economic ties or gains; (4) a marked increase in political and 
administrative capabilities of at least some participating units; (6) unbroken links of social 
communication, both geographically between territories and sociologically between 
different social strata; (7) a broadening of the political elite; (8) mobility of persons, at 
least among the politically relevant strata; (9) a multiplicity of ranges of communication 
and transactions. Three other conditions were found to be essential; (10) a compensation 
of flows of communications and transaction; (11) a not too infrequent interchange of 
group roles; (12) considerable mutual predictability of behaviour.^They stated however 
that none of these conditions was by itself sufficient and the presence of all of them was no 
guarantee to successful amalgamation. Deutsch et al nevertheless concluded that any 
territory which fulfilled all the essential conditions should be a good part of the way to 
successful amalgamation.
Compared to the 12 background conditions necessary for an amalgamated security 
community to be formed only three are required for a political security community to 
succeed. These are; (1) the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision 
making; (2) the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to
45 ibid., p58.
46 ibid. p58.
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each other's needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to 
violence; and (3) mutual predictability of behaviour. On the other hand they also found 
that certain conditions which had often been considered essential for the formation of an 
amalgamated security community turned out to be overrated. Though helpful, they were 
found not to be essential and included (1) administrative and dynastic union; (2) ethnic or 
linguistic assimilation; (3) strong economic ties and; (4) foreign military threats.
The relative ease with which a pluralistic security community could be formed 
makes it an attractive method for countries considering regional integration. This is 
because it does not need too many predetermined conditions for success. Secondly, it 
ought to appeal to those regions where political unification is not a goal, and where 
member states are unwilling to enter into supranational arrangements in order to reap 
economic benefits.
Compared to the essentially federalist postulations of neo-functionalists, 
communication theorists see integration as being possible within a pluralistic international 
system. It must be pointed out that pluralism is just one of two possibilities that 
integration, according to the communication theorist, could result in. The only reason why 
they de-emphasise an amalgamated security community, whether unitary or federal, is 
because it is more difficult to achieve and its pursuit might make the achievement of even 
a pluralistic security community difficult. The latter has a lower threshold than the former. 
It is therefore not quite correct to categorise communication theory as pluralist theory or 
perspective as Pentland did.47 All that Deutsch et. al do is to emphasise the relatively less 
demanding conditions and easier attainment of a pluralistic security community.
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The communication theorists are primarily concerned, like functionalists, with 
peace and security. The framework within which this is achieved is secondary. Thus 
Deutsch stated:
Since our study deals with the problem of ensuring peace, we 
shall say that any political community, be it amalgamated or 
pluralistic, was eventually successful if it became a security - 
community - that is if it achieved integration - and was
unsuccessful if it ended eventually in secession or civil war. 48
Integration is therefore a goal, a terminal condition in communications theory. It is 
also the condition that will ensure peace among member states. The minimum condition 
that ought to pertain for integration to be present is a pluralistic security community in 
which the independence of member states is retained.
The process of integration itself is paralleled to an assembly line. The integrated 
communities 'are assembled in all their essential elements and aspects in the course of 
history, somewhat as an automobile is put together'.49 According to this analogy, the 
sequence in which the elements are added does not really matter. Just as the performance 
of an assembled car does not depend on the sequence but instead on the fact that all the 
elements have been added so integration does not depend on defined consequences. Thus 
Deutsch concludes:
47 Pentland, C., International Theory and European Integration. Faber and Faber, London, 1973.
48Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, op. cit., p3.
49 Deutsch, W. K., The Analysis of International Relations, op. cit. p275.
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Functionalism and functional arrangements..., have 
little effect by themselves upon the eventual success or 
failure of efforts to establish and generate security 
communities. The outcome in each case is most likely to 
depend on other conditions and processes, particularly 
on how rewarding or unrewarding were the experiences 
associated with functional arrangements. The most that 
can be said for functionalism is that it avoids the 
perils of premature amalgamation, and that it gives the 
participating governments, elite, and peoples more 
time gradually to learn the habits and skill of more 
far-reaching, stable, and rewarding integration.50
This would seem to negate the spill-over concept which is so central to both 
functionalism and neo-functionalism. Implicit in the logic of spill-over is the development 
from the simple to the complex; an organic complexity which is achieved as enmeshment 
and engranage cause integration to move from less contentious issues to previously 
untouchable areas of high politics. Additionally, the mechanistic approach the Deustch 
analogy suggests, implies that the elements (parts) which should be assembled to arrive at 
the end state are clearly recognisable and are available. The process itself would only 
facilitate a terminal state for which favourable conditions were already available to be put 
together as the parts of a car are available to be put together. This implies that the 
background conditions are crucial and are to be likened to the parts of a car. Once they are 
absent, integration becomes impossible.
It is obvious from the above that such a mechanistic approach is not possible, given 
that there is no agreement on what constitutes the parts that should be put together, and 
that the form of the terminal state is something that member states do not always agree 
on. We would suggest that it is the interplay between the process and background 
conditions that would determine relative success.
50 ibid. p. 227.
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The process itself, according to the communication theorists, often begins around a 
core area which is made up either of a unit or a collection of units which in some 
significant respects are stronger, more developed, and more attractive than the rest. 
Political leaders of such core areas then act as the elite/unifiers for the emerging integrated 
political system. As the process develops the political divisions within the emerging 
amalgamated security community become weaker and shift away from the boundaries of 
the participating units. The previous political divisions are replaced by political life which 
cut across the originally political units. The more varied and salient these mutually 
crosscutting divisions are, the better for the acceptability of the emerging union. On the 
other hand if old pre union cleavages are paralleled and reinforced by the cleavages of 
language, religion, ideology, economic interest, and social class, then integration might 
actually be halted or reversed.
Whilst core areas might act as active leaders during the initial stages, the process 
itself is more likely to be given leadership by a cross-class coalition which allied the most 
outside of the insiders and the most inside of the outsiders. The first group is made up of 
those alienated members of the ruling class while the latter group include the newly 
emerging politically aware of the masses. The logic behind this is that these two groups if 
left out of the process are likely to contend for power later and therefore act as disruptive 
influences on the process. By securing their support, future frustration or alienation is 
curbed.
In addition to such coalition formation, integration according to Deutsch involves, 
from the very outset, major compromises since it is not absolute like-mindedness which is
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necessary but complimentarity of ideas and the willingness to work together or at least add 
their contributions together . The skill to make compromises is essential. Such 
compromises must be those which seek ways to exchange political favours instead of those 
that are mutually obstructive. The favours exchanged must also dovetail 'genuine and 
substantial concessions to one another's vital interest.51
As a result of the difficulties involved in establishing mutually viable patterns of 
accommodation, the process takes a considerable time. This time span can be divided into 
three stages during which leadership is provided by different groups. In the initial stages 
leadership is provided by intellectuals, then follows leadership by great politicians and 
finally, the stage of mass movements politicians and/or large-scale elite politics.
As a political process integration is supposed to have a takeoff period when it 
changes from proposals put forward by a few prophets and scattered individuals to a more 
co-ordinated movement with significant power behind it. Such takeoff can be assumed to 
occur as soon as a major social or political group, or political institution is committed to it. 
Takeoff is supposed to be followed by the attainment or abandonment of integration within 
two generation (between 20 - 60 years), even though they could take as long as five 
generations (150).
Events that might contribute to takeoff are increasing loads or demands upon the 
capabilities of governments by their population. When such increased demand cannot be 
met by the individual governments and it is recognised that a new kind of unit is needed
51 Deutsch, An Analysis of International Relations, op. cit., p278.
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for greater responsiveness, performance and greater services, integration may be viewed as 
leading to the forming of the new unit. Thus integration is seen as a means of overcoming 
the limitations of the nation-state as a form of social organisation.
A second set of events suggested as providing an impetus for takeoff is the 
existence 'of an external challenge which requires some new and joint response. Finally 
integration may become acute, and takeoff occur when a new generation arrives on the 
political scene, and are willing to take earlier degrees of common interests and outlooks 
for granted, and ready to take it as the starting point for new political action.
In his assessment of the contribution the communication approach made to the 
study of regional integration Haas stated that the hypotheses upon which the assertions 
rested were falsifiable. The hypothesis quoted was that 'if the rate of transactions is such 
and so, under conditions of balanced loads and capabilities, then elite responsiveness 
increases. If  elite responsiveness increases then a security community will arise....'52 This 
hypotheses is falsifiable, according to Haas because it is not possible to assign causative 
significance to variables that are associated with human perceptions and motives.
This criticism of Deutsch's historical interpretation of regional integration is 
unjustified. This is because in several places in Political Community Deutsch emphasised 
the importance of certain essential background conditions which need to be present for a 
security community to emerge. As pointed out earlier, the formation of a security 
community results from the interplay of these background conditions, some of which have
52 Haas, E. B., The Study of Regional Integration, op. cit., p22.
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little to do directly with human perceptions and motives. Neither do the other variable 
such as those responsible for takeoff, and those responsible for maintaining the process i.e. 
the balance between capabilities and loads. Additionally, Haas seems to lay a lot of 
emphasis on transactions without stating what these transactions are. The stress put on 
economic transactions in Haas's assessment of Communications theory is skewed since 
Deutsch et al emphasised that transactions which lead to Community formation must 
include not only the exchange of goods, services and ideas, but also more institutions for 
carrying on consultation between governments, and where possible for making joint 
decision. Thus even if the East African Common Market broke up despite the high level 
of transaction, as Haas cited, this was largely because the emphasis was placed on 
economic exchange without adequate attention being paid to compatibility of values or 
even to the building of mechanisms for responding effectively to each others grievances.
Even though Haas' criticism of Communications theory is excessively severe, he 
does point out two very important considerations which limit the use of Communications 
postulations as a theory. The first is the difficulty of using transaction flows as a proxy 
variable for measuring perceptions that lead to behaviour. The second is that the approach 
is retroactive rather than predictive. There is no relationship between the content of 
messages and the evolution of capacity on the part of regional institutions. But having 
said that, the assertion that communication theory does not explain when and how trust 
and responsiveness among actors, elite as well as masses, are to occur is not entirely 
correct because Deutsch listed four overlapping policy procedures for increasing 
responsiveness. Trust is treated as a corollary of the emergence of crosscutting divisions.
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Communications Theory and West African Integra/ion
West Africa, it would seem, from the elements that constitute responsiveness is 
fairly well placed to be successful at regional integration. The straddling of tribes across 
borders means there are already in existence unbroken links of social communication 
between the member countries. Moreover, boundaries do not reinforce the underlying 
social structure and cleavages within the region. Tribes straddle common border of 
neighbouring countries, and hence make the political boundaries incongruent with the 
actual social cleavages. The Ewe straddle the Ghana and Togo border while the Yoruba 
straddle the Nigeria and Benin border. As we conclude in the next chapter, this makes it 
possible for interaction between the members of the different countries.
Increased administrative capability, and volume and range of communications as 
elements of responsiveness are not background conditions. They are factors that are 
expected to help in sustaining the process. They are, therefore, expected to develop as the 
integration process continues, even though it does not preclude the fact that where they 
are already present the attainment of integration might be easier. Administrative capability 
within and between West African countries is weak. Indeed the weakness of the state in 
West Africa is to a certain extent, a result of the limited scope of governmental 
responsiveness to the needs of their population. Thus though social communication would 
seem to encourage integration, administrative weakness and the limited range of 
communication between the countries of the region would seem to mitigate against it. 
Though Deutsch and his colleagues do not think strong economic ties are essential for the 
formation of integration, it has to be pointed out that such an observation is made in the 
context of integration being pursued for peace and not for economic development. In an
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instance where the aim is predominantly economic strong economic links can indeed 
prove decisive in how fast goals are achieved. A major difficulty of the West African 
region is the low level of trade between the member countries. This, as has been pointed 
out in the first chapter, is responsible for the slow pace of integration in the region.
To the extent that administrative capability and the volume and range of 
communications as elements of responsiveness are expected to develop over time, the low 
capability of West African governments may not be a limiting factor in the growth of 
ECOWAS. The problem however arises where such capabilities do not develop fast 
enough for governments to be able to respond to the stresses within the system. An 
example of such a case occurred when as a result of the free movement of people within 
the community, Nigeria found itself being flooded by citizens from member countries. 
Because governments did not have the capacity to check the number of their people going 
to Nigeria, or educate their citizens about the 90 days limit to staying in other community 
countries, the consequent repatriation of illegal immigrants from Nigeria caused a lot of ill 
feeling within the community. It could be suggested that the inability of other 
governments to respond to the growing pressure on the Nigerian government to do 
something about the growing number of foreigners was in part responsible for the 
problem. Nigeria's own incapacity to keep track of such migrants also contributed to the 
problem. The important point here is that for integration to be an effective tool for 
regional collective decision making in West Africa, administrative capability and the 
volume and range of communications has to increase. So must the responsiveness of 
governments to each other.
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Whether applied strictly to regional integration, or to internal political development 
in West Africa, the above suggests that integration is a long term process. The recognition 
of new centres of political identification to replace or even coexists with the pre-existing 
ones ought therefore to be expected to take longer, according to this theory, than the 30 
odd years since independence. Tribal loyalties and allegiance to traditional rulers would 
have to be replaced by loyalty to the state within a context of increasing responsiveness. 
Internally, what political integration seeks to achieve are amalgamated security 
communities, and as we suggest in chapter three this is gradually taking place. Within the 
regional context, even though reference is made to unity in the Treaty of ECOWAS, the 
member states envisage a framework which retains their independence- a pluralistic 
reorganisation of relations within the region. In both cases, communications theory 
suggests that enough time will have to be allowed for integration.
ECOWAS was promoted most strongly by Nigeria with the help of Togo. These 
two countries, but especially the former, could be regarded as the core area around which 
the organisation was formed. Since the overthrow of General Gowan, the level of 
Nigerian leadership of the organisation has oscillated with some of the country's leaders 
even going to the extent of questioning its benefits in relation to its costs.53 
Communications theory also states that a regional coalition is necessary for integration. 
Whether a cross - class coalition across the region will be able to give leadership to 
ECOWAS is doubtful. In the first instance, the idea of integration is limited mainly to 
people who are either directly involved with ECOWAS, or are interested for one reason or
53 Gambari, I., ECOWAS, Time for National Appraisal' cited in Bach , D., Tolitics of West 
African Co-operation', in Journal of Modem African Studies, vol. 21, Part 4, 1983, pp 605-623.
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another. They form a minority. In other words there is not sufficient awareness of the 
organisation among the general population, as is indicated in chapter six. Secondly, there is 
no mechanism that brings these people together as was the case with Jean Monnet and the 
Action Group in the formation of the European community. Thus it cannot be expected 
that a cross - class coalition will be able to give direction to the development of the 
community. Hence, unless a member state, such as Nigeria but preferably a coalition of 
states give leadership to the organisation, it will be difficult to harness the necessary 
impetus to enable the organisation to grow.
Additional to the above, if we were to subscribe to the three background 
conditions that the communicationists put forward as the ones necessary for the formation 
of a pluralistic security community, West African countries meet none of them. Differing 
ideologies of governments mean there is no compatibility of major values relevant to 
political decision making, neither is there the capacity to respond to each others needs, 
messages, and actions quickly( as mentioned above), nor is there mutual predictability of 
behaviour because of the frequent changes in governments, border closures or external 
orientation.
Even though these background conditions are for the formation of security 
communities, they nevertheless, we suggest, apply to any scheme in which members are 
interested in acting collectively. Trade and the rationalisation of industries require 
predictability, and compatibility of values.
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From the above it can be concluded that West African countries do not meet the 
criteria for increasing the level of transaction between them. But as has been pointed out 
in the first chapter, integration among developing countries is for creating conditions. The 
assumption of a static situation where all the necessary conditions already exist is negated 
by the desire to create those same conditions through regional integration. Integration in 
West Africa therefore takes as its starting point, a situation which is opposite to those 
assumed by transactionalist theory. However, whether ECOWAS will indeed create the 
conditions is a different issue altogether.
2.5 The Federalist Approach
Federalism is seen as a multi-dimensional concept of principles, doctrines 
institutions and processes that deal with the problems of concentration, diffusion, and 
sharing of political power.54 The federal principle is the method of dividing powers so that 
the general and regional governments are each within a geographical sphere co-ordinated 
and at the same time independent.55 Federalism, according to Mally can be divided into 
three conceptual types, federation, confederation, and a supranational community.
A federation is a political system of governance based on a constitution which 
allocates powers between a central sovereign government and autonomous provincial and 
local governments. The central government represents the state externally and has 
jurisdiction over all members of the subordinate provinces. A confederation is an 
association of sovereign states who are linked together by a treaty. The central power 
formed in this case is given certain powers of policy co-ordination but retains final decision
54Mally, G., The European Community in Perspective. Lexington, London, 1973.
55 Wheare, K. C., cited in Welch, C. D., Dream of Unity. Cornell University, Ithaca, 1966.
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making with the individual states who retain the autonomy in veto powers. Confederation 
unlike a federation has only limited external sovereignty with all decisions being 
implemented indirectly through member states.
Finally a supranational community is made up of elements of both confederation 
and federal type of administration. It has both unanimous and veto-voting procedures and 
partial autonomy that is exercised through common organs.
Federation, as a method for international organisation was especially popular in 
Western Europe after the second-world-war, and in Africa in the 1960s. Its main tenets 
are the building of regional institutions and solidarities. The methods advocated for 
achieving these goals rest on the normative assertions based on the faith of the 
propagator.56 Successful federal political institution such as those of the U.S. A are used as 
illustrations of what can be achieved. As Paul Taylor pointed out, federalism assumes that 
diversities which necessitate the formation of large political entities have a clear 
geographic distribution.57 Thus the advocacy of a united Africa for example, assumes that 
the problems facing individual countries can be solved once the nation-state is transcended. 
As we have noted above, in our examination of neo-functionalism, the extent to which size 
contributes to effective economic and political efficiency is a question which has vexed 
leading academics even though it is agreed that there is a minimum size is required for 
economic viability and subsequently for profitable participation in international trade and 
politics.
56 Haas, E., 'The Study of Regional Integration', in Regional Integration: Theory and Research, 
Lindberg and Scheingold, op. cit.,p 20.
57'Conceptual Typology of International Organisations', in A Framework for International 
Co-operation, op. cit.
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Applied to regional integration, federalism sees the attainment of such goals in the 
drawing up of constitutions, and the transfer of power to regional institutions through such 
means as the provisions of a Treaty. In other words, and contrary to neo-functionalism, 
federalism views regional integration as a de jure rather than a de facto  undertaking, 
especially in the initial stages. It does not envisage a gradual building of an actual 
solidarity as the step toward political union, but rather sees such solidarity as a 
consequence of the formation of regional governments. Though no federations have been 
formed in recent contemporary history, the desire for a certain amount of supranationalism 
is seen as desirable for effectiveness in regional integration schemes. As was pointed out 
earlier, the aim of some protagonists of Europe integration was the desire to form a federal 
Europe. However, the method that was adopted for its achievement was not a federal and 
binding constitution which will ensure a single step formation of a federal Europe, but 
rather a compromise economic deterministic approach which found theoretical validation 
in neo-funtionalism.
\
The Treaty of ECOWAS originally stated in the preamble that 'the ultimate 
objective of the efforts' are accelerated and sustained economic development of their states 
and the creation of homogeneous society, leading to the unity o f the countries o f  West 
Africa.5* One can conclude that a form of federation, whether supranational, confederate 
or unitary, was originally envisaged for the region.59 Though this clarifies the type of unity 
the member countries are interested in , it nevertheless does not preclude supranationalism.
58 Emphasis is ours. The new Treaty clarifies this to mean econmic union.
59 The revised treaty of the organisation changes this to '... our final goal is ... the economic union of 
West Africa;'quoted from the Draft Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, drafted by Legal Experts, ECOWAS, 
Lagos, October, 1992.
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It is more a pluralistic economic community60 rather than a unitary state that is being 
pursued.
Regional political federation and eventually continental federation had, as 
mentioned earlier, been a goal of pan-Africanists such as Nkrumah of Ghana. This had 
been widely opposed by people, such as, Balewa of Nigeria, Tubman of Liberia and 
Houphaet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire. They favoured economic co-operation. The 
subsequent division of the region, along these lines, into two groups, the Monrovia group 
(the regional equivalent of the continental Brazzaville group) and Casablanca group, was a 
direct result of this. The Monrovia view of incremental integration prevailed. Thus the 
method being used by the ECOWAS countries is one that had been extensively debated 
since independence.
Federalism, as we have seen, was widely debated in West Africa in the 1960s. The 
majority of states refused to federate. Economic incrementalism was seen as the best way 
to enhance the economic prospects of the member countries. The institutional structure of 
ECOWAS is essentially neo-fiinctiionalist. Though both neo-functionalism and federalism 
include supranationalism, the difference between them is the methods they advocate for 
regional unity. While neo-functionalism sees supranationality as a goal that is arrived at the 
end of a process of integration, federalism sees it as the beginning of the process.
Federalism therefore does not attempt to imply legitimisation at the group level, but 
instead sees authority and legitimacy transfer as something that governments decide on and 
do. It is a statecentric perspective of reordering the international system. Other forms of
60 The communication theorists talk about a pluralistic security community, which lays emphasis on 
peace and security and not on economic development.
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relations are subordinated to the centrality of states as the units that constitute the building 
blocks in international relations and their representatives as the ones who determine how it 
is shaped. From this perspective, it is assumed that once governments take the decision, 
the rest of their citizens will inevitably follow. This may perhaps be true in a situation 
where a supra-state is desired and where nationalism has not taken root. The limitation of 
this perspective, however, is that it de-emphasises popular loyalty and therefore implies 
that the permanence of such schemes are dependent on the orientation of governments.
As Haas pointed out, events since 1954 in Europe and since 1960 in Africa 'have 
effectively contradicted descriptions, explanations and predictions', and concluded that this 
approach in its pure form is probably discredited'.61
Though no federations have been formed in recent history, the assertion that this 
falsifies federalist postulates to international organisation is based on the assumption that 
federalism ought to result in a state with a central administration. This supposition, 
however, limits the definition of federalism. As we noted earlier, a federation can range 
from a relatively loose supranational organisation, through confederation to an 
amalgamated state. The fact that most integration schemes have aspired to some form of 
supranationality can be taken as a continuing survival of the concept. This assertion 
becomes even more plausible if we subscribe to Forsyth's definition of a federation as one 
which is based on a foedus or a treaty between states.62 The notion of a federation which is 
defined retrospectively misses the evolution of such structures. A prospective definition,
61 Hass, 'The Study of Regional', p 21.
“ Forsyth, M., Unions of States. Holmes & Meier, New York, 1981, p 1.
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on the other hand, is able to accommodate the modem attempts to move 'beyond the 
normal restricted circle of interstate relations.'63
From the above it can be suggested that regional integration schemes are better 
described in federal terms than in neo-fiinctinalist terms. This is especially so if we 
consider a federation as being a structure that can be formed not necessarily for security 
purposes but also predominantly for economic ones. As Forsyth properly recognised 
elsewhere in his book:
the Zollverein is indeed significant because it demonstrates how 
strong and relatively autonomous the welfare motive to 
confederation had become by the first half of the nineteenth 
century. In the twentieth century the strength and relative 
autonomy of the welfare motive has again been demonstrated by 
the establishment of the Benelux Union in 1948 and the European 
Economic Community in 1958, as well as by the creation of various 
common markets -such as the West African Economic community, the 
Central African customs and Economic Union, and the Central 
American Common Market - in the developing world.’64
What federal theory does very well in to describe the initial process of the 
formation of an integration scheme. It however does not explain the actual process 
dynamics as the process unfolds. Thus far from being falsified, it contributes substantially 
to an understanding of how governments actually start the process of integration.
2.6 The Contribution of Integration Theories
The emphasis on predictive capacity of social science theory is a long standing 
debate, and Haas' desire for such scientific accuracy for integration may have contributed
63 ibid., p 4.
64 ibid., p 161.
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to his discarding of integration theory as obsolete for Western Europe and obsolescent for 
the developing countries. Human behaviour is largely determined by an interplay of 
factors which because they are in the future cannot be predicted with any degree of 
accuracy. Thus even though the presence of certain variables may aid prediction, the 
constancy of such behaviour is itself dependent on unforeseen circumstances. As Puchala 
pointed out, even though transactional analysis attracted controversy it has in a dialectical 
fashion improved understanding. Exponents have recognised its limitations, and its early 
critics have accepted its usefulness. Like all the other theories , transactional analyses are 
useful for investigating some aspects of regional integration, and less useful for 
investigating others.65
The various theories of integration address different aspects of the integration 
phenomenon.
Since functionalism does not endorse regional integration, its main relevance to the 
subject lies in its contribution to neo-functionalism. Federalism explains the treaty 
component of integration schemes better than either neo-functionalism or 
communicationism. It however fails to explain the process mechanisms because of its 
concentration on the constitutional aspects of unification.
The communication and neo-fiinctional theories are the two theories which explain 
the process of integration best. Their similarities are found in the identification of certain 
independent variables as being important for regional integration or disintegration. Both
“ Puchala, D. J., 'International Transactions and Regional Integration', in Regional Integration: 
Theory and Research, op. cit.
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theories recognise the importance of regional transactions and the gains and losses 
associated with them by actors. They also see the need for verbal and symbolic 
communication among crucial elite. There is also the identification of mutual 
responsiveness between elite and mutual expectations of rewards as important elements in 
regional integration. Finally they see the adequacy of institutions to handle the 
transactional and communication load as important.
They however differ in how the variables are defined and operationalised.
Whereas communications theory treats all transactional variables as equally salient, 
neo-functionalists identify some as more salient than others. The transactions associated 
with such issue areas are therefore treated as crucial variables for studying particularly 
salient regional tasks.
Apart from the differences in the theoretical assumptions which underlie the 
definition of variables, there are also differences in the concepts which are used to organise 
the data and interpret the outcome. Thus the concepts of responsiveness and spill-over 
determine conclusions that are drawn from data by communicationists and 
neo-functionalists respectively.
As Haas pointed out in The Study of Regional Integration the strength of the 
communication theory lies in its generality and its systemic character whilst 
neo-functionalism derives most of its virtue from its closeness to the actors. Both theories 
have however been unable to demonstrate positive prescriptive processes outside Western 
Europe. Neither are they individually able to predict or describe the integration process.
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Because they address the issue of regional integration from different levels of abstraction, 
it is difficult to complement the successes of the theories. Communications theory is 
highly descriptive and does not address the issue of causation, whereas neo-functionalism 
concentrates on showing causality.
A common criticism levelled against the two theories is that they both fail to 
recognise the importance of high politics. Thus questions such as the effects of 
extra-regional influences on regional units is understated. Such critics point out that while 
common markets might be effective between a group of countries, this does not mean that 
such unions will lead to political union, thus undermining the spill-over concept of 
neo-functionalism.
This throws into perspective, the difficulty of accepting the Balassa model which 
starts with a free trade area and ends up in supranationalism. This difficulty derives from 
the neat separation that the classification adopts in categorising the various stages of 
integration and the assumption that one step leads to a next and higher stage of 
integration. It is difficult to identify where economics merges into politics. Political 
involvement is much earlier than the Balassa continuum would seem to imply. The 
assumption that economic union has a lower threshold than political union permeates 
theorising about regional integration. This assumption also leads to the expectation that 
economic integration leads to political integration.
Nye, for example, proposed66 that the concept of integration be broken down into; 
economic integration, social integration, and political integration. The three could then be
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divided into subtypes each associated with a clear measurement. By stressing type rather 
then levels of integration, Nye hopes this disaggregation will enable theorists to relate the 
various usage of integration to each others 'without having to decide a priori which is prior 
or more easily achieved.'
Integration among developing countries, as has been pointed out, is usually 
embarked upon because of the multiple desire of achieving; economic development, 
increasing the participants bargaining power, and avoiding international marginalisation. 
Secondly integration schemes among developing countries are usually modelled along 
EEC lines. ECOWAS for example, is based on gradualist and incrementalist, economic 
deterministic lines i.e. neo-functionalism.
To the extent that the framework that is used and the concepts underlying regional 
integration were formulated mainly with the European political, social and economic 
context in mind, to what extent can such theory act as a basis for successful integration in 
places such as West Africa?
It is our contention that the historical and contextual differences between Western 
Europe and West Africa, imply that theories formulated for the former will in the main be 
inapplicable to the latter. Secondly, the high emphasis laid on attaining and maintaining 
peace reduce the relevance of these theories. Work done on integration among developing 
countries have, however, yielded some empirical generalisations67 which we will seek to 
validate or falsify with our own study of the Economic Community of West African States.
“ Nye, J., 'Comparing regional Markets', op. cit.
67 Haas, 'The Study of Regional Integration', op. cit., pp 9-17.
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That way, we will be in a better position to push the study of regional integration among 
developing countries forward.
These generalisations could act as the hypothesis for future research in regional 
integration theorising. They have been reproduced below .
General Empirical Findings: Global
1. As transactions between members of a regional grouping increase as compared 
to third countries, they perceive themselves as being increasingly interdependent.
2. Actors will evaluate interdependence as negative it they feel their regional 
partners are profiting more than they are, and positive if they feel benefits are equally 
distributed in some areas though not necessarily in all or in all simultaneously.
3. Differences in the size of partner countries is not a good predictor of the success 
or failure of an integration scheme. The preponderance of a particular country may not 
have negative influences or the perception of smaller partners if that 'cove area' can 
provide special payoffs. But if such payoffs are not forthcoming then differences in size 
can hinder integration. Additionally the size differentials may cause increased diplomatic 
activity among the smaller partners if they perceive the control of the cove area as 
important for the regional organisation.
4. An increased emergence of both governmental and non-governmental channels 
of communication stimulates interdependence. But the positive evaluation of such 
channels by members cannot be predicted.
5. Resulting conditions, caused by integrative activities in a number of issue 
arrears, which may result in de facto , or de jure political union is difficult to predict.
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Seemingly positive integrative activities, after successful accomplishment, may result in 
'self-encapsulation,' organisationally and attitudinally, and therefore may not provide new 
incentives which support integration. The accomplishment of tasks may result in the 
setting up of rival organisations whose activities do not contribute to overall integration, 
leading instead to a 'spillaround' situation which does not succumb to political 
centralisation. Self-encapsulation has been observed in activities relating to 
telecommunications, transportation, the protection of human rights, military strategy and 
procurement, and public health.
6. Of all issue and policy areas commitment to create a common Market is the 
most conducive to rapid integration and the maximisation of spillover. Arrangements for 
the setting up of common scientific and technical ventures tend to lead to 
self-encapsulation. On the other hand, organisations with mandates short of creating a 
common market have great difficulty in influencing the policies of their members.
Empirical Generalisations : Developing Nations
1. Integration in Africa has been largely symbolic; joint policy making with 
economic objectives does not follow the European pattern:
a) Actor expectations are prematurely politicised thus preventing incremental 
bargaining on relatively non controversial shared objectives.
b) Bargaining with reciprocal benefits, especially where payoffs have to be 
deferred, is all but impossible because of the limits on resources. Since issues cannot be 
kept separate easily, national differences in size and power become divisive, c) The 
absence of pluralism makes the formation of voluntary groups on a regional basis very
136
difficult. Ideological ties between leaders, where they exist, are helpful to integration; 
ideological cleavages are most divisive and cannot be overcome by shared economic aims, 
d) Countries that are poorly integrated make poor partners in a regional integration 
process because of the reluctance of leaders to further undermine their control at home.
2. Even though non economic integration in Latin American countries is also 
largely symbolic, economic integration efforts usually share many characteristics with the 
European pattern: a) Countries whose size and resources base make them self sufficient 
take very little interest in regional integration. Power and size under these condition 
inhibit integration, b) Differences in social and economic development inhibit the 
development and evolution of regional elite responsiveness (LAFTA). On the other hand, 
similarities of both social and economic development promote elite complimentarity and 
responsiveness (C ACM & the Andean Group)
c) Where there is a diffuseness of administrative and organisational functions at the 
national level, coexisting within a setting of poor local integration and weak nationalism, 
regional integration tends to be dominated by technocrats (CACM). Strong central 
government and nationalism limit the operation of technocrats in regional integration 
(LAFTA).
d) The logic of incremental decision making and the spill-over phenomenon 
operates even in regions where national integration of individual countries is weak despite 
a persistent aura of economic crisis (CACM). This is explained by 2(c). From those 
empirical generalisations Haas concluded at that time that future hypotheses for the study 
of regional integration should be formulated in the context of common markets.
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Empirical Generalisations: The External World.
A regional integration (subsystem) could be influenced very strongly by its 
relations with the external world (system). Three main distinctive and identifiable 
configurations have been identified as important strands in the interaction between the 
subsystem and the system: (1) The global system within which the regional grouping 
perceives itself as struggling may be the main concern of actors, e.g. economic integration 
among developing countries. (2) A single state (or its elite) may be seen as the 
extra-regional force which hinders or aids integration. (3) Another regional counter system 
may be the extra-regional force which explains integration or disintegration. From these 
three configurations come the conclusions that; (a) countries who perceive themselves as 
being victimised by the global system will be motivated toward integration as a means of 
"getting out from under", (b) On the other hand perceptions of dependence on 
extra-regional systems may if it is pervasive act as a disincentive to integration.
4(a) The role of an extra-regional state in explaining regional integration is 
indeterminate. An extra-regional state with hegemonic tendencies may undermine regional 
integration through its payoff capacity.
(b) At the same time regional integration among developing countries sometimes 
survive mainly through the support of extra-regional states.
(5) Other regional counterunions are a definite though temporary incentive for 
integration; (a) regional unions which are of a military kind survive only as long as there is 
a rival external grouping. Those of a diplomatic character also disintegrate under such
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circumstances, (b) Economic integration of an industrial region may survive simply 
because they find the strength they need in dealing with another such union.
As Haas pointed out the empirical generalisations which have been culled from the 
various theories seeking to explain, describe and predict integration processes are a 'mixed 
bag' of statements which exist at various levels of meaning. The theories are therefore 
imperfect because, for one thing, it is not clear what level of abstraction they are supposed 
to operate at. Secondly, each theory has its own internal hierarchy because there are no 
universally accepted key concepts, term, or constructs around which they interpret their 
variables. Thus the independent variables which are thought to be of causative significance 
are particular to the theory and therefore may not explain the integration process as it is 
perceived by other theories or indeed predict outcomes which are deemed valid by other 
theories. The closeness of the variables (both dependent and independent) to the 
particular theory and also to particular schemes make them limited in their universal 
applicability.
Some of the difficulties of integration theorising arise from the closeness of 
intellectuals to processes which are still happening and which do not have previous 
precedence with which to compare them. The various definitions have been propounded 
by using the structure of national politics as a model, or historical observations of 
community formation which do not necessarily hold true at the regional level or in modem 
times. Further, projections made from and modelled on a particular form of national 
political structure are bound to be limited in its applicability. Neo-functionalist theories 
have therefore been applicable to pluralistic political systems. The applicability of
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communications theory on the other hand is limited because of the background conditions 
which, for example are deemed essential for the formation of pluralistic communities. 
These conditions were present within certain historical contexts which political economic 
and social configurations at the present time make difficult to replicate.
Seeing that the social, economic and political context within which various 
integration schemes operate are different, the question then arises as to the desirability of 
overarching variables.
It is our proposition that because of the indeterminate nature of social processes it 
is ill advised to propound definite process mechanism and outcomes. Instead the 
possibility of different process paths and outcomes should be recognised.
Conclusions
As we have seen from above, the literature on integration is a motley collection of 
not easily reconcilable data. Theories are mainly Eurocentric, and address different levels 
of abstraction.
Among other things, it is felt that the economic, political and social differences of 
Western Europe make the theories nearly irrelevant to developing regions such as West 
Africa. Pluralism from example, is seen as essential for the validity of neo-functionalism in 
West Africa. This being the case to what extant has military regimes and lack of pluralism 
affected regional integration in West Africa? Since the Treaty of the ECOWAS is 
essentially an adoption of a gradualist approach similar to the EEC's and is therefore 
neo-functional, one may suggest that missing factors found in pluralistic systems but 
missing in the dictatorial West Africa environment will affect the extent of integration that
140
can be achieved by this means. This is because the decision making and bargaining style 
inherent in pluralistic society are essential to regional integration by gradual means.
However, to the extent that political and economic institutions in West Africa have 
aspired to Western European models and politics is becoming pluralistic, one may hazard 
to say that neo-functionalism, so long as it does not aspire to federalism, is not entirely a 
dead horse but rather a crippled one which with changing situations in West Africa may 
eventually be healed. Of immediate relevance to us is the extent to which the application of 
Eurocentric theories by West African countries as the underlying theories guiding regional 
integration has affected the effectiveness of integration in the region. By testing the a 
priori assumptions and propositions of the theories as outlined above and in chapter one 
we will be in a better position to detail what is applicable and what is not. Having done 
that we will then be in a better position to determine, with empirical evidence, what 
aspects of international integration theory are not applicable in the West African context.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
3.1 Introduction
The embodiment of a regional integration scheme is found in the institution that is 
formed by the member countries to regularise and facilitate decision making on mutually 
relevant and regionally based issues. The capabilities of such an institution and its future 
prospects are therefore circumscribed by opportunities and constraints that the member 
countries make available to it or use in checking it. The willingness of member countries 
to endow the regional organisation with increased capabilities is itself circumscribed by 
their individual domestic social, economic and political conditions, as well as, by systemic 
factors beyond their control.
ECOWAS as a regional organisation, therefore, functions within an environment 
made up of the socio-political and economic milieu of the sub-region. However, the 
regional environment itself is very much influenced by the international political and 
economic order. In chapter one we examined the reasons for regional integration. The 
conclusions we arrived at were that regional integration is embarked upon for two main 
reasons. First, developing countries see it as a means for industrial development. Secondly, 
they see it as a means of reducing their dependence on western markets and international 
finance. Article 2 of the treaty establishing the organisation states that:
It shall be the aim of the community to promote co-operation an 
development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the 
field of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, 
agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial 
questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of 
raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and
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maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among 
its members and contributing to the progress and development of
the African continent.1
The aims are themselves preceded by the stated desire and conviction that such 
development must take place within a context of 'self-reliance'.2
The formation of ECOWAS in May 1975 was the culmination of several attempts 
by West African governments to unite all the countries of the region and to transcend the 
administrative legacy of colonialism by bridging the gap between the linguistic zones which 
had become polarised after independence because of the inability to agree on what the 
collective agenda for the region and indeed the whole continent should be. Unity, an 
important theme for the relations between the newly independent states posed a problem 
to them because it meant different things to the various leaders. It comprised several 
values to individual leaders and included;
unity to find appropriate African solutions to problems and 
prevent the intervention of non-African powers, unity to express 
a common outlook, unity to bring about the rapid termination of 
colonial rule, and unity to lessen the weakness caused by 
underdevelopment.3
Thus though there was agreement about unity, there was difficulty in defining what 
form such unity should take. Exponents of Pan-Africanism, such as Ghana's Nkrumah, 
seemed willing to consider a radical transformation of the political map, and defined unity 
accordingly. To him, Pan-Africanism meant unity and unity meant political unification. 
Thus Pan-Africanism meant nothing unless it transcended the artificial barriers and
1 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the ECOWAS treaty.
2 Preamble of the ECOWAS treaty.
3 Welch, C. E., Jr., Dream of Unitv: Pan-Africanism and the Political Unification of West Africa. 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1966, p 2.
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boundaries imposed by colonialism. The ideology entailed the outright scraping of 
frontiers.4 The close identification of Pan-Africanism with political unification resulted, 
largely, from the activities of Nkrumah.5 However , not all African nationalists, and 
subsequently Heads of State subscribed to political unification as the goal to be sought in 
African unity. Others interpreted it to mean economic or technical co-operation.6 Indeed, 
long before independence, there was disagreement between Nigerians and Gold Coasters 
about the prior unification of the colonies before independence was sought. The Nigerian 
members of the African Students Association of America and Canada, where Nkrumah's 
political activities began, did not agree with the idea of fighting for independence on a 
collective basis. They felt that there was no question of considering African or West 
African unity at that stage of the anti-colonial struggle. Instead, each colonial territory was 
to be left alone to struggle for itself, 'each working out its own salvation as best it 
could,...'.7 No inter-territorial political parties were formed between nationalists from 
English and French speaking colonies. The Ewe unification movement was the only 
example in the region.8 Pan-Africanism, in the Nkrumah sense, had to be sold to the 
French speaking nationalists within the region on the eve of their own independence.
Nkruamh's strong belief in the pre-eminence of political unification was based on 
the perception that political, economic, cultural, or technical co-operation without political 
unification would be inadequate for the task of building Africa. To him industrialisation, 
and planned use of resources required more than,
'the kind of tinkering that limits us to inter territorial 
______ associations within customs unions, trade agreements,_______________
4 West Africa. London, May 20,1961, p. 555.
5 Welch, op. cit.
6 ibid.
7Bankole, T., Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah. Nelson, London, 1957, p.43.
8 Welch, op. cit.
< s
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intercoiranunications services, and the like, ... such tinkering
ignores the crucial requirement of continental integration as the
essential prerequisite for the most bountiful economic progress.'9
Africa, he felt, required a common political basis for the integration of policies 'in 
economic planning, defence, foreign and diplomatic relations.'10 Thus, to him co-operation 
of any sort required political unity to succeed.
A final observation that must be mentioned about Nkrumah's interpretation of 
Pan-Africanism was its evolution from an endorsement of regionalism, to opposition to it. 
Initially, he thought;
the self-determination of the dependent territories was the 
prerequisite to the federation of self-governing states on a 
regional basis, leading ultimately to the creation of a United 
States of Africa.11
Political unification at the regional level was to be a step toward eventual 
continental political unification. However, this view changed because he came to see 
regionalism as being an impediment to continental unity. This was because of the 
possibility that it would engender loyalties which will give rise to power politics between 
the various regions.12 Pan-Africanism failed to gain support.
After independence, the desire for closer association conflicted with the desire to 
retain the separate identities of the new states. Once the nationalist came to power they 
focused on internal development and national integration. Unwillingness to subordinate, 
what came to be perceived as the national interests, after independence, led to an emphasis
on economic and technical co-operation. The failure of the Mali Federation, and the
9 Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, quoted in Welch, op. cit., p. 19.
10ibid., p. 20.
11 ibid. p.22.
12 ibid.
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Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, the overthrow of Nkrumah, (all of which more later), among 
other things, resulted in economic and technical co-operation becoming the theme for 
unity among the countries of the region.
Several attempts have been made by West African countries to form integration 
schemes. Those that were formed have been between the French speaking countries of the 
region. The English speaking countries have never really come together to form an 
economic grouping since independence.13 The first economic grouping among the 
francophone West African countries, Union Douaniere del'Ouest (UDAO), was formed in 
June 1959, and was between Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, 
Mauritania, and Niger. The main purpose was to redistribute the custom duties which the 
coastal states collected on transit trade with the landlocked members.14 This was replaced 
in June 1966 by Union Douaniere de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (UDEAO) with the same 
membership. UDAO was disbanded because the members could not find a generally 
acceptable formula for the distribution of the custom revenue collected on imports, and 
because it favoured the more industrialised economies of Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire whose 
manufactured exports benefited from special tariff concessions. The imports of Ivorian 
products by Burkina Faso, Niger, and Benin involved losses that amounted to 6 percent,
3.7 per cent, and 3.1 per cent of their respective total customs revenues during 1967.15 At 
a meeting in Bamako in May 1970 the majority of the seven members opposed any further 
expansion of existing arrangements. A protocol agreement was instead adopted which 
stated that any new Francophone economic community should reflect some equity such
13 Asante, S. K. B., The Political economy of Regionalism in Africa. Praeger, New York, 1986.
14Bach, D. C., Politics of West African Economic Co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS' in Journal 
of Modem African Studies, vol. 21, Part 4, 1983.
15 Bach, ibid. p. 606.
146
that trade liberalisation would be linked with the co-ordination of development plans and 
the establishment of compensation measures.16
UDEAO was also dissolved and its place taken by Communaute Economique de 
l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) in May 1970 and was launched by a protocol agreement. The 
treaty establishing the community was however not signed until 17 April 1974 in Abidjan. 
Its economic aims were to accelerate the industrialisation of its members, to facilitate trade 
in manufactured goods and raw materials, and to improve the infrastructure of the area 
through the development of transportation and telecommunications.17
As we have indicated above, co-operation schemes were usually along linguistic 
lines and were mainly among the French speaking countries. Those that crossed the 
linguistic barrier were either stillborn or dormant . The West African Free Trade Area 
which was initiated between Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire in 1964 did 
not get off the drawing board. Other examples include the Ghana-Guinea and later the 
Ghana-Guinea-Mali union.18 The formation of ECOWAS, which includes English, French 
and Portuguese speaking countries is, therefore, a significant step. The way impediments 
were overcome and suspicions allayed before it could be formed will be looked at in more 
detail later on in the chapter. But before we do that and in order to be able to appreciate 
the significance of the formation of ECOWAS sufficiently, we need to understand the 
political milieu of West Africa, both in terms of its development and its historical 
antecedents.
16 ibid.
17 Asante, S. K.B., 'CEAO/ECOWAS: Conflict and Co-operation in West Africa, in The Future of 
Regionalism in Africa. Onwuka, R. I., and Sesay, A. (ed.), Macmillan, London, 1984.
18 Asante, Regionalism in Africa, op. cit.
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3.2 General Characteristics of West African Politics
To attempt a listing of common characteristics of West African politics is to 
analyse issues at a high level of abstraction. This is because since independence the politics 
of West African states have undergone a lot of experimentation both with regimes and the 
adoption of ideologies. However, underlying all the divergencies, the experimentations and 
flux that characterised the politics of the region are certain common characteristics. The 
obvious and fundamental of these is their colonial experience. From this common 
denominator the various countries of the Community have experienced a varied set of 
political regimes which can broadly be divided into military regimes and one-party states. 
Regime changes, in most instances, have been accompanied by ideological reorientation at 
the state level and the formation of new coalitions at the regional level. Each regime has 
also been accompanied by a leadership style that the incumbent of office has deemed 
expedient and appropriate for governance.
Leadership styles have included such types as charismatic, patriarchal, 
technocratic, and populist/prophetic which produced authoritarianism, patrimonialism, 
patronage,19 and a mix of these. A brief listing and description of the generalities will, it is 
hoped, enable a better understanding of the issues that form the basis of political behaviour 
in the region, and hence the issues that have affected and still affect intra-regional 
relations.
19Chazan, N., et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (2 ed.), Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, Boulder Colorado, 1992, pp 161-168.
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Colonial Experience
Historical factors more than anything else have been very influential in determining 
both the structure and shape of the states within the region. Colonial rule in particular has 
been the most significant in terms of the shape of politics since independence. As has been 
pointed out by many historians, the nation-state in Africa is a European creation, and West 
Africa stands out as the most heavily demarcated region, in terms of the size and number 
o f states, on the continent. It reflects more than any region in the world, the legacies of 
colonial demarcation and today contains some of the poorest countries in the world.
The region was colonised mainly by the French and the English. Post 
independence West Africa is therefore made up mainly of francophone and anglophone 
countries. Of the 16 countries that make up ECOWAS, five are English speaking, two are 
Portuguese, and the rest are French speaking. However, despite the preponderance of 
French speaking countries in the region, the very high population of Nigeria (two-thirds of 
the population of the region) compensates for the fewer number of English speaking 
countries.
Of particular salience in the colonial legacies are the artificial boundaries that today 
determine the geographical extent of each individual country. The effects of this has been 
the separation of ethnic groups into different countries. It has also created countries with 
very dissimilar economic resource bases and economic viability. The dividing of the same 
tribal group into different countries and the agglomeration of different ethnic groups into 
the same country has created ethnically differentiated and amorphous states.
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This situation was expected by several observers to result in a proliferation of 
secessionist movements and irredentism after independence. However, after an initial spate 
of ethnically inspired opposition of ruling governments, the situation settled down to what 
might be called a manageable equilibrium. Thus, apart from the Biafran war of secession 
(1967-70), the survival of colonially inherited boundaries has been remarkable.20
One reason that may be responsible for the relative stability of the highly ethnically 
heterogeneous African state is that the agglomeration of diverse but numerically small 
groups within individual states has created a situation in which none of them dominates the 
political sphere to a disproportionately large enough extent to cause the other groups to 
view their continued political survival as threatened perpetually. In instances where large 
and homogeneous groups exist and where there seems to be a disproportionate 
distribution of the benefits of independence, as was the case in Nigeria, communal conflicts 
occurred. A second reason for the survival of colonial boundaries is that West African 
leaders like all other leaders on the continent very jealously guarded the political 
independence of their territories and in instances where such independence was threatened 
either by internal dissension or external aggression were not averse to protecting the 
boundaries and territorial integrity by calling on the assistance of the former colonial 
masters.21 Leaders have helped each other, where they found it in their interest, to quell 
internal dissension.22
Finally the OAU entrenched in its charter in 1963 the principle of preservation of 
existing colonial partition boundaries, whilst the notion that territorial integrity is identified
20Chabal, P., Power in Africa. Macmillan. London, 1992. See also Chazan, et al, op. cit.
21Chipman, J..french Power in Africa. Blackwell. Oxford, 1989.
“ th e  Seifegzfrele inter ention in the Gambia in July 1982 is a case in point.
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with the state system became a basic premise of the emerging code of African international 
law.23 Thus colonially inherited boundaries could not be redefined without effectively 
going against the spirit of the OAU. Hence few attempts on colonial boundaries have ever 
been attempted, and 'where they have been, the only conceivable way of resolving them 
has been by reference to the colonial order. Attempts at secession, that is challenges to the 
colonial legacy, have failed largely because they have had virtually no support from other 
African countries. 24 The result today is the existence of states where domestica politics is 
maintained by a careful distribution of state benefits in such a way as not to invite 
accusations of ethnic partiality.
It may be suggested however, that the idea that homogenous groups have been 
divided between countries and lumped together thus creating potentially unstable states is 
somewhat exaggerated. Most ethnic groups are themselves highly differentiated group. 
The Ewes and the Akan of Ghana, the Yoruba and Ibo of Nigeria , and other tribes in the 
region are made up of similar but different groups who speak different dialects. The 
Asante Empire was anything but a nation made up of a consenting, willing and 
homogenous group. Therefore the colonial demarcation of the region should be seen not 
from a non factual and sometimes romantic perspective of how the region would have 
been made up of peaceful coexisting ethnic groups since that can never be proven.
It is actually very difficult to see how national boundaries could have been drawn 
to coincide with tribal boundaries. As the map on the next page shows West Africa in very 
heterogeneous. If tribal boundaries had been followed the sizes of states in the region
“ Young, C., 'The Colonial State and Its Political Legacy' in The PrecariouB alance: State and 
Society in Africa. Rothchild. D., and Chazan, N., (ed.), Westview Press, London, 1988.
24Chabal, P., Power in Africa, Macmillan, London, 1992,. 122
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would have been even smaller than they are today. Thus it would have been 
difficult, no matter who demarcated the region, to have had ethnically homogeneous 
states. The ethnic, and more specifically, the tribal diversity of states is inevitable given the 
patchwork of tribal boundaries in the region. It can indeed be said that the straddling of 
tribes across borders is also inevitable. What was not inevitable is the size of the countries. 
It is this rather than those mentioned above which reflect the colonial scrambling for 
territory.
The empirical issue is that the balkanisation of West Africa has created 
economically unviable entities whose continuing dependence on their former colonial 
masters for sustenance has undermined their ability for independent action and influenced 
intra-regional relations. The fear of Nigeria by the French speaking countries of the region, 
for example, is orchestrated mainly by France25 in her attempt to retain her political 
influence in the region. It has in certain instances coloured their assessment of 
co-operation proposal advocated by that country.
Another effect of the unviability of the post colonial state is the inability to meet 
the needs of their people. States have inherited societies within their boundaries who 
demand from their governments the basic necessities of existence especially since these 
were promised as the rewards of independence. The inability of most of these states to 
meet the demands made on them because of their economic weakness has been, to a large 
extent, responsible for the rapid regime changes that have occurred in the region after the 
initial euphoria of independence had died down.26 An interplay of this burden of economic
25 Chipman, J., ibid.
26 ECOWAS states account for less than one-third of the membership of the OAU but between 1958 
and 1990 they accounted for half the military take-overs. As Welch pointed out, the incidence of coups
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weakness and scarce state resources combined with inappropriate economic policy and 
corruption to create a further dependence on foreign aid and a preoccupation with 
domestic development. The instability that has plagued West African politics has in most 
instances been economically determined. Such preoccupation with the need for immediate 
domestic economic development means governments pay more attention to schemes that 
promise quick returns, and less to schemes, such as regional integration, whose benefits 
are long term.
Another effect of colonialism on the state of politics in contemporary West Africa 
is the fragility of state institutions that governments inherited at independence.27 West 
Africans inherited institutions that were both alien and undeveloped. During the colonial 
period the administrative apparatus that existed had been "the minimum required to secure 
a semblance of control".28 Within these administrative sectors indigenous people had 
usually occupied the lower echelons, and at the time of independence lacked the 
experience that was needed for conducting the affairs of state. To meet their various 
needs such as the provision of services and development, almost all the governments on 
assumption of office expanded the bureaucracy by creating various ministries and 
parastatal organisations. They also promoted inexperienced people into high positions. 
Both of these had the effect of expanding the public sector and therefore increasing public 
expenditure, as well as inefficiency.29
d'etats among ECOWAS States are not as evenly spread as overall figures might suggest. Of the 16 
members of ECOWAS, two-thirds of the successful coups took place in five countries. Benin and Burkina 
Faso (6 each), Ghana(5), Mauritania and Nigeria (4 each). Welch C.E, Jr.," The Military Factor in West 
Africa: Leadership and Regional Development"in Okolo, J.E, and Wright, S., West African Regional 
Co-operation. PP. 157-183.
27 Chabal, P., Power in Africa, op cit.
28 Chazan, et al. p 28
29Tordoff, W., Government and Politics in Africa (2 ed.), Macmillan, London, 1993.
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The effects of this on the overall decision making process of the individual country 
varied and depended on both the leadership style and the ideology of the incumbents of 
office. At an abstract level, however, the general offshoot was that party functionaries 
were appointed to man administrative positions. The party in such instances became the 
route to personal advancement and enrichment.30
As a result the extended family system in many of these countries people who 
either because of their education or party affiliation found themselves in positions of 
authority suddenly realised that their traditional obligations necessitated their employing 
kinsmen.31 Where it was not employment that was demanded of them, these relatively 
better off people found that their salaries had to be used to help other less fortunate 
members of their families either by sponsoring their education, training or through direct 
remittance. Corruption which today is a major problem in most of these countries can to 
some extent be traced to demands made on the salaries of these public servants and 
therefore to the interplay between inherited structures and the indigenous social system.32 
Nepotism on the other hand resulted from demands made on incumbents of office from 
their kinsmen. The elaborate network of patronage can also be traced to the way party 
and ethnic affiliations to an important public figure became the root to personal 
advancement.
30Lamarchad, R., The Changing Structure of Patronage Systems' in The Precarious Balance, op.
cit.
31 Nigerian politics has to a large extent been influenced by the utilisation for 'personal benefit of 
officeholders as well as that of the reference group'. Joseph, R., Class. State and Prebendal Politics
32 Other factors account for the crippling corruption in West African countries, such as, dwindling 
real incomes, inappropriate government policies. What we are stating here is how colonialism merged into 
the post-colonial state to create fairly lasting characteristics in West African politics.
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Politics itself in instances where it was affected indirectly by these pressures 
became highly personalised and corrupt as nearness to decision making and state resources 
became an imperative to ones ability continue showing such favour to kin and party. The 
fragility of inherited institutions therefore combined with kinship pressures, partycentrism 
and individual dishonesty to create a political culture of nepotism, corruption, tribalism, 
patronage, and personalised politics, which weighed heavily on an over burdened public 
sector.
The result of all these was that state resources became closely linked with the 
financial aspirations of the political elite. They were therefore suspicious of any schemes 
that might hinder their closeness to state resources.
Another aspect of the colonial legacy that needs mentioning is the absence of a 
constructive political culture on the eve of independence. Colonial rule had been 
authoritarian and had been supported by an army that was used to ensure compliance of 
the indigenous population. Government itself was imposed and not participatory, 
hortatory rather than consultative.33 On the eve of independence untried constitutions 
were drawn up by the departing colonialists and imposed on those coming into office. 
They were expected to use rules and regulations of governance which they had not seen 
their former masters use in their own administration.
As soon as the new governments were confronted with ethnic dissent in the initial 
stages of independence, and opposition to their ideologies they resorted very quickly to
33 Chazan, et al., Politics in Contemporary Africa.
the more familiar authoritarianism and the use of the army as a means of governance that 
the colonialist had used quite effectively.34 The impedance of opposition forces, such as 
other political parties, the judiciary, regional assemblies, and traditional authority 
structures by ruling governments were meant to enable the building of structures that the 
incumbents saw as necessary for nation building. The undeveloped nature of West African 
politics today is to an extent explained by the curbing of political dissent in the early days 
of independence. The one party state which most of these states experimented with at one 
time or another is also a response by many governments to what was viewed as 
impediments to policy implementation and inappropriate political structures for ethnically 
heterogeneous political communities. Some of the legacies of such rule is that access to 
the political centre became highly circumscribed and opposition, where it exists, finds it 
nearly impossible to operate. The military therefore became the main instrument of 
political transition. Many of the member countries of ECOWAS have experienced military 
coups several times since independence. These have also left their mark on the politics of 
the region. They have impeded the development of bureaucratic styles of decision making 
and long term strategic planning is difficult because military governments tend to rule by 
decrees and are usually inclined to jettison the programmes of their predecessors. They 
have affected intra-regional relations to the extent that they created unpredictability in 
regional politics and lack of confidence in the implementation of treaties. Repudiation of 
agreements by previous governments, such as Acheampong's repudiation of loans 
contracted by the Busia regime in Ghana when the former overthrew the latter in 1972 is a 
case in point.
34Kasfir, N., 'Designs and Dilemmas: An Overview' in Manhood, P., (ed.) Local Government in the 
Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa. John Wiley Publishers, New York, 1983.
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The points noted above should not by any means be seen as an attempt to 
exonerate incompetent and corrupt governments but rather as a detailing of the ways in 
which the colonial legacy affected politics in the early days o f independence and 
subsequent regimes in the region. The diverse experiences of West African politics have 
been gained within the lifespan of a generation of political leaders. Doubtless, the changes 
occurring all over the region at the present time will be informed by these experiences just 
as the initial attempts at self-governance were informed by the methods of colonial rule.
Whereas colonial politics influenced political structures and modalities in West 
African countries in the early period of independence, it is the post colonial regional 
political environment that provides the crucible for regional integration. Thus an analysis 
of this period of West African political history is essential for understanding the milieu in 
which ECOWAS is operating.
Intra-Rezional Relations in Independent West Africa.
International relations within West Africa is a product of history, the processes 
leading to decolonisation and post-independence political developments. The historical 
antecedents derive from the regions colonisation by Europeans. Apart from Cape Verde 
and Guinea- Bissau the rest of the countries participating in the economic community 
were colonised either by France or Britain.
The first result of this is that it created an anglophone/francophone divide within 
the region with the result that coalition in regional negotiations is usually along these
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linguistic lines. The francophone countries, particularly, tend to act collectively by using 
regional arrangements and organisations in their negotiations with the anglophone 
countries.35 This is exemplified by the way members of the West African Economic 
Community's (CEAO) co-ordinated their actiivities in the negotiations leading up to the 
formation of ECOWAS and subsequently in it's activities within the organisation.
This is not to imply that the French speaking countries within the region always act 
together and always agree on strategy. Guinea under Sekou Toure, until recently, had 
been an outsider in post-independence intra-francophone relations. By voting against the 
French proposed Franco-African Community he got his country ostracised by both France 
and the French speaking countries within the region.36 Additionally, for ideological 
reasons Guinea had aligned itself to Ghana and Mali until the overthrow of Kwame 
Nkrumah and Keita in 1966 and 1968 respectively.37Even intra-CEAO relations usually 
showed strains and disagreements. A two day CEAO Head of States meeting which was 
scheduled to take place in Niamey from 22 January 1975 was postponed because of the 
withdrawal of the Mali delegation. The reason was that they would not attend a meeting 
with the Burkinabe because of the border dispute between them.38 Thus where the national 
interest was concerned, the individual countries normally conformed to what pertained in 
international relations behaviour,39 and put the national interest first. This however, does 
not detract from the broad coalescing of countries along anglophone and francophone 
lines.
35Bach, D., 'The Politics of West African Economic Co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS'., in 
Journal of African Studies. 21, 4(1983).
36Mazrui, A., and Tidy, M., Nationalism and New States in Africa. Heinemann, London, 1984.
37 These countries subscribed to radical Pan-Africanism, and semi-socialist policies.
38 West Africa. 27 January 1975.
39 The refusal of Mali to work with the then Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) within CEAO because 
of border disputes in January 1975 is an example. West Africa 27/1/75.
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The anglophone countries within the region, especially Ghana and Nigeria, had 
always considered such polarisation as an indication of the dependence of the French 
speaking countries of the region on France and an impediment to regional co-operation. 
The balkanisation of French West Africa during the decolonisation process with the 
Loi-Cadre policy was viewed by certain West African leaders of the time, such as Ghana's 
Nkrumah, as a deliberate policy to create a neo-colonial situation which perpetuated the 
dependence of the French speaking states within the region on France.40
Such a view affected his relations with these states when they became independent 
because he saw continued dependence on France as an impediment to Pan-Africanism. The 
siding of the newly independent French speaking states with France against Algerian 
nationalists in the UN General Assembly of I960,41 and their stance during the Congo 
crisis only went to buttress the perception that they were puppets of their former colonial 
masters.
The French speaking countries have always adopted a moderate attitude towards 
European presence and influence in Africa. Their support for Morocco in the OAU in 
1983 against the Saharawi Arab Republic( Polisario Front) only crystallised the long held 
view that unlike the more radical countries these moderates did not see foreign 
domination as undesirable and were unwilling to question the structural legacy of 
imperialism. Their usually moderate stance meant that the French speaking countries 
within the region invariably found themselves arguing for the need to keep links with
40 ibid.
41 Nkrumah, K., I Speak of Freedom cited in Mazrui and Tidy ibid.
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extra-regional actors. This difference in the view of the majority of francophone West 
Africa, and that of anglophone countries toward extra-regional actors created differences 
in their approach to interaction with extra-regional actors especially between 1957 and 
1966 and intermittently since then. Thus to the extent that one of the aims of regionalism 
is to reduce dependence, such divergence of attitudes toward the issue was bound to affect 
the willingness and commitment of the two groups to reduce it.
A second effect of colonialism is that it created discontinuous linguistic zones. 
Ghana, for example, is separated from it's anglophone counterparts both in the east and the 
west by French speaking countries. The same could be said of Nigeria, and The Gambia. It 
is only Liberia and Sierra Leone the border each other. There is therefore the feeling 
among the English speaking countries of the region of being hemmed in by French 
speaking states who by virtue of their colonial experience are different. The French 
speaking countries on the other hand form a more spatially continuous zones. This spatial 
discontinuity buttressed the mutual feeling of suspicion that arose soon after independence. 
For Ghana, under Nkrumah, the problem of being surrounded by what was regarded as 
puppet states of France hindered close collaboration. For the francophone countries 
Nkrumah's attempt to get a no-vote against the Franco-African union in the decolonisation 
process, pronouncements of the desire to absorb Togo into Ghana, and subsequent 
suspicion of his complicity in the assassination of President Olympio of Togo led to a lot 
of unease about possible Nkrumah aided subversion of their governments.
Such discontinuity also made the Ghana-Guinea Union meaningless because of the 
distance that existed between the countries and the linguistic barrier to communication.
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Though colonialism had a divisive influence on post independence regional 
relations, it also reduced the number of languages spoken within the region covered by 
ECOWAS to three and thus facilitated communication in a way that would not have been 
possible with the multiplicity of languages that are spoken within the region. Colonialism 
therefore to that extent facilitated rather than impeded communication and interaction.
It is usually posited that African countries would have been better off without 
colonialism and that the actual effect of the advent of the colonialist was to stymie 
indigenous development. This is a counter-factual statement that cannot be verified. 
However as in all cases of cultural contact, colonialism has, in the context of regional 
relations, both facilitated and hindered co-operation.
However even if we were to insist that colonialism created difficulties for West 
African co-operation the relevant question to ask in our context of regional co-operation is 
what independent West African countries did after independence to reduce the negative 
effects of colonialism?
At independence one of the main issues that confronted West African countries 
was how to regulate relations with each other. Extreme Pan-Africanists such as Ghana's 
Nkrumah favoured the total uniting of the whole continent under a Union Government. He 
therefore viewed regional integration as an impediment to such continental goals.42 
Regionalism to him was just another form of balkanisation which would end up in
42 Mazrui and Tidy, op. cit.
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compartmentalising the continent. This argument was similar to the Mitranian objection to 
regional integration found in functionalist theory of international organisation. Others, 
such as, Cote d'Ivoire's Houphouet— Boigny on the other hand opposed a one-step 
transition to continental federalism. This was not surprising since Houphouet - Boigny 
had earlier opposed the formation of a post colonial federal system among the French 
speaking countries of West Africa and had actively participated in frustrating the proposed 
Mali Federation because of the fear that his relatively prosperous country would be 
saddled with subsidising the poorer countries within such a federation.43 This raises the 
question of whether the cosmopolitanism that elevates the regional goal above national 
aspirations, and which regional integration theory takes for granted and is assumed for 
member countries really exists among West African countries. Granted, Cote d'Ivoire later 
participated in regional groupings in which attempts were made to implement distributive 
measures, however this normally resulted in stagnation or dissolving of such organisations. 
The question of whether ECOWAS will be able to transcend such particularism is one 
objective of this thesis.
Another reason for the failure of continentalism was that all the new leaders were 
anxious to protect their newly won positions of influence. Some actually saw Nkrumah's 
suggestions of an African Union government as an ill disguised ambition to rule Africa.
Nkrumah's views were supported, initially, by the Casablanca group consisting of 
Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, and Egypt. The moderates (the Brazzaville group),
43Chipman, J., op. cit.
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consisting mainly of the French speaking countries together with Nigeria and Liberia 
supported a loose association of independent states in Africa.
West African countries were, by belonging to these continental cleavages, divided 
into these two camps by their perceptions of what they thought ought to be the form of the 
relationship between the newly independent states. It must be noted that while Nkrumah, 
the advocate of Pan-Africanism, was opposed to regional integration, the moderates 
favoured nothing more than a co-operative framework without supranationalism. The two 
positions were not reconcilable particularly because of the methods advocated by the two 
groups and also because of the mutual suspicions of the moderates on the one hand and 
the more radical, particularly of Nkrumah of the other.
The unwillingness of the French speaking countries to vote against a federation 
with France, their support for France against Algerian nationalism, support for a loose 
federation in Congo and support of Moise Tshombe, and their opposition of a united 
Africa convinced Nkrumah about what he perceived to be the shallowness of their 
independence. He therefore encouraged dissident groups from neighbouring French 
speaking countries to undermine their rulers by giving them financial assistance, and by 
allowing them to use Ghana as a base for their seditious activities.44 These activities 
deepened suspicions and made regional co-operation between the countries more difficult.
Another post-independence development was that West African heads of state 
(anglophone ones) broke up common currencies and dissolved common services, such as
44 Thompson, W., Ghana's Foreign Policy. 1957-1966. Princeton University Press, 1969.
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the West African Airways corporation, the West African Cocoa Research Institute, and 
West African Currency Board, that had linked them together during the colonial period. 
Thus in certain instances West Africans themselves adopted policy measures which 
effectively reduced the level of co-operation that existed previously and also hampered 
future co-operation. The francophone countries however did retain such links with each 
other and with France (possibly because of the co-operation agreements they signed with 
the latter during the decolonisation process).
Many of the countries balkanised themselves further by creating regions that 
further disaggregated the state along ethnic lines thus eventually making national 
integration even more difficult. The Mali Federation between Senegal and the then Soudan 
(now Mali) also broke up because of personal and ideological differences between 
Senghor and Keita just as politics in Nigeria was stymied by the personal differences 
between Awolowo, Azikiwe, and Amadu Bello. Thus West Africans could not sustain 
co-operation in instances where it was attempted and broke up even more in certain 
instances where it had existed prior to independence.
The evidence that exists does not support the view that colonialists alone were 
responsible for the present pattern of spatial allocation and lack of co-operation in West 
Africa. The above then were the initial occurrences that laid the foundation for West 
Africa inter-state relations.
Corollaries to some of the post-independent developments such as the ideological 
competition between socialists and pro-western regimes resulted in each seeking to prove
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the superiority of it's system, and thus further aggravating regional cleavages.45 Such 
national rivalry still exists among the countries within the region both at the elite and mass 
levels.
Furthermore military coup d'etat within the region later created a situation of 
unease and uncertainty as neighbouring countries accused each other of harbouring 
dissidents from each other's country. Mutual distrust developed. The early part of 
independence in West Africa was therefore a period of competition and rivalry between 
the leaders of the region.
From the above we can conclude that even though colonialism played an important 
role in creating numerous micro-states in West Africa inter-state relations within the 
region could have been less acrimonious if African leaders had had the will to do 
something about it. The personalisation of politics very early on in the post-independence 
period combined with the situation created by the decolonisation process to create a 
situation which divided West African countries along linguistic and ideological lines and 
thus made it difficult for them to build on co-operative ventures that had been established 
to facilitate colonial rule, and made it difficult for ease in communication and consensus 
building among the leaders.
45 The famous wager of Boigny with Nkrumah in 1957 that the conservatism of his country will 
make Cote d'Ivoire economically better off in ten years is an explicit example. Zartman, W.I., and 
Deldago, C.L., The Political Economy of Ivoiy Coast, Praeger, New York, 1984, p. 1.
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Extra-Regional Influences on International Relations
In addition to colonialism, extra-regional influences in West African 
post-independence inter-state relation could also be traced back to the early 1960s and the 
association of the francophone countries within the region to the EEC through France. 
Both Ghana and Nigeria viewed this with suspicion. For Ghana that was a perpetuation of 
colonialism, and prevented the eventual uniting of the African continent. For Nigeria it 
blocked the potential to become a regional power with a regional market for its nascent 
industries.
Nigeria's lukewarm attitude to the EEC only improved after negotiations for the 
Lome convention. Some have attributed the federal government's change of attitude to it's 
need to secure and neutralise it's French speaking neighbours.46 French support for the 
Biafrans, the use of Dahomey (now Benin) by the International Red Cross Society to 
supply the secessionists with medical help, and Cote d'Ivoire's recognition of the 
breakaway territory heightened the need for the federal government to secure it's borders 
and sovereignty against future upheavals47
French support and presumably that of it's West African client states was a result 
of the desire to see Nigeria's dominance of the region broken. They therefore saw the 
Biafran secession as a step in that direction. Likewise, the fear of domination of the region 
by Nigeria led Cote d'Ivoire (France's main ally within the region) to also support the 
Biafrans.
46 Bach, D., op. cit.
47Ogunbadejo, O .,' Nigeria and the Economic Community of West African States: From Vision to 
Reality', in African Contemporary Records. Annual Survey and Documents 1986-87, African Publishing 
Company, New York, 1988, pp. A124 - A140.
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This throws into perspective the seemingly illogical actions of political leaders. If 
the Biafrans had succeeded it could easily have triggered off a spate of such demands in 
other countries within the region, including the Cote d'Ivoire, because of the ethnicised 
politics of the period. Shrewd politicians such as Hougphouet Biongny could not have 
failed to realise such possibilities. We can only conclude that his support for French policy 
towards the federal government provided potential benefits that, in his calculations, 
outweighed the precedent that the break-up of Nigeria could have set. Additionally, 
because of the guarantee of French intervention in preserving his government, Hougphouet 
Biongny felt secure enough not to worry about secessionism within his own borders. 
Another interpretation that could be given to the desire to see Nigerian influence broken 
would be to interpret the support from a realpolitik perspective and to view intra-regional 
relations as one dominated by the quest for dominance.
Whatever the reason for the mainly francophone support for the Biafran secession, 
it heightened Nigerian suspicion of France and it's intention within the region.
The federal government's renewed activities after the civil war to regroup and form 
a regional organisation incorporating both anglophone and francophone countries should, 
to a certain extent, be seen as a means of pre-empting such occurrences in the future. 
Additionally the proposal by a meeting of Nigeria's ambassadors of the need for the federal 
government to undermine francophone solidarity by forming a regional organisation that 
would supplant the Organisation commune africaine et mauricienne (OCAM) and create a
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market for Nigerian industry supports the assertion that Nigeria saw French intervention is 
the region as an impediment to its national interest.48
The main obstacle to a region wide integration scheme before ECOWAS were how 
to reconcile the francophone/anglophone divide and its political ramifications, the linguistic 
differences, Pan-Africanism versus co-operation, ideological differences and the desire to 
cling to national sovereignty. These obstacles had to be overcome for ECOWAS to be 
formed. How this was done forms the subject of the next section.
3.3 Antecedents to ECOWAS
As was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, several attempts were made to 
create a regional organisation which transcended the various language barriers in the 
region. ECOWAS was a culmination of such attempts. The first efforts that were made 
toward multi-linguistic regional integration was through a 1962 Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA) initiative for joint industrial development programmes in the region. At the 
first meeting of its Standing Committee on Industrial, Natural Resources and Transport it 
was decided to help governments to industrialise through specialisation within the region. 
This was to be done through harmonisation of industrial development plans and joint 
studies.49 As a consequence of this decision, a mission of the organisation was sent to West 
Africa to investigate the possible areas of industrial co-operation. A conference was held 
in Lagos in November 1963 on Industrial Co-ordination in West Africa as a result.
48 Stremlan, J., The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War. 1967-1970. Princeton, 1977.
49ECA, Report of the West African Industrial Co-operation Mission. E/CN. 14/246, January 7, 
1964, p. 1.
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Three years after the Lagos Conference, 11 states attended a conference on 
Economic Co-operation in West Africa in Niamey in October 1966. At this meeting, 
various recommendations relating to co-operation within the region were adopted.50 
Following this, another meeting, the West African Conference on Economic Co-operation 
was held in Accra between 27 April and 4 May 1967. At this conference the then 
executive secretary of ECA, Robert Gardiner, presented the Articles of Association which 
were adopted at the Niamey conference for adoption and signature. This brought into 
being the Economic Community of West Africa.
At the Accra Conference, 12 out of the 14 countries in the sub-region signed the 
Articles thus establishing the Community. They included; Upper Volta (now Burkina 
Faso), Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, Ghana, Darhomey (now Benin), Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, 
Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.51 The Gambia and Guinea were absent. Thus a 
multi-lingual scheme was started. Subsequently, efforts were made to establish a region 
wide organisation which embraced all states. As a result a meeting Heads of State in April 
1968 in Monrovia established the West African Regional Group. An Interim Ministerial 
Council was also formed. At this meeting Nigeria and Guinea were given the task to 
prepare priority areas for co-operation among the members of the organisation. Senegal 
and Liberia were also given the task of preparing a draft treaty and an accompanying 
protocol on a customs union.52
50Gruhn, I.V., 'The Economic Commission For Africa', in African Regional Organisations. 
Mazzeo, D., (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 41- 47.
51 ECA, E/CN. 14/9, Annex VII
52Asante, S.K.B, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa, op. cit.
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Though Nigeria and Guinea submitted a report, the Interim Council of Ministers 
meeting that was to consider it together with the Senegal/ Liberia proposal for a custom 
union never met. Between 1968 and 1973, when the next Conference of Ministers took 
place in Lome, no other meeting had been convened to consider the priority studies or the 
draft treaty discussed in 1968. There was thus a complete lull in region wide co-operation 
efforts between 1968 and 1973.53
During this period there was a renewed effort by Cote d'Ivoire to revitalise the 
UDEAO. Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Dahomey (now Benin), and Togo had been absent from the 
Monrovia meeting of heads of state but had subsequently claimed that the pace of a region 
wide integration scheme was being rushed. There was the fear of anglophone domination, 
particularly of Nigerian domination. At France's suggestion they sought to counterbalance 
Nigerian influence in the region. This may have formed the background to Nigeria's 
Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction to observe at the 1973 
conference of Minister for the proposed West African Economic Community that: 
' Sometimes , our attitude toward economic co-operation has been ambivalent; sometimes 
it has been downright negative. We have allowed ourselves to be persuaded that our future 
lies in seeking salvation outside our continent'.54 France's influence in West Africa, the civil 
war in Nigeria, domestic preoccupations and national politics, to mention a few, were 
some of the factors that hindered the formation of an organisation that embraced all states 
in the region.
S3Usoro, E. J., 'Past and Present Attempts at Economic Integration in West Africa', in Economic 
Integration of West Africa. Edozien, E. C., and Osagie, E. (ed.) Ibadan University Press, 1982, pp. 38 - 
58.
54 Adebayo Adedeji quoted by Nwabuzor, E. J. O., 'Politics of African Economic Integration', in 
Edozien and Osagie, op. cit., p. 92.
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As we have indicated above, co-operation among francophone countries suffered 
several set backs and many became defunct. Efforts to incorporate both English and 
French speaking countries in a scheme also floundered in 1968. In 1975, however 
ECOWAS was formed. Below we consider some of the factors leading to the formation of 
the organisation.
3.4 The formation of ECOWAS
It has been suggested that Nigeria's willingness to use her influence to stop the 
incursion of Libya into the region by sending troops to Chad,55 her support of the anti 
apartheid movement in South Africa and MPLA in Angola,56 the ending of the Yaounde 
Convention, changing Nigerian/French relations and the leading role Nigeria played in 
negotiations leading to the Lome Convention57 all had a part to play in reducing the feeling 
of suspicion of the possible effects of Nigeria's influence within the region. The decision to 
work for a West African integration was, therefore, an important aspect of redefining 
Nigerian post civil war geopolitical space because it implicated it in issues that went 
beyond economic co-operation.
Hence Nigeria's attempts to ostracise the populist military governments of 
Rawlings (Ghana) by the Obasanjo government and later of Doe (Liberia) and Sankara 
(Burkina Faso)58 by the Shagari regime helped in reassuring the more conservative leaders
within the region of the willingness of the federal government to restore the status-quo
55 Chazan, et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa.
56 This brought Nigeria into conflict with Senghor of Senegal who was accused of being reactionary 
for supporting the FLNA and UNIT A.
57Mayall, J., 'The Impact For Africa of the Enlarged European Economic Community', in The 
Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development. Shaw, T. M., and Heard, K. A., (ed.), Longman, Bristol, 
1979.
58Agyeman-Duah, B., and Ojo, O.L, 'Interstate Conflicts in West Africa: The Reference Group 
Theory Perspective', in Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 24, 3, Oct. 1991.
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ante, and thus winning them over to accept her foreign policy as benign and mutually 
beneficial. But it also meant the various Nigerian governments went beyond economic 
issues, and into judging the legitimacy of governments.
Once it became clear that the formation of ECOWAS would not undermine old 
privileges, such as francophone links with France, or be a vehicle for Nigerian domination, 
anglophone/francophone interactions could converge and did so during the negotiations of 
Lome 1. Nigeria's dominant role in the negotiations leading to the Convention further 
indicated the advantages to the region of having an emerging power as an ally.
The above arguments however give an exaggerated impression about Nigeria's 
influence on intra-regional relations in West Africa. Some of the actions taken by Nigeria 
to allay suspicion of its intentions, such as the willingness to maintain the existing order 
were taken after ECOWAS was formed. Thus though Nigeria was important in revitalising 
the idea of an all encompassing regional organisation, it must be remembered that such an 
organisation would probably have been formed earlier if the federal government which had 
been one of the countries, together with Guinea, assigned with the task of preparing a 
priority study on possible areas of co-operation within the region had not been distracted 
by the civil war soon after the April 1968 meeting in Monrovia.
Secondly, external influences brought about by the 1972 oil price shocks may have 
influenced decisions to join ECOWAS since Nigeria is an oil producing country. The other 
countries within the region were probably working in their own interest just as Nigeria 
was.
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Thus several reasons, including the ones listed above combined with the supposed 
economic advantages of regional integration to help in overcoming the cleavages that 
divided the region into coalitions along the various cleavages.
The above description does not imply that all interactions in independent West 
Africa were based on coalitions along linguistic differences. As was mentioned earlier, 
Guinea, Ghana and Mali formed a union which transcended these barriers. Nigeria, and 
Liberia joined the Cote d'Ivoire in thwarting Nkrumah's plans for an African Union 
Government. Moreover differences did occur between states belonging to the same 
linguistic zone as the break-up of the Mali Federation indicated. Just as the period from 
independence to 1963 (the formation of the OAU) saw turbulent rivalry between states 
and diplomatic coalitions crystallised in the Casablanca and Brazzaville groups( Monrovia 
group at the regional level ) so did 1963 to 1970 see a settling o f such high profile 
jockeying. For one thing Nkrumah had been overthrown by a group of conservative 
oriented military officers who eventually handed over power to Busia , who among other 
things was a friend of Houphouet-Boigny.
Like all other African countries, those in West Africa were preoccupied with the 
crisis in Zaire, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia's white minority 
and the attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria. There was also a shift from the desire 
to consolidate the individual state's external sovereignty vis-a-vis other countries within 
the region to the desire to define the direction of the continental system that was emerging 
particularly after the formation of the OAU.59This shift may have been because of the
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OAU's stance on colonially inherited boundaries. Once it had been settled that the 
boundaries were to remain as they had been at independence, pan -Africanism lost its 
impetus as a viable ideological challenge to the new states. Economic rather than political 
unification became the theme for West African co-operation, thus paving the way for such 
working together.
The solidarity that drove all third world countries, especially between 1970-75 to 
demand a New International Economic Order engulfed West African countries also. 
Despite the impact of the oil price shocks, the strong identification with OPEC countries 
in the third world was nearly universal because of the belief that such occurrences could be 
replicated in other sectors of international trade in primary goods. Thus though the impact 
on developing countries was relatively more severe, they nevertheless supported the OPEC 
price hikes. There was also the wide spread break in diplomatic relations with Israel and 
apartheid South Africa.“ The effects of these occurrences were that they showed West 
African countries that joint action could help their cause in international relations. On the 
other hand the countries within the region had had their concerns shifted from regional 
politics. Their attention had been caught by the various occurrences in the international 
system to the neglect of regional goals. The new third world co-operative ethos had to be 
translated to the regional level. This was done by Nigeria in her promotion of ECOWAS.
ECOWAS came into being therefore because of a redefinition of the goals of 
co-operation from the mainly federalist meaning it had in the 1960s, to economic and 
technical co-operation within the context of pursuing a new international economic order.
59 Chazan, et. al„ op. cit.
“ Chazan, et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa
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It was also facilitated by the feeling among the francophone countries that they were more 
able to counterbalance Nigeria weight through collective action in CEAO. The impact of 
the oil price shock of 1973 also played a part to the extent that it created the need to 
ensure a source of supply, but more importantly indicated to the countries what collective 
action can achieve for commodity prices and bargaining in international political economy. 
However, it could be suggested that if Nigeria, for own her reasons, had not pursued 
integration as strongly as she did after the Biafran war, and been willing to foot the bill for 
promoting it, the Economic Community West Africa would probably have remained on the 
drawing board.
3.5 Regional politics after the formation of ECOWAS
Apart from the main political constellations crystallised around radical/revisionists 
and the pro-western conservative regimes in West Africa, especially in the early part of 
independence, relations within the region have been stable. The uneasy equilibrium has 
only been disturbed by occasional skirmishes such as those between Mali and Burkina Faso 
over land disputes in 1983. Borders have also been closed intermittently by various 
governments because of accusations of neighbours of harbouring political dissidents.61 
Smuggling has also caused difficulties and soured relations on occasions. But overall 
external sovereignty has been largely respected within the region despite the linguistic, 
ideological and regime type cleavages that have divided the region.
61 Border dispute exist between Mali and Burkina Faso, Ghana and Togo, and Senegal and 
Guinea-Bissau.
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The period between 1975 to 1983 saw tensions develop over Western Sahara, and 
the crystallisation of old coalitions. The period also saw the near break-up of the OAU and 
the institutionalisation of a yearly summit between France and the francophone African 
countries. However, widespread drought and severe economic difficulties saw most of the 
governments concentrating on domestic issues except for the flare up between Ghana and 
Togo over accusations that the former was aiding Togolese dissidents, and France's 
intervention with her troops to support Togo.
During the same period Ghana and Nigeria closed their borders while the latter 
expelled citizens from other countries in 1983 and 1985. To the extent that most 
indigenous trade is done by road in the region, such closures affected the level of 
interaction between the citizens of the countries within the region. Thus apart from the 
political ill-feeling that such closures engendered, they also discouraged the formation of a 
regional community.
Generally, relations within the region were consensual when outside threats were 
perceived as the common enemy, especially in economic issues. In the main, however, 
relations were and are based on calculations of cost and benefits in relation established 
patron-client benefits between external forces and regional entities. France's role as 
protector and economic supporter is very salient in francophone calculations of costs to be 
incurred and the benefits to be derived from regional co-operation.
External affiliations have played a part in the evolution of West African 
intra-regional relations. The almost enforced association of francophone countries of the
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region with France created difficulties in relations between countries such a Guinea and the 
rest the former French colonies within the region. The desire to cling to the special 
relations between it and its former colonies drove it to adopt disastrous policies such as 
the support for Biafran secessionism. It also perpetuated the colonial division of the 
countries in the region into linguistic zones which are still very salient in intra-regional 
relations.
Intra-regional relations in West Africa have improved over the years. There has 
been a rapprochement between Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea is back within the fold of 
the francophone group, changes in leaders have thawed acrimonious relationships while 
Nigeria's ability to influence regional relations has continued to wane with its dwindling 
resources. Global political changes have also affected politics within the region. France is 
more discerning than it used to be about its association with certain regimes within the 
region. Above all the collapse of the Soviet Union and the falsification of the socialist 
ideology has reduced the schism that existed between pro-western regimes and 
populist/socialist regimes. It is bringing about a change in political leadership within the 
individual countries with their own dynamics for economic and political development and 
consequently for regional relations. These may have repercussions for ECOWAS. The 
domestic politics of individual countries will determine to a large extent the level of 
commitment to regional goal. Thus, in the next section, we move to the domestic level of 
analysis in our bid to describe the environment of regional integration in West Africa.
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3.6 Domestic Politics and Regional Integration
Several factors at the state level of analysis contribute to the success of regional 
integration schemes. It is therefore important that our examination of the factors 
constituting the environment of ECOWAS takes account of the domestic politics of the 
countries in order to see how they either facilitate or impede the functioning of the 
organisation.
Two related issues of political will and political commitment have been identified 
as essential for regional integration. These essential ingredients underpin the legitimacy 
and authority that are accorded to politically relevant actors who negotiate and enter into 
binding decisions on behalf of their countries. But the extent of the authority given to 
delegates and representatives derive from the legitimacy of incumbent governments. 
Hence, an a priori assumption can be made that there is a relationship between 
commitment to regional organisations, internal political structures and the authority of 
national representatives.
Apart from affecting decisions taken at the regional level, internal political 
structures also determine the extent to which the public and elite are able to participate in 
regional decision making at the state level. The extent to which national elite or the 
informed public participate or influence decisions taken at the state level, before they reach 
the regional level, therefore, depend on access to the decision making centre.
The theory of regional integration postulates that regional elite complimentarity of 
values across the region contribute to the success of regional schemes. This is because
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they indicate the expectations and determine the evaluation of gains and loses that will be 
attributed to participation in such schemes. Participation by a broad spectrum of relevant 
elite; political, academic and those from the business sector, are therefore seen as 
important to a better calculation of benefit and costs and hence to a more rational decision 
on whether to join a scheme, agree to certain decisions or indeed continue participating in 
the organisation. This is not to imply that all elite groups from all sectors of the society 
will have the same view about what the variables that should be used in the calculations of 
benefits and cost should be. However such participation will mean that a thorough 
examination of the various interests would have been considered before decisions are 
made.
The extent to which functionally differentiated and formally organised groups 
within member states are capable of articulating and influencing policy outcomes 
independent of control by authority groups is however dependent on the level of pluralism 
at the state level. Similarly, the flexibility that national representatives have when 
negotiating at the regional level very much depends on the autonomy that they have and 
which is in turn dependent on recognition by other participants that such autonomy is 
backed by appropriate authority at the national level.
Schmitter,62 for example, has produced a matrix which attempts to predict the 
effects of the interplay between voting modalities at the regional level and the autonomy 
enjoyed by national representatives, and the types of decision making this entails for 
regional integration. Where treaty provisions provide for unanimity rather than majority
62 Schimitter, P.C. ’A Revised Theory of Regional Integration' in Regional Integration: Theory and 
Research Lindberg. L.N. and Scheingold, S. A. (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971, p249.
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voting, and the autonomy of national representatives is low, it is envisaged that negotiator 
will tend to adopt proposals of the least cooperative member's position. This is because 
they lack the authority to make concessions. On the other hand, where enforced unanimity 
is low i.e. majority voting is accepted, and national representatives' autonomy is high, 
negotiations can result in policies that upgrade the different positions of the actors and 
hence result in extending the scope and level and hence the authority of the organisation 
beyond the original area of competence.
Obviously, the more autonomy representatives enjoy and the less enforced 
unanimity these is, the more probable it will be for the process to advance and the more 
likely the possibilities there will be for organisational growth.
Political decision making has varied within West Africa with changes in regimes 
since independence. Various social groups, incipient classes, a variety of local community, 
professional associations, trade unions, women's organisations, and religious 
organisations63 have with varying degrees of effectiveness affected decision making 
differently at different times within each country.
Apart from the varied impact of groups, on internal politics, political parties have 
also affected decision making differently in the member countries of ECOWAS.
At the general level however, because most West African governments at the 
attainment of independence embarked upon the consolidation of power and on institutional
“ These social organisations are examined in more detail in the next chapter.
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building, it resulted in an expanding of the bureaucracy, a downgrading and impedance of 
opposition parties and a strengthening and expansion of the coercive apparatus. This as 
pointed out earlier, resulted in party functionaries being promoted to head administrative 
and coercive structures especially since the political loyalties of people who were 
previously in such positions were not always clear.
The party therefore came to be used as an instrument of bureaucratic supervision. 
Moreover because the administration was central in decision making, the posting of party 
functionaries into administrative positions implied the encroachment of the party in 
decision making e.g. Ghana. In other instances such as in Cote d'Ivoire, the party was 
subordinated to government institutions and thus occupying a symbolic rather than a 
central role in decision making.
Leaders in West Africa have over the past three decades of independence been 
occupied with what rules and patterns of decision making to encourage in order to 
increase their power. They have also been concerned with how to gain compliance from 
their citizens. Individual political centres have been propelled by quite distinct principles 
and operated in different ways despite the common constraints they all faced at 
independence. Individual leaders have therefore put their particular imprint on the manner 
in which politics is conducted. At a general level however, experimentation, and trial and 
error have guided political activity and decision making since independence. The rules and 
institutions of governance, as Chazan et. al. put it: 'have been filtered through the 
ambitions, interests, limitations, and capabilities of the political elite'.64
64 Chazan, et al, op.cit pl48.
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To a large extent, the differences in rules and practices that emerged and that 
underlie political practice could be found in three elements. These are; principles for 
decision making, the locus of decision making, and the manner of decision making. The 
first element includes political vision and ideology which together influenced the goals set, 
and also affected the plans for governing. The second element was the type of leadership 
style and the mode of operation adopted by the elite in the implementation of objectives. 
Finally, the establishment of rules of the political game dictated the manner of decision 
making.
All three elements have had implications for regional integration. As mentioned 
earlier, differing ideologies in the early days of independence determined intra-regional 
cleavages between countries. The often differing ideological underpinnings influenced the 
extent to which national goals were compatible. Even where they were compatible, the 
strategies adopted for achieving such goals were markedly different. This was exemplified 
by the impact of Ghana's African Socialism and Cote d'Ivoire's Pragmatism on the process 
paths adopted for economic development under Nkrumah and Houphouet - Boigny 
respectively.
Experimentation with African Socialism which dominated the political landscape of 
Africa as a whole in the early 1960s was more wholly embraced by Ghana, Guinea and 
Mali. The remaining countries within the region adopted a pragmatic position vis-a-vis the 
dominant ideologies even though this invariably implied association with the West.
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Liberal democracy was also practised in Ghana and Nigeria at various stages of 
independence while Gambia and Senegal have been able to maintain a kind of democracy 
since independence. In all other instances autocratic civilian and military governments rule 
in systems of single or no-party situations. ECOWAS countries account for less than a 
third of OAU membership, but have accounted for more than half of the military 
take-overs on the continent. During the early years of the organisation, between 1976 and 
1984, for example, there were 18 attempted coups in the region. Eight of these failed and 
ten succeeded.65 Indeed, one of the reasons given for the overthrow of the Gowon regime 
of Nigeria by commentators on 29 July 1975 was that:
... many ... had become disenchanted with Gen. Gowon's 
style of government-particularly his preoccupation 
with grand schemes like ECOWAS when so much more needed to 
be done to improve the lot of the average Nigerian.66
Thus in addition to the unpredictability that such rapid regime changes engendered, 
regional integration was itself a reason for such change. The more important implication of 
this reason for regime change is that it affected the core country of the regional 
organisation. Since Nigeria, under Gowon, was the main protagonist of ECOWAS, his 
departure was a blow to regionalism especially since those who took over power did not 
share his enthusiasm for it.
In addition to the predominantly authoritarian and autocratic forms of governments 
that emerged in West Africa, politics became highly personalised. Relations among leaders 
and coalitions among countries within the region were affected by the personal friendship
65 For details see Cook, C., and Killingray, African Political Facts Since 1945. 2 nd (edition), 
Macmillan, London, 1991.
66Hills, P., in The TimesOJKl. July 30/7/75.
184
and animosities of leaders rather than by economic expediency. This obviously affected 
regional integration. As Agyeman-Duah and Olatunde observed, ECOWAS had come to 
constitute a reference group 'with rights and privileges for member states, particularly their 
leaders; conflict occurs when a regime is perceived by others to have violated group norms 
and values and is pressured to observe the sub-regional code of conduct ... as 
interdependence increases ... abrupt social changes such as overthrow of "respectable" 
heads of state or radical economic reforms become the basis of conflict because they upset 
the existing equilibrium'.67 A shortcoming of the theory of regional integration, however, 
is that the process conditions envisaged for the achievement of goals do not take into 
account the impact that the personalisation of political power can have on such schemes.
Another form of political practice that has emerged in the sub region since the late 
1970s is a form of radical populism. Starting from Ghana, it spread through emulation to 
Liberia and then Burkina Faso. The radicalism and rhetoric that usually accompanied this 
ideology created animosity in neighbouring countries who feared emulation of such trends 
within their own borders.
This has had the effect of reintroducing the ideological differences that prevailed in 
the early days of independence. The difference, however, was that it was more the fear of 
emulation rather than being averse to continental unity that made it create conflict between 
these leaders and the old guard. To the extent that it led to the exclusion of the leaders of 
Ghana, Liberia and Burkina Faso from meetings, it had a negative impact on co-operation 
efforts. Since regional integration depends for its initiation and progress on elite
67 Agyeman-Duah, B., and Olatunde, O . , ' Interstate Conflict in West Africa: The Reference Group 
Theory Perspective', in Comparative Political Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, Oct. 1991, pp. 303 - 304.
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complimentarity of values, such a post-ECOWAS development buttressed the assertion 
made above about the effect the personalisation of power has on commitment to regional 
goals and subsequently on progress toward a more integrated region. Liberia, for example, 
threatened to withdraw from the organisation because of the embarrassment it caused Sgt. 
Doe.
Another a priori assumption that is made is how frequent military changes in both 
ideological leanings and leadership affect regional integration. Often heads of state, 
despite the autonomy they might enjoy in decision making fora, find that the uncertainty 
that they will be around long enough to implement policy decisions mitigates against their 
willingness to wholeheartedly guarantee the implementation o f regional integration 
decisions, especially those that might have immediate short term costs for their country. 
As the Gowon case indicates this may indeed be a pragmatic attitude, to the extent that it 
may lead to a military take over being rationalised on that basis.68 On the other hand the 
lack of such guarantees subtracts from the weight that regional decisions should normally 
have. Another effect of such political changes is that since new governments sometimes 
decide not to honour the commitments made by their predecessors, participating countries 
may feel that resources that they devote to regional schemes will be wasted. They are 
therefore unwilling to commit state resources to obligations that may only go to waste.
Hence it is not only decision making at the national level but the whole of the 
political structure of member states that is important to regional integration. Because 
there are no regularised forms of political transition, and military governments tend to be
68 cf. p. 42.
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erratic, there is usually no guarantee that incoming governments will honour commitments 
made by those they come to replace. Uncertainty and unpredictability are heightened at the 
regional level.
Such political unpredictability and uncertainty are particularly inimical in situations 
such as West Africa where the type of integration that is postulated, a p r io r i, as being 
able to overcome dependence, lead to industrialisation and increase trade within the region 
needs to have a high level of government involvement. The inherently dirigiste 
presuppositions underlying third world integration implies that governments must actively 
participate in integration through actual investment into industry and other joint ventures. 
Unpredictability about whether investment embarked upon will be completed or where 
completed will be approved by successive governments are therefore bad for integration.
Another result of the fluidity of national politics in the region is that various forms 
of regimes emerged in post-independent West Africa. These include what have been 
categorised as administrative-hegemonial, party-mobilizing, pluralists, and party centralist 
regimes.69 However, regardless of the regime type that emerged in the individual 
countries, in instances where civilian rule was maintained, the one party system was 
adopted, and political elite circulated in a way which reflected party loyalty, ethnic 
affiliation and/or expertise. Closeness to leaders was essential for individual advancement. 
Power is often concentrated in the hands of the leader either of the party where it was 
civilian or, in the hands of the military head of state.
69 These have been detailed extensively in Chazan, et al., Politics in contemtoparv Africa, op. cit.
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Whether military or civilian, access to the political centre is severely circumscribed. 
Participation in decision making is severely restricted so that the impact of the masses, and 
interest groups in policy decisions is minimal. Trade union activity is censored whiles the 
predominantly state owned news media has little effect as a source of pressure on 
governments. However, even though such regimes give a picture of exclusivity in decision 
making, they nevertheless involve a wide variety of actors in the process. To the extent 
that key interest groups such as ethnic, regional, classes and occupational groups are 
perceived as more likely to co-operate with government institutions, they are incorporated 
into the decision making process .^Nevertheless governments choose whom to involve in 
politics. This again means government participation is crucial to integration because of its 
preponderance in decision making.
It has been suggested that governments with high political capacity are more able 
to pursue and implement policies and economic readjustments programmes, such as the 
kind that integration entails, than governments with low "capacity". If strong governments 
could be equated to authoritarian ones then one can suggest that most West African 
governments since independence have been fairly politically capable and should have been 
able to undertake integrative policies. However, the examples of the Ghana-Guinea Union 
suggests that decisions taken by political leaders to integrate without the involvement of 
politically relevant elites and the politically aware section of the masses quickly become 
defunct with the removal of such leaders from power. Such organisations tend to be 
unsustainable. Besides, it is erroneous to think authoritarian and imposed governments are 
strong . As Killick, for example, pointed out, because such governments 'lack a publicly
70Chazan, et a., p 133.
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accepted claim to a right to govern, [they tend to] be particularly nervous of public 
opinion'.71 Autocratic government are, therefore, not necessarily strong governments. This 
explains, to a certain extent, why they tend to be hesitant about committing state resources 
to regional goals.
If  strong governments alone are not the crucial and deciding factor in the 
perpetuation of integration schemes then to what extent does popular support affect the 
longevity of such schemes? Research has mainly been geared towards finding the causal 
link between popular support for integration schemes and the formation and maintenance 
of such schemes. Not much research has been done into finding the link between political 
structure and integration. But as has been suggested above, decisions taken at the highest 
level of the political structure without elite involvement or popular support tend to fail. 
The suggestion has been made that when the political elite and the masses support such 
schemes, such support is predicated, to a certain extent, on perceived advantages to be 
derived from the scheme. Such utilitarian support may therefore help to maintain the 
scheme after an incumbent is no longer in power because both groups see an advantage in 
maintaining the scheme. Thus where such unions are not entered into by leaders for 
symbolic measures but are done with the view of improving the lot of their countries, such 
schemes will be more likely to succeed.
Since there is no intrinsic commitment to the region as such, regional co-operation 
is pursued because of its potential advantages for national development. Political stability 
and economic welfare of a particular country can be severely affected by events in
71Killick, T., Policy Economics. Heinemann, London, 1981, p. 20.
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neighbouring countries, and the national governments, in addition to overt economic gains, 
might therefore enter into integration schemes to stabilise their environment. On the other 
hand where integration might disrupt the economic, political or social environment of the 
state, national governments are unlikely to support it even if the long term gains are likely 
to outweigh the negative short term effects. There is in this instance an interactive effect 
of national politics and regional integration is that regional goals will only be supported 
when on balance national interests are not harmed by such goals. Hence, taking into 
consideration the differential impact of regional integration schemes, as long as national 
leaders regard the individual state rather than the region as the political unit, economic 
integration which benefits some to the detriment of others will not be supported by those 
who stand to lose.
In the preceding pages we have detailed the political context both before and after 
the formation of ECOWAS. We also looked at how obstacles were overcome for the 
organisation to be formed. The question to ask is how the political dynamics of the 
organisation will affect its functioning and hence the achievement of the goals envisaged 
for it. The preceding analysis has concentrated on the West African political milieu, and 
how this affected the formation of a region wide integration scheme. In other words, now 
that the organisation has been formed, what will be its political dynamics? To be able to 
analyse the political dynamics of the organisation, we need an analytical framework which 
helps us to pinpoint the impact of politics on regional integration.
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3.7Political Variables in the Analysis of Regional Integration Among 
Developing Countries.
As we examined in the first two chapters the theories of integration that have been 
formulated to explain and sometimes to predict regional integration outcomes were 
formulated with a European context in mind. Even though a few studies were devoted to 
developing countries, generalisations derived from them serve more to elucidate the 
difficulties that such schemes face 72 than to explain the formation, maintenance, and 
process paths of integration among developing countries.
Despite some of the very important findings of the traditional theories their 
European centredness limit their use in four very important ways. First, because European 
countries are not dependent economies the theories omit the consequences of political and 
economic dependence on integration. Second, because Western European states were 
already industrialised on the onset of these schemes the threshold from which they started 
and which the theories take for granted make them limited in their application to 
developing countries. Third, the political structure - pluralism - which international 
relations theorists assume for the process conditions of regional integration are absent in 
most developing countries. Fourth, the highly politicised nature of economic development 
issues are not appropriately recognised by integration theory except cursorily and therefore 
make existing theory inadequate.
72 Nye, J., 'Comparing Common Markets'
To be able to explain the political context of West African integration adequately, 
we have to relate the objectives of the integration scheme to the political economy of the 
region.
Integration among developing countries is, as already noted, primarily a means to 
development and not a means to countervailing the strength of superpowers, mitigating the 
spread of communism, or of maintaining regional peace as was the case in Western 
Europe. These reasons together with those noted above go to underline the inadequacy of 
Eurocentric models as explanatory frameworks for analysing regional integration models 
among developing countries.73
Because of the aims envisioned for them, such schemes are predicated on the 
economic advantages that can be derived from the dynamics of the process. What 
therefore happens is that its advocates concentrate on the perceived economic advantages 
that can be derived from them. To support their arguments economic justifications are 
made for the desirability of embarking on such schemes. However, the context within 
which economic integration schemes function is made up not of what is economically 
desirable but by what is politically feasible.
Like any international economic relation, economic integration has the potential of 
creating interdependencies that sometimes conflict with the sovereign prerogatives of the 
member states. It could also result in changes that may have consequences for regional
73 The activities of ECOWAS in peacekeeping efforts in the Liberian civil war is not a primary aim 
of the organisation and is not included in the main treaty. The ECOWAS monitoring group( ECOMOG) is 
based on a defence protocol which was signed after the treaty itself came into force. Thus though regional 
security may have been an implicit desire of the founders of the organisation, it was not the basis for the 
formation of the organisation. See appendix 1.
195
resource allocation, and distribution of wealth. Furthermore, it has the potential of 
resulting in change that could result in social, economic and political dislocation of the 
member countries. Thus while seeking to maximise their advantage from such schemes, 
national governments will also attempt to limit the negative effects of such schemes 
through intervention at various levels. As Gilpin, for example noted,
behind seemingly technical issues of trade or international money 
lurk significant political issues that profoundly influence the 
power, independence, and well being of individual states. Thus, 
although trade may well be of mutual benefit, every state wants 
its own gains to benefit disproportionately to its advantage,.... 
to have its say in decision making....'74
The agreements that form the basis of such organisations and the extent to which 
decisions are complied with and implemented are a reflection of what the individual 
countries consider as being the costs and benefits that such schemes have for them. The 
highlighting of the advantages without a careful consideration of the feasibility of such 
schemes tend to make the achievement of the desired goals difficult.
A careful examination of the political feasibility of a region economic integration 
scheme is therefore important when such programmes are being analysed for their 
effectiveness in achieving their goals.
As already detailed in the introduction of the thesis, the hypothesis guiding this 
study is that economic integration schemes such as the ECOWAS will not achieve their 
goal unless the political and social dynamics of the region are also taken into account when 
the possible economic gains that can be derived if they succeed are being considered.
74 Gilpin, R., The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1987, p24.
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If, as has been mentioned above, the Eurocentric framework is inadequate for 
analysing regional integration, then it will be appropriate to use one that meets our need 
better. The four limitations that we identified as making such theories inadequate means 
that for regional integration to lead to development in West Africa, it must be able to act 
as an engine for industrial development ,and as a means of overcoming dependence. The 
process itself must be able to take place within a political milieu that is still developing, and 
in a situation where economic issues are salient to the extent that they can be categorised 
as high politics.
Analytical Framework
Since these issues have only been cursorily addressed in the available literature, the 
suggestion, made by Axline, that the politics of third world integration be analysed by 
using tools that reflect both the type of integration needed for development, and the 
negotiating modalities of such schemes is of particular relevance.75
He suggested two models, originally, used by Mytelka and Haskel as frameworks 
for such an analysis. Mytelka's analytical framework sort to categorise integration schemes 
into three models. Each subsequent category incorporates the previous one and includes 
additional measures that make it more complex and extensive than the previous one.
The first type involves a laissez-faire free trade area which is based on neo-classical 
liberal economic theory. This type resembles the European model and emphasises trade
75 Axline, W.A., Caribbean Integration. The Politics of Regionalism. Francis Pinter, London, 1979.
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liberalisation. This kind of integration, it is suggested, leads to an unequal pattern of 
exchange, and polarisation among developing countries. The consequences are the 
creation of a disequilibrium situation which tends toward instability, and disintegration.
The second model includes all the features of Type 1 but incorporate measures that 
seek to correct the negative effects of laissez-faire trade liberalisation. Redistributive 
measures are adopted to take care of the unequal gains, while compensatory measures are 
used to combat polarisation. This model requires a high level of governmental commitment 
in regional integration by member countries and implies a dirigiste approach.
The two elements of commitment and dirigisme are needed if the setting up of 
mechanisms such as solidarity funds, fiscal compensation schemes, a regional development 
bank and regional allocation of industries to facilitate the redistribution and compensatory 
measures are to be possible.
The third model (Type III) involves the free trade area of Type I, the compensatory 
and redistributive mechanisms of Type II and measures to combat and eventually 
overcome dependence.
I f  it is to be effective, regional integration has, in addition to the relatively short 
term goals of trade liberalisation, to incorporate such long term developmental goals into 
its framework in other for it to be congruous with national aspirations. Type III 
integration which incorporates trade liberalisation, redistributive and compensatory
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measures and regional policies, as well as measure to combat dependency as described 
above, is the ideal form that regional integration among developing countries should take.
However, even though it provides the most benefits, Type m  schemes are the most 
difficult to achieve. This is because of the more complex institutions that are required, the 
wider scope of decision making, and the greater commitment to regional co-operation that 
it entails than the first two types. Such requirement must be met in the context "where all 
questions of economic development are in the realm of 'high politics' and the where 
particularism is an extremely strong force, and where the definition of dependence is 
sometimes problematic.
Dependence in this context is referring to its historical, functional and structural 
manifestations. As with most developing countries, the production of primary goods for 
export in West African countries is not a result of free market forces allocating 
comparative advantages to various regions of the world, but is a result of conscious 
political decisions taken in the colonial era to grow these products for Western domestic 
and industrial consumption. One result of this, discussed quite extensively in chapter one, 
is that West African economies are dominated by the production of single or a narrow 
range of crops. The consequence of this is that they experience sometimes quite severe 
fluctuations in their export earnings. This historical antecedent has consequences for 
dependence to the extent that the markets of these countries have been and remain the 
former colonial masters.
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Another manifestation of this historical shaping of the economies of these countries 
is that a large part of West Africans are peripheral to the exchange economy. This is 
because the majority of the citizens live in rural areas either not conducive to the 
production of the main export crop or were not introduced to its cultivation. Their main 
occupation is subsistence farming with minimal exchange being undertaken. Both the 
methods of cultivation, the size of farms, and land allocation methods make the quantity of 
goods produced small. What is therefore sold of the total harvest is able to fetch a very 
meagre income for the farmers. Indeed what is sold is determined by the immediate needs 
of the household, such as the need to buy basic essential such as fuel, clothing, pay school 
fees and debts. Small quantities of crops and household fowls are carried to the weekly 
market for sale to meet such immediate needs. Little money is left for savings or 
investment or even as funds for emergency since the crops actually act as proxy banks. 
The result of this is that countries in the region are typically structure with a small urban 
and commercialised cash crops producing sector on the one hand coexisting with a rural, 
predominantly subsistent sector.76
The resulting dualistic77 nature of the economies has consequences for nation 
building because resources that originate mainly from the commercialised cash crops 
producing areas have to be redistributed to benefit the whole country. This is because 
people from such cash crops producing areas tend to resent the siphoning of resources to 
other part of the country.78 People from the producing areas have often felt that they
76 This categorisation like any is to a certain extent restrictive, especially to the extent that it does 
not, for example indicate the changes that are taking place. However, it does, describe the general 
structure of the economic structure of these countries.
77 Dualism is not being used in the Marxist sense of exploitation of a periphery by a centre but 
rather is a description of two coexisting structural forms.
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subsidise governments disproportionately and tend by their utterances and behaviour to 
antagonise others who do not come from that region. To the extent that ethnic divisions 
within the state are coterminous with such productive zones they tend at various times 
and for various reasons to aggravate ethnic cleavages.79
The accepted comparative advantages of today's West African countries which are 
really a colonial creation, to the extent that they are not natural resources but agricultural 
products, and the structural legacies of such colonially contrived comparative advantage 
have continuing consequences for politics and development. If development is taken in a 
holistic sense to include not just economic but political and social progress of the general 
population, then regional integration ought to include measures that seek to correct the 
structural anomaly described above. To ignore such issues will be to ignore a potential 
source of political instability and thus the 'noise' that interferes with responsiveness to 
regional objectives since governments tend to be distracted from long term goals which 
regional integration embodies to concentrate on nation building thus undermining 
regionalism and transfer of sovereignty.
Another aspect of dependency is the excessive reliance on foreign capital flows for 
development purposes and balance of payment adjustment. As a result o f this West African 
countries of this now spend a large proportion of the foreign exchange earnings in 
repayment of loans. The repercussions have included not being able to properly finance 
development projects with recurring borrowings with debilitating consequences. Apart 
from the effect such financial dependence on development programming, its secondary
79
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effects on national pride, outside interference in economic sovereignty have detrimental 
effects and consequences. The large proportions of earnings spent on repayment of loans 
means that little is available for spending on regional integration with its long term yields.
The issues that will form the basis of negotiation in a Type m  scheme are the 
agreement on a regime for direct foreign investment, increasing the ratio of regional to 
external trade, shifting exports toward the manufacturing sector, promoting 
industrialisation, and increasing the bargaining power of the region.
As a guide to what to expect from such negotiations, Axline adopts Haskel's 
analytical tool which categorises integration policies into those that are expansive and 
those that are distributive. Expansive policies are those which are based on trade 
liberalisation and benefit the relatively more developed countries within the region. The 
more developed countries (MDCs) are therefore likely to support such policies. The less 
developed countries within the region (LDCs) on the other hand, more likely to support 
distributive measures that seek to share out the benefits derived from trade liberalisation 
since they are more likely to lose from regional trade liberalisation.
The ECOWAS treaty categorises the countries within the region into three groups 
instead of two and thus deviates slightly from Haskel's model. Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal 
and Cote d'Ivoire, constitute the most developed countries. The second group is made up 
of Benin, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, and Togo. The least developed group is made up 
of Guinea-Bissau, the Gambia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The last two 
groups can be collapsed, however, for analytical purposes.
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If the type of integration envisaged by ECOWAS members is similar to Type m  
and negotiation positions resemble the Haskel model, the questions that arise are whether 
the institutional framework of the community is adequate to cope with the extensive and 
comprehensive policies that that type of integration scheme implies? Secondly, if the 
LDCs are unlikely to support expansive regional policies without adequate distributive 
policies, how are the essentially medium to long term benefits that are expected to accrue 
to the MDCs reconciled with the need for short term distributional policies demanded by 
the LDCs as a condition for their participation? Do the MDCs find it worth their while to 
participate in a scheme that places immediate financial burdens on them and in which the 
magnitude of the benefits are uncertain? How, on the other hand do the LDCs reconcile 
the inability of the community to provide adequate redistributive and compensatory 
measures with the possibility of the relative disadvantages that they might face.
The fact that the community has survived 18 years implies that the members have 
been able to find common grounds for working together. National goals do converge to 
the extent that development is a common aspiration for all of them.
To Axline, the negotiations that lead to the adoption of the mechanisms and 
measures of a scheme constitute the politics of regional integration. In addition to the 
negotiation modalities actors at the domestic, sub-national, and the systemic levels have 
been identified by the framework as important. Since we have already described the 
domestic and international environment of ECOWAS, we will look at the institutional 
framework of the organisation. This will enable us to assess, in chapter six, the effect the 
structure of the organisation has had on the integration process.
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3.8 Institutional Structure of ECOWAS
As Cox and Jacobson pointed out 'decision making in international organisations 
occurs within a context comprising the functions, the institutional frameworks and basic 
procedures and the historical developments of the agency.'80 While providing the arena for 
interaction by the member states, the organisation is itself a reflection of the compromises 
that had to be made and the expectations that the members have for it. Whether such 
expectations are going to be met will depend on the amount of authority that is conferred 
on it or the constraints that are put on it. These are usually reflected in the treaty 
establishing the organisation. As Feld and Jordan pointed out the nature and shape of the 
institutional framework 'must obviously relate to the task performance and functions an 
IGO is expected to carry out, but political desiderata may impose on purely rational 
considerations to set up an effective management model'.81 Thus an attempt to analyse the 
achievements of ECOWAS must necessarily include a description of the framework within 
which decisions have been and are taken as an essential first step toward an assessment of 
the impact of regional integration on the economies of the member countries.
If, as we have mentioned above, the type of integration scheme that will help in 
development requires very comprehensive decision making within an extensive 
institutional framework, then whether ECOWAS is able to act as an engine for growth will 
depend to a certain extent on the adequacy of the institutional framework and the level of 
authority at its disposal.
“ Cox, W.R., and Jacobson, H.K., The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-making in International 
Organisations. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1974,p5.
81 Feld, J.W., and Jordan, R.S., International Organisations: A Comparative Approach. Praeger, 
New York, 1983, p85.
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The ECOWAS treaty, as we have shown above, envisions the achievements of a 
Type HI integration scheme. This means that the organisation must be able to facilitate 
trade among the member countries, must have the capacity to implement compensatory 
and distributive measures, and be able to restructure the economies of the member 
countries to overcome external dependency and corrects the legacies of colonial patterns 
of production within the member countries. The question that we are seeking to answer, 
which we asked earlier, in this context, therefore, is whether the institutional framework of 
ECOWAS is adequate for the achievement of the goals of its members.
ECOWAS is made up of five main institutions. These are (1) the Authority of 
Heads of State, (2) the Council of Ministers, (3) the Executive Secretariat, (4) the Tribunal 
of the Community, and (5) the Technical and Specialised Commissions.
The Authority of Heads of state is the 'principal governing institution1 of the 
Community and is responsible for the performance of the executive functions of the 
Community. It has a rotating Chairman who is selected annually from among its members. 
Its directions and decisions are binding on all other institutions of the Community but the 
treaty does not state whether such power extend to members countries.
The Council of Ministers is the next in hierarchy. It consists of two representatives 
of each member state. Its responsibilities include reviewing the functioning and 
development of the community in accordance with the provisions of the treaty; 
recommending policies that will ensure the efficient and harmonious functioning and
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development of the community; giving direction to all subordinate institutions of the 
community; and exercising other powers assigned to it by the treaty.82 Such powers 
include recommending the removal of the Executive Secretary and the External Auditor,83 
determining the terms and conditions of appointment of the employees of the community84 
and of the External Auditor as well as his/her powers.85
Unlike the once a year meeting of the Authority, the Council meets twice a year 
with one of them immediately preceding the annual meeting of the Authority. Its decisions 
are binding on subordinate institutions unless otherwise determined by the Authority. 
Decisions are taken by unanimous vote.86 Where there is an objection by any member to a 
proposal the issue is referred to the Authority. Like the Authority it has a rotating 
Chairmanships.
The ECOWAS like most international organisations has an Executive Secretariat 
which is headed by an Executive Secretary who is assisted by two Deputies. Members of 
the Secretariat owe their loyalty to the Community entirely. A Financial Controller also 
forms part of the Secretariat together with other officials deemed necessary and appointed 
by the Council. The Executive Secretary is responsible for the day to day administration of 
the community and its institutions. He or she is ,expected to service and assist the 
institutions in the performance of the duties, keep the functioning of the community under 
continuous examination and making reports of such observation to the council of
82 Article 6 of the ECOWAS Treaty
83 Article 8, paragraph 3.
84 ibid., paragraph 6.
“ article 10 para. 2.
86 Article 6, par. 6.
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Ministers, as well as submitting reports of activities to all sessions of the Council. The 
Executive Secretary also has initiatory powers conferred on him by the Treaty.87
In addition to the above institutions the original Treaty made provision for four 
Technical and Specialised Commissions which shared responsibility for reporting and 
making recommendations to the Council through the Executive Secretary on matters in 
their field of competence. These included: the Trade, Custom, Immigration, Monetary and 
Payment Commission; the industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission; the 
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission; and the Social and Cultural 
Affairs Commission.88
The Treaty has since its inception been amended to include a Defence Council as 
one of the principal institutions of ECOWAS and a Defence Commission added as one of 
the specialised commissions.89
Finally, the Community has a Tribunal which ensures "the observance of law and 
justice in the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty". It is also responsible for the 
settlement of disputes such as may be referred to it.
The authority structure of the Community is such that the Treaty invests ultimate 
power in the Authority of Heads of States. It, alone, is responsible for determining the 
procedures of the dissemination of its decisions and directions, those of the Council of
87 Article 8, par. 10 a to d.
“ Article 9 of ECOWAS Treaty.
“ ECOWAS Document A/SP2/5/81, 'Additional Protocol Amending Article 4 of the Treaty of the 
Economic community of West African States Relating to the Institution of the Community', in Official 
Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Vol. 3 (June 1981), pp 7-8.
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Ministers, "and for the implementation of such decisions and directives". This means that 
disagreements within the Authority will paralyse the Community. Furthermore, it means 
that, apart from differences that may arise over policy, personality clashes and differences 
in perceptions might result in the organisation's inability to reach agreement. To the extent 
that the Authority cannot make binding decisions, this can have a negative effect on the 
functioning of the Community. These may therefore have the effect of reducing the 
effectiveness of the Community the oscillations of personal idiosyncrasies of participating 
individuals.
As was mentioned above the treaty of the Community incorporates trade 
liberalisation, compensatory and distributive measures, and policies to overcome 
dependency. As we noted from the analytical frameworks, this means an extensive and 
powerful institutional framework is required. That simply means an institution with 
supranational powers, and the capability to gather information and resources to 
disseminate it, expertise to formulate pertinent policies and to see that they are 
implemented, ability to monitor progress adequately, ability to cultivate and influence 
public opinion, and rendering judgement regarding obscure or ambiguous, factual or legal 
situations.90 Secondly, it also means a high level of commitment to regional goals and a 
dirigiste approach to regional development planning. As has also been stated above, 
unanimity rules are used in the Council of Ministers meetings and presumably by the 
authority also since nothing is said about voting procedures for the Authority. In any case, 
since decisions of the Authority are not binding on member states, unanimity will be 
needed.
90Feld, J.W. and Jordan, R.S., International Organizations: A Comparative Approach Praeger 
Special Studies, New York, 1983.
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The two elements of dirigisme and unanimity which are found in the Treaty, and 
the need for supranationalism for the goals of the Treaty to be achieved are very difficult 
to combine in a system of sovereign states with their national interests.
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have described the general political milieu of ECOWAS. We 
have also indicated that ECOWAS integration requires an extensive institutional structure. 
The political milieu is made up of the domestic politics of the various countries, then- 
foreign policy orientations, the impact of systemic factors, competing regional 
organisations and negotiation modalities that, a priori, are expected to be adopted by the 
member states depending on how they expect to be affected by policies. Based on the 
experience of other, now defunct, West African regional organisations, such as UDAO, 
UDEAO,91 and the East African Community,92 we can confidently assume that negotiation 
positions will be similar to the Haskel model, and the less developed countries will stress 
compensatory and redistributive measures while, the more developed will, generally, be in 
favour of expansive measures.
The internal politics of the states within the region are changing. Ghana, Senegal, 
Togo, and Benin, to mention a few, have had multi-party elections. They are also pursuing
91 See p. 7 above.
92 A constant complaint by Tanzania and Uganda about the organisation was that Kenya gained 
disproportionately to them.
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IMF imposed structural adjustment programmes with varying degrees of vigour. Change in 
political leadership in France has reduce her willingness to support wasteful, corrupt and 
autocratic regimes. At the same time the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the discrediting 
of socialism has reduced the salience of ideological divisions within the region.
Since ECOWAS has not yet become a fully fledged free trade area, it is difficult to 
analyse the impact of negotiating modalities. Nevertheless, this framework together with 
Lindberg's paradigm for measuring regional collective decision making, will enable us to 
measure the extent of collective decision making that has been attained in the region and 
be able to assign reasons for the level achieved so far in chapters five and six respectively.
CHAPTER FOUR
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION
4.1 Introduction
The link between society and regional integration is not as obvious as that 
between it and economics or politics. This is because the various aspects of the social 
system which impinge on the process are indirect, and only find expression through their 
influence on political stability and economic structure of the member states. Hence state 
and society interaction to provide the crucible within which social forces impact with the 
more obvious political and economic influences to affect the speed and extent of regional 
integration.
In order to examine the way in which state institutions interact with society, we 
will need to delineate the relevant aspects of the social system, and trace how they affect 
institutions and policy outcomes. Having elucidated what the impacts usually are, we will 
then be in a position to examine how they influence regional integration. Since regional 
integration is an interface between domestic and foreign policies, the question that will 
guide the enquiry into the impact of society on regional integration is how the social 
structure of the individual countries affect their willingness to co-operate at the regional 
level, and to implement regionally derived policies.
As Naomi Chazan has stated, political life in Africa is conducted through a 
complex web of social forces, institutional settings, and interpersonal relationships1. Social
1 Chazan, N., et al, Contemporary Politics in Africa, p 71.
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groups are identified as furnishing the building blocks of political action and interchange. It 
is therefore necessary that those aspects of society that have implication for foreign policy 
decision making are examined in order to explore their possible impact on regional 
integration.
Social groups in general can be categorised to include those based on ethnic, 
regional, religious, generational, class and race affiliations. Though these broad categories 
hide the actual subcategories within which social interaction actually occur on a day to day 
basis in West African societies, we will concentrate our analysis on them. The reason for 
this is that they are more relevant to our purpose.
The ethnic group, for example, is a large and unwieldy sort of social organisation. 
Within it are a motley collection of more intimate territorial, religious, and political 
affiliations. However, the nearer one moves toward the more intimate level of social 
interaction the less effective they are in terms of their impact on policy at the state level. 
Hence a village elders meeting or even a traditional court is less likely to influence political 
decisions than the possibility of ethnic unrest.2
The vertical interaction between society and the state is facilitated by the structure 
and various mechanisms of political intercourse that were described in the previous 
chapter. As was noted, the patron-client relationship in African politics provides the link 
between politics at the state level and the lower levels of society through intermediaries
2 As Olzak and Nagel noted, 'Competitive theories suggest that economic and political 
modernisation encourages collective action based on ethnic identity because these two processes favour 
organisation on the basis of large-scale identities rather than on the basis of kinship, village, tribal or some 
other small-scale identity.' Ozlak, S., and Nagel, J., Competitive Ethnic Relations. Academic Press, 
London, 1986.
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who sometimes represent the interest of ethnic groups. These intermediaries take various 
forms in different countries but are the main avenue for formal articulation of ethnic 
support or disenchantment.
Since intra-group interaction does not impact quite as strongly on public policy as 
inter-group interaction, and group and public interchange, the analysis will hence forth be 
concentrated on the last two forms of social interaction, their effects on national policy, 
and how these translate into foreign policy.
The questions which have been stated on the previous page as guiding the impact 
of society on regional integration could be restated as follows; first, to what extent do 
public preferences constitute an effective influence on a given set of national 
decision-makers, encouraging them to make decisions which increase (or diminish) 
regional integration? Secondly, does the public have any influence on foreign policy?
Integration theory answers the second question in the affirmative. As Inglehart3 
pointed out, the public can have an influence on regional integration to the extent that the 
polity permits free elections, referenda, and demonstrations in the streets. However, the 
amount of influence that the public can exert and under what conditions is not clear. It can 
however be assumed that such influence will be more where governments are dependent 
on the public for their continuing existence in office. In situations of military rule and 
one-party states( which predominate in West Africa) government sensitivity will probably
3 Inglehart, R., Tublic Opinion and Regional Integration' in Lindberg and Scheingold (ed.) 
Regional Integration: Theory and Research. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.
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be more heightened by the fear of public dissent culminating in counter-coups or military 
overthrow respectively.
So far we have given the impression that the impact by society on foreign policy 
and hence regional integration is one way. However, just as public opinion can exert some 
degree of pressure on national decision-makers it seems equally evident that opinion 
leaders can often influence public opinion.4 Thus it is important that in assessing the 
influence of the public on regional integration, that we are conscious of the fact that public 
opinion itself is shaped by government through the mass media, television, speeches, and 
various propaganda instruments.
The relationship between public preferences and political decision-makers should 
therefore be viewed in terms of a feedback model in which both sets of people influence 
each other. The relative impact of society and the state on each other, we propose, will be 
dependent not only on the extent to which free elections, referenda, and demonstrations 
are allowed as Inglehart suggested, but also on the relative resources available to the two 
groups i.e., the public and society. Thus ownership of the media, or other means of 
propaganda will determine whose arguments are aired.
Thus relative importance of societal input depends on; first, the structure of the 
decision-making institutions, that is, whether it is pluralistic or monolithic, the norms and 
perceptions of elite decision-makers, whether decision-making is open or closed, and if 
there is institutionalised competition between alternative groups. It will also depend on the
4 ibid.
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distribution of political skills, that is, whether the public is uninformed or informed about 
the issue, and whether the group attempting to exert the influence is politically relevant or 
irrelevant. Finally, the relative importance depends on the degree to which the given 
decision relates to deep-seated values among the public or evokes only relatively 
superficial feelings.5
To answer the question about the extent to which public preferences influence 
decision-makers we will have to attempt to find answers empirically. To do so we will 
describe the social system of West African countries generally in order to see the extent to 
which they impact on decision-making itself. Since we have already described the political 
make-up of the member states of ECOWAS, this chapter will concentrate on a more 
detailed description of those social aspects that were mentioned cursorily as affecting 
politics in the previous chapter. A repetition of certain aspects of politics is therefore 
inevitable. Of particular importance to this chapter will be the issue of ethnicity, 
professional associations, trade unions and the mass media. These categories are the ones 
that reflect most effectively the relative impact of opinion on domestic and foreign policy.
4.2 Ethnicity: Definition. Concepts and Characteristics in West Africa
The diverse ethnic composition of West African states is seen as having multiple 
ramifications for national unity, political stability, leadership styles, and regimes in the 
region. In all instances where an explanation of the political and economic malaise of 
Africa is attempted, ethnicity usually features as an important variable whose impact is
5 ibid.
215
seen, largely, as negative. As the most prominent feature in the literature about the social 
structure and organisation of West African states it is appropriate that we, also, examine 
the phenomenon to ascertain the validity of the assertions made about it and the effects 
attributed to it. It is our contention that though ethnicity has and continues to be important 
in the economic, social and political organisation of the state in West Africa, the available 
literature has not taken changing conditions into consideration, and culture, of which 
ethnicity is an aspect has been assumed to be static since independence. It is also assumed 
that ethnicity is necessarily a bad thing. This negative connotation pervades the analysis of 
its impact on the states. After surveying the literature, we will attempt to indicate from 
qualitative fieldwork we conducted in Ghana that ethnic affiliations have mellowed since 
independence and also argue that contrary to popular belief, ethnicity was an important 
organisational principle prior to colonialism and in the early days of state formation in 
West Africa. This is because it provided an easily recognisable structure for governments 
to use in their interaction with their societies.
Ethnicity as a concept is laden with difficulties. Rudolf and Thompson, for 
example, have identified three problems as posing difficulty in defining it.6 The first is how 
to delineate it from other distinctions based upon language, racial characteristics, culture, 
historical traditions, nationality, or various combinations of these factors. Second, is the 
difficulty of comparing various types of ethnicity to one another. This is because the 
definition of ethnicity suggests an interrelationship between 'such types as indigenous 
populations, immigrant groups, religious minorities, linguistic minorities, and nationalities'. 
There is thus a lack in distinction between the political and sociological aspects of the
6Thompson, R.J., and Rudolf Jr, J.R., 'Ethnic Politics and Public Policy' in Western Societies: A 
Framework for Conceptual Analysis in Ethnicity. Politics and Development. Thompson, D.L, and Renan, 
D., (ed.) Lynne Rienner, 1986.
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concept, and also in how they relate and interact with each other. Finally, there is 
imprecision in the relationship between ethnicity and other forms of identification and 
conflict. 'Just as different types of ethnic conflict may overlap..., so do ethnic and social 
class conflict'.7 To understand ethnicity, therefore, it is important that the interrelationship 
between it and other forms of social organisations is made clear.
This problem with definition, it has been suggested, is because of the 
multidisciplinary approach in the study of the concept. Various perspectives, ranging from 
those of anthropologists to political scientists, sociologists and historians, to mention a 
few, have all been cited in the literature thus providing a kaleidoscope of insights into the 
concept.
We have chosen two examples of the perspectives for our analysis. The first is by 
Thompson and Rudolph who see ethnicity a s ' a type of cultural segmentation that may 
also intersect class and territorial segmentation'.8 This view covers the nebulous nature of 
the phenomenon. These authors also list the bases of ethnic distinction as including the 
possession of a symbolically different geographical origin. This could be historical or 
recent, and is of prime importance because it provides the basis of differentiation. Other 
elements in their elaboration of the perspective include; historical traditions, social 
customs, languages, physical appearance and religion. However, the essential element in 
ethnic distinctiveness is that it is ascriptive and describes an overlap between cultural, 
social-class and territorial segmentation of society.
7 ibid. p28.
8 ibid. p39.
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The second perspective sees ethnicity as 'organised activities by persons ... who 
jointly seek to maximise their corporate political, economic and social interests'.9 What 
this suggests is the deliberate exploitation of ascriptive affiliations, and introduces a 
dynamism and utilitarianism to the concept that the previous perspective does not 
highlight. Apart from the ascriptive criterion which forms the basis of the organisation of 
ethnic groups this perspective also makes little distinction between the activities and goals 
of ethnic groups and the activities of other interest groups such as trade unions.
Both the dynamic and static aspects of ethnicity that have been highlighted by the
definitions cited above will be examined later in the chapter, but the importance of
ethnicity to regional economic integration can be traced to its effect on internal and
intra-regional political interaction. First, the multiethnic composition of individual states
(described in chapter 3) has meant a concentration by national governments on
nation-building and the forging of state unity. Regional integration which, according to
integration theory, involves the transfer of a certain amount of sovereignty is therefore
seen as being incompatible with the aim of nation-building because of its alleged ability to
further undermine the already precarious cohesion within the countries.10 It has also been
suggested that the straddling of ethnic groups across borders of neighbouring countries
creates situations of possible irredentism and secessionism, and hence that governments
are unwilling to further subvert their territorial integrity by reducing the salience of
boundaries as a means of state demarcation. Added to these, because the straddling of
9 Chazan et. al., Contemporary African Politics p2.
10Etzioni for example noted that 'the integration process... involves at the least some reduction of 
the integration of the member-units as they become increasingly incorporated into the system.' See 
Etzioni, A., Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces. Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, New York, 196(7), pl6.
See also Gordon, L., Economic Regionalism Reconsidered', in World Politics, vol. 13(1961), pp
235-236.
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ethnic groups make international boundaries permeable, such occurrences are seen as 
having implications for national security.
The first proposition that ethnic heterogeneity is destabilising for the internal 
structure of countries is based, implicitly, on the idea of the ethnic group being an interest 
group which seeks to promote the collective goal of the group at the expense of other 
groups within the country. This corresponds to the Chazan et. al. definition cited above, 
and which sees inter-ethnic interaction mainly as conflictual.
If  the ethnic group is indeed a consciously organised group which seeks to further 
the interest of its members, then the framework within which such groups function, the 
rules governing state/society interaction, and the characteristics of the public domain in 
terms of the scarcity or the availability of distributable resources could be posited as 
important elements in ethnic organisation, compromise and conflict. The framework which 
makes up the level of ethnic segmentation and determines the intensity of the interaction 
between the various groups and between them and the state is provided by the relative size 
of ethnic groups within the country, the number of such groups, their settlement patterns 
within society, and the extent of overlapping or cross-cutting. Additionally, the way in 
which the state is organised, in terms of leadership style, ideology, and institutional 
structure, will affect the salience of ethnic conflict in determining access to distributable 
resources. The intensity of ethnic co-operation and conflict and its salience in resource 
distribution, is affected also by broader societal factors such as, socio-economic change, 
political organisation, or government policies.11
11 Thompson and Rudolf op.cit. p32.
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Thus the impact of ethnic affiliation on political stability has to be looked at 
multidimensionally, and from a dynamic perspective, as we pointed out at the beginning of 
the chapter.
The discussion so far has portrayed the ethnic group as unified and cohesive. 
However some characteristics listed by Chazan et al., do not confirm such an impression. 
These include its fluidity and lack of homogeneity and its lack of cohesiveness. These are 
in addition to its espousal of the common (indivisible) interest of its members.12 The lack of 
cohesiveness and the espousal of common interests may sound contradictory and 
paradoxical. Such discrepancy is because government resource allocation is designed, 
where it is meant to curb actual or potential conflict, to appeal to the group as a whole and 
not to individuals since individuals are in themselves are not as threatening to national 
unity as the group is.
The fluidity of the ethnic group, it has been suggested, derives from its recent 
roots. In the words of Chazan et a l ' it is less accurate to characterise the ethnic group on 
the African continent as having a fixed , centuries old, primordial consciousness1. They 
place the root of ethnic self-definition at the period between late colonial and post colonial 
period, and attribute the vying and competition for power, status, economic resources and 
social services as the main factors leading to ethnic identification.
12 Chazan et al. op.cit. p!02.
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Though we may agree with the view that the ethnic group is characteristically fluid, 
the idea that ethnicity is of recent origin, in our opinion, cannot be made so categorically.13 
The view that ethnicity is new to Africa is mainly derived from the utilitarian definition of 
the ethnic group and perhaps on the assumption that it is linked with parliamentary 
democracy. Even though it removes the sometimes pejorative connotations that the 
concept has and the implicit portrayal of ethnic conflict as an innate quality, inborn in the 
African, it will not be entirely correct to characterise ethnicity in Africa as a colonial 
experience. Such an assertion would seem to imply that intra-group interaction in 
pre-colonial Africa was always consensual, a view that though desirable is unlikely in any 
human society. It also assumes that pre-colonial collective identification was very narrow 
and hence rudimentary.
If  ethnicity is viewed as an organised collectivity for achieving group goals then 
ethnicity among the Anlo Ewes of Ghana, for example, could be traced to long before the 
advent of the Europeans. According to Ewe history it was the suppression of ethnic rights 
that precipitated their exodus from Notsie in today's Benin under King Agorkorli to their 
present-day habitation in Ghana.
Similarly, ethnic groups functioned actively in the Ashanti kingdom long before the 
advent of Europeans. Collective group action can therefore not be said to have started 
with late European rule or with the post independence era. Such an assertion would seem 
to ignore traditional political forms and actions before colonialism. In the light of the
13 Since the definition of ethnicity includes identifying characteristics such as language, religion, 
and a shared culture to mention a few, the underlying delineating features that distinguish one ethnic 
group from another can indeed be said to include some primordial elements. In any case though ethnic 
identification may be fluid, the extent of the fluidity is narrowed by the ascriptive qualities.
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above, it can be hypothesized that ethnic groups function in unified political systems.
Hence that colonialism by incorporating different and independent groups under one 
umbrella saw a resurgence of ethnic pressure in the days before independence as the 
various groups fought for dominance, equality or at least for assurances from their colonial 
master. Thus colonialism, by centralising authority and bringing previously disparate 
groups together, encouraged group bargaining which is normal in any political 
transformation process. The recent fighting in Bosnia, the break-up of Czechoslovakia 
and factional and communal conflict in many parts of the former Soviet Union is similar to 
what happened in Africa on the eve of independence. The perception of politics as a 
zero-sum game perhaps aggravated ethnic bargaining and resulted in a situation that 
created excessive tension as groups vied for dominance.
The second characteristic of ethnic groups is their heterogeneity and the lack of 
cohesion. This means that individuals identify themselves with a segment of the group in 
certain instances and with the whole group on other occasions. In Ghana, for example, the 
individual may identify himself with the Akan as opposed to the Ewe at the state level. 
However, at the cultural, linguistic and territorial levels he may identify himself as an 
Ashanti as opposed to a Fanti even though both groups fall under the broader Akan ethnic 
group. The ethnic group in West Africa in certain instances is therefore a broad category. 
Even though Ewes can be classified as an ethnic group, differences exist in dialects, 
religion, cultural observances, etc.. Variables are therefore capable of being refined even 
further to differentiate between co-residence in a region, economic activity and other 
types.14
14 Though such subtleties exist within ethnic groups, conflicts such as the Biafran secession tend to 
follow the broader fault lines rather than the more finely defined identifications. Thus intra-ethnic 
heterogeneity tends to be less obvious and subordinated to the larger interest of the group. This may indeed
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The heterogeneity of the ethnic group also means that individuals belonging to 
different ethnic groups are able to identify with each other in other groups formations such 
as social class, religious groups and trade unions all of which cut across ethnic boundaries. 
Thus an analysis of the role of groups in the politics of West African countries must be 
done with their internal structure in mind.
Despite the internal divisions and the changing form ethnic groups adopt under 
different circumstances, they have and still continue to be highly significant politically. 
What intra-ethnic schisms indicate is the complicated politics of the region. An example of 
such internal disunity was, for example portrayed by the rivalry between Chief Lakode 
Akintola, an Oyo Yoruba and Chief Obafemi Awolowo an Ijebu Yoruba in the early days 
of Nigerian independence.
Another aspect of the internal diversity is its impact on intergroup exchange. 
Instead of a two way bargaining process between ethnic groups and central government, 
there is in most instances a two level interactive process. The first takes place within the 
ethnic group itself at the required level and its centre, and the second part being that 
between the ethnic bloc intermediaries and national leaders at the top.
The third and final characteristics of the ethnic group that we need to look at is
that it promotes the communal interest as opposed to the individual interests of its
members. Through them demands by an ethnic group to secure railway facilities or roads
be inevitable since those with whom the ethnic group is in conflict tend to regard the larger group as a unit 
rather than as a collection of identifiable units. The ethnic group is to that extent not as voluntary as may 
be indicated above.
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are made. Such demands are indivisible. However, though ethnic intermediaries represent 
collective demands at the governmental level it is not uncommon to find government 
ministers appropriating resources for their area of origin (hometown) sometimes to the 
exclusion of other segments of the same ethnic group. This is because the intermediary 
tends to get the most political support from his immediate hometown.
As was mentioned earlier, ethnic demands are usually articulated by the elite and 
are usually urban led. The demands normally take the form of a reciprocal exchange 
between central authority and the intermediaries who represent ethno-regional interest 
according to what they perceive those interests to be. Ethnic cleavages are regarded by 
most leaders who oppose them as divisive. In a lot of instances national leaders have 
voiced their opposition to such arrangements. Because of the negative effects attributed to 
it national leaders, in the quest to foster national unity, have used several devices to 
reduce its salience in national politics. This they did by attempting to weaken ethnic 
linkages , and by creating common national ties, remembrances and values. Thus public 
policies abolishing chieftaincy in Guinea, and ethnically based political parties in Ghana 
were all attempts to overcome divisions and to keep such cleavages in check. So were the 
banning of movements in Nigeria of ethnic groups that were aim for the creation of 
ethnically homogeneous states. The formation of single-party states all across the region 
were attempts to overcome what, among other things, were perceived to be the 
detrimental effects of ethnic fragmentation.
Despite the public pronouncements against ethnicity, leaders usually took and still 
take proportionality principles into account when dispensing political appointments and in
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fiscal allocations. Thus though central-state elite sometimes view ethnoregional 
negotiations as burdensome (even in instances where they are openly acknowledged, as in 
the Cote d'Ivoire) they still regard it as a necessary form of political exchange. This is to a 
certain extent explained by what has been called the softness of the West African State. 
The inability to impose its regulations, and thereby exact compliance by threatened 
coercion makes ethnic allocations a useful means for enhancing legitimacy.
4.3 Ethnicity. Political Structure and National Unity
The role of the elite in ethnoregional bargaining and the structure of politics at the 
centre have implications for national unity and subsequently for regional integration.
It must be remembered that the elites who champion ethnic causes are themselves 
members of the ruling class and that the impact of ethnic bargaining is different in 
single-party and no-party states. It must also be remembered that ethnic conflict does not 
only occur when resources are perceived as being disproportionately allocated in favour of 
a particular group. Ethnic groups may conflict with central government as the latter seeks 
to overrule the prerogatives of traditional rulers. In such issues as land redistribution and 
ownership West African governments have often clashed with traditional leaders. 
Additionally, regionalisation may accentuate conflict if such regions are coterminous with 
ethnic boundaries or if the region is dominated and identified with a particular linguistic 
group.
The relative role of the political elite and the public in making ethnicity a salient 
aspect of politics in West Africa is another aspect that is important. Political aspirants have
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and continue to use the ethnic group as the focus of their support and usually articulate 
their campaign rhetoric in a manner that is meant to appeal to ethnic sentiments. Symbols 
and remembrances are evoked to buttress the idea of ethnic cohesion and the need for 
unity. The 'we' versus 'them' has come to dominate West African politics because of the 
tendency for the political elite to depend on their ethnic group for support. Election to 
parliament depends very much on being able to win the vote of one's ethnic group. This 
has gradually had the effect of leading the public to expect parliamentarians to champion 
the particularistic interests of the ethnic group. It is our contention that post-colonial 
ethnic conflict is elite led.
In multi-party systems regional representatives might find themselves on the 
opposition benches. This means that regional/ethnic interests are not represented in the 
ruling party. The result of such a situation is that it takes a lot of logrolling to get fiscal 
allocations. This is mainly because governments tend to allocate resources in a way that 
will enable them to retain their support base. In an instance when most of the MPs from a 
region find themselves in opposition and where such a region coincides with ethnic 
allegiances, conflict between central government and the region may arise as the ethnic 
group feels itself discriminated against.
Another scenario that may arise is where parties are not entirely ethnically based. 
In such a situation some MPs from the region might find themselves able to guarantee the 
government the allegiance of the group they represent because of their closeness to 
resources and their ability to give substantive returns to the group. Multi-party politics
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could therefore result in ethnic resentment and conflict if the first situation obtained or into 
intra-ethnic factional conflict if the second situation was the case.
In an instance where ethnic conflict is fuelled by a lack of closeness to resources, 
leaders may tend to concentrate their attention on resolving such conflict. With the scarcity 
o f distributable resources being the norm in West Africa countries, the demands made on 
the limited resources might make it difficult for state leaders to allocate any for regional 
integration programmes. Political commitment is also reduced as energy is concentrated on 
nation building.15 As we saw in the previous chapter, both vast resources and commitment 
are essential to an integration process whose aim is to promote industrial development, 
restructure existing structure national economies and reduce dependency. A situation such 
as this will therefore make the attainment of the goals of the regional organisation 
impossible.
This conclusion however presupposes a constancy in the salience of ethnicity. But 
as has been mentioned earlier, the salience of ethnicity is contextual and is dependent on 
such factors as socio-economic and political orientations and alignments at any particular 
time. In a multi-party system, governments change and so do resources and methods of 
their allocation. Ethnic intermediaries are themselves only able to sustain their position if 
they are able to reciprocate ethnic allegiances. The ethnic group may therefore switch its 
allegiance to others who are perceived as being more effective in championing group 
interests.
15 Etzioni, A., op. cit.
To the extent therefore, that ethnic organisation is fluid and heterogeneous, and 
politics itself dynamic, it is difficult to assess the direct impact of ethnicity on national 
unity. As Rupert Emerson, for example noted, 'the notion of a single national culture, 
shaping the community and embracing all its people, is an admirable one whose principal 
shortcoming is its remoteness from historical fact'.16 This is important because it implies 
that ethnic diversity does not preclude the formation of a political community. The United 
Kingdom, Canada or Spain, for example, are not ethnically homogeneous states. Despite 
the conflicts that arise between different ethnic groups in these countries they are 
nevertheless regarded as constituting political communities. Cultural homogeneity is 
therefore neither a prerequisite for political unification nor a sufficient condition. West 
African countries are therefore not beyond the pale. We suggest that it is only in instances 
where political parties are polarised along ethnic lines, and ethnic groups are the main 
groups that political parties appeal to and one particular ethnic group always dominates 
the decision-making machinery that ethnic conflict might become endemic and therefore 
hinder political unification. It is ,for example, inconceivable that a countries such as Chad 
or Sudan could devote themselves to regional goals even if they wanted to because of the 
ethnic and factional conflicts within them.
In one-party states and military regimes where ethnoregional intermediaries tend to 
be close to decision-making, the dangers of ostracisation that may result from supporting 
an opposition party do not arise. However, because regional representatives are appointed 
invariably by the governments they may lack the independence to represent the ethnic
16Emerson, R , From Empire to Nation. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960, p 149. 
See also Harrision, S.S., 'The Challenge to Indian Nationalism', in Foreign Affairs. July, 1956, pp 620ff.
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group correctly. This is because to safeguard their positions they tend to please central 
government.
Whereas the position of an intermediary in a civilian regime where local elections 
are held is dependent on local endorsement, military regimes impose their own lieutenants 
as intermediaries. But even so such appointees tend to be members of the ethnic region 
that they are selected to represent. Thus regional commissioners under the Afrifa, 
Acheampong, and the Rawlings regimes in Ghana have all emanated from the regions they 
represented at the centre. This has been the case in Liberia under Doe and in Burkina Faso 
under various military regimes.
4.4 Ethnicity and Intra-Regional Relations
Nation-building in West African countries has gained ground since independence 
and identification with the state has increased while the salience and probability of ethnic 
irredentism has waned and has reduced as governments devised ways and means of 
distributing resources.
Since independence there has been a lot apprehension about the effects that 
inherited colonial boundaries would have on the stability and durability of the states within 
the region.
Such apprehension was based on the fact that the arbitrariness of the colonial 
divisions had resulted in states with ethnically differentiated social systems, and that in
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some cases the same ethnic group had been separated to by boundaries with the resulting 
straddling of the same ethnic group across common borders. The fear of these two 
aspects of ethnic composition within West Africa was that it would lead to secession and 
irredentism.
The implications of weak boundaries for regional integration well known and is 
that such states devote more time to nation-building than to regional goals.17
It is true that ethnic diversity posed very serious problems for West African states 
in the first decade of independence as each ethnic group sought to assert itself politically. 
It is also true that an actual secession attempt was made by the Biafrans of Nigeria which 
led to war between 1967 and 1970. Furthermore, it is undeniable that politics, even today, 
is still influenced by to a large extent by ethnic loyalties. Irredentist claims made on the 
Ewe speaking section of Togoland after the latter's independence caused a lot of 
apprehension in the 1960s and led to a souring of relations between the two countries. 
However, despite all the problems that arose and still are, the colonial boundary has 
become a permanent feature of the region with no modifications. Indeed they are seen as 
one of the most resilient colonial inheritances to date. This issue is in our opinion 
important enough to warrant an extended comment.
It is generally agreed that West African states survived their early year of 
independence more as a result of the system of recognition in international society than 
through the legitimacy derived from popular sovereignty. However, to assume a priori
17Feld, J. F., and Jordan, R. S., International Organisations.
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that African states persist today simply because of the system of recognition in 
international society as Jackson and Rosberg18 do is misleading. It is misleading because 
their conclusion is not based on research, and the philosophical underpinnings to their 
arguments presuppose the idea of a nation and social integration as given and not as 
processes that develop over time. What constitutes the empirical bases of states in their 
opinion is the possession of a stable community and an effective government.19 This 
definition of the state reflects the tendency in the West to believe that national integration 
is already an accomplished fact,20 a de facto  condition.
It is our contention that such a definition of the state while purporting to form the 
empirical basis of statehood is limited and static and ignores the process of the 
development of national consciousness. A definition of statehood must necessarily include 
aspects of nationalism to be viable and to reflect its dynamic nature. If  we agree with 
Hinsley's explanation, nationalism does not come to exist where it has not existed before, 
nor does so because men have discovered a political loyalty which they previously lacked. 
What it does imply is that political loyalty has been transferred from other structures to the 
nation. Nationalism is therefore just one form of political loyalty [which] may be 
expressed in other ways than loyalty to the nation - in attachment to the clan, the tribe, the 
city-state, the empire.21
18 Jackson, R.H, and Rosberg, C.G, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the 
Juridical in Statehood' in World Politics, vol. xxxv, no. 1, Oct. 1982.
19 This is based on the Weberian definition of a state being a corporate group that has compulsory 
jurisdiction, exercises continuous organisation, and claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its 
population, including 'all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction'. Weber, 'The Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization, ed. by Talcot Parsons and cited by Jackson and Rosberg, ibid.
“ Duverger, M., The Study of Politics. Nelsons. London, 1972.
21Hinsley, F.H., Nationalism and the International System, Hodder and Stoughton, London< 1973,
p. 13.
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From this, an a priori conclusion can be drawn that contrary to the expectation of 
de facto nation-states in Africa, exhibiting effective governments and stable communities, 
it is indeed the de jure  that paves the way for the establishment of a state defined in the 
Western sense. Since the state in Africa is part of the globalisation of Western forms of 
political organisation which developed in Europe from the 17th century it is inevitable that 
it has to develop to approximate the maturity it has reached in Europe. There is therefore 
nothing unique about the relative lack of'statehood' in Africa. Even though there are 
differences in the historical context, the basis of sovereignty and the actual dynamics of 
nation-building in Europe after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the Treaty of Utrecht 
in 1713, the nation-state as it is perceived today took time to evolve just as it is doing in 
Africa today. Indeed it was the signing of these treaties that laid the basis of the sovereign 
state system in Europe and its various attributes, such as territoriality, and internal and 
external sovereignty. The consolidation of the state at the expense of Christian 
cosmopolitanism was a process not a given condition. Indeed, as Deutsch, for example, 
postulated from historical studies of the amalgamation of Britain, the United States, 
Germany and others, political unification takes between three generations and 160 years 
for previously diffuse communities to get to a position of stable expectation of peace 
where conflict is resolved by peaceful means and not through war. The consolidation of 
the state in Africa at the expense of ethnic affiliations, former imperial powers and other 
external actors ought to be expected to take some time to evolve.
Our argument that a political community was in the process of being formed in 
West Africa seems to be supported by preliminary qualitative research conducted to test 
the extent of nationalism among West Africans. Though only tentative conclusions can be
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drawn from the research because of the non-random nature of the sample, and the 
smallness of the sample size, the answers are instructive to the extent that they are 
indicative of a growing sense of nationalistic feelings toward the state in West Africa. 
Nationalism is gradually taking root. To examine the issue of the idea of the nation we 
asked Ghanaians, Nigerians, Togolese, Ivorians, Sierra-Leoneans and Liberians living in 
London whether they saw themselves as different from other people from other states of 
the region. There was an unequivocal and unanimous yes response from all the 
respondents. Not even one respondent differed from this position.
We then asked if they were willing to fight for their country against other countries 
such as Burkina Faso, Togo, Nigeria and Mauritania, apart from those who were pacifists, 
the answer was again yes.
In a second research conducted in Ghana22 we tried to build on these preliminary 
answers by attempting to gauge the locus loyalty. It was an attempt to see whether the 
state or the ethnic group commanded more loyalty among citizens. What came out was 
that Ghanaians questioned saw political allegiance in relation to two levels of comparison; 
the international and the national. Ghanaians from all ethnic groups saw themselves as 
Ghanaians when the comparison was with people from other states (foreigners). At the 
national level social and political differentiation were not so clear-cut. Not all people from 
an ethnic group identify with the same political party even though the tendency was to 
support candidates from ones own ethnic group. From the research23 we concluded that
22 The number of ethnic and tribal groups in West Africa countries is so high that it would be 
impossible to test each group in every country. This would have been superfluous. The Ghanaian sample 
in our opinion a fair indicator of the general situation in other countries of the region.
23 Again rudimentary in terms of its level of scientific sophistication; non random sample, sample 
size of 110 people altogether, and qualitative questions.
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ethnic affiliation is predominantly a social differentiation which spills over into political 
identification if political parties are ethnically based. The reasons given for identifying with 
political parties that are dominated by people from the same ethnic group range from 
affective feelings to utilitarian expectations that resources and political positions will be 
more likely to be distributed in favour of people from the ethnic group of an incumbent. 
Others supported political parties solely on the basis of whom they thought could do the 
job better.
At the national level it was clear that those questioned did not see the ethnic group 
as more important than the state. The ethnic group and the state were not seen by those 
questioned, especially the more educated, as being in conflict. The two were different 
social construct which overlap at certain times. The validity of the state was not being 
questioned by ethnic conflict. Neither is ethnic conflict endemic. Conflict arose when 
inequity was perceived in the distribution of resources in favour of the incumbent's ethnic 
group. From these we concluded that ethnic diversity, by itself, did not pose a danger to 
the survival of the state. It was difficult to determine where the locus of loyalty lies.
The conclusion that ethnic identification and political allegiance do not always 
coincide is supported by a third research conducted among the Ewes of Ghana and Togo. 
In addition to showing the complicated nature of the dynamics of ethnic affiliation and 
nationalism, the research also buttresses our opinion that states are becoming de facto  
entities and are not persisting because of outside recognition. We used the Ewes as our 
sample because of the historical desire to form a to be amalgamated into the same country 
and to overcome their demarcation that had resulted from the defeat of Germany in the
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1945. If  the straddling of ethnic groups was to be problematic for nation-building, the Ewe 
unification movement and its activities, including representations at the UN, should have 
been a cause for concern in post independent Ghana and Togo after the incorporation of 
the English Trans-Togoland into The Gold Coast and subsequently into Ghana after the 
latter's independence. The Ewes are therefore important because it was a case which was 
expected to result in difficulties for the national governments concerned. What has 
happened since independence is therefore instructive for understanding the effect of ethnic 
diversity and the straddling of tribes across borders on the domestic politics of states 
within the region.
The research was initially carried out to test the validity of the assumption that the 
straddling of tribes across borders creates irredentist and secessionist tendencies and 
therefore leads to instability. The research revealed that the straddling of tribes across 
borders did not necessarily result in secessionist tendencies among the general population 
of those tribes.
When we asked Ghanaian Ewes the question; 'Whom do you identify with more, 
Togolese Ewes or people from other tribes in Ghana?', the majority of people in the age 
group 40 to 65 years responded that they identified with Togolese Ewes more than with 
people from other tribes in Ghana. When the same question was put to Togolese Ewes of 
the same age group, 84 of the 100 people questioned said they identified with Ewes 
across the border than with other tribes in Togo. There was therefore mutual identification 
with each other across the common border. When the same question was put to people 
between 15 and 39 the answer varied with the level of education, the distance they lived
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away from the border, their perceived future prospects, where they attended school, and 
whether they could speak the Ewe language. Though a similar number of people were 
questioned the qualifications make it difficult to quantify.
We found, however, that the further the informant lived from the border, the higher 
the level of education, if he or she attended school in other parts of the country other than 
Ewe areas or there was a good mix of ethnic groups, if one perceived his or her prospects 
to be good and not threatened, and if he or she could not speak the language then the level 
of identification with those across the border was minimal or even non-existent. They did 
not see any overwhelming sense of belonging together culturally, and neither did they see 
their futures converging. On the other hand, those who lived closer to the border or had 
relatives in either country, were less educated and could not speak the languages of the 
other tribes, and had not mixed extensively with people from other tribes tended to identify 
with the tribesmen across the border. However their identification was cultural rather than 
political.
When we asked the 40 to 65 age group why they identified with each other more 
than with people from other ethnic groups from their own countries, the predominant 
answer was that because they shared the same culture, language, religious practices and 
that they had relatives living on the other side of the border. Particularly for Ghanaian 
Ewes who did not speak English or any of the languages of other tribes in Ghana and 
Togolese Ewes who were in the same position, language was a very important criterion for 
identification. The Ghanaian Ewes actually felt more at home in Lome the capital of Togo 
and went there more frequently than to Accra because Lome is in an Ewe speaking part of
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Togo. Another reason, especially among the elite of both countries was that they felt 
discriminated against by other tribes from their own country.
When asked whether they felt the Ewes of both countries should be united into one 
country (Ghana or Togo) or secede from both countries and form their own new state, all 
except one person said no.
The reason for the apparent ambivalence was explained by separating 
socio-cultural identification from political identification. Most of those questioned did not 
see any special advantages accruing from such a move. A large number thought such an 
occurrence would actually lead to retrogression. One reason for the perceived negative 
impact of such a move was that since official business was conducted in European 
languages in the region they would have to adopt either french or english as the lingua 
franca. If  english were adopted, the Ghanaian Ewes would be at an advantage in terms of 
jobs and political office and vice versa. Thus the common language factor would not 
produce any substantial advantages except in social communication.
The separation of political and cultural affiliation was validated by the fact that 
Ghanaian and Togolese Ewes were willing to fight each other if war erupted between 
armies of the two countries. The reason for their willingness to fight was that they would 
not go around asking if an enemy was from their ethnic group or not. The enemy from the 
neighbouring country will be treated collectively rather than as possibly members from 
ones own tribe.
237
Another reason that was given for not wanting to join to form a separate state was 
intra-ethnic rivalries. It was pointed out that the Ewes did not constitute a homogenous 
group except from a distance. Beside Ghanaian Ewes generally felt superior to their 
counterparts in Togo while the Togolese Ewes felt Ghanaian Ewes were scamps.
Both groups of Ewes also felt they had lived so long in their individual countries 
and therefore identified with the state and other groups within it politically. Of the more 
than 100 people interviewed only one person was willing to fight a war of secession, but 
expressed the improbability of the need or occasion ever arising. It was also pointed out 
that having established economic, social and political links with other groups in the 
individual countries since independence, it was indeed very difficult to envisage giving it all 
up for the possibilities of living in an ethnically homogenous state, a situation which did 
not promise any obvious advantages.
Neither group of Ewes was therefore particularly interested in forming a separate 
state of their own even though they expressed a liking for the idea of free interaction 
between them as a result of regional integration.
Even though there is clearly no desire on the part of the Ewes of Ghana and Togo 
to either separate to form their own state or be united with their affine in either country, 
their straddling of the Ghana-Togo border has contributed to the sometimes acrimonious 
relationship between the two countries. Though the Ewes expressed the desire to be united 
after the second-world-war, and even made representation to the United Nations on the 
issue, such demands have become dormant. The present generation of Ewes have lived in
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the respective countries since they were bom and have therefore become politically 
integrated into those countries. This we deduced explains, to a certain extent, the 
difference in the answer of the two age groups.
From the above we concluded that de facto political communities are being 
formed in West African countries. Though the ethnic group remains an important group 
for individual identification and group action, political loyalty was with the state rather 
than the ethnic group. A nascent political loyalty to the state is developing which makes 
the assertion that African states lack empirical statehood anachronistic. Borders are now 
accepted as permanent features of the political landscape at the formal level.
If  the Ewe experience is added to the fact that apart from the Biafran war of 
secession, no country in West Africa has been faced with break-up because of ethnic 
diversity, then we can conclude tentatively that the state is an empirical reality. 
Governments continue to be the only legitimate users of coercive force. In the Liberian 
civil war, the issue is not about the legitimacy of the state but about power and resource 
distribution, and ethnic discrimination. But even in this case ethnic groups continue to 
identify with the state.
Our conclusion therefore is that states are not at risk of disintegrating because of 
their diverse ethnic composition. Neither is the straddling of tribes across borders a threat 
to the survival of the state in the region, though it might be a threat to regimes. The only 
reason why a regional organisation might not get the attention it desires from its member 
states is because domestic planning and development issues take precedence over regional
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goals. This is not peculiar to ECOWAS because even in such advanced integration 
schemes such as the EEC, domestic political, social and economic issues get primary 
attention from ruling governments.
Politicians in West Africa are aware that the state is no longer a mere inheritance 
from the colonial era. They are however mindful of the effects of their policies on 
perceptions about equitable distribution of political appointments, executive positions in 
parastatal organisations, project and resource allocation and also careful of making 
utterances that would be construed as indicating ethnic bias.
Hence to the extent that politicians continue to regard ethnic cleavages as 
important in policy formulation it can be suggested that such perceptions will affect their 
level of participation in regional organisations. Ethnic diversity, it is thought leads to social 
disintegration and therefore threatens the survival of the state. Thus in instances where 
national decision-makers see the national interest, in this instance, the security of the state, 
as threatened, they will take decisions to counteract them. In a situation where resources 
are limited and internal demand on them is high, national governments will be unlikely to 
allocate such resources to regional goals despite the long term advantages of such regional 
allocation.
It must be stressed that though the idea of the nation is gaining ground slowly, the 
ethnic group continues to be an important object of identification. It is the predominant 
reference group in social organisation, and has not been replaced by class identity on a 
sufficiently general level. Even in the urban areas where social assimilation has been
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highest, individual ethnic/tribal societies perpetuate the links with the hometown and the 
ethnic group.
The usually negative connotations that interaction between ethnic groups has 
attained in West African politics has to a certain extent been influenced by the racial 
undertones it has acquired, especially in the West. Ethnic organisation is, in our opinion an 
important organising principal which could serve very well in a political situation where 
pressure groups and lobbies are not well developed. Governments adopted a negative 
attitude to ethnic demands, in part, because many politician's could not come to terms with 
potential alternative centres of autonomous power,24 and, we suggest, did not know quite 
how to incorporate and assimilate such sources of opposition to the ruling party's 
proposed structure of the state or the bureaucracy during the early days of independence. 
Without ethnic pressures it is difficult to envisaged how governments would have been 
mindful of equity in the spatial distribution of resources without a bias in favour of areas 
where they got the most votes. Our conclusion on ethnic pressures is that it was a useful 
means of expressing general demands. It's conflictual and potentially disintegrative impact 
on national politics and the survival of the state, could to a certain extent, be because 
nationalist governments failed to realise that the nascent pluralistic political systems that 
had been introduced on the eve of independence by the departing imperial powers was in 
part dependent on finding compromises between groups and bargaining between 
conflicting interests.
24Hodder-Williams, R , An Introduction to the Politics of Tropical Africa. George Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1984. See also Collier, P., 'Africa's External Relations: 1960-90, African Affairs: vol. 90, no. 
360, July 1991.
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Since the second wave of multi-party politics that started in the 1990s after a 
combination of factors including internal pressures for more open government, the collapse 
of the former Soviet Union, and the subsequent linking of Aid to good governance by 
Western donor countries, many governments have used the ethnic factor as a defence 
against the introduction of pluralism. They have tended to assume that ethnic conflict is 
endemic. A defeatist determinism colours the perception about their approach to ethnic 
issues.
The perspective that we have suggested here is that ethnic groups can be an 
important means of ensuring an equitable distribution of resources, and of governing. 
Consociationalism, because of its overt compartmentalism, would however not be an 
appropriate method of creating a compromise between social cleavages and the need for 
nation-building. The appropriate form of incorporation would require research which has 
as its basis not a presumption that ethnicity is detrimental but that it can be a legitimate 
form of social organisation and hence an aspect of governance.
If it is true that for regional integration to be successful it must, among other 
things, be able to lead to an incorporation of the informal, largely rural, 
non-commercialised sections of West African countries into the exchange economy, then 
in the absence of pressure groups, ethnic pressures are necessary for bringing the effects of 
integration on rural areas to the attention of governments. Regional policies that target 
rural areas for the provision of social amenities, employment opportunities, and the 
inculcation of methods of improved productivity can, we suggest, only be appropriately 
identified by those who live and work in those areas. Appropriate development methods
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are more likely to be suggested by those who know the lifestyle of the rural areas than by 
bureaucrats in Lagos or state capitals without first hand knowledge of those areas. It is 
now widely believed that the more residents of an area are involved in the planning and 
implementation of a development programme the more likely it is to succeed. Thus a 
combination of the technical expertise of bureaucrats and social knowledge of those such 
programmes will affect is ensured, in the latter case, by a form of social representation 
which for the rural areas can only be done by the ethnic group.
We are working on the assumption that ethnic conflict is a symptom rather than a 
cause of internal political conflict. Ethnic conflict in West African is therefore indicative of 
the failure of the political system to find ways of accommodating existing and converging 
linguistic, territorial, religious, cultural and historically based social organisation of life 
within countries. The superimposition of a political system on previously existing systems 
must necessarily take account of them. The fragile political structure of countries in the 
region are partly a result of this failure.
This last point leads us to ask how the free movement of people across borders, a 
right to reside in any of the member countries of the region and also the right of 
establishment in any member country25 is hampered by the fear that it will undermine 
national sovereignty. The question that arises in this instance is whether the shifting of 
loyalties to regional institutions, seen by integration theory as essential26, will undermine 
the already fragile sovereignty of the individual states within the region.
25 Article 27, Treaty of ECOWAS.
26 Both the supranationally oriented neo-functionalist theories and the pluralist theories expect 
either a shifting of loyalty or the building of region wide identification among citizens of the member 
countries.
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The possibility of a retrenchment as individual states feel their sovereignty 
threatened can only be speculated on but the high possibility of that happening is indicated 
by what has happened in the European Community at various time in its history. The 
differences, however, between Western Europe and West Africa are obvious. The 
arguments in the European Community are over the authority of national parliaments to 
take political and economic decisions in the national interest. In addition to these 
problems, West African states have the possibility of undermining their nascent 
nation-states by giving too much distributive and legislative powers to a regional body.
The answer to these questions, however, depends to a very large extent on the 
philosophy that governments and the public subscribe to as the principles that should 
govern their relations with each other. If ECOWAS members feel that the future 
development of the region lies in the uniting of the states into a single state then the 
forging of ties that eventually replace the developing nationalistic loyalties pose no 
problems and the shifting of loyalties or the transfer of sovereignty to a supranational body 
can help bring that about. Secondly, the straddling of tribes across borders will only help in 
facilitating that process. This is because the positive effects of territorial contiguity27 will 
be buttressed by linguistic and culturally continguous border areas.
However, if the status quo is seen as the philosophy, and nationalism which fosters 
a collective ethos in citizens is seen as the organising principle, then the lack of focus that 
may be engendered by diverting attention from the state to regional institutions is likely to
27Etzioni, A., Political Unification.
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impair such goals. The developing nationalism will be undermined because, as we have 
stated above, a complete transfer of loyalties from ethnic groups to the state has not 
occurred yet. The increasing political identification of tribes that straddle borders with the 
states they have belonged to since independence may also be undermined.
It is very difficult to speculate on the future philosophical orientation of states or 
opinion formers. What seems to be the case now is that many question the economic 
viability of the state in the region, indeed the whole continent, without questioning the 
territorial limitations that contribute to continuing poverty. From all indications, the states, 
as the region is constituted now, are likely to remain for quite some time to come.
Whether larger states will be formed is something that is impossible to predict at the 
moment. It is however probable that if a unitary state which incorporates the existing 
countries is envisaged as the future political structure of West Africa, then the more 
nationalistic the countries become the more difficult that will be to achieve. On the other 
hand if a pluralistic political system, based on either a federation or confederation, is 
envisaged then the consolidation of the state does not pose as much difficulty if the 
majority of people think that is the structure they will prefer.
From our discussion, we can conclude that ethnicity is neither a threat to the 
survival of the state nor to regional integration. Political conflict is the cause rather than 
the effect of ethnic conflict. Ethnicity can actually lead to equitable spatial distribution of 
the gains of regional integration and mitigate against its adverse effects if ethnic groups are 
able to highlight the effect integration is having on it. Tribes across borders can also 
facilitate regional integration in several ways to the extent that they act as culturally
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continuous zones between different states and have facilitated interaction despite the 
introduction of international borders.
There is no doubt that dissidents escape from one country to another all over the 
region, and that this is sometimes facilitated by the straddling of common borders by the 
same ethnic group. Tribes across borders have not in every instance been a problem for 
neighbouring countries. The Ghana/Togo Border, for example, has experienced one of the 
most protracted tension because of this issue. However, from our research we found that 
the tension was not caused by the straddling of the same ethnic group across the common 
border but by coincidences that have combined to make that boundary important in the 
strategic calculation of both countries.
The factors that have combined to cause tension on the Ghana/ Togo border 
include; the nearness of the Togolese capital to the border, the internal impact of ethnic 
identification of politics, and the difficulties that arose between Nkrumah and Olympio 
over the unification of Ghana and Togo after the latter's independence.28
The capital of the Togolese Republic is only about four miles from the border with 
Ghana. This means that dissidents find it very convenient to penetrate the country from 
Ghana. The capital is also situated in Ewe territory. Ayadema, the president of Togo 
regards the Ewes as his main political opponents. A large majority of Ewes also feel that 
Olympio, an Ewe, was overthrown by the active participation of Ayadema, a Kabre. Part 
of the Olympio family, and the first president's son, who has pretensions toward ruling
28 Amenumey, D.E.K., The Ewe Unification Movement: A Political History. Ghana University 
Press, 1989.
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Togo lives in Ghana. Thus even though the general Ewe speaking population around the 
border are apolitical, the coincidence of the factors listed above have combined to create 
suspicion of the Ewes in Togo by the ruling predominantly Kabre government. The border 
is therefore regularly closed and accusations of political connivance are made regularly, 
especially, by the Togolese government. As long as the Togolese authorities perceive an 
Ewe threat the border will continue to feature highly in Togo's strategic calculations. 
Indeed the situation could actually be reversed if rulers of Ghana perceived their main 
opposition to be the Ewe and there is an Ewe president in Togo.
The straddling of tribes across borders does not therefore pose the problem 
attributed to it in the region. The problems is mainly a result of the personalisation of 
politics and in the Ghana/Togo case a combination of historical, cultural and ideological 
factors.
Apart from ethnic groups, other social groups that are expected to affect 
decision-making at the regional level are those formed around associational interests.
Such associations include occupational groups such as lawyers, teachers, farmers, 
workers, engineers, police, soldiers, traders and entrepreneurs.
These groups are able to affect regional economic integration to the extent that 
they are able to influence political decision-making at the national level and lobby regional 
decision-makers at the regional level. But being able to influence decision-making is itself 
not enough to make a group able to effective in affecting the direction of regional
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integration. Groups will only attempt to influence policy decisions if they perceive their 
interest as being either promoted or threatened by regional integration.
Thus while certain groups might be indifferent to the impact of regional 
integration, others will seek to influence government decision positively or negatively 
depending on how their interests are affected.
Groups that are most likely to try and consciously promote or impede regional 
integration are those that will be affected by treaty provisions such as trade liberalisation, 
the common external tariff, and rights of residence and establishment. Other interest 
groups may lobby governments to push for policies that promote their interests within the 
framework of the regional organisation. Such lobbying will depend on how effective 
groups are in pressing their demands, how organised they are, the resources available to 
them, their closeness to decision-makers, and their level of awareness about the effects of 
regional integration. It also depends on how seriously political decision-makers take such 
groups, and how important such groups are in determining the continuing stay in power of 
holders of office.
Groups that may therefore be of importance to regional integration are Trade 
Unions, Chambers of Commerce, Manufacturers Associations and perhaps student groups 
to the extent that they sometimes constitute a well informed group within domestic society 
in developing countries.
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4.5 Trade Unions
Trade Unions were among the first non-elite bodies to coalesce in the region 
during the colonial period, with workers organisations being formed around sources of 
labour, such as, the railways, and major urban concentrations.29
Trade unions in West Africa like elsewhere work primarily to protect and advance 
the interest of their members. However they have certain characteristics which conform to 
their situation in developing economies.
First, trade unions are relatively limited in membership in West Africa. This is 
because of the narrow industrial base of the region.30 Unionised labour therefore forms a 
minority of the total working population of the region. In addition to a large self-employed 
non-waged labour employed mainly in subsistence agriculture, fishing and petty trading 
activities, there is also a large population of non-unionised wage labour employed in small 
firms. Where labour is unionised they have tended to have a limited advantage compared 
to the unskilled workers in other sectors of the economy as a consequences of 
organisation.
Government employees form the largest part of organised labour in these 
countries, and are mainly found in the public sector and parastatal organisations. Their 
actions are therefore mainly directed at government policies.
On the one hand they are able to disrupt the functioning of state establishments, 
and are able to catch the attention of the government because the latter is the main
29 Chazan, et al. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa.
30 Jeffries, R., Class. Power and Ideology in Ghana: The Railwavmen of Sekondi. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1978.
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employer in the countries of the region. On the other hand, their closeness to government 
has affected their independence. Attempts have been made by officials to standardise 
criteria for membership, control wages, and exact loyalty from labour leaders.31 Like any 
employer, Governments have sought to and do exert influence and control over trade 
union activities by co-opting trade union leaders and thereby subordinating trade unions. 
However despite such manipulation and effort to subordinate trade unions to state policies 
and to co-opt leaders, as many people have entered the labour market, and individual 
unions have pressed for better conditions for their members, unions have persisted and 
have reorganised and in many cases been invigorated especially in the 1980s.32
Through strike actions, withdrawal, slowdowns, sabotage and other forms of 
protest they have frequently created a mood of discontent in countries. They have 
consequently been in a position to make governments more accountable , though they have 
not been able to bring substantial political transformation.33
Thus the experience of'organised labour has been one of increased government 
intervention and periodic dissension'.34
Trade unions do not however always work in opposition to government and have 
sometimes been instrumental in according acceptability to military take-overs. Depending 
on the disposition of their leaders they sometimes work to promote government policy
31 Chazan et al. op. cit. p87
32 ibid.
33 Cohen, R , 'Resistance and Hidden Forms of Consciousness Amongst African Workers', Review 
of African Political Economy. 19(1980):822.
34Sandbrook, R., and Cohen, R., (ed.), The Development of an African Working Class: Studies in 
Class Formation and Action. London, Longman, 1975.
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whether they perceive the situation of workers as being improved by government policy, 
they can either act as essential supporters of government policy or as opposition. In 
instances where union leadership is closely associated with the political leadership a 
patronage relationship develops.
It must however be noted that trade unions are not a homogenous entity despite 
the fact that they sometimes belong to an umbrella group. Whereas certain sections of the 
trade union movement might be supporting government policy, others might be opposing 
it. Hence the impact of their activity on government depends to a large extent on the 
internal cohesion of the movement, the extent of government influence on the leaders, how 
informed they are about a particular issue in terms of its overall impact on their members, 
and the general economic condition within a country at the time.
Regional integration and trade unions impact on each other in a two way process. 
The impact of regional integration on trade unions might be felt through the provisions of 
free movement for community citizens, rights of residence, and establishment, all o f which 
are contained in the treaty of ECOWAS. Trade unions on the other hand can affect 
regional integration at two levels; national and regional. In the first instance they can act as 
pressure groups to affect government disposition toward particular politics. At the 
regional level they can lobby regional policy initiators to adopt policies that are to their 
advantage and sometimes contrary to national politics. Regional bureaucrats can also use 
trade unions and other pressure groups to cajole governments into accepting policies that 
they would otherwise not adopt.
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In the instances where unions feel the jobs of their members will be threatened by 
provisions, such as, right of establishment and employment for community citizens, they 
might organise to oppose such policies, especially in instances where there is already a 
high number of unemployed labour competing for positions. West Africans countries have 
a high level of unemployment and trade unions are likely to press governments to stem 
migrant workers from member countries. This has happened twice in Nigeria since the 
formation of ECOWAS, once in Ghana prior to the formation of ECOWAS, and in various 
instances through discrimination policies directed at foreign nationals in the Ivory Coast. If 
two of the four so-called more developed countries within the region, Nigeria35 and Ivory 
Coast, have found it necessary to adopted discriminatory policies, then it is doubtful that 
the spread effect that is expected to mitigate the tended toward unequal development, 
through labour movements, is unlikely to materialise.
The particular action taken to exert pressure on policy makers depend on the type 
of regime that is in power. The desire for national development makes national goals more 
important to government. Thus where trade unions are justified in the fear of 
unemployment resulting from regional policies, such views are likely to converge with that 
of national decision-makers anyway. It can be assumed a priori therefore that it is unlikely 
that governments and domestic unions will clash over regional policies.
The current low level of activity is probably because ECOWAS is not advanced 
enough to impact directly on the lives of individuals or groups. As it develops and its level
35 Nigeria expelled illegal community immigrants but it nevertheless was an indication that if there 
was difficulties, such as, unemployment in the national economy foreign community citizens could be 
targeted for expulsion.
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and extent of penetration increases, interest groups such as trade union might become 
more active.
A higher level of union activity will depend, however, on the resources available to 
the unions and how much national and regional cohesion there is between unions. The 
capability of pressure groups to represent their members in the European Community is 
very much facilitated by their ability to establish offices in Brussels and other parts of the 
community countries where regional decisions are made. They are also able to employ 
experts who keep them informed about policy proposals that might impact on their 
members. The developed lobby system is also extensively used at both initiation, decisional 
and post-decisional stages of community decision-making.36 In 1985 there were an 
estimated 500 such groups working on behalf of various interests. All of these cost their 
members a substantial amount of money which unions in the ECOWAS region do not 
have.
The extent of trade union activity in ECOWAS activities is low, and will continue 
for a long time to come. Like national governments, they are also preoccupied with 
domestic issues. Perhaps an increase in the decision-making capability of the Community 
will propel them to act but until then their potential impact is yet to be felt.
36Butt, A., Pressure Groups in the European Community. UACES Occasional Papers 2, 1985.
253
4.6 Business Groups
Despite the relatively undeveloped nature of Business interest groups in West 
Africa, they were instrumental in encouraging governments to pursue the formation of an 
economic community which had been abandoned in 1968.
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, between 1968 and 1973 efforts toward 
regional integration had come to a standstill. During this lull a Federation of West African 
Chambers of Commerce was established in November 1972 in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Its 
members included Liberia, Niger, Togo, Dahomey (now Benin), Guinea, The Gambia, 
Ghana, and Nigeria. Though Upper Volta and Cote d'Ivoire were represented, they did not 
join till the following year in Accra, Ghana.37 It is a representative body of the organised 
private sector of the economy in the region, and seeks to provide a link between the 
national Chambers of Commerce and national Associations of Chambers of Commerce, 
Industry and Mines in West Africa.
Among the aims of the federations was to 'promote the establishment of an 
economic community and a common market in the West African region and encourage the 
speedy re-establishment of supranational commercial institutions'.38
As a result of its composition, and through various meetings held in both French 
speaking and English speaking countries of the region the federation played an important 
part in transcending the language barrier in the region. Representations made to the heads
37Fajemirokun, H., 'The Role of West African Chamber of Commerce in the Formation of 
ECOWAS' in Readings and Documents on ECOWAS. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 
Macmillan, Lagos, 1984, pp 76 - 90.
38 ibid., p78.
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of state of the countries where the meetings were held, first in Sierra Leone to Siaka 
Stephens in 1972 , in Ghana to I.K. Acheampong in 1973, and in Cote d'Ivoire to 
Houphouet-Boigny in 1974 together with others were used to advocate the resuscitation 
o f the idea and desirability of the formation of a West African economic community.
The Federation therefore played an important role in reviving the abandoned 
desire to form an economic community that included all countries of the region.
The political backing that was necessary for the actual formation of the 
organisation is what was spearheaded by the Nigerian and Togolese governments who 
included members of their chambers of commerce as part of their official delegations or as 
advisers to the governments at the meetings leading to the formation of ECOWAS.39
Since its formation the Federation of West African Chamber of commerce has 
established ECOBANK Transnational Incorporated. This commercial bank is the first to 
have branches in five neighbouring capitals namely Lagos, Cotonou, Lome, Accra, and 
Abidjan. It also plans to establish a West African Airline to facilitate intra-regional travel, 
an African Mineral Resources Development Fund, and a Maritime Transport Company.40
Despite these achievements the business interest groups have not been as active as 
they perhaps ought to be. The possible reason are examined below and again because of 
the lack of documented material will be based on theoretical propositions of the interaction 
between business associations and regional integration schemes. Business Associations for
39 ibid.
40 Contact. ECOWAS, Vol. 2, No. 2, September 1990.
255
our purpose can be divided into two groups; Commercial and Manufacturers Associations. 
As has been indicated above both commercial and manufacturers are represented in the 
Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce. However, for ease of analysis we will 
maintain the categories above. This is because despite working in a common organisation, 
the impact of integration on them will be different.
Among the first group could be listed Chambers of Commerce, and Market 
Women's Associations. The activities of these groups centre on the selling of either 
imported or locally manufactured goods. Generally, commercial activity is organised in a 
two tier hierarchical structure with the big commercial houses such as G.B. Ollivant at the 
top and the majority of small scale retailers and petty traders at the bottom.
In most of West African countries both foreign manufactured and locally produced 
goods pass through the established commercial stores to the petty traders who do not 
usually have direct access to the sources of supply. This is because the majority lack either 
capital, the education or contacts to effectively participate in formal channels of marketing. 
Though a few enterprising individuals manage to procure goods for themselves directly 
from manufacturers or from abroad, the large majority of traders are dependent on 
purchases they are able to make from agents of the foreign and local manufacturers. This 
means that they are usually unable to influence pricing or distribution policy of 
manufacturers directly except through the consequences of the prices they charge for their 
goods in the market.
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In conformity to the two tier structure of the commercial sector, the bigger and 
established stores usually have more access to government decision-makers than the to the 
petty traders. The reason for this is because the business elites in West African countries 
are usually closely associated with the political elite. Indeed, in most instances it is the 
business elite that sponsor political parties, and constitute the founding members of such 
parties, and politicians are sometimes businessmen themselves.
There is usually, therefore, an interdependent relationship between political elite 
and their counterparts in the commercial sector. The exchange of favours such as the 
allocation of import licenses, and foreign exchange for monetary kickbacks means a close 
working relationship between these two groups. They are therefore in a position to 
influence policy. Even where they do not influence policy, they are invariably the ones who 
gain from import licences.
Part of the policy framework of regional integration has the effect of opening up 
the domestic market to regional competitors through the elimination of tariffs among 
member countries, and the reduction in imports from non-member competitors through 
increasing tariffs on goods from foreign sources.
In the case of a lifting of restrictions on imports from partner countries, regional 
integration has the effect of flooding the market of less competitive producers, making 
available goods in a quantity that wipes out some or all o f the excess profit previously 
enjoyed by traders as a result of shortages in the domestic market. It also has the effect of 
opening up the protected market for local manufacturers. Unless increased quantities sold
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by local traders of community originated goods compensates for the reduction in profit 
margins, the overall impact of tariff elimination may be negative for the domestic 
commercial sector. Though it may result in increased welfare for the region in absolute 
terms, its overall impact in terms of jobs losses in the commercial sector, and bankruptcies 
and redundancies in the manufacturing sector must be considered. Also, its effect on 
overall industrial development must be taken into account in welfare calculations.
The adoption of a common external tariff (CET) results either in import duties 
being higher than previously or lower. Higher tariffs will result if averaging results in 
community tariffs being higher than what pertain domestically prior to integration. This 
will also have the effect of increasing the profit margins for importers if there are no 
cheaper community substitutes to replace imports. In this case quantities imported will not 
change very much if the demand for such goods is inelastic. On the other hand, if tariff 
averaging results in a reduction in tariffs then the profit margins will fall, with 
consequences similar to those discussed above.
Depending therefore on what tariff levels are before a CET is adopted, an 
informed pressure group of commercial business will press for an adoption of tariff levels 
that will increase their profit margins or leaves them unchanged.
The extent to which pressure groups in the commercial sector are able to affect 
policy is limited because of the style of decision-making in West African countries, the 
technical knowledge that is required and the resources needed for effective lobbying. The 
highly centralised decision-making style and the specialised nature of such decisions
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together with the lack of transparency in policy decision-making means that despite the 
closeness of the political elite and the business elite, the latter is unable to affect decision. 
Additionally, pressure groups are only able to affect decisions if they are informed about 
the decisions and their consequences, and have the resources to lobby governments on a 
collective basis. Moreover, the structure must be conducive to lobbying. As mentioned 
above, because of the secrecy with which most policies are formulated, adopted and 
implemented, affected sectors are usually unaware of such measures until they are 
implemented.
Additionally, commercial activity in the region is not usually organised as an 
interest group on a competent and efficient level because of the lack of qualified personnel 
and resources.
Finally, the lack of political pluralism means that the political structures are not 
conducive to pressure activity and effectiveness within West Africa.
Policies that form an integral part of regional integration may affect manufacturers 
differently. Treaty provisions on the freeing of trade, the establishment of a CET and the 
definition of rules of origin may have different impacts on different types of manufactures.
A common external tariff can be a two edged sword for manufacturers. While 
protecting them from competition from non-members, it also has the effect of increasing 
the cost of foreign inputs. Protected industries will enjoy a regional market free of 
competition from the rest of the world. A tariff averaging may however reduce tariffs in
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countries thus exposing them to imports from the rest of the world and from partner 
countries.
Domestic manufacturers will tend to want tariffs that help in protecting them even 
further or maintaining the pre-integration status quo.
Freeing of trade will as elucidated in chapter one affect different manufacturers 
differently whilst the rules of origin may affect industries with a high level of foreign 
ownership.
Again the same situation as those enumerated for the commercial sector hold for 
the manufacturers. But it must be noted that the commercial sectors and the manufacturing 
sector may sometimes find themselves fighting on opposite sides.
4.7 Conclusion
So far the commercial and manufacturing sectors have not had the level of impact 
that integration theory would advocate in the ECOWAS region. This is partly because the 
integration process is itself not advanced enough to have the consequences that will 
necessitate vigorous concerted action by interest groups. The lack of transparency in 
policy formulation both at the regional level and the national level also means these groups 
are not involved in the day to day policy evaluations, except on an occasional basis.
The propelling influence that interest groups are supposed to have of regional 
integration is therefore lacking. Regional integration is predominantly the politicians' toy 
with a very low level of awareness among the commercial sector.
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Though the treaty of ECOWAS stresses social development as one of its objectives 
the emphasis has been on recreational activity, though some advances have been made in 
mobilising women, attempting to harmonise education policy and co-operation in research 
activities. Social policies, such as regional development programmes have not yet been 
integrated into policy documents of the community. Thus though the possibility of unequal 
development is recognised, the recognition is that of differential development at the 
national level. Ethnic demands may therefore eventually be the force that brings this into 
focus.
The emphasis being laid on encouraging interaction between the nationals of the 
member countries through sports could help create the social community needed to 
underpin economic integration but sports activities can also generate strife and rivalry and 
therefore actually hamper regional integration.
We can conclude therefore that ethnic straddling of borders can actually facilitate 
regional integration though its impact on regional policy is indirect. On the other hand 
because of the dirigiste nature of commercial and manufacturing activity and centralised 
policy formulation in West Africa, groups in that sector have little strength in affecting 
government policies, especially since they are not seen as a real threat to the survival of 
governments.
The empirical impact of these groups on the pace of integration will be examined in 
chapter six, but before we do that it will be appropriate to measure the extent of
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integration achieved so far in order to use the frameworks we have been detailing in this 
and previous chapters.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Extent of Regional Integration in West Africa
5.1 Introduction
Regional economic integration is a means to an end, and not an end in itself. As we 
pointed out in the first chapter, the reason for embarking on ECOWAS was , primarily, 
economic and social development. Economic integration involves regional collective 
decision making which is expected to lead to joint action for goal achievement. As we saw 
in chapter three, the decision making aspect of economic integration is of crucial 
importance to the outcome of the process because it determines the framework for trade 
liberalisation, specifies distributive and compensatory measures, and shapes the modality of 
relations with non members. Collective decision making is therefore indicative of the 
extent of joint action to solve problems. It is therefore a good measure of the extent of 
regional integration.
Decision making, however, only facilitates regional economic co-operation, 
co-ordination and all the other forms of interaction that a regional integration scheme 
entails. The measurement of success or failure is mainly reflected by the achievement of 
the actual goals stated in the treaty establishing the integration scheme. Thus in the case of 
ECOWAS, the reduction in dependence on Western markets for import and export 
requirements and the increasing of intra-regional trade are the substantive goals that 
collective decision making is to facilitate. To these should be added industrialisation which 
is the ultimate aim of the member states and which, it could be suggested, will determine 
the long-term sustainability and desirability of regional integration.
263
In attempting to gauge the extent of integration achieved among ECOWAS 
countries so far, we will, therefore, use the extent of collective decision making, change in 
the direction of external trade and in the volume intra-regional trade, and the impact of 
economic integration on industrialisation within the region to measure how far it has 
progressed in the region.
To enable us to measure collective decision making, we will use certain aspects of 
a model proposed by Lindberg for gauging regional decision making.1 The other measures 
will be done by comparing relative figures of the various indicators over the period the 
organisation has been in existence.
5.2 Extent of Regional Collective Decision Making
International integration, according to Lindberg, is the 'process whereby larger 
groupings emerge or are created among nations without the use of violence'. The 
groupings can be said to 'exist at different analytical levels' and each level can be conceived 
of as 'a number of nations linked to each other in certain salient ways'.2 Such analytical 
levels include social community, security community and economic union. Political 
integration is another such level of analysis and is said to occur when the linkage between 
the nations 'consist of joint participation in regularised, ongoing decision making'.3 These 
decisions are not only made regularly but are binding and include the implementation by 
various means such as collective institutions and/or processes rather than by formally 
autonomous national means. Elaborated, it means a number of governments begin to
‘Lindberg, L.N., 1*01111001 Integration As A Multidimensional Phenomenon' in Regional 
Integration. Lindberg and Scheingold (ed.), Harvard Univ. Press, Mass., 1971, pp 45-127.
2 ibid., p45.
3 ibid.
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create and use common resources in the pursuit of common objectives and in doing so lose 
some factual attributes of sovereignty and decision making autonomy.
Thus political integration describes the institutionalisation of collective decision 
making at the regional level. It constitutes both the institutional framework and/or process 
that is involved in joint endeavours by a group of countries. By implication, it forms the 
matrix that is filled or animated by the particular type of issues that characterise decision 
making in the region concerned. From this perspective political integration lays the 
framework within which joint economic, social, security decisions or a combination of 
these are taken by a group of countries for their mutual benefit. It involves the decisional 
process which enables issues to be discussed, decisions taken and implemented 
collectively. The link between economic and political integration, we suggest, is therefore 
that the latter provides the framework within which the desires, and aims of economic 
integration are articulated.
The model lists ten properties which have been identified as those that constitute a 
collective decision making process. Each of these is defined as a range of variation. 
Political integration is then conceptualised as the 'gradual build-up over time of a variety of 
such properties or a combination of them'. The properties are seen as bearing a systematic 
relationship to each other at any given point in time and over time. The ten properties that 
are identified by Lindberg are further clustered into three overall categories according to a 
systems paradigm and referred to as level, animators and consequences of a collective 
decision making system.
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The level of a collective decision making system is then described by looking at the 
scope o f decision making, the range o f decision making stages, and whether collective 
decisions in any issue area or at any decision making stage are more decisive than similar 
decisions taken at the national level, i.e., the importance of regional decisions in relation to 
national ones on the same issue.
Animators ’describe the energy available to the system at the time of analysis’4. 
They are made up of demands for action emanating from the constituent parts and are the 
driving force that activate the system. These demands flow from relevant political actors. 
It also includes the response of collective decision-makers to these demands. The extent to 
which the demands can themselves be processed depend on the resources available to the 
collective decision makers, the way in which the leaders make use of them' and the 
propensity of national bargainers to use these resources for the maximisation of collective 
as against individual interests.
The third and final set of categories are collectively called consequences of 
collective decision making. This is made up of the extent to which decisions penetrate the 
system, the level of compliance with the decisions and the distributive consequences of the 
decisions.
From the above clusters, the following ten properties can be identified: functional 
scope, range of decision making stages, the relative importance of regional decisions, 
demand flows, resources, leadership, bargaining modalities, penetration of decisions, level
4ibid., p49.
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of compliance with decisions, and the distributive consequences of the decisions. All of 
these properties interact to describe, and explain the dynamics of integration.
The paradigm enables us to identify variables that can be used in a systematic 
analysis of ECOWAS. It also makes it possible to describe West African regional 
economic integration multidimensionally by looking at how political, economic and social 
factors interact to produce the level of achievement that has been attained since the 
organisation was formed.
It must be remembered, though that none of the properties by themselves indicate 
success or failure of integration. A high level of problem recognition does not necessarily 
mean that the resources, manpower, or national motivation are there for them to be 
implemented. Neither does a high level of decision making stage, e.g. imply that 
governments will ensure that they are carried out. National decision making in the issue 
areas may be more important and actually conflict with regional decisions. There may also 
be a lack of co-ordination and transmission mechanisms that ensure that decisions taken 
are transmitted to the member country for implementation.
The individual measures however indicate what is causing neither a stagnation in 
the process or contributing to the dynamism in the scheme. They therefore make it 
possible to suggest, in policy terms, an improvement in performance. They may also 
indicate that the theoretical framework being used is inappropriate for the particular 
political, social and economic environment. As we mentioned earlier, it is our contention 
that despite the demise of neo-functional theorising since the late 1960s, the underlying
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theoretical foundation of most integration schemes that aspire to custom unions combine 
economic gradualism and incremental decision making both of which are essentially 
neo-functional. Though the desired final outcome may not be the political union that 
neo-functionalist theories suggested, it nevertheless usually implies a significant delegation 
of sovereignty. Willingness to delegate such authority coupled with the resources, 
leadership, bargaining modalities and the political, economic and social structure combine 
to make regional integration a success.
5.3 ECOWAS since 1975
The level of achievement or the extent of failure of ECOWAS since its inception 
can be gauged by the first three properties of a collective decision making system, i.e. 
functional scope, range of decision making stages, and the relative importance of regional 
decisions vis-a-vis national decisions. The functional areas have been reproduced below. 
The remaining properties help in explaining why integration has progressed, has stagnated 
or regressed, and are used in chapter six.
Scope o f  decision making
In operationalizing scope Lindberg identified four functional areas which together 
had 22 issue area listed under them. These are listed below:
External Relations Functions
1. Military security
2. Diplomatic influence and participation in world affairs
3. Economic and military aid to other polities
4. Commercial relations with other polities
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Political-constitutional Functions
5. Public health and safety and maintenance of order
6. Political participation (i.e. symbolic participation, 
voting, office-holding)
7. Access to legal-normative system (equity, civil rights,
property rights)
Social and Cultural Functions
8. Cultural and recreational affairs
9. Education and research
10. Social welfare policies
Economic Functions
11. Counter-cyclical policy (government expenditures,
prices and wages controls, budgetary policies)
12. Regulation of economic competition and other government
controls on prices and investment
13. Agricultural protection
14. Economic development and planning (including regional 
policies, aid to depressed industries, public finance, 
guarantees of investments etc.)
15. Exploitation and protection of natural resources
16. Regulation and support of transportation
17. Regulation and support of mass media and
communication (including post-office, television, radio, etc.,)
18. Labour-management relations
19. Fiscal policy
20. Balance-of-payment stability( exchange rate, lending 
and borrowing abroad, capital movement)
21. Domestic monetary policy( banking and finance, money
supply)
22. Assurance of free movement of goods, services, and 
other factors of production( not including capital).
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This operationalization is essentially an extrapolation of the tasks of governments 
and national parliaments to the regional level. It therefore assumes an advanced internal 
political structure and bureaucratic decision making among the members of the scheme. It 
also presupposes the gradual transfer of such tasks to the regional level, and is based on 
the assumption of an eventual predominance of regional decision making over national 
ones. This conclusion is arrived at because a look at the 22 issue areas include nearly all of 
a national government's duties.
An assumption that we made while counting the issue areas was that they were all 
regarded as of equal salience. This assumptions was made because of the difficulty of 
assigning weights to individual issue areas. A second point to be kept in mind while 
interpreting the table is that a low level of threshold of problem recognition is used for 
inclusion in the counting of functional scope. Problem recognition according to Lindberg,
refers to those political activities involved in recognising 
that problems confront the group as a whole, that some sort of 
concerted or co-ordinated or joint action is called for. It 
includes the gathering and exchange of information and the 
processes of generating alternative solution or proposals for
action.5
Hence inclusion does not mean that actual implementation has been taken 
collectively with regard to that issue area. The extent of collective action will be gauged in 
the next section where we look at the range of decision making stages.
’Lindberg, 'Political Integration as a Multidimesional Phenomenon', ibid., p 66.
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In selecting items for inclusion in functional scope, we also recognised, as Lindberg 
did, that the purpose of the listing is only to gauge how extensive the ECOWAS system is. 
The table is indeed a reflection of neo-functionalist assumptions of a gradual transfer of 
national decision making to the regional organisation. The use of the model is justified for 
two reasons. First, the political and economic theoretical framework of ECOWAS is 
neo-fimctionalist and gradualist. This means that despite the shortcomings in 
neo-functionalism, any other method that is used in assessing regional integration in the 
ECOWAS region would be incongruous with the process path that is envisaged both by 
the political and economic assumptions reflected in the treaty of the organisation and 
hence for the scheme.
This is so because the movement from a free trade area to an economic union is 
gradualist6 and implies progressively higher levels of joint decision making among the 
member countries. In addition to this resulting in an increasing preponderance of joint 
decisions in the issue areas covered by the treaty over national ones, it also implies 
increasing supranationalism because of the transfer of chunks of autonomy as a result of 
such policies as a single currency. Whether this results in federalism or not is debatable but 
as pointed out in chapter three, the original treaty did specify unity of the region as the 
ultimate goal. The revised treaty adopted in July 1993 in Cotonou, Benin clarifies this as 
economic.7 This does not detract from the argument however. That economic unity by
limiting economic sovereignty,8 and spilling over into the commercial and trade policies of
6 Article 2 of the Treaty of ECOWAS, reads 'For the purposes set out in the preceding paragraph 
and as hereinafter provided for in this Treaty, the Community shall by stages ensure:...'. Emphasis ours.
7 The 1993 Revised Treaty states in the preamble that; the 'final goal is the is the accelerated and 
sustained economic development of Member States, culminating in the economic union o f  West Africa,..' 
cfi, chapter two, p. 140.
8 In the revised Treaty member countries are 'Convinced that the integration of the Member States 
into a viable regional community may demand the partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties to 
the Community within the context of a collective political will.' It goes on to indicate that the members
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the participating countries encroaches on various aspects of foreign policy, social, and 
political-constitutional autonomy goes without saying. These are neo-functional tenets that 
are almost inevitable if higher levels of integration is required.
Secondly, by using national decision making standards as a means of gauging the 
extent of integration among ECOWAS countries, we are in a better position to indicate 
the importance of specific regional decisions ,i.e. whether national decisions are more 
important in the issue area than regional ones, and therefore be able to see whether 
regional integration is being taken seriously by member governments.
Since the treaty establishing ECOWAS mentions areas of decision making only in 
broad terms the above list aids in making it more definite. Moreover, because the end 
result of what collective decision making should be is not clear, we can assume that the 
most it can get to is that all decisions previously taken at the national level will eventually 
be taken at the regional level. Thus it can be assumed that the list is fairly inclusive and 
able to accommodate any level of competence that is delegated to the organisation by the 
member countries. It is, however, doubtful if member countries of any regional integration 
scheme can be specific in determining what areas the organisation should be competent in. 
The list also makes it possible to accommodate the expansion of collective decision 
making into previously autonomous areas. Finally, to the extent that national decision 
making is the most sophisticated model available to policy makers and international 
relations theorists, the paradigm helps in elucidating what regional decision making aspires 
to.
accept' the need to establish Community Institutions vested with relevant and adequate powers'. Preamble 
of Revised Treaty.
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Despite having regarded the issue areas as equal in weight, we acknowledge that 
some are more salient than others, and that salience itself changes over time. Additionally, 
the categorisation into functional areas is for convenience. The overlap that occurs in 
reality is jettisoned because it makes the task more manageable. Finally, the preponderance 
of economic issues may be attributed to the fact that economic policy areas are more 
readily distinguishable,9 and, also, because ECOWAS is predominantly concerned with 
economic development.
Using the list of issue areas, and giving them equal weight, the issues covered by 
ECOWAS since its inception can be counted to see how they compare with the model.
From the table below we can see that from a situation of not working as a group, 
the ECOWAS countries have gradually increased the issue areas which they recognise as 
needing a common approach to solve.10 Moving from an initial situation where no 
decisions were taken by all 15 countries of West Africa together in a single forum, the 
member countries were able to decide on 6 issues areas by 1980. This figure increased to 
12 issue areas in 1985 and to 17 in 1990.
The predominant area of common interest is economic, followed by social-cultural 
issues then political-constitutional and external relations with one issue area each.
9Lindberg, L., & Scheingold, S., Europe's Would Be Polity. Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1970, pp
67-68.
10 As has been mentioned earlier, collective decision making is a continuum that moves from 
problem recognition, through deciding on an alternative to implementation.
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Table 4
Vector Representation of the Functional 
Scope of ECOWAS: 1975-1990
Year Cultural/
Social
Function
Political-
Constitutional
Functions
Economic
Functions
External
Relations
Functions
1,975 0 0 0 0
1,980 0 0 5 1
1,985 3 0 8 1
1,990 5 1 10 1
With the qualifications mentioned in mind, we can conclude that regional economic 
integration among West African countries has managed within a period of 15 years to 
cover an impressive 17 issue areas.
This level of problem recognition compares very favourably with that of the 
European Community between 1957 and 1970. Both the EEC and ECOWAS had a total 
o f 17 issue areas over a 13 and 15 year period respectively. If  the level of problem 
recognition is about the same in the two Communities over a similar length of time, the 
question that arises is whether they achieved a similar level of effectiveness in decision 
making over that period.
Effectiveness depends on more than problem recognition alone. The quality of 
collective decision making goes beyond the mere counting of issues discussed in the
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collective arena. Below we look at whether things moved beyond the problem recognition 
stage for ECOWAS.
Looking at the scope of decisions alone as a measure of economic integration 
would seem to indicate that collective decision making is becoming very important to the 
member countries of ECOWAS. Such a conclusion would, however, be misleading 
because counting the number of issue areas does not give an indication of whether issues 
discussed in the collective arena have had an impact on national decision making. To see 
how effective regional decision making is to the member countries we will have to gauge 
the range of decision making stages collective decision making covers and the relative 
importance of regional decision making vis-a-vis national decision making. These are 
considered below.
Range o f Decision making Stages
The range of collective decision making can be gauged by looking at the depth of 
collective action taken in order to realise the aims of a decision. This can range from 
problem recognition through decision to application. This distinction between the various 
stages of decision making was first made by Laswell and adopted by Lindberg.11 The latter 
operationalised it and scored the various stages on a scale of 1 to 6. These vary from 
collective problem- recognition to collective implementation and enforcement. Below is a 
reproduction of the range scores for each decision stage and the coding instructions that 
go with it.
11 Lindberg, 'Regional Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon', op. cit.
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Range
Score
1
2
3
Stage of Decision
Coding Instructions
Collective 
problem-recognition
Specific action 
alternatives defined 
collectively
Formal recognition by governments of 
their representatives that problems 
are common and that concerted, 
co-ordinated, or joint action is 
desirable. Intergovernmental
meetings are held or collective 
institutions meet to discuss ways 
and means of concerting,
co-ordinating, or deciding jointly. 
Joint information gathering is 
initiated with object of concerting 
national policies as distinct from 
carrying out a service for one or 
more governments.
Some policy options sure defined 
as acceptable, others as not. 
National decision-makers agree to a 
range of compatible policies. Most 
politically relevant elites must be 
mobilised. Study sessions of civil 
servants are of little moment in 
fields where great interest group 
associations are dominant and 
decisive, unless their leadership is 
also engaged in the process. On the 
other hand, the relevant elite for 
monetary policy or for capital 
movements will be smaller and the 
role of governmental actors more 
decisive.
Collective decisions Intergovernmental bargaining
on policy guidelines and choice of a type of policy
(e.g., anti-inflationary economic 
policy), leaving it up to national 
authorities to translate into policy 
(e.g. , to hold government 
expenditures stable or freeze wages 
or prices).
Detailed collective 
goal-setting 
implementation by 
national rules
Choice of policy actually 
limits national authorities to 
passing legislation implementing a 
detailed collective decision. Some 
discretion due to interpretation.
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5 Decisions on policies
and rules directly
binding on individuals
No national discretion
since intergovernmental decision 
requires no translation into 
national law via national processes. 
Actual implementation and
enforcement by national authorities.
6 Collective 
implementation 
and enforcement
Common institutions are created 
to administer and enforce detailed 
binding rules as adopted by
collective decision.
Below we score each issue area that has been specified in the previous section to 
give us an idea of the extent of collection problem solving. Higher scores imply that 
decision making becomes progressively binding and regional institutions more 
supranational.
External Relations
ECOWAS collective decision making in external relations functions is limited to 
military security within the region. It has not as yet been able to involve itself in the 
military security of the region external to itself. A protocol on Non-Aggression was signed 
on April 22 197812, and that on Mutual Assistance in Defence in 1981.13 The Protocol on 
Non-Aggression incorporates provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Scored 
against the range of decision making these two protocols would receive six points. Though 
these protocols were signed nearly ten years ago, they were not implemented until 1990 in 
the wake of the Liberian crisis. Despite the late implementation of the protocols, even 
though flare-ups had occurred between Ghana and Togo at various times, Burkina Faso 
and Mali in early 1984 and 1985,14 Senegal and Mauritania, and Liberia and Sierra Leone
12 The actual value of this protocol is the symbolic value of intent toward each other.
13 Three instances of military action are given when the protocol would be enforceable: Aggression 
from a non-member state; Conflict between member states; and Internal conflict in a member state.
MChipman, J., French Power in Africa, op. cit.
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before the Liberian civil war, the important point for our purpose is that actual 
implementation involving a peacekeeping initiative of ECOWAS under its Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) was instituted by the organisation. This action is mainly an 
implementation of the Mutual Assistance Protocol, but helped to revive the Protocol on 
Non-Aggression which had not been implemented on occasions, such as those mentioned 
above when tensions within the region had been high. Indeed, the implementation of 
ECOMOG contradicted earlier expectations expressed about the feasibility of 
implementing a defence protocol in the region. Chipman for example felt that,
' ... the ECOWAS Defence Protocol [was] an important step forward 
but few practical results [were] likely to emerge for sometime. 
It is not easy to imagine anglophone and francophone states 
acting together to defend a member state from external 
aggression, and it is equally unlikely that the Defence Protocol 
itself would be invoked to allow for diplomatic action of a kind
which would ease tensions among member states.15
What has happened in Liberia negates this view.
In addition to the intra-regional peacekeeping initiative, ECOWAS members have 
been able, on one occasion, to concert to work towards the preservation of the OAU 
when the organisation was faced with collapse as a result of the continuing presence of 
Polisario's Saharan Arap Democratic Republic (SADR) delegates.16 The previous year 
two attempts to convene an OAU in Tripoli failed( Tripoli I in August and Tripoli II in 
November 1982) over the issue.17 They decided to respond positively to an appeal to 
heads o f state of Africa to attend the nineteenth summit of the OAU in June 1983. This is 
significant because ECOWAS membership that reflects the political cleavages between
15 ibid., pl77.
16 African Research Bulletin. African Research Ltd, Exeter, July 1-31,1982, p 6512. See also the 
June 1-30,1983 issue, p 6860.
17 It must be stated that the venue and Gadaffi's intervention in the Chad dispute between Goukouni 
and Habre had as much to do with boycott as the re-emergence of continental cleavages.
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radicals and moderates. Whilst some of the members18 of ECOWAS had given diplomatic 
recognition to the SADR, others,19 mainly supporters of Morrocco, had objected to it 
delegates being recognised. To get both parties within ECOWAS to go to the OAU 
meeting was an achievement because of the long running disagreement between the two 
camps. However the significance of the organisation's intervention was that it probably 
helped to save the OAU since a third successive failure to convene a meeting would 
probably have destroyed the organisation.20This of course did not mean that the member 
states of ECOWAS agreed to adopt a united front at the continental meeting. At the 
meeting itself the continental cleavage and the different national foreign policy orientations 
emerged again with Guinea, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Upper Volta, Niger, Sierra Leone and 
Togo joining a continental coalition which agreed to boycott the plenary meeting if the 
Polisario front was represented.
An interesting thing about the Polisario issue was that Guinea had moved from the 
radical camp to the moderate position akin to the majority of French speaking countries in 
ECOWAS. This could be because of the desire of the Sekou- Toure governments to rejoin 
the French system of international relations. This has indeed happened, and the importance 
of French assistance to the survival of her former colonies is demonstrated by the reversal 
of Guinea's foreign policy.
A second resolution also sought to intervene in the Chad crises by appealing to the 
international community for material support to offset the cumulative effects of drought
18 Those who had recognised SADR included, Guinea Bissau, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Sierra Leone, 
and Mali.
19 These included; Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, the Gambia, Liberia and Upper Volta
20 A/RES. 1/5/83, Resolution on the OAU, official Journal of the ECOWAS, vol. 5, June 1983, pl3.
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and war.21 This was also part of a continental agenda which created severe difficulties for 
the OAU. Two delegations had sought to represent the country in Tripoli. Both Habre and 
Goukouni, supported by Libya, felt they ought to represent that country. Though 
reflecting a continental concern, the intervention of the Authority of Heads of State of 
ECOWAS after an appeal by the outgoing OAU chairman to help preserve the 
organisation saw a region wide agreement being reached to attend the OAU summit and 
thereby helped to save the continental organisation.
These two attempts at coalition formation could be categorised under the issue of 
diplomatic influence and participation in world affairs. The extent of such resolutions 
could be scored at two. However, these resolutions were one-off occurrences. The 
organisation has not been very active in world politics.
ECOWAS does not give economic or military aid to other polities, neither has it 
been able to act as a body for collective bargaining on commercial issues for its members 
vis-a-vis other polities. Such issues remain the prerogative of national governments.
From the above we can conclude that, though ECOWAS collective decision 
making in its external relations with other polities was very precise in defining and 
implementing its objectives, these rare cases have been in instances which involved 
political issues on the African continent itself. They have been diplomatic manoeuvres to 
preserve the OAU. In the Chad case cited, it was really only appealing to external sources 
for assistance. None of the cases so far has involved bargaining with other economic blocs
21 ibid., RES 2/5/83.
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or individual countries. ECOWAS has since its formation not been able to negotiate tariff 
reductions with trading partners nor managed to get itself recognised as a major player in 
international economic relations. It has instead been limited to appealing to the 
international community for assistance to open up markets for goods from developing 
countries. It has mainly been a conduit of aid and finance from external sources outside the 
region.22 On this basis ECOWAS has not yet been able to increase the bargaining 
position of its members.
Political-Constitutional Functions
Of the three issue areas listed under this functional area, health has been the only 
one which has had decisions taken on it. Protocol A/P.2/7/87 rationalised the West African 
Health Community (WAHC) and the Organisation de Coordination et Endemies (OCCGE) 
into a single organisation designated the West African Health Organisation. In effect it 
brought together an anglophone and a francophone health organisation and incorporated 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde - countries which, originally, did not belong to 
either group. Thus a health institution incorporating all ECOWAS members was formed. 
The West African Health Organisation was constituted as a specialised agency of 
ECOWAS with clearly defined objectives and functions and spelt out modalities. The 
range of the decisions taken in conjunction with the WAHO could be given a maximum 
score of six.
22 For example, the Fund signed a financing contract with the European Investment Bank for the 
telecommunications programme launched by the community. Consequently, it was able to finance loan 
agreements it entered into with member countries within the project framework. West Africa Magazine. 
London, 1984, pp 2329 - 2332. The ADB and the EEC have also provided funds for the construction of 
bridges over the Cavheu and Mansoa rivers in Guinea Bissau where the trans-coastal highway crosses 
them. West Africa Magazine. 27 July - 2 August, 1992, p 1262.
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The remaining two political-constitutional functions remain firmly within the 
purview of national governments. Issues relating to political participation and access to the 
legal-normative system by individuals was determined during the period under 
consideration, solely, by national governments.
Social-Cultural Functions
ECOWAS countries have gone a long way in taking collective decisions in social 
and cultural matters. Several recreational activities have been instituted. These include the 
institutionalisation of football, tennis, a universities games and basket ball since 1983.
A soccer series has since been launched by the Conference of Ministers of Youth 
and Sport with a Houphouet-Boigny trophy for the senior division and a Shehu Shagari 
trophy for the junior division. A basketball federation cup has also been donated by Abdou 
Diouf. This is given a score of six.
Two other social developments are the formation of the West African Women's 
Association in 1987 which is intended to mobilise women across the region, and West 
African Youth Union in 1990. This will also receive a score of six.
Education and Research has also received attention in the collective decision 
making of ECOWAS. An ad-hoc committee formed to look into harmonising education 
qualifications across the region made recommended on the equivalence of certificates in 
1982. It was also recommended, in the same year that joint research be encouraged and 
scholarships be awarded to academics in the region. These have, however not been 
followed up. A score of one is therefore assigned to this.
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Even though the games have been launched with the purpose of improving social 
contact between citizens of the region and in so doing create a sense unity, games have 
actually created animosity in several instances within the region. The most recent has been 
the retaliatory beating of Ghanaians in Cote d'Ivoire for the rough treatment an Ivorian 
team got from football funs in Ghana in December 1993. It caused an exodus of Ghanaians 
from Cote d'Ivoire and also resulted in the death of several Ghanaians. From this 
perspective though the games received a score of six, they have not achieved their 
purpose and have instead caused rivalry rather than a sense of community feeling.
Thus whether social activities such as games will bring the citizens of the member 
states together remains a debatable issue.
Economic Functions
Among the issue areas listed, those found under the broad category of Economic 
Functions have had more decisions taken on them than in any other policy area. The 
reasons for this are, first and as stated above, that unlike all other policy areas in national 
policy formulation, those that are economic related have been more extensively classified 
and are more easily distinguishable. Second, ECOWAS is basically an economic 
integration area and therefore has a treaty that is predominantly made up of policy issues 
that seek to promote regional trade and industry.
Most of the issue areas listed in Table 1 under Economic Functions have had 
decisions taken on them. In 1979, following the two year period that was used in deciding
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on issues such as the location of the offices of the organisation, the appointment of 
personnel, initial funding and other basic functional matters, the six priority areas that 
decisions were taken on; trade and customs, fiscal and monetary, transport and 
communications, immigration, industrial co-operation and agricultural co-operation, were 
all concerned with economic issues that would facilitate trade liberalisation.23 The 
emphasis was , from the very beginning, economic. Various decisions have been taken to 
further clarify these broad areas and to extend the scope of economic co-operation activity 
among member countries. Indeed for almost ten years, ECOWAS policy decisions were 
concerned mainly with these priority areas.24
On customs and trade matters decisions have been taken and protocols both at 
Council and Authority level to define and clarify the application of the Community Rules 
of origin25. A decision of Heads of State and Governments set targets relating to the 
minimum level of local participation that would qualify products for preferential taxation. 
From May 1983, indigenous capital ownership was expected to be at least 20 percent, 
from May 1986 , this was to rise to 40 percent, and from May 1989, it was to be 51 
percent.26 Decisions on how assessment of loss of revenue within the community is to be 
calculated27, and on the re-exportation of goods within the community28 have also been 
taken. A score of five is given for this level of activity because it leaves no discretion to 
national governments but does leave the enforcement to national governments.
23 Ten Years of ECOWAS, Published by the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS, June 1985, p ll .
24 Ten Years of ECOWAS, op. cit.
25 Article 15, paragraphs 1-2 of the Treaty of ECOWAS. This was a Protocol on the Rules of 
Origin. Authority decision A/DEC 9/5/79, taken in May 1979 sought to reconcile the English and French 
texts and to align the French version with the English concept of 'value added'. Official Journal, vol. 1, 
June 1979.
“ Decisions A/DEC 1/5/80 and A/DEC 1/5/83, Official Journals, vol. 2, June 1980, and vol. 5, 
June 1983.
27 Authority decision A/DEC 17/5/80, of 28 May, 1980, Official Journal, vol. 2, June 1980.
“ Council of Ministers decision, C/DEC 7/11/79 of 19 November, 1979, ibid.
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Decisions have also been taken by the Council of Ministers29 and The Authority30 
on harmonisation of customs documents and procedures within the region to facilitate 
trade co-operation programmes. A time table has also been drawn for the movement from 
the establishment of a Free Trade Area to a Common Market. A total of 15 years was 
envisaged as being required for the establishment of the common external tariff that would 
bring this into being. In addition to this, traded goods were categorised into three groups 
for revenue loss and compensation purposes. The first two; unprocessed and traditional 
handicrafts do not qualify for compensation for revenue loss because of the removal of 
tariff and barriers while the third group, industrial products qualify for compensation31
Steps to define both non-tariff and tariff barriers and set a timetable for their 
reduction and their eventual elimination on goods that qualify were also embodied in 
various decision taken by central decision making institutions. An Authority of Heads of 
State and Governments decision A/DEC 18/5/80 stipulated the elimination of all non-tariff 
barriers in four years starting from the 28th of February 1981.
For the purpose of elimination of import duties and taxes on industrial goods 
member states were categorised into three groups depending on their relative level of 
industrial development, importance of customs revenue in national budgets, and 
accessibility difficulties, i.e., transport problems.32 Group Three is constituted of the most 
developed countries of the region and is made up of Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and
29 C/DEC 7/11/79 and C/DEC 3/5/80, ibid. C/DEC 3/11/82, Official Journal, vol. 4 , June 1982.
30 Convention A/P 4/5/82, and A/P 5/5/82, Official Journal, vol. 4, June 1982.
31 Council and Authority Decisions C/DEC 8/11/79 and A/DEC 1/5/81.
32 West Africa Magazine, London, November 1984, p 2325.
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Senegal. Group Two is made up of Benin, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo. The 
least developed states were put into Group One and is made up of Guinea Bissau, The 
Gambia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.33 Industrial goods were, also, 
classified into Priority and Non-Priority Industrial Products for the purpose of tax 
elimination.34
From 28 May 1983 all taxes and tariffs were to be gradually eliminated. This is 
unlike the one step elimination adopted for unprocessed goods and traditional handicrafts. 
The table below shows how the elimination was to be accomplished by the different 
groups of states for the different categories of industrial products. A score of five is given 
in this instance also because it is agents of national governments who enforce the rules laid 
down in the decisions rather than a collective institution.
Table 5
SCHEDULE OF TARIFF REDUCTION IN ECOWAS
Country Group
Priority 
Industrial Products 
(p i)
Non-Priority 
Industrial Products 
(P2)
G1 8 years on the 
basis of 12.5% 
reduction each 
year
10 years on the basis of 
10% reduction each year
G2 6 years at 
16.66.% reduction 
each year
8 years at 12.5% reduction 
each year
G3 4 years at 25% 
reduction each 
year
6 years at 16.66% reduction 
each year
Source: Ten Years of ECOWAS 1975 - 1985, ECOWAS, op. cit., p25.
33 Official Journal, vol. 5 , June 1983.
34 Council decision C/DEC 3/5/82, Official Journal, vol. 4, June 1982. Broadly speaking priority 
sectors include agriculture and agro-industry, communications and industrial infrastructure while the 
others constitute the non-priority sector.
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Compensation procedures for loss of revenue, timing and mode of payment are 
also clearly spelt out in Authority decision A/DEC 19/5/80.35 This deserves a score of six 
because the Fund is responsible for implementing the decision.
From the above it can be seen that decisions are detailed and goals are set for 
implementation by national governments. Though Authority decisions are not binding on 
member states, the decisions on trade liberalisation do not need interpretation by national 
governments because the various classification and categories indicate what particular 
states are supposed to do. Coding will therefore be 5 in the range score.
ECOWAS collective decision making does not yet impact directly on domestic 
monetary policy formulation. However several decisions have been taken to improve 
payment for regionally traded goods. To that end a monetary programme has been decided 
on,36 to eventually reduce the 10 currencies in the community to a single one. The creation 
of a single monetary zone is a long term goal which is expected to be preceded, first, by 
improving facilities for effecting payments through a West African Clearing House. This 
will lead to a medium term goal to achieve convertibility of the individual currencies, and 
finally, to a long term goal of the single ECOWAS currency. Regional balance of payment 
policy could be given a score of three because though policy alternatives have been 
defined, methods of achieving convergence have been left largely in the hands of national 
governments.
35 Official Journal, vol. 2, June 1980.
36 Council decision C/DEC 5/5/81 , Official Journal, vol. 3 1981, and Authority decision A/DEC 
6/5/83, Official Journal, vol. 5 , June 1983.
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The member states have also embarked on collective implementation of transport,37 
and telephone and other telecommunications infrastructural building as a means of 
connecting the individual countries and to facilitate trade and socio-cultural interaction. 
These links are also expected to correct the existing situation where communications links 
are mainly with former imperial states with few between the states within the region. In 
terms of range of decision making stages the area has been the most extensive in collective 
regional decision making. Apart from the actual building of the trans West African 
Highways, various decisions covering all aspects of road, air and maritime transport have 
been taken, including the harmonisation of laws and regulations. Collectively, all the 
decisions when scored would receive a score of 6 on the scoring scale.
Other areas of economic co-operation include agriculture,38 economic development 
planning and support for mass-media. Decisions in these areas are extensive and would 
score 4 each in terms of the specificity of the programmes on which decisions have been 
taken on.
Agricultural co-operation has resulted in the establishment of regional centres for 
selected seeds and cattle species. Pilot projects have also been done on; how to take 
advantage of different climatic zones within the region, forestry, irrigation dams, river 
basin development, processing and preservation of food, agricultural pricing and 
development of distributive and marketing channels for agricultural produce. The Schemes 
are to act both as a way of demonstrating new farming practices to farmers and also to 
implement community policies.
37 Authority decision A/DEC 20/5/80, Official Journal, vol. 2, June 1980.
38C/DEC 1/5/81, Official Journal, vol. 3, June 1981, and A/DEC 4/5/82, Official Journal, vol. 3, 
June 1982.
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The Community has also targeted the year 2000 as that in which the region should 
become self-sufficient in food production, and for raising agriculture as a priority area 
rather than the neglect it has suffered in most parts of the region since independence. 
Agriculture has therefore been covered very extensively by Community decision making. 
This gets a score of six, since common institutions have been set to implement the 
decisions.
Industrial co-operation has identified certain areas such as food production, 
agrochemical, agricultural machines, construction materials, petrochemicals, 
pharmaceutical, iron and steel and automobiles and related industries as priority areas.39 
Various guidelines for promoting regional enterprises have also been decided on and are 
embodied in the Regional Development Co-operation Policy and Co-operation 
Programmes.40
Unlike other issue areas such as agriculture, transport and telecommunications, 
industrial policy is still at the general guidelines level and does not as yet involve specifics 
or joint projects. Scoring will be 1 on the scale.
From the above we can conclude that collective decision making has been 
extensive and that some issue areas have been more broadly covered than others. Some 
have had decisions taken that are more specific and involve actual implementation by 
collective institution whilst implementation in other areas are left to governments. Others,
39 Council Decision C/DEC 8/11/79, Official Journal, vol. 2, June 1980.
40 Authority decisions A/DEC 4/5/84 and A/DEC 3/5/83, Official Journal, vol. 5, June 1983.
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especially industrialisation, have had only general decisions taken at the problem 
recognition level.
Despite the high level of decision making stage of some the issue areas, 
conclusions cannot be made about the effectiveness of regional decisions until we look at 
the importance national governments attach to them. If the salience of regional decisions 
are high then it is more likely that governments would create the frameworks needed at the 
national level to facilitate their implementation. A low salience on the other hand may, a 
priori, result in non-ratification of regional protocols, a neglect of decision or even 
impedance of regional decisions by governments. Below, we attempt to gauge the 
importance of regional decisions to national governments and decision makers.
Relative Importance of Community Decisions vis-a-vis National Decisions
Though decisions have been taken both extensively and sometimes at a high 
decision making stage, it does not necessarily mean that the decisions are always complied 
with or implemented or indeed that they are even ratified by national governments.
A major problem that has been recognised in the functioning of ECOWAS is that 
decisions are either not ratified or are just not implemented by member states. One reason 
for this is because national planning still takes precedence even in areas where 
governments have taken collective decisions. But significant strides have been made by 
ECOWAS countries since the community was formed. These strides are particularly 
evident in transport and telecommunications. We use a revised41 measure devised by
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Lindberg to gauge relative effectiveness of the collective arena vis-a-vis national decision 
making. This measure reproduced below gives attributes that indicate the terms of 
decision making scoring 1 for preponderance of national governments and 5 for a 
preponderance of community decisions;
Low Integration
1. All policy decisions are made by individual governments by
means of purely internal processes or are made in other 
nonnational settings.
2. Only the beginnings of West African level decision authority 
have appeared.
3. Substantial regular policy-making goes on at the West African 
level, but most matters are still decided by purely domestic 
processes.
4. Most decisions must be taken jointly, but substantial decisions 
are still taken at the nation-state level.
5. All choices are subject to joint decisions in the West African
system.
High Integration.42
Though the usual difficulties of using such discreet measures for measuring 
continuous variables arise in this case, it is possible to give an indication in the various 
issue areas of the relative importance of national decision making. Enumerating the 
individual issues areas and scoring each according to the scale above would be the 
appropriate thing to do but the non availability of data makes this difficult. However, a 
general score of 2; only the beginnings of West Africa level decision authority have 
appeared, could be given. In other words , even though decisions may score very high on 
the decision making stage scale, actual implementation is low because of a preponderance 
of national decision making which compete with the decisions made at the regional level.
41 The revision entails substituting West Africa for region to make it more specific.
42 Lindberg, 'Regional Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon', op. cit., p 69.
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This score is supported by 1981, six years after the formation of the community 
only one out of six protocols that had been signed by the Authority had come into effect 
since they were signed in 1978. By 1984 only two out of eleven protocols had been 
ratified by at least seven member states, that is, the minimum number o f states required for 
ratification. No member state had ratified all the protocols whilst six members had ratified 
none - nine years after the formation of the organisation.43 Thus even though in table 5 12 
issue areas had been listed as having had decision taken on them, little tends to be done 
beyond the conference itself.
In addition to using the level of decision making as a measure of regional 
integration in West Africa, it will be appropriate to see the extent to which decisions have 
changed the pattern and level of trade within the region. As was elaborated in the first 
chapter and reiterated several times, ECOWAS is attempting to facilitate regional 
development through regional trade based on the assumption of economies of scale and 
the so-called dynamic effects of third world economic integration. It should therefore be 
expected that the functioning of ECOWAS will result in the manifestation of some of the 
dynamic effects such as industrial development, expanded intra-regional trade, increased 
efficiency in production, and reduced dependence.
However, because integration is still at the free trade stage assessments will have 
to be limited to the extent to which ECOWAS has affected trade within the region, and 
redirected trade from its dependence on western markets to the region. But the failure to
43 West Africa Magazine. London, 1984,p 2324.
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move beyond attempts at trade liberalisation is itself indicative of how little has been 
achieved relative to the schedule set out in the Treaty.
5.4 Trade As a Measure of Integration
Since regional economic integration implies a movement from a free trade area to 
total economic integration with a common external tariff being adopted, ECOWAS 
effectively means the extrapolation of the arguments for protection to the regional level. 
As was argued in chapter one, the belief is that protection at the regional level has several 
advantages over similar measures at the national level. Import substitution 
industrialisation, for example, is expected to be less disruptive for the highly dependent 
economies because the pooling of resources for regional industrial development would 
mean less cost for each individual state than would otherwise have been the case if they 
embarked on such programmes individually.
Industrial development however is predicated on the availability of a market of 
sufficient size to absorb goods produced. A regional market is expected to result in an 
enlargement of the market. Indeed the theoretical essence of a regional integration scheme 
is that industry will be able to take advantage of economies of large scale production as a 
result of such an enlarged market. The market must therefore exist for both intermediate 
and final goods for regional integration to succeed.
A regional market is, however, not created until there is interpenetration by the 
member states of each others market. This interpenetration is expected to increase as the
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scheme moves from a free trade area to a common market. Since the setting of a common 
external tariff (CET), and the creation of a common market was expected to be in place by 
the end of 1992 it will be instructive to see how the direction of trade flows has changed as 
ECOWAS moved progressively toward a common market.
Before regional integration begins to yield results, the initial stages usually result in 
costs to the members as they set up institutions and divert funds from national programmes 
to the region. The eventual reaping of benefits do n o t ,however stop costs from accruing 
to the participants, albeit, at different rates. Some may be able to offset these cost by the 
benefits they derive from their participation. Since regional economic integration has costs 
for the participating countries in terms of more expensive goods, lost revenue, as well as 
the effects of economic polarisation, a perpetually protected but inefficient regional market 
and industries would impede rather than accelerate regional development in the long-run. 
The question that arises is what sort of time frame participating countries are willing to 
wait before reaping the benefits of the scheme? In other words how long would members 
be willing to protect regional industries that may not necessarily be in their countries?
From the section on regional collective decision making we came to the conclusion 
that various decisions have been taken and implemented to facilitate regional trade. These 
include monetary issues, the building of roads and telecommunication networks, 
harmonisation of tariff procedures, the defining of the rules of origin, the classification of 
countries into stages of development categories, and of goods into priority groups. How 
these have facilitated trade can be gleaned by comparing regional trade before and after the 
creation of ECOWAS. Such a measure will not only indicate how much has been
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achieved, so far, but will also help us in assessing the future effectiveness of ECOWAS as 
a tool for economic development. The successful achievement of implementation targets 
will imply that projects do not overrun their cost projections and opportunity costs. 
Though delay may not be the only cause of increased cost of various aspects of 
integration, unsuccessful implementation will mean continued funding the programmes that 
invariably turn out to be more expensive than anticipated, especially in instances where 
sunk cost considerations propel continuing implementation when abandonment would be a 
more sensible option to adopt.
To emphasise these costs is not to labour the point, particular since the political 
and social impact of such cost must be borne in mind in a region where resources are 
scarce and where the individual countries need such diverted foreign exchange for 
domestic programmes.
Though regional integration among West African countries has tremendous 
obstacles to overcome and trade has to be established where only little had existed before, 
a measurement of intra-regional trade would indicate just what the impact of trade 
facilitating decisions have achieved and how they are influencing change in the direction of 
trade of member states, improving intra-regional interdependence, and reducing 
dependence on foreign markets.
Apart from presenting statistics on regional trade flows it would be even more 
instructive to see the role manufactured goods are playing in intra-regional trade. Because 
agricultural export produce are duplicated in the various countries of the region, it is
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unlikely that intra-regional trade will be significant in these commodities. This is because 
the region does not have the capacity to process and produce consumer goods out of them 
for the regional market, which in any case is too small to absorb all the derivatives of such 
raw materials.
To the extent that the main export produce of West African countries have their 
markets abroad, and also from the above argument that the regional market is unlikely to 
eventually replace the present markets of these primary goods, regional integration has to 
be based on non-traditional export goods. For the dynamic effects of regional integration 
to be manifested in ECOWAS regional integration will have to be based on industrial 
goods. It must be remembered that goods are usually exported if there is an excess of it in 
the domestic market. But since West African countries are on average net importers of 
food, exchange of food cannot underpin integration either. In addition to these arguments, 
it is clear from both theory, and the ECOWAS Treaty that the member countries are more 
interested in using the scheme as a means of industrialising their economies.
To reiterate therefore, a measure that shows how manufactured goods production 
are increasing to take advantage of the enlarged market is an important indicator of level 
of success achieved so far and a good indicator of future success. Table 7 below shows 
the percentage distribution of trade by ECOWAS countries from 1985 to 1991. 1985 is 
chosen as the base year because it is two years after the freezing of Community tariffs. 
This means that the effect of such freezing and gradual elimination tariffs44 ought to have 
started having an impact. It also gives us four years before 1989, when all tariff barrier
44 cf. Table Six, p. 353 above.
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between members were to have been abolished. 1985 is also ten years from the signing of 
the treaty of the community. That gives sufficient time for intra-regional trade to be 
showing signs of diversification and improvement. Post-1989 should, after the elimination 
of barriers, and 15 years after the formation of the organisation, show an indication of 
increased trade between the member countries.
Table 6. INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE OF ECOWAS 
Percentageof total Exports going to other Member States
Country 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Benin 2.40 6.30 9.10 14.40 9.00 9.40 9.40
Burkina Faso 19.90 20.50 23.60 17.70 19.20 17.70 17.90
Cape Verde N/A N/A N/A 1.50 1.70 2.20 N/A
Ivory Coast 10.70 11.70 13.70 15.40 20.50 17.50 22.80
The Gambia 16.80 11.90 8.20 6.30 4.90 4.60 5.20
Ghana 4.30 1.00 2.40 1.80 1.90 1.80 2.10
Guinea 0.50 1.60 1.70 2.30 2.00 2.20 2.40
G-Bissau 17.70 1.80 2.40 1.70 2.90 1.70 1.10
Liberia 3.00 0.40 0.03 0.40 0.07 0.03 0.08
Mali 5.20 7.20 9.60 5.70 5.20 4.10 4.40
Mauritania 3.50 6.90 5.30 6.20 8.10 4.20 4.20
Niger 17.00 6.70 4.90 5.90 8.40 8.40 10.50
Nigeria 3.30 3.80 3.80 5.10 4.30 3.30 3.50
Senegal 18.00 13.20 17.10 15.10 11.60 12.00 13.00
Sierra Leone 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 N/A N/A
Togo 5.40 7.50 9.20 7.70 8.10 9.70 10.50
Source: Calculated from UN Direction of Trade Statistics.
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On average the member countries of the regional organisation export most of the 
goods to the industrialised countries of western Europe and the United States. As the 
following tables indicate, by 1991 this situation had not changed much. Gambia, for 
example, was exporting 5.5% of a total of 166.22 million dollars worth of exports to its 
ECOWAS partner countries. This compares with 90.5% to the industrialised countries. 
Guinea exported 2.4% of its total exports of 637.78 million dollars to ECOWAS countries 
relative to 85.5% to the industrialised countries.
The state with the highest proportion of its exports going to other member states 
of ECOWAS is Cote d'Ivoire with 22.8% out of a total of 2,077.8 million dollars. The 
least exporter to the region is Guinea Bissau with 1.1 in 1991, out of a total of 19.665 
million dollars.
On average, the francophone countries participate in intra-regional trade more that 
the anglophone countries. Between 1985 and 1991 Benin, for example, increased its 
percentage share of total exports going to the region from 2.4% to 9.4%, with a high 
14.4% in 1988 which is an increase of 12%. Burkina Faso has maintained a fairly stable 
share of between a low of 17.7% to a high of 23.6% for the internal market. Cote d'Ivoire 
has increase its share of exports going to the internal market from 10.7% in 1985 to 22.8% 
in 1991.
The anglophone countries on the other hand have not increased exports to the 
regional market by any significant amount. From 3.3% of its exports going to the regional 
market in 1985, Nigeria reached a high of 5.1% in 1988 and fell back to 3.5% in 1991.
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Ghana on the other hand started from 4.3% in 1985, got to a low of 1% in 1986, and 
thereafter hovered between 1.8% and 2.1% reflecting a fall on the 1985 figures.
The expansion in trade between some francophone countries and the lack of any 
such expansion for the anglophone countries reflect the higher level of pre-integration 
trade that existed between them before ECOWAS was formed. Various regional 
organisations among them had facilitated a certain level of trade. The English speaking 
countries on the other hand had broken up common institutions at independence and 
therefore reduced interaction among themselves. The increase in francophone trade on the 
other hand is mainly a result of increased percentage volumes exported to traditional 
trading partners. The impact of ECOWAS in such instances is therefore difficult to assess. 
What it does indicate, however, is that there is a potential for increased trade among the 
partner countries. According to the Secretariat, a major reason for the failure of the 
scheme to date is the non implementation of the scheme.45
The failure of integration to have an impact on direction of trade flows has resulted 
in the relaunching of a trade liberalisation scheme in 1990. If  tariff reductions had followed 
the original timetable of the Treaty, 15 years should have seen the formation of a customs 
union. 1990 should therefore have been the year when a common external tariff should 
have been imposed. The inability to start the process of eliminating tariffs and moving 
gradually from a free trade area, to a custom union both in 1981 and 1983 respectively 
means January 1990 has become the new date for relauching the process.
45ECOWAS, 'ECOWAS: A Conducive Political Environment - The Basis for Regional Integration', 
Article prepared by the Information directorate of the Secretariat, West Africa Magazine. 27 July - 2 
August, 1992, p 1264.
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New guidelines for achieving trade liberalisation46 have been issued. For the 
purpose of elimination of tariff barriers, goods have been classified into three broad 
groups. These are handicrafts, unprocessed goods and industrial products. From January 
1990, member states were to stop levying duties on any unprocessed good or handicraft 
products originating from the Community. These goods must, however, be accompanied 
by an ECOWAS Certificate of Origin, issued by the authorities of the exporting member 
state as proof that the goods originate from within the region. Industrial goods will have 
tariffs reduced according to the time table outline earlier in this chapter.
Trade liberalisation in industrial products started off with twenty-five approved 
products selected from eight member countries. These include non-cocoa based 
confectionery, foam mattresses, refrigerators, air conditioners, matches, plastic bags, 
hides, natural leather shoes, synthetic leather shoes, kitchen utensils, bleach, vinegar, lime, 
emulsion paint, floor paint, billets, laminated steel, tiles, biscuits beer, stout, insecticides, 
fungicides and limestone. The countries whose firms got access to the regional market are 
Nigeria and Benin with the highest number of goods; six and five respectively, followed 
by Ghana, Senegal, Niger and Mali with three products each, and Burkina Faso and Cape 
Verde with two products each.47 By 1992 this had gone up to one hundred and thirty 
products.48
46 this has been defined by the Secretariat as comprising the following stages: I) the consolidation of 
custom duties and charges of equivalent effect and non-tariff barriers; 2) immediate liberalisation of 
unprocessed goods and traditional handicraft; 3) gradual liberalisation of industrial products originating 
from member states; 4) gradual establishment of a common external tariff.
47ECOWAS, Contact. September, 1990, vol. 2, no 2, p 6.
48ECOWAS, ECOWAS: A Conducive Political Environment', op. cit., p 1264.
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Trade liberalisation is therefore not an across the board freeing of trade for all firms 
to take advantage of the regional market. Firms have to apply by the 26 February deadline 
if each year for its products to be approved for community tariff treatment.49 Trade 
liberalisation is therefore going to depend on local manufactures being aware of the 
procedure for gaining community treatment.
In certain instances the none implementation of agreed policies may be said to 
contribute to the low level of trade amongst the member countries. Though the treaty 
expected the removal of all tariffs and other barriers with equivalent effect,50 members 
continue to maintain such barriers against each other.
Nigeria, for example, maintains an import prohibition list o f goods whose 
importation from Ghana are banned. These include: (1) live or dead poultry; (2) 
vegetables; (3) processed wood excluding wood in the rough; (4) fruit, fresh or preserved, 
and fruit juices; (5) textiles fabrics of all types and articles thereof excluding, (a) nylon tyre 
cord, (b) multifilament nylon chafer fabric and tracing cloth, (c) mattress tickings, (d) 
narrow fabrics, trimmings and linings, (e) made-up fishing nets, mosquito netting materials, 
(f) gloves for industrial use, (g) canvas fabrics for the manufacture of fan belts, (h) 
moulding cups and lacra, elastic bands and motifs, (i) textile products and articles for 
technical use, and (j) transmission or conveyor belt or belting of textile materials. Others 
include (6) domestic articles and wares made of plastic, (7) mineral waters, soft drinks and 
beverages, (8) rice and rice products, (9) maize and maize products, (10) wheat and wheat 
products, (11) sparkling wines, (12) vegetable oils excluding linseed and castor oils used
49ECOWAS Contact. September, 1990, vol. 2, no. 2.
50 Article 12 of the ECOWAS Treaty.
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as industrial raw materials, (13) aluminium sulphate including alum, (14) retreated and 
used tyres, (15) branched alkyl benzene, bentonite ad barytes, (16) mosquito coils, (17) 
meat (whether frozen of not), (18) fish (whether frozen or not except those caught and 
landed by vessels licensed and authorised by appropriate Nigeria Authority), and (19) 
expired or contaminated food products (whether in can or any other packages).51
Ghana also applies seasonal quotas, such as, those on fish between May and 
September.52 Other restrictive practices used by the member countries are custom 
clearance delays, discriminatory customs tariffs, documentation and registration 
procedures.
Indeed apart from the perennial non implementation factor, two reason given in 
1992 by a monitoring missions for the slow pace of the relaunched scheme are that even 
though trade is taking place in the specified industrial products, it is doing so 'outside the 
scope of the liberalisation scheme and without the necessary documentation, e.g. 
certificate of origin etc...'. The second reason is that there were delays in removing barriers 
by member states.
It would have been interesting to show how trade in the goods listed for 
Community treatment have fared since the scheme started in 1990, and especially how the 
companies that have been approved to trade have performed. Unfortunately figures are not
51CTA, Economic and Export Analysts Ltd., The ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme, A 
Project Report to the Commission of the European Communities and the Government of Ghana, CTA, 
Reading, 1992, p. 4.4.
52 ibid.
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available. However the monitoring group's observations indicate that things are not as 
encouraging as the Secretariat would have liked.
An interesting thing about the figures we have considered is that contrary to 
initial fears, Nigeria has failed to take advantage of the wider market created by the 
formation of ECOWAS. Though it is still too early to make concrete judgements about 
the impact of ECOWAS on the direction of trade of the partner countries, evidence so far 
has not shown any appreciable diversification of markets or increased trade flow between 
partner countries. ECOWAS countries, in some cases, rely even more heavily on Western 
industrialised countries as the main export markets.
5.5 Industrialisation as A Measure of Integration
Another revealing set of figures provides us with an idea of the extent to which 
industrialisation has progressed within the region. Since, as mentioned above, the purpose 
for regional integration is to accelerate industrialisation, it will be helpful to see whether it 
has actually occurred since 1975.
Table 8 below shows the structure of production in ECOWAS countries for the 
years 1965 and 1989. Since ECOWAS could not, reasonably, have been expected to show 
any real impact on industrialisation immediately after its formation, we deliberately chose 
1989, a 14 year lapse. This year is compared with 1965 which gives an adequate period 
prior to the formation of the community and is therefore capable of showing changes in the 
structure of the economies of the member countries.
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Table 7.
Percentage Distribution of Gross Domestic Product
Country GDP(millions USS) Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services
1965 1989 1965 1989 1965 1989 1965 1989 1965 1989
S- Leone 320 890 34 46 28 11 6 6 38 42
Nigeria 5850 28920 54 31 13 44 6 10 33 25
Mali 260 2080 65 50 9 12 5 6 28 38
Niger 670 2040 68 36 3 13 2 8 29 51
B-Faso 350 2460 37 35 24 26 11 15 39 39
Benin 220 1600 59 46 8 12 N/A 5 33 42
Ghana 2050 5260 44 49 19 17 10 10 38 34
Togo 190 1340 45 33 21 23 10 8 34 44
Guinea N/A 2750 N/A 30 N/A 33 N/A 3 N/A 38
Liberia 270 N/A 27 N/A 40 N/A 3 N/A 34 N/A
Senegal 810 4660 25 22 18 31 14 20 56 47
I- Coast 760 7170 47 46 19 24 11 17 33 30
Mtania 160 910 32 37 36 24 £ 32 38
Source: World Development Report 1991, World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 208.
(Figures for the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Cape Verde were not available).
The figures show that industrialisation in the ECOWAS countries experienced a 
decline as a proportion of GDP in some countries, while some increased appreciably and 
others stagnated relative to 1965 figures.
Those that experienced a decline in proportion of industry to GDP include Sierra 
Leone, from 28% in 1965 to 11% in 1989, Ghana from 19% to 17% and Mauritania from 
36% to 24% Those that experienced significant increases include Nigeria which increased
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substantially from 13% of GDP to 44% and Senegal from 18% to 31% of GDP. Others 
registered increases of between 2% and 5%.
It is difficult to attribute the increases, where they occurred, to regional integration. 
The conclusion can, however, be drawn that ECOWAS has not had any substantial impact 
on industrialisation in member countries. Since 1965 to 1989 includes periods before 
ECOWAS was formed, it is inclusive of all the years that the organisation has been 
operational, and therefore ought to have shown signs, where they exist, of improvement in 
the industrial prospects of the member states.
Indeed, the separate figures given for manufacturing indicate that even those 
countries which showed substantial increases did not increase the manufacturing base very 
much over the period. The region, therefore, has a long way to go in turning the 
assumptions made about industrialisation into reality.
Combined with the level of trade within the region, the conclusion that can be 
drawn is that industrialisation, and manufacturing in particular has not increased its share 
of GDP in the region. The purpose for wanting to create a lager regional market has 
remained unfulfilled.
5.6 Conclusion
The assessment of the achievements of ECOWAS has centred on three main 
criteria: the level of collective decision making, the impact of the community on the
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direction of exports of member countries, and the extent to which it has affected 
industrial development.
The conclusion we came to, after assessing the level of collective decision making 
was that a wide scope of decisions have been taken together. However, though problems 
have been recognised as needing collective action, and decision taken together on policy 
guidelines, they have been lacking in actual implementation. Goals have been set for the 
formation of a custom union, the free movement of community citizens and the 
introduction of a single currency. But the implementation of policy guidelines leading to 
the fulfilment of such goals have not been very encouraging for several reasons which will 
be examined in the next chapter.
Though the non implementation of collective decisions affect the impact on 
intra-regional trade and industrial development, that alone cannot be taken as the reason 
for the low level of regional trade and industrialisation. Included in the reasons are the 
initially low level of intra-regional trade and industrialisation prior to the formation of 
ECOWAS and structural rigidities, such as dependence, which are endemic in the sub 
region.
In the following chapter, we will argue that the reasons for the low level of 
achievement have as much to do with political and social factors as with economic factors.
C H A P T E R  6
REASONS FOR SLOW PROGRESS OF ECOWAS
6.1 Introduction
In the last chapter we measured what level of integration has been achieved by 
ECOWAS since it was formed in 1975. The general conclusion was that regional 
collective decision making covered a wide breadth of issues. Among the 22 issue areas 
listed by Lindberg, ECOWAS covered 17. Despite such a wide coverage of issues, most 
collective decision making did not lead to action in the issue area. In moving from 
problem recognition, through options choosing to actual implementation stages of the 
decision making continuum ECOWAS mostly stopped at the second stage. Problems are 
recognised as needing regional collaboration. Various options are examined and decisions 
taken. But when it comes to governments implementing the decisions little action is taken.
In this chapter we will examine the factors that account for such non 
implementation. We will also attempt to examine why even though many governments 
and practitioners believe that joint action is the only way in which West African countries 
can develop important decisions concerning industrial, commercial, fiscal and social 
policies are not directed to the regional level for collective decisions.
In order answer the questions of why regional decision making is extensive but 
shallow, we will look at the properties that have been identified as necessary for dynamism 
in collective decision making and mentioned in the previous chapter. These are the cluster
307
of properties that are collectively termed the activators or animators of collective decision 
making activity.1 They include demands, resources, and bargaining modalities.
Collective decision making systems respond to the demands for action from the 
constituent parts. The processing of such demands for action depend on the resources that 
the system possesses. Such resources are used by leaders for demand aggregating, 
coalition formation, and compliance inducing functions"2 Collective decision making is also 
affected by the systems bargaining modalities. That is the strategies they adopt, whether 
they are zero-sum or cooperative, and which reflect the aims and expectations of actors 
vis-a-vis each other.3
In addition to the activators, the final cluster of properties referred to collectively 
as the consequences of collective decisions4 help in indicating why collective decision 
making does or does not penetrate constitute subsystems, why compliance is low, and why 
the changes that occur at the national level as a consequence of collective decision in 
ECOWAS are minimal.
These two clusters will help us explain the slowness of ECOWAS integration. The 
method that will be adopted here is to see the way the political and social environment 
affects the animators and consequences of collective decision making.
6.2 National Interest. Dependence and Demand Flows
lindberg, Political Integration as a multidimensional Phenomenon. p53
2 Lindberg, p53.
3 ibid., p54.
4 ibid. p54
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Demand according to David Easton is defined as: 'an expression of opinion that an 
authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be 
made by those responsible for doing so'.5
There are two elements in the above definition which need to be highlighted. First 
the "expression of opinions" is done (or expected to be done), according to integration 
theory, by national governments, interest groups and pressure groups. Thus the flow is 
from the state to the regional organisation.6 Secondly, such expression of opinion should 
carry with it the authority for the regional organisation to perform the function. To this 
extent even though opinions may be expressed by groups other than governments, it is 
really only the latter who can, as custodians of the national interest (gate keepers) delegate 
such authority. The opinions that are of most relevance to the functioning of regional 
organisations such as ECOWAS are therefore those that emanate from national 
governments. This is particularly heightened in the ECOWAS region where no effective 
region-wide interest and pressure groups exist to press for particular interests at the 
regional level as pertains in the EEC. It is also heightened by the decision making 
structure of the organisation. All decisions are decided on by either the Authority of 
Heads of State or the Council of Ministers. Initiating powers of the secretariat are 
monitored, and are thus only effective where national political and economic interests or 
programmes are not affected.
5 Easton, D., quoted in Lindberg, N. L, ibid., p75.
6 On this all theoretical perspective of regional integration agree.
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The extent to which the opinion of national governments converge is therefore of 
crucial importance to the effective functioning of ECOWAS despite the fact that national 
interests may converge without leaders wanting to do business together in which case 
demands may not be forthcoming. One of the reasons for the low performance of 
ECOWAS is because of a lack of demand flows from member states.
Having asserted that the Secretariat of ECOWAS and interest groups are relatively 
less important to the functioning of the organisation than governments in terms of the 
authoritative allocation of responsibilities to the regional organisation, we will now turn to 
ask why there is a lack of flow of demands to the collective arena from the constituent 
parts and what the effects are on integration.
As we noted above, out of the 22 universal issue areas listed, ECOWAS has 
covered 17 of them. That is a remarkable achievements for an organisations which was 
only formed in 1975 and did not really start functioning till 1977. What we also noticed 
was that though such a wide number of issues had been covered, such coverage was 
usually limited to the problem recognition stage and a few to the decision making stage.
The large number of issue areas covered is an indication of the identical and 
convergent goals that most governments in West Africa have. At a very general level 
West African countries are united by the desire for economic development. These goals 
have been expressed in fora such as the OAU7, UNCTAD and indeed the U.N general 
assembly. The Lagos plan of Action8 after recognising the need for collective action on
7 One of the aims of the OAU, expressed in Article (1(b) of its Charter is "to co-ordinate and 
intensify" the co-operation and efforts of its members to achieve a better life for their people and African 
in General
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development issues divided Africa into three regions. These regions are expected to work 
together toward collective self-reliance.9 The unity of ECOWAS countries, found in their 
desire to develop economically, is reflected in the fact that out of the 17 issue areas they 
decided on collectively 10 of them were connected with economic functions, followed by 5 
cultural and social functions, and 1 external relations function and 1 political function.
ECOWAS member States have from the foregoing therefore accepted, that certain 
decisions should be made jointly. Such an attitude is underpinned by the feeling that they 
are individually unable to achieve some of the economic goals by themselves.10 The desire 
to move from an underdeveloped and under privileged position in the world make them 
willing to pay attention to the goals of ECOWAS.11 This desire has however not been 
translated into demands in the Eastonian sense of governments directing problems to the 
regional arena for collective solution. Issues related to industrial development are 
considered at the national level. Since integration among developing countries is 
rationalised on the basis of its ability to produce dynamic benefits for the participating 
countries through industrial co-operation, a failure to rationalise emergent industries or to 
co-ordinate commercial policies mean that possible benefits such as economies of scale, 
and increased bargaining power will not materialise.
8 The 1960 Lagos Plan of Action and the special UN Session on Africa in 1986 were all 
conferences which accorded priority to regional co-operation and integration.
9 These regions were Africa, Central Africa, and East and Southern Africa.
10 The second Nigerian development plan for example contained an entire chapter on the need for 
co-operation entitled "Economic Integration and African Unity". Second National Development Plan 
1970-74: Programme Of Post-War Reconstruction and Development (Lagos Federal Ministiy of 
Information, (1970) Chapter 9.
11 Achi A, 'Regional Economic Integration and Foreign Policy' in The Political Economy of Ivory 
Coast Zartman & Delgodo C (ed.) Praegar, NY 1984.
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Though it will be a generalisation to imply that all decisions o f ECOWAS resemble 
aspirations more than objectives, it is true to say that even in instances where choices have 
been made between alternatives, there is widespread and sometimes general non 
implementation by member countries of the decisions.
Qualitative demands that would tie the economies of ECOWAS countries together 
in a strategic planning process are usually not directed at the regional organisation. Plans 
for industrial development, structural adjustment programmes, the implementation of 
international financial institutions' conditionalities are undertaken with the context of the 
national economy in mind without much thought for their impact on regional goals. 
Nigeria Benin, and Ghana, for example, are each implementing IMF/World Bank 
sponsored adjustment programmes. These are however being done independently of each 
other as well as the other members of the organisation and of the general objectives of 
regional integration.
Thus there are the twin problems of a lack of demand flows to the regional arena 
and in the reverse direction a lack of implementation of collective decisions. Below we will 
attempt to explain why this is so.
Among other things, this situation reflects the priority given to national goals over 
regional ones. The emphasis placed on national goals is an indication that where the fine 
print of national objectives clash with the more general regional goals and objectives, the 
former will take precedence over the latter. Even though this is not peculiar to West 
African countries, it nevertheless contradicts the assumed 'cosmopolitanism' that underlies
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integration theorising and practice for and among developing countries. Thus countries 
who, broadly speaking, see themselves as losing overall from regional integration because 
of its polarisation effects will be slow in directing demands to the ECOWAS especially 
when the economic, social and indeed political cost cannot be immediately and accurately 
determined and where compensatory measures are not readily available. The now defunct 
East Africa Community is an example in this regard. Apart from the ideological 
differences between Tanzania and Kenya, and the personal animosity between Nyerere and 
Amin one of the problems that responsible for the break up of the organisation, regarded 
at one stage as the most advanced among developing countries, was what was perceived 
as the unequal distribution of benefits.12 Though this problem is not peculiar to integration 
among developing countries, it tends to have a higher impact on the because of the lack of 
resources to compensate those who are affected negatively as a result of particular 
policies. Thus even though member countries share the desire to develop economically, it 
is doubtful whether any of them is willing to forego its own industrial development for the 
sake of an absolute industrial development of the region as a whole.
There is another reason for the lack of demand flows to the regional organisation 
and why national policies take precedence over regional goals even if they are compatible 
and could probably be better implemented as part of a regional programme. It is that the 
member countries are highly dependent on foreign aid and technical assistance as a result 
of their poverty.
12Reminger J. P, Multinational Co-operation for Development in West Africa. Pergamon, New 
York., 1979.
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One aspect of such dependence is that it brings to the fore the contradiction in 
attempting to be less dependent while at the same time realising that one has to depend on 
the very same people from who one seeks independence.13 ECOWAS countries have also 
been plagued by this contradiction between the desire for self reliance and the need for 
dependence since independence. Thus just as Nkrumah, for example, while denouncing 
western imperialism envisioned that new investment in capital for development would be 
obtained from western public and private sectors;14 ECOWAS member states continue to 
appeal to states outside Africa for assistance to help them over their burden of 
'neo-colonialism’. The final communique of the Authority of heads of state of ECOWAS, 
issued after their 1990 summit is a typical example of the dilemma. It stated among other 
things;
....The inadequate support given by the international 
community to Africa under UN-PAAERD against the growing economic 
recovery and development needs of the sub-region. The authority 
noted that recent global events, especially the dramatic economic 
and political changes in Europe, would increase the 
marginalisation of the countries of the sub-region unless specific 
measures were taken to safeguard West African interest. To this 
end the Authority made an urgent appeal to the international 
community, and the EEC and its members countries in particular, to 
appreciate the serious development challenges facing West Africa 
and provide adequate support to supplement the economic recovery 
and reform efforts of West African states.15
The above quote indicates how the ideology that underlies regional integration 
among developing countries' calls for regional solidarity to overcome dependence and 
neo-colonialism is undermined by their poverty.16
13 Card E, "The Political Economy of Ghana" in The Political Economy of Africa. Harris R (ed.), 
Schenkman, Cambridge Mass, 1975.
14 ibid. p53
15 Final Communique of the Authority of Heads of State of ECOWAS, Contact, vol. 2, no. 2, 
September, 1990, pl4.
16Mayall, J., "Britain and the Third World" in The West and the Third World. O'Neill R & Vincent 
R. J, Macmillan, London, 1990.
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Apart from undermining the integrity of such schemes it also makes ECOWAS 
countries cautious about policies that might actually result in aid being spread thinly 
through regional organisations over which they have little control instead of coming to 
them directly.17 It also results in caution about policies and generally in organisations that 
might lose them their traditional advantage in the markets of benevolent developed 
countries. The formation of ECOWAS as an example was itself only endorsed by 
francophone speaking associates of the EEC after the Lome Convention was signed. The 
signing of the Lome Convention by the Commonwealth 'associable' states and Guinea 
together with the members of the expired Yaounde Convention of the region lifted a 
stumbling-block from the path of'ECOWAS in that it unified the basis on which all 
independent West African States would pursue trade relative to EC countries.... For the 
francophone countries who had been associated with the EEC through the Yaounde 
Convention, this meant that the ECOWAS Treaty could no longer represent a potential 
threat to their access to the markets of Western Europe.'18 What made it even more 
acceptable to these countries was that the Lome Convention unlike the Yaounde 
Convention preceding it earmarked specific funds19 to encourage ACP regional projects20 
and was therefore not going to use up funds that would have gone to the member 
countries directly.
17 Lister M. The European Community and the Developing World. Avebury, Aldershot, 1988.
18 Bach D. C, Francophone Regional Organisations' in West African Regional Co-operation and 
Development.
19 Articles 156 to 166 of the Lome Convention is devoted to specifying how regional co-operation in 
the ACP countries will be done. Article 156, paragraph 3, for example states that" in order to promote 
and strengthen the ACP states' collective capabilities, the Community shall provide effective aid enabling 
them to strengthen regional economic integration and consolidate co-operation of a functional type 
....'.Fourth ACP-EEC CONVENTION, signed in Lome on 15 December 1989.
“ ibid. p60
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The dependence on aid and markets, and the perceived advantages of maintaining 
traditional links with former colonial powers hinder the single minded pursuit of 
integration in the sub-region. Demands therefore do not flow to the collective decision 
making arena as they ought.
Contrary to the impression that the above may give, external actors from the 
developed regions of the world usually encourage regional integration in West Africa and 
among developing countries in general. Most of these actors have a benevolent attitude 
toward such organisations. France is however peculiar in certain respects in that though it 
encourages such arrangements it discourages groupings that it sees as affecting its vital 
interests within any particular region. Francophone sub-saharan Africa is important to 
France's pretensions to great power status. Its attitude toward ECOWAS was therefore to 
encourage a countervailing francophone group - the West Africa Economic Community 
(CEAO) to be formed to forestall the preponderance of Nigeria in ECOWAS.21 This has 
had a lasting negative impact on ECOWAS.
Related to the point above, the existence of CEAO as a major and more efficient 
rival of ECOWAS together with many other similar groups within the region mean that 
demands flow to many other organisations apart from ECOWAS. There is therefore a lack 
of concentration on one organisation, and instead attention is divided between several 
groupings.
21 Bach, D. C., The Politics of West African Co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS', in Journal of 
African Studies. 21. 4 (1983V
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Since it is widely accepted that the CEAO is more effective than ECOWAS22 it 
can be expected that until the latter is able to provide the benefits that the former is able to 
give to its members demands will continue to be directed by CEAO members to it.
In addition to this impact France has had in advocating the formation of CEAO the 
bilateral co-operation agreements between France and the francophone ECOWAS 
members means that they tend to direct demands to France rather than to organisations 
within the region. As long as defence and technical assistance agreements exist between 
France and some francophone West African countries matters concerning these issue areas 
will be directed at France.
An example of this is that when commandos passed through Ghana to overthrow 
the Eyadema regime in 1986 it was not ANAD - the CEAO equivalent of the ECOWAS 
Defence Protocol - or ECOWAS that was used as a basis of intervention but French 
troops who stifled the conflict.23
In actual fact the belonging of members states to different regional groups may 
sometimes result in actions that duplicate efforts unnecessarily. The signing of the 
ECOWAS Defence Protocol in 1981 was what "spurred" the francophone countries to 
accelerate their own negotiations for the adoption of a CEAO Defence Protocol.24 The 
CEAO defence protocol however did not only rival that of ECOWAS but was better and 
more relevant to the countries at the time. An important element that was part of CEAO's
22 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa, from Crisis to Sustainable Growth. World Bank, Washington 
D. C 1989.
23 Chipman, J., French Power in Africa. Blackwell. Oxford, 1989.
24 ibid. pl77.
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Defence Protocol that was lacking in ECOWAS is a clause in Article 7 in which members 
understood not to shelter or tolerate on their territories active opponents involved in 
subversion activities against governments. Thus the CEAO Defence Protocol addressed a 
specific and predominant fear that the more general ECOWAS protocol does not. Defence 
matters arising in ANAD countries will obviously be referred to CEAO take the ECOWAS 
even though all the members of the former also members of the latter. From previous 
French military activity in the region such as the one cited above, it is doubtful if 
ECOMOG would have been used if Liberia had been one of the francophone countries 
which had maintained its ties with France.
As an aside, even though it is true that France has a lot of influence in West Africa 
and by its policy of limiting Nigerian influence25 impeded the functioning of ECOWAS 
through duplication of integration schemes,26 the extent of such influence must not be 
exaggerated. France has not got unlimited leeway with its allies in the region. That would 
be assuming that francophone West Africa leaders have no mind of their own. France is 
allowed the leverage it has by its client states because the relationship is mutually 
beneficial. Those countries that maintained relations with France, since independence 
fared better in terms of resource transfer than Sekou Toure's Guinea which did not.
25 As Chipman has stated in French Power in Africa. French support for the Biafran government, 
though never official, extended to disguised arms transfer made through Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire was 
extensive. President de Gaulle's private view, (not necessarily shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
was that the break-up of Nigeria, a potential African great power, was in the French interest.... France 
was prepared to defend this geopolitical interest even when its defence might put French economic 
investment at risk. Chipman, J op. cit., pp 126 - 127.
26 In addition to believing that CEAO could provide wider markets for their manufacturing sectors, 
Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire shared a common concern of Nigeria's new political and economic influence in 
the region should be checked. An association of francophone states to replace the troubled Organisation 
commune africaine mauricienne (OCAM) was therefore deemed necessary for that suppose. 'The project 
was immediately encouraged by President Georges Pompidou of France who went as far as to declare that 
the francophone states should co-ordinate their efforts to counterbalance the heavy weight of Nigeria.' 
Statement in Jeune Afrique (Paris). 12 Febuary 1972, p 23, cited in Bach, op. cit.
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From the above it can be said that the existence of several rival organisations in the 
region (30 in all) together with an extra-regional rival who is developed and can afford to 
give to its affiliates advantages that ECOWAS cannot hope to match have the effect of 
reducing the flow of demands to ECOWAS.
Apart from France's negative impact on ECOWAS another source of difficulty for 
regional organisations in the developing world is the funding policies of development 
agencies which sometimes affect the attention ECOWAS receives from its member states. 
A larger share of aid is donated to individual countries than to regional organisations. 
Country programming receives first priority in UNDP allocation of resources. 'At least 
82% of net resources are set aside for country programming, and at most 18% for inter 
country programming...'.27
Such allocation policies inadvertently affect the priority states accord to regional 
organisations despite the fact that programmes designed for regional economic and social 
integration have first claim on resources for inter-country programming. The issue here is 
that if regional integration is a sine qua non for economic development then resource 
allocation ought to be reversed. A counter argument could of course be used that since a 
lot of countries share the amount going to states, such proportions are realistic. We would 
argue that if integration is that important even the recipient countries themselves should be 
advocating a scaling down of country support in favour of regional programmes.
27Remmmger, op. cit., p75.
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We can conclude on the basis of the above that even though external actors 
encourage and even sponsor regional integration, sometimes in an attempt to promote the 
realisation of a new international economic order, external dependence of the states in the 
region make it difficult to focus attention on projects leading to regional integration. 
ECOWAS member states adopt policies that conform to requirements of international 
finance more readily than they do long-run policy goals of ECOWAS. The francophone 
countries allow an extra regional foreign policy orientation because the dividends are 
immediate relative to the probable and uncertain long term benefits from regional 
integration. This situation must not be judged as an uncritical willingness to kow-tow to 
France but rather as part of the effects of dependence.
It might even be suggested that such attitudes are realistic and pragmatic given the 
needs that they have. But such a view would imply a passive acceptance of the status-quo. 
The more probable explanation is that economic pragmatism together with the links forged 
during the colonial period combine with security concerns to make the francophone states 
willing to depend on French military, economic and technical assistance.
As we have argued, the external environment is largely benign toward integration 
in West Africa, the deliberately divisive French policy and inadvertently negative impact 
of disbursement policies of agencies such as the UNDP not withstanding. However, 
poverty and dependence make it difficult for West African countries to focus on regional 
goals.
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6.3 Intra - Regional Relations and Demand Flows
If as we have noted above, a lack of concentration on ECOWAS by member states 
prevents governments from directing demands to the regional organisation, then how 
should we explain the large number of issue areas that have been decided on? Who brings 
them to the attention of collective decision makers and how does the sources of such 
demands affect the effectiveness with which decisions are carried out?
Most issues that have been decided on are predominantly issues that are already 
broadly stated as goals in the Treaty of the organisation and relate to decisions that are 
implied by the broad process of regional economic integration. The Specialised 
Commissions of the organisation and the Secretary General are the main sources of 
dynamism in the organisation.
In order to explain why regional policies emanate from the Secretariat more than 
from national capitals we need to look at other factors. Why, for example, did 
francophone countries accept to form the CEAO, at France's suggestion, as a 
countervailing influence against Nigeria even though such a pre-emptive step would 
obviously affect a wider organisation. Was Nigerian preponderance a threat to the 
security of other states within the region? Were there indications that it would use its 
strength to gain an unfair advantage over its partners?
As Aluko noted in The Foreign Policy o f African States28, power distribution 
among all states in Africa is more or less even. In ECOWAS, West Africa however
28 Aluko O, "The Detriments of the Foreign Policy of African States" in The Foreign Policy of 
African States. (Ed) Holder & Stoughton, 1977 pp 1-24.
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Nigerian population and GDP is more than that of the rest of the other member states put 
together. This gives it an enormous potential political power which it can use as a 
leverage if it so desired. However, West African countries like most countries in Africa 
have rarely employed force to settle disputes.29 That of course does not mean that Nigeria 
could not do so in the future and therefore that other states ought not seek a regional 
balance of power. The immediate and possible reason for the fear of Nigeria, especially by 
Cote d'Ivoire and Niger30 could be because the former supported Biafran secession and 
feared reprisals while the latter is very dependent on Nigerian markets and ports for its 
foreign trade. Not all francophone countries, however, saw Nigerian preponderance as 
negative however. Senegal and Togo, for example, saw it as playing a stabilising role 
within the region, with her power serving as a sort of deterrent against external powers.31 
However, at a general level the majority of countries, not just the French speaking ones, 
view it with suspicion. This suspicion was, to a certain extent, justified because Nigeria 
saw the presence of French bases as an impediment to its own progress toward regional 
great power status.32 Indeed, the ECOWAS Defence Protocol calls for a withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from the region once ECOWAS can guarantee mutual defence. That is 
probably seen as increased Nigerian military activity within the region, hence the 
countervailing Defence Protocol signed by CEAO members soon after the ECOWAS 
Defence protocol. The question that arises is, whether the presence of French troops in
29 ibid. p l2
30 Chipman, J. op cit.
31 Libyan activity in Chad was a case in point, while South African Strength was another
32 As Chipman noted, 'For most of the period since 1960, an intense fear of the power of Nigeria 
has helped francophone African states deal with each other, and has provided a special reason for their 
acceptance of a French residual role in West Africa. The need to counterbalance Nigeria has never been a 
declared policy of francophone African states, but it is clearly implied by their willingness to reintroduce 
French political, economic and military power into the region. What is more important, Nigerians have 
always perceived France as intent on acting as a countervailing force in West Africa, they have put 
pressure on the francophone African states to behave more independently of France. This itself, may have 
helped to strengthen the links between weak francophone African states and their strong, extra-continental 
protector. French Power in Africa, pp. 231 - 232.
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francophone West Africa has a negative impact on regional integration. The answer to this 
is that it does so only to the extent that the French government uses such assistance as a 
leverage to coerce its client states to pursue anti-integration policies. France's reaction 
toward the formation of ECOWAS as noted earlier, was not anti-integrational. Its fear 
was that Nigerian influence would need to be countervailed because it posed a threat to 
her own influence in the region. But the method it advocated was another integration 
scheme.
It is inconceivable that the francophone countries themselves did not realise that 
there was a power struggle between Nigeria and France. It is further improbable that the 
French desire for influence over its former colonies did not create unease among the 
francophone leaders. The dilemma for the francophone countries was whether to allow 
themselves to be influenced by France or by Nigeria. The calculations of the benefits and 
costs with regard to national security and economic interest by the francophone countries 
was probably influenced by two factors. First the advantages of supporting France were 
more than Nigeria could provide. Secondly, because of proximity Nigerian preponderance 
posed more problems for security than did France. Retaining French influence was akin to 
"killing two birds with one stone" despite the fact that they would be called puppets of 
France. The first advantage was that French troops guaranteed internal security, and 
secondly, that such troops would repel any hegemonic tendencies that Nigeria might have 
or even display.
The formation of CEAO meant they could derive all of the benefits of an 
integration scheme and at the same time retain French economic and military aid. French
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opposition actually worked to the advantage of the Francophone countries. Thus to 
conclude that any economic group which did not favour French interest would not survive 
as Atsian33 does is to give little credit to African political leaders whom such a statement 
portrays as giving unqualified leeway to France, and does not consider that the 
francophone countries may actually be working in their own interest and that they gain 
advantages because of their orientation toward France in their foreign policy.
The repercussions on ECOWAS of such orientation, as mentioned above, is that 
demands (problems) tend to be passed to France for solutions and resolutions. For the 
region as a whole it has the negative tendency of further accentuating the mainly 
anglophone/francophone divide thus making co-operation between them more difficult.
However, to the extent that after the formation of ECOWAS Nigeria attempted to 
introduce the notion that votes should be based on how much a state contributes to 
ECOWAS thus giving it a virtual veto power in the organisation vindicated the fear that 
others had of its intentions. It also brings to the fore the different intentions and attitudes 
that successive leaders of an individual state might have toward an international 
organisation. Whereas Gowon did everything possible to dispel the fear of Nigerian 
motives, his successor made it very obvious that Nigeria would only be willing to act as 
the core support for the community if it derived commensurate benefits. Though this may 
be a realistic posture to adopt it served to undermine Nigerian credibility as a leader for 
regional integration.
33 Atsian A, Regional Economic Integration and Foreign Policy in The Political Economy of Ivory 
Coast. Zartman I. W & Delgo C (ed.) Praegar, NY, 1984 p!85.
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The fear of Nigerian preponderance in the regional organisation was prominent just 
before and during the early years of ECOWAS. As mentioned above it managed under 
Gowon, through various bilateral arrangements, to lessen the suspicion of its opponents. 
Though still seen as the overwhelming power in the region, Nigeria's inability to convert 
her oil wealth (generated by the OPEC price hikes) into general development of the 
country reduced its prestige. Furthermore a deepening debt created constraints on her 
pretensions to regional great power status. There are two ways in which this could be 
explained. First her dwindling resources relative to her own needs reduced her ability to 
offer side payments to other countries within the region.
In the period leading to the formation of ECOWAS, the Nigerian president, 
Gowon's diplomatic style largely succeeded in allaying fear of a Nigerian dominated 
ECOWAS. This was mainly because of a display of a willingness to contribute to the 
success of the organisation without reaping immediate benefits. In addition, targeted side 
payments, including financial aid to drought-stricken neighbours, and the supply of oil on 
soft credit terms to a number of countries including Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo.34 It 
also embarked on several joint parastatal projects with individual countries within the 
region. These included mining with Guinea and Niger, petrochemicals with Senegal, and 
cement and sugar with Benin.35 Dwindling resources also meant the increasing inability to 
convert wealth into influence within and outside the region. Secondly, Nigeria as an 
indebted country lost prestige. This was aggravated by the widely held view that it was a
34 Aluko, O., 'Options in Nigerian Foreign Policy', Conference of the Canadian African Studies 
Association, Winnipeg, May 1979, p. 18
35Ojo, O.J., Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS', in International Organization, xxxxiv, 4, 
Autumn 1980, pp. 590 - 600.
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country in which corruption and mismanagement were endemic. The overall effect has 
been that pronouncements by Nigerian leaders have been less and less bold.
However, despite the problems it has faced over the past 15 years Nigeria stills 
remains the predominant though not pre-eminent power in the region. Her participation is 
still very crucial to the future of ECOWAS. It could even be hypothesised that without 
Nigeria's active participation the organisation would stagnate.
Another constraint that affects the flow of demands from the member states to the 
regional organisation is the level of trust between the members. Trust among West 
African countries is quite low. This is reflected in the constant border closures between 
neighbouring states. It is also reflected in the intermittent accusation by leaders of each 
others complicity in undermining national security and stability. Border disputes exist 
between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Mauritania, Mali and Burkina Faso and 
Ghana and Togo.36 In October 1992, 5 Ghanaians were shot dead by Togolese soldiers on 
the Ghana/Togo border. Ghana's protestation included a statement by the foreign ministry 
that "Ghana had no interest in destabilising any of its neighbours especially those with 
which it shared kinship and blood relations."37 Senegal at various times has accused 
Guinea Bissau of encouraging and arming Casamance separatists from Senegal.38 Sierra 
Leone and Cote d'Ivoire have also been accused of helping coup plotters in Liberia.39
36Chipman J, op cit. pl91.
37 Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, quoted in African Research Bulletin.
38 African Contemporary Records, 1986-87 vol. xix
39 In 1985 Doe accused Ivory Coast of helping dissidents. Sierra Leone was also alleged
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The effects of such border disputes is that it has combined with the personalised 
nature of politics to create animosity between particular leaders. This inevitably affects the 
willingness to direct problems to the region for collective decision making. Such instability 
and the fear of possible undermining of national security by neighbours creates 
unpredictability in the relationship between the states of the region and also make national 
leaders unwilling to further increase the permeability of their already porous boundaries 
having to eventually implement basic policies of regional integration such as free 
movement of people and goods. The possibility of incursions from neighbouring states will 
prevent national leaders from 'joint decisions' which imply reducing the salience of borders 
because that may undermine national security.
Animosity is not only created by distrust in issues related to subversion and 
boundary disputes but also because leaders fear that political change in neighbouring states 
will spill over into their own territory. The rise of populist regimes from the late 1970's in 
Ghana, Liberia and Burkina Faso caused leaders such as Houpheot Boigny to press for the 
ostracization40 of the leaders of these countries from participating in regional and 
continental organisations. The foreign minister of the Doe government was for example 
banned from attending an OAU economic Summit in Nigeria. About a month later the 
head of State himself was excluded from an ECOWAS Authority meeting. Though the 
reasons given were ostensibly because of the executions that had taken place after Doe's 
coup d'etat, the fear of emulation in their own countries was another reason for such 
attempts to isolate the new leaders. It goes without saying that even if such difficulties are 
removed later on, suspicions and ill-feelings remain. The watch dog group that was set up
40 West Africa Maeazine. 2 June 1980.
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after Doe's exclusion from the Lome summit to monitor activities in Liberia eventually met 
Doe and led to his eventual acceptance as a head of state. That however did not stop him 
accusing Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone of subverting his government. It also made him 
decide not to participate in ECOWAS proceedings immediately after the period following 
his humiliation.
Petty jealousies also exist among West African countries. The desire to outdo each 
other has always been present since the early days of independence. Rivalries between 
Ghana and Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Ghana, to mention just two, have sometimes 
undermined the desire or ability to work together. The unwillingness to encourage a 
scheme that might actually lead to the further underdevelopment of ones own country 
whilst facilitating the development of others may also be partly responsible for the low 
level of demands flowing from governments to the collective decision making arena.
Apart from disputes arising from accusations of subversion and borders, the more 
prosperous, and economically stable countries within the region also fear the influx of 
migrant workers or displaced populations from their less prosperous or less stable 
neighbours. Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria have served as a magnet for migrant workers all 
over the region. In 1993 Ghana had to accommodate Togolese nationals fleeing from 
political upheavals within that country. The presence of 1.2 million Burkinabe in the 
Ivory Coast between 1984-87 was seen by Ivorian leaders as a security risk because of the 
revolutionary policies of Thomas Sankara, the then Burkina Faso leader. Nigeria on the 
other hand had to expel millions of Ghanaians illegal immigrants from its territory because 
of resulting unemployment of Nigerians and increasing difficulties for the government.
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The management of migrant populations, and the desire to control agent provocateurs, 
have been a policy of both of francophone and anglophone leaders,41 and makes it difficult 
to envisage how the movements of people that must accompany regional economic 
integration is going to be implemented by the member countries.
Though a protocol on free movement has been signed among ECOWAS countries, 
it has remained mainly symbolic because individual governments continue to adopt policies 
that prevent citizens of the region moving between states. Road blocks litter the main 
international highways that connect the countries to each other while border guards 
demand bribes openly from drivers in transit. In certain instances passengers have had to 
contribute money towards the payment of such bribes or else are left behind at the border 
to fend for themselves.42 This situation makes trade between the different nationalities 
difficult and makes it difficult to accept that regional integration is seen as crucial for 
development.
In addition to how intra-regional political relations, foreign policy orientation, 
distrust, and unpredictability, among others, affect regional integration, domestic politics 
also plays an important part in the extent of regional integration attained so far. Below we 
consider in detail how this happens and has contributed to the slow pace of ECOWAS 
integration.
41 Chipman J, op cit. pl71
42 An account given by Ghanaians travelling to Cote d'Ivoire including the writer's own brother and 
father. This situation is the same on all the major roads.
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6.4 Internal Politics and Demand Flows
As was stated earlier, the higher priority given to national development policy 
means regional goals are relegated into the background. It is indeed inconceivable that 
national governments would give more priority to regional goals whether in West Africa 
or anywhere else. However, in addition to this factor political upheavals have also 
contributed to the lack of demand flows to the regional body. A concentration on 
domestic security makes leaders less attentive to regional goals. Coup d'etat and counter 
coups have not only reduced the capacity to concentrate on regional developmental goals 
but have also resulted in border closures.
Expectations of national leaders have also lessened from their height in the mid 
1970s. Originally, ECOWAS was seen as fulfilling various goals. In 1976 the Senegalese 
president, Senghor, expressed the hope that ECOWAS would be the springboard to the 
formation of a Continental Union, transcending linguistic, monetary and administrative 
differences.43 Others expressed similarly high expectations for the grouping. But by 1988, 
most leaders were expressing frustration about the lack of progress and elusiveness of 
regional integration and doubt that it will lead to economic emancipation and economic 
development or as the first step toward the building of a United States of Africa. This 
recognition that ECOWAS is not yielding the benefits expected contrasts very much with 
the attempts to form a continent wide integration scheme with regional schemes such as 
ECOWAS acting as the building blocks. In any case, the increasing disillusionment of 
leaders has also played and continues to play a part in the lack of flow of demands from 
heads of government to the regional arena.
43Fratemite - Matim quoted in African Research Bulletin. March 15 - April 14 1976. Dr H. 
Limann, President of Ghana talking about the prospects of ECOWAS in 1980 also had similar aspirations 
for it, quoted in African Research Bulletin. March 1 -31 1980.
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As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, ECOWAS collective decision 
making has covered several issues especially in those related to economic functions. The 
apparent implication of that would be a high level of demand flow to the regional 
organisation. From our treatment of demand flows we have stated that the contrary is the 
case. Then how do problems get recognised as needing collective action? The answer is 
that most of the decisions by the Authority of Heads of State or the Council of Ministers 
are made on issues proposed or brought before it by the Specialised Commission as 
needing attention. In the main demands do not originate from national capitals even 
though the West African Federation of Chambers of Commerce sometimes plays a part in 
highlighting issues that need attention. As has been suggested earlier, using the Easton's 
definition of demand, the lack of demands from governments means that issues discussed 
are not always necessarily those that of priority to the members.
However, even though problem identification does not, in the main, emanate from 
the member countries themselves, the fact still remains that issues are recopgnised as 
needing collective attention. Why then has there been so little action? Though the lack of 
authoritative demand flows from the constituent members to the organisation plays an 
important part in explaining the low level of impact the organisation has had so far on the 
development goals of the member countries, other factors also contribute to both the low 
threshold of decision making and compliance with decisions by member countries. In the 
following sections we will look at some of the other factors that contribute to this state of 
affairs.
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6.5 Resources and ECOWAS Integration
Resources are conceived of as the Variety of means available to collective decision 
makers that enable them to process demands'44 They are seen as important for the 
implementation of decisions in a collective decision arena. Since integration is a 
non-coercive, voluntary and consensual decision making process, the ability of decision 
makers to gather support for decisions and form coalitions that support particular 
proposals is facilitated by the resources they have. This is because for a proposal or 
cluster of proposals to get all the way through the process supporters must be recruited 
and potential opponents neutralised. This is done by 'either adjusting the proposals to 
meet additional demands, by eliminating objectionable portions, by promising other things 
in other areas or at future times and so on'.45 The main problem that faces integration is to 
induce political actors to join coalitions at different levels and stages of the decision 
making process.
By enabling the manipulation incentives and highlighting of the opportunity costs 
of not supporting a particular proposal, resources provide the wherewithal for the 
achievement of the various regional objectives embodied in the goals which may not 
always be compatible with individual national goals.
Resources as Lindberg pointed out may consist of certain aspects of the system 
itself: the extent of prior agreement among participating governments in what can be 
handled collectively; rules and norms that prevail among governments and other collective 
decision-makers and that define the procedures 'that are expected and acceptable in the
^Lindberg L. N, Politics International As a Multidimensional Phenomenon... p 79.
45 Lindberg and Scheingold quoted in Lindberg, ibid.
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processing of demands; the extent to which supranational decision structures have been 
able to develop appropriate expertise and autonomy; and the extent to which the system is 
able to dispose of monetary resources ( acquired either by government allocation or by 
taxation ).
Apart from the resources that are part of the system, collective leadership is also 
able to use resources that are analytically outside the system and that enter it from the 
continent systems. These resources include expectations of future gains or acceptable 
outcomes on the part of elite or groups bases on past experiences with the system (specific 
support) and secondly the expectation that those to whom collective outcomes are 
addressed will comply with them, either because they accept the collective arena itself as 
legitimate (diffuse support) and there is a high level of mutual political identification 
among the populations of the constituent units.
Internal Resources
As has been pointed out in the previous section, the Secretariat of the ECOWAS is 
instrumental in setting the agenda for the fulfilment of the general goals outlined in the 
Treaty. It does this by translating the treaty provisions into more tangible policy proposals 
for endorsement by either the Council of Ministers or the Authority of Heads of State. It's 
ability or inability to get the two decision making organs to move forward or to resolve 
conflicts has depended very much on not only on the financial resources at its disposal but 
also on the prior agreements contained in the Treaty on what can be decided on 
collectively, the norms, rules, and conventions that have been laid down on how conflicts 
should be resolved, the extent of supranationalism, and the extent of popular support for
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the organisation. All of these constitute the resources that are available to a regional 
collective decision making process.46
The ECOWAS Treaty lays down a well defined time table for the achievement of 
the objectives that will enable the member states to achieve their economic and social 
development objectives. Articles 12 to 18 give the duration for moving from a free trade 
area to the establishment of a customs union among the member countries. A period of 15 
years after the definitive entry into force of the Treaty is envisaged for the establishment of 
a Customs Union 47 The first two years was a grace period during which no member was 
required to reduce or eliminate import duties. On the other hand members were not to 
impose any new duties or taxes, or increase existing ones.48 The 8 years following the 2 
year grace period was to see the progressive reductions, and ultimate elimination of import 
duties in "accordance with the schedule to be recommended to the Council of Ministers by 
the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payment Commission of the Secretariat.49
The clearly articulated timetable for the achievement of objectives and the 
assigning of responsibility to various organs of the Community give an internal dynamic to 
the organisation. Thus even though the process has been delayed, the delay has not been 
very long. Though the organisation was formed in 1975, it was not until 1977 that the 
Secretariat was set up. Furthermore the first decisions regarding the implementation of the 
Treaty were adopted in May 1979 in Dakar. The ten years needed for the freezing and 
eventual elimination of tariffs started in 1981 after an initial need to gather statistics and
^Lindberg, ibid., pp 79-91.
47 Article 12
48 Article 13 paragraph 2
49Refer to table ? in chapter 5, p..?
334
conduct studies on the various aspects of co-operation. Trade liberalisation was therefore 
supposed to be in place by 1990 after starting in 1981. The liberalisation programme was 
re-launched in 1983 because it had failed to move forward. The latest relaunch came into 
effect in January 1990.50
Whilst the delay could be taken as a pointer to the problems faced by ECOWAS, 
the issue that concerns us here is how inspite of member governments non implementation 
the process manages to move forward at all. Part of the answer could be found in the 
detailing of the timetable and objectives in the Treaty in a form that gives it an internal 
dynamic of its own and therefore acts as a resource that enables decisions to be taken on 
various aspects of the scheme. Thus the little progress that hs been made so far is made 
possible by the prior agreements in the Treaty. It could therefore be argued that without 
such a detailed scheduling in the Treaty, progress would be even slower.
Even though such prior agreements exist and ought to act as the blueprint for 
progress the lack of other complementary resources have been responsible for the long 
delay in liberalising trade and achieving economic union.
One such resource that is important for the effective functioning of an international 
organisation and is internal to it is the extent of its supranational powers. Even though 
some scholars, such as Lindberg, express scepticism about supranationalism51 as a 
resources , it is our contention that such influence is important in the case of ECOWAS. 
Lindberg's scepticism is based on the empirical evidence that no supranational institution
50 Contact, Publication of ECOWAS, Vol. 12 No. 2, September 1990, p 6.
51 These are the "possession of clear decision making jurisdiction and authority or ability to impose 
sanctions". Lindberg ibid., p84
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possesses this resource. To him, the ability of supranational organisations to play an 
important role in the decision making process, participate in all aspects of the stages that 
influence policy choice and goal preferences is determined more by the way the 
organisation's officials interact with national political actors, representatives and 
government officials "by providing services and skills that are in demand"52, rather than in 
supranational attributes per se.
Such a view overlooks the actual decision making process of service 
intergovernmental organisations. In such organisations as opposed to forum 
organisations53 decisions are usually taken by either heads of State or Council of Ministers. 
Such decisions are binding once they go through the legitimising procedures laid out by 
the Treaty establishing the particular organisation if it provides for such authority. The 
secretariats on the other hand usually play an initiatory role. In most instances 
commentators tend to equate the powers at the disposal of the secretariat with the 
influence the organisation has. However, real authority of an 1 GO rests with the supreme 
decision making organ, such as the Security Council of the UN and the Council of the 
EEC rather than the general assembly or the commission, despite the enormous influence 
they have on decisions. These executive organs are subject to laid down rules that enable 
them to take binding decisions. Hence, it can be alleged that the inability of the Authority 
of ECOWAS to take binding decisions does indeed deprive the organisation of an 
important resource. Thus the lack of even the smallest amount of endowed 
supranationality severely hinders the functioning of the organisation.
52 ibid.
53Feld, J.W., and Jordan, R.S., give a good distinction between the two categories in International 
Organisations: A Comparative Approach. Praeeer Special Studies, New York, 1983.
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It is our contention that the delay of the process could be partly explained by the 
deficiency that is caused in the decision making process by a lack of supranationalism of 
any kind in ECOWAS. Non implementation is partly because Authority decisions are not 
binding on member states.54 Collective decisions may therefore be ignored by member 
states without any sanctions being imposed on them.
Another aspect of this issues was given by Dr Bundu, the Executive Secretary in 
his 1990 report as being responsible for the ineffectiveness of ECOWAS. He pointed out 
that representation at Council sessions (the only other decision making organ of the 
community) were sometimes by persons not of ministerial status. Decisions taken by the 
council therefore lacked the authority that was required.55
Another effect was that the link between the community and member States was 
weakened since those taking decisions sometimes had no immediate access to their 
national decision making apparatus. Above all such a reduction in the rule making 
competence of the Council is indicative of the low level of importance members accord to 
the regional organisation.
From the above we can conclude that a certain amount of supranationalism must 
be present for decisions to be effective.
Another factor that the paradigm identifies as important for organisational 
effectiveness is the level of expertise that it has. The level of technical expertise available
54 Article 5, paragraph 3 which details the power of the Authority makes its decisions binding only
on other areas of the Community and not on other member States.
55 Contact, ibid. p8
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to ECOWAS is low. Regional economic integration is a highly technical process which 
requires an equally high level of professional expertise. Even though the Secretariat has a 
good crop of competent employees, the often over-stressed desire to balance the 
geographical spread of Community employees, thus putting equitable distribution of 
employment opportunities before competence of employees means the latter is sometimes 
sacrificed for the former.
In addition to the shortcomings of emphasising equitable distribution of 
employment opportunities among member countries instead of employing the most 
qualified and experienced and or capable people , ECOWAS does not possess information 
that sets it apart as a centre of regional economic and political data. National information 
centres have more adequate information gathering bureau than does the regional 
organisation. This reduces the attributed prestige that national governments give to it in 
terms of requests for assistance from or 'expressions of confidence in or reliance on 
supranational actors, because they have the best ideas, provide initiative and guidance or 
are indispensable'.56 The low level of technical expertise and information databank at the 
regional level was partly responsible for the delay in getting started. Outside experts had 
to be drafted in from Europe and other international organisations such as ECA. At 
various stages in the process, such as the setting up of a computer network for the 
organisation, the organisation has depended and continues to rely on outside help. The 
regional organisation therefore does not enjoy the respect that it would if it was the main 
source of certain kinds regional information that national leaders and policy makers as well 
as bureaucrats depend on for their own work.
56 Lindberg, p. 85
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The effect of these shortcoming is that national governments feel they are more 
capable of pursuing individual development objectives. Another effect is that it reduces 
the initiating capabilities of the Secretariat. Though the Treaty confers such capabilities on 
the various Commissions, a lack of information and expertise makes it difficult to propose 
policies without having to conduct extensive research and information gathering first. This 
delays the schedule of the organisation, including the harmonisation of tariffs, and non 
tariff barriers.
The recognition of the important role of "information in the sub-regional 
integration process" and the need for a more organised system of gathering, processing 
and disseminating it in the region that promoted the Authority to sanction the Executive 
Secretary to expedite action on the formation of the ECOWAS information policy 
programme.57
The resources mentioned so far are those that are internal to ECOWAS itself.
They derive from treaty provisions, and the power that are a part of supranationality. 
Supranationality here referring not only to the legal jurisdictional provisions given to the 
organisation by the treaty but also from the perception national actors have of the 
legitimacy of the organisation to participate in decision implementation.
The cumulative capabilities of ECOWAS deriving from treaty provisions and 
perceived legitimacy are however closely dependent on and are reflected by the extent of
57 Final Communique of Authority of Heads of State issued at the end of their May 1990 Summit 
held in Banjul.
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transactions between the regional organisation and the member States. By transactions is 
meant the interactions between ECOWAS and collective authority structures on the one 
hand and national authority structures on the other. The actual impact of regional 
economic integration on the economic development of the member countries can only 
result from the penetration of national policy decision making structures and 
implementation processes by ECOWAS decisions. As integration moves from the 
collective problem recognition and information gathering stages to policy implementation,, 
national governments and regional institutions would be expected to interact more and 
more.
Such increasing interaction between the institution and member58 states forms the 
essence of the whole process. Without such interaction, it is unlikely that ECOWAS will 
have, or indeed develop the authority or skills, or human resources that it needs. Thus we 
agree with Lindberg' assertion that regional problem-recognition, decision and application 
requires an even increasing intensity of interaction between the organisation and its 
member states.
Such increased interaction between the organs of the ECOWAS and 
representatives of government in decision making may reduce nationalistic feelings to the 
extent that a kind of camaraderie develops, though this may not necessarily be so. 
Increased interaction may actually increase conflict as differences between governments 
become more apparent.59
58 Lindberg op cit. p86
59 Taylor P
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Though such a possibility exists, it is equally possible that such increased 
interaction will yield norms of conflict resolution between member states which will 
facilitate joint problem-solving.60
Finally, because the support and recognition ECOWAS gets from the public in 
member countries is highly dependent on how much information is provided and the 
attitudes expressed by national authorities and elite, the level of participation by national 
governments is important in legitimising it in the eyes of the public. Since there is a 
preponderance of governments in the functioning of the organisation, and in political and 
social organisation in general, their active participation is essential in creating an awareness 
of it to the public.
If these, mainly, theoretical postulations are true, then the very low level of 
interaction between the regional organisation and national governments has important 
repercussions for the integration process. In most instances the offices that co-ordinate 
the activities of ECOWAS and disseminate information to decision-makers at the national 
level is manned by a senior civil servant who is below the rank of a permanent secretary. 
Together with a very small number of very junior staff. Such outfits form a very low level 
authority group with very little impact on policy formulation.
In Ghana, for example, they constitute an office in the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning. When we asked for documents of ECOWAS, the office did not have 
either the complete set of ECOWAS protocols, the publications of the secretariat or
60 Lindberg op cit.
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information that set them apart as a specialist office. In place of substantive information 
from the ECOWAS Secretariat, they were able to produce only photostat copies of articles 
form West African Magazine for perusal. They did not have a full set of the protocols of 
the organisation or the specialised information that ought to be available from such an 
office.
Additionally, High Commissions and Embassies of member countries in London 
could not provide specialised information about the organisation. Apart from the Nigerian 
High Commission library no other member State could produce literature. Most did not 
even have the address of the Secretariat (again apart from Nigerian High Commission, 
understandably).
From the above, it can be concluded that member states give very low priority to 
ECOWAS and do not either promote its activities effectively to either citizens or 
harmonise national decisions very effectively with regional one. Secondly, to the extent 
that High Commissions embody the foreign policy of member states, such lack of basic 
information is also indicative of the low knowledge and hence priority given to the 
organisation by personnel and decision makers. The fact that there is no separate 
ECOWAS body to co-ordinate the organisation's activities and monitor implementation of 
decisions in member states means it does not feature any higher than any other 
international organisation in their strategic calculations. It becomes difficult to accept the 
premise that regional integration is a panacea to economic development in West Africa. 
President Jawara in 1990, the year he was made the Chairman of the organisation, 
suggested that there was a need to 'consider the establishment in all Member States of
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adequately equipped mechanism for the translation of collective resolutions and decisions 
into operational Community programmes while at the same time ensuring that they are not 
at variance with national programmes'.61
This problem and its repercussions have been recognised both by outside observers 
and the Secretariat of the organisation. In connection to the issue of the absence of 
efficient mechanisms for transforming ECOWAS policy measures into national policies 
and programmes, the Secretariat acknowledged that one of the reasons for this is that 
ECOWAS is still "very marginal to ...major national preoccupations...."62
The less than adequate level of attention given to the organisation is further 
indicated by the non ratification of protocols by member states. By September 1990, only 
three member states,( Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Togo)63, of the organisation had ratified 
all 23 protocols of the community.64
Both the lack of transmission mechanisms and the lack of commitment it indicates 
in the non-ratification of treaties are acknowledged by the Heads of States themselves. 
Even in instances where Protocols have been ratified, a high degree of non-implementation 
prevails.
61 Contact. September, 1990, p. 18.
62 Ten years of ECOWAS 1975-85, ECOWAS, 1985 p99.
“ Nigeria and Togo were primarily responsible for the bringing together of the two major language 
groups together under ECOWAS and their ratification of the protocols indicates a certain amount of 
consistency, despite the fact that the Buhari regime had been less than optimistic about the organisation 
after it had overthrown the Gowon regime. It is also indicative of the differing attitudes of individual 
leaders toward integration and the important impact the personal likes and dislikes of political leaders can 
have on the process.
“ Executive Secretary's Address to Summit in May 1990, Contact, ECOWAS, Sept. 1990.
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In 1992 when the World Bank, for example, was approached by ECOWAS for 
assistance, the Bank decided that Member States ought to show more commitment than 
they had hitherto shown before any assistance would be given. It therefore proposed the 
Minimum Agenda for Action(MAFA 1) as a means of Member States to demonstrate such 
commitment. Based on their performance over a period of one year, the would then 
decide whether to support integration under ECOWAS or to support a proposed 
Francophone Economic Community.
Amongst other things members were to implement (1) free movement of persons, 
(2) free movement of goods, and (3) payment arrangements. Despite the stakes, members 
were unable to fulfil the programme. As the table below indicates the member states could 
not show that they were able to implement the basic policies for trade liberalisation. At the 
start of the second phase of MAFA there was substantial carry over of policies to be 
implemented. The complementary programme(MAFA II) which sought to implement 
measures; to ensure inter-state road transit of vehicles; coordination of regional air/sea 
transportation and freight; and to improve intra-trade payments and settlements systems 
had to be implemented together with the previous policies which had not been carried out. 
The table on the next two pages show the extent of implementation the program had 
achieved.
Part of the reason for such a situation may to a certain extent be explained by the 
decision making procedure of the member states. As has been explained in Chapter 3, 
foreign policy and major policy issues have to be sanctioned by the Head of State in the 
absence of an effective legislature. The majority of member states had either a military
MINIMUM AGENDA (1992/1993) 
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1; Free Movement of Persons
a/ Reduction of security 
check-points Ves Yes 2 Yes Yes Yes Y«es NO (10) Yes Yes (3) (11) Yes No No
b/ Printing of the harmo­
nised entry and exit 
form (1) NO NO No No No No
i
No Ho (10) Yes
(8)
Yes (3) Yes
(8)
Yes No No
c/ Printing and issuance 
of the ECOWAS Travel 
Certificate NO Yes Yes No 4 Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No No
2. Free Movement of Goods
a/ Removal of non-tariff 
barriers
b/ Printing of Customs 
documents
c/ Introduction of special 
counters for transit
Yes
Yes
Yea
Yes
Yes
Yes hio
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
I 11 III IV V VI VII /III IX X XI Xll c m XIV XV XVJ
vehicles and reduction of 
Customs processing time Yes Yes (2) - (5) Yes (7) No - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yi
3. Payment Arrangements
a/ Elimination of restric­
tions on the use of 
local currencies by 
Community citizens in 
payments for the follow­
ing travel expenses:
- Hotel bills Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y.
- Airport tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Jlo Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Y.
- Purchase of air 
tickets Yes No Yes Yus
Mu
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Y.
FOOTNOTES
1. Member States requiring entry and exit records for certain travellers.
2. Some of the actions included in the Agenda (transit procedure, special counters, are not
relevant in the case of Cape Verde, which is an island.
3. Information obtained during the awareness seminar on the scheme held in December 1992.
4. The certificates are in the process of being printed.
5. Installation of counters are under consideration. Transit procedure does not:, however, exceed 3 hrs
6. The certificate of origin is yet to be printed.
7. No information available.
0. Check-points are positioned at entry and exit points.
9. being studied by the Central Dank, in collaboration with other banking agencies.
10. No information due to prevailing situation within country.
11. Instructions given for reduction but not fully implemented.
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government or a dictatorship civilian one party government. Autocratic and 
personalised decision making at the highest levels of government means issues have to be 
brought to the personal attention of the ruler. In such a situation, overloading of the 
executive usually occurs. Personal opinions also play a higher role in these instances than 
in a situation where such issues are openly discussed and opinions reshaped. Besides these 
is the problems of personal dislikes of leaders being projected to become national positions 
on issue. Additionally, there is also the feeling that the monetary cost of ECOWAS can be 
postponed by procrastinating with protocol ratification.
Though personalised politics and decision making styles have played a negative 
role in ECOWAS, in instances where a leader identifies very highly with the goals then the 
personal decision making style becomes advantageous to regional integration. Empirically 
this had been the case with Gowon of Nigeria and Ayadema of Togo who were 
instrumental in the formation of the group.
On balance, the effect of the internal non-financial resources considered above have 
been mainly negative.
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The final resources which is listed by Lindberg as being internal to the system that 
we will consider in our analysis is the monetary resources at the disposal of collective 
decision makers. Issues relating to financial matters of ECOWAS are found in Articles 
50-55 of the organisation's Treaty.
The ability of ECOWAS to respond to demands and induce compliance or support 
for its activities will be greatly enhanced if it can provide financial resources for the 
provision of public services and goods to its members. The concept of collective 
self-reliance which underlies the Treaty presupposes the harnessing of regional resources 
for targeted and judicious reallocation to promote development within the region.
Harnessing funds for regional development is however not the only use for which 
monetary resources are needed. The day to day running of the Secretariat, the sponsoring 
of research and information gathering activities and salaries of staff are expected to be met 
by resources derived from contributions from member states.65 Other areas that need 
financial input include compensation for loss of revenue due to trade liberalisation, losses 
'suffered as a result of the location of Community enterprises', as well as funds for the 
financing of projects in member states. Another need for which financial resources is 
needed is to promote development projects in the less developed Member States of the 
Community.
65 Articles 53-54 of ECOWAS Treaty
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The compensatory and redistributive role that the Community is expected to play 
as the process develops have been delegated to the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation 
and Development. Redistributive and compensatory mechanisms are essential for the 
continuing survival of regional integration. As has been pointed out in chapter three, 
private and foreign finance capital and industries tend to conglomerate or be, attracted to 
the more developed regions of such a system in order to be able to take advantage of 
external economies of scale. The net effect is that certain less developed areas become 
even more impoverished as they experience backwash effects because of the movement of 
capital and productive labour to the growth poles within the region. The deliberate 
compensatory and redistributive measures are an acknowledgement of the inability of free 
market forces to produce enough spill over effects through profit repatriation and 
remittances to counter the move of factors to the growth poles.
If such effects are not taken care of, they create difficulties for the process. An 
example of the negative impact polarisation is that it was among other factors the cause of 
the break up of the now defunct East African Community. To the extent that the actual 
impacts of integration have not been manifested in the ECOWAS region yet because of the 
low level of integration, the above example ought to be sufficiently indicative of what 
could happen.
As has been mentioned above, funds are also needed for the smooth running of the 
community. The revenue of the Community budget is to be derived from contribution from 
member states. As at August 1992, non-payment of contributions by members has 
resulted in arrears amounting to $28m. This according to the Executive Secretary
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amounted to twice the annual budget of the Secretariat.66 With such severe financial 
constraints the community is hard put to function efficiently. Staffing, among other things 
is difficult with such delays.
The reasons for non-payment of contributions to the Secretariat's budget could be 
attributed to several factors. Among the more pertinent are the general poverty and 
shortage of hard currency in the member countries. The external debt burden accumulated 
over the years and national priorities on the limited funds available make ECOWAS 
funding of less urgency to member states.
The Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development on the other hand 
does not rely entirely on contribution from members. The Treaty specifies three other 
sources for acquiring funds. These include income from community enterprises, receipts 
from bilateral, and multilateral sources as well as other foreign sources, and subsidies and 
contributions of all kinds and various sources.67
The Fund helps with project preparation, appraisal and financing. As detailed in 
the previous chapter, various projects have been embarked upon by the Fund. The Fund 
has in accordance with the priority programme of the Community helped in the 
procurement of finance for member states to build physical infrastructure and also to train 
personnel. A telecommunications project which is part of the Panafield programme is 
intended to link the members of the sub-region together and also reduce their dependence
66 Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 29 No 7, July 16 August 15 1992
67 Article 51 of ECOWAS Treaty.
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on telecommunication systems in London and Paris is on course, with a $50m assistance 
from the EEC.68
The road project which is co-financed by BADEA, ADF, BOAD and the Fund is 
nearing completion. Other projects such as the funding by UNIDO of a training 
programme of the Fund's own staff and personnel from member countries on how to use 
computer models for project analysis have also been undertaken. The Fund however faces 
many difficulties in getting access to information from member countries, the co-operation 
of members in implementation of programmes and even in members taking up loans 
negotiated on their behalf.
In 1990 the Managing Director, in his address pointed out some of the difficulties 
the Fund encountered in its operations. The Fund could not, for example, undertake 
project preparation work in Niger, Guinea, Togo or Ghana because these member states 
did not communicate the relevant information and documents to it. Neither could it 
embark on projects appraisals because it had applied sanctions on the members who were 
not meeting their loan commitments. Though loans had been arranged by the Fund from 
the ADB/ADK for which charges were being incurred, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal 
had failed to sign the loan Agreements negotiated on their behalf despite numerous 
reminders.69 Such procrastinations result in lack of implementation and consequently in a 
delay in effective achievement of regional integration goals.
68 West Africa, 28 May - 3 June 1990, p883.
69 Ten Years of ECOWAS. Op. cit.
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Though reasons were not given by the Fund for such difficulties as those 
enumerated above, the low and sluggish take-up rate of loans points to the low absorption 
capability of member countries. This situation results from the inability to prepare 
adequate projects for funding. The EEC's development Fund faces a similar problem with 
its dealings with the ACP group.
Absorption capacity is affected by the decision making structure. The absence of 
adequate representation of ECOWAS at the national level, a lack of personnel, and slow 
take up rate of loans means that work in connection with projects tend to get delayed.
Thus in certain instances it is not really a lack of funding that causes delays in 
Community programmes but rather the slowness or inability of members to utilise the 
facilities made available to them by the regional organisation and its institutions.
In addition to the resources considered above, some resources emanate from the 
environment itself These are those which reinforce any political system and come mainly 
from the population. Such 'support', as Lindberg points out is particularly vital in 
democratic or pluralist system that are based to a large extent on the ''consent of the 
governed.70
Though several scholars have pointed out that there is no direct causality between 
social assimilation at the regional level and Institutional development and effectiveness71
70 op cit. p87
71 Fisher, International Organisations Vol. 23, No 2 pp 285-286 & Puchalla, International 
Organisation Vol. 24, No 2 pp 183-208, quoted in Lindberg op cit.
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the existence of emotional and identitive affinities between peoples does create conditions 
within which governments can work toward more positive international -co-operation.72
Our findings from field work in Ghana, Togo, and interviews conducted among 
nationals of ECOWAS countries in London indicate that there is a "permissive consensus" 
in West Africa among the general public and elite groups about the desirability of 
ECOWAS.73 This endorsement does not influence national decision makers to the extent 
that it should. This is because politics in West Africa is not based on voting. Thus 
regardless of the general populations' endorsement, little pressure can be brought to bare 
on politicians to take decisions that are favourable for economic integration. To the extent 
therefore that governments are not accountable to an electorate, public opinion is not 
essential in foreign policy and hence not to regional integration either. This does not imply 
that popular participation will result in support for regional schemes. As explained below, 
the permissive consensus may change to antagonism toward regional integration if 
nationalistic tendencies develop to counter the possible encroachment of the organisation 
on national prerogatives.
Additionally the knowledge the mass public has of international integration is very 
limited, and to the extent that the majority of the population are illiterate and live in rural 
areas, policy decisions are affected mainly by the section of urban elite who are able to 
comment on such technical issues. Among such elites in West Africa there is the 
overwhelming assumption that regional integration will be beneficial to the region. In our 
survey that sought to gauge attitudes toward regional integration, a high proportion of
72 Puchalla op. cit.
73 Refer to questionnaire in Appendix ?
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respondents thought ECOWAS was able to solve the problems of the region if it was 
given the chance. Hence it can be concluded those who were aware of ECOWAS would 
in the main support their states' involvement in ECOWAS. The impact of changes in the 
political structure occurring over the member countries of ECOWAS may however mean 
that popular opinion becomes more and more important as decision making at the national 
level becomes more transparent. A government which is seen as obstructing or 
obstructing or impeding national development through non-implementation of, say, 
ECOWAS decisions may in such instances suffer electoral defeat. That of course assumes 
the development of a pluralistic society similar to what pertains in the more developed 
regions of the world. It also presupposes that the general public becomes more 
knowledgeable about the implications of policy choices.
Both of these are unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. Thus it can be 
hypothesised that the general public and even some elites, other than the political elite will 
be largely excluded from influencing the future development of the organisation.
The above conclusion drawn from our survey though valid for the short term 
cannot be extended far into the future. The populations of individual member states 
cannot be expected to support the regional organisation against their own governments 
indefinitely. At the present time those able to comment on the issues support regional 
integration and feel their governments are obstructive. They are either unaware of the 
implications for national political and economic sovereignty of supranational organisation 
or a single currency. This situation is likely to change as allegiance to the state increases 
and as pluralism results in public scrutiny of policy implications. The development of
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nationalism to cover economic issues will depend on the increasing awareness of both 
economic policy makers and business elites of the implications for them of the shifting of 
the locus of decision making to the regional organisation, and the movement of capital and 
labour to growth poles respectively. In respect of policy makers it can be suggested that 
in instances where they see themselves being displaced by regional bureaucrats their 
opposition to regional goals will increase. Such opposition will percolate to the general 
population as they seek to influence public opinion in their favour. The success of such 
influence attempts will as has been suggested above depend on how open political debate 
becomes. If  the process of structural change going on in most of these countries is 
sustained then it can be expected to lead to situations such as those in Western Europe 
where politicians are able to draw support for either opposition to or endorsement of 
regional goals. The time frame for such a development is anybody's guess but will take 
decades because of the near absence of a pluralistic political culture in the region.
Political pluralism therefore could eventually work either to the advantage or 
disadvantage of regional integration. The political environment certainly will be more 
complex but the success or failure of the regional organisation will at least be less 
dependent on the whims of heads of state.
6.6 Leadership and ECOWAS Integration
The final element that is postulated as determining the success of a regional 
integration scheme, according to the paradigm we have used so far, is the leadership 
available to it. It is seen as one of the most vital determinants of survival and growth of a
354
regional organisation. This is because it is the leaders who use the resources available to 
the organisation to process demands and treaty provisions. As has been found from initial 
studies of the European Communities74 and historical studies of voluntary integration 
schemes75, integration is facilitated by the assumption of leadership roles by some elite or 
combination of elites.76 These "leaders" after justifying their role and making it acceptable 
to the others are then able to cajole, push or even dominate the process. Such techniques 
are however carefully balanced by the leadership showing sensitivity to the needs and 
concerns of the members and a willingness to respond to their presuppositions.77 
Increased responsiveness is seen as one of the necessary conditions for success of 
integration schemes.78 In addition to individual elite and elite groups offering direction and 
leadership to the process, individual member States or group of States can also be crucial 
in performing that role.79 Where it is a single state the situation would resemble one of a 
hegemonic state attempting to give direction to international political and economic 
relations by underwriting the costs of the process and giving direction to the system 
through collaboration with other power within it.80
The role of collective leadership would be to identify and solve problems, ensure 
that differences between members states are handled in acceptable ways, evaluate output 
and store and retrieve information and articulate goals for the collectivity and symbolise 
such goals effectively.
74 Haas & Lindberg
75 Etzioni & Deutsch
76 Lindberg, Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon.
77 Lindberg L. Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon.
78 Deutsch K. The EC and the North Atlantic Area, cf. p
79 Haas E, Core area and Regional Integration.
80 Gilpin R, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press.
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To be effective, they ought to be able to build support for their own legitimacy, 
engineer consent of the other authorities and elite by organising bargaining and exchange 
of concessions and creation of output that are satisfactory to member states. They ought 
also to be able to stimulate belief in a common interest and conviction that they are able to 
evaluate and articulate such interest accurately and therefore qualify to be its major 
spokesman.
Though Lindberg's paradigm concentrates on supranational and political actors as 
providing and constituting such leadership, we have added states as another variable.
These two types of actors perform different roles. Supranational and political actors make 
use of the various resources available to the system, including: prior treaty agreements; 
norms of conflict resolution; supranational structures and the prestige they command; their 
power and expertise; financial resources, and support. States on the other hand provide 
the resources that are used by the former group.
Three determinants of effective leadership have been identified by Haas. These are 
the ability to define the organisational ideology, commitment to the ideology and 
supporting coalitions and alliances between the member states for the organisational 
ideology and the proposals and actions of supranational leaders.
ECOWAS personnel have from their utterances and reports articulated the 
ideology of collective self reliance over the years. They have in certain instances gone as 
far as to suggest that ECOWAS is a panacea to the problems of development in the 
subregion. As his predecessors, Abass Bundu, for example, stated in his 1990 report that
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'no individual Member States in the sub-region will achieve any significant growth, much 
more economic independence, except through the collective strength of the whole'.81 This 
statement is congruent with the rhetorical expression of expectations (especially the early 
years of the organisation) political leaders. It is therefore not a counter ideology to what 
leaders have. In consequence therefore, this should make for supranational effectiveness. 
Neither do the actual proposals of the ECOWAS personnel (referred to as supranational 
leaders) differ from statements and proposals, of national leaders. However, what we have 
noted above is that actual preference do differ from political rhetoric. Thus even though 
national political considerations, traditional trading ties and foreign policy orientation 
contradict the underlying cosmopolitan ideology of ECOWAS, the assumption of 
collective solidarity continues to underpin the process.
Though commitment of supranational leaders is congruent to the ideological 
orientation of regional integration among developing countries, concerns have been 
expressed about the allegiance of leaders to the regional organisation. This concern was 
given expression when Bundu proposed that all Community appointees be made to take an 
oath of secrecy and loyalty to the Community.82 This was prompted by what the 
Executive Secretary saw as the conflict of interests of employees of the secretariat. Such a 
concern is indicative of the probable shallowness of commitment to regional goals. Since 
regional goals sometimes contradict national interests of member states, nationals 
employed by the regional organisation may tend to alert their governments about issues 
that might affect them adversely. This will, if it occurs, impede bargaining and 
compromise, and might result in pre-emptive measures on the part of national leaders.
81 Abass Bundu, quoted in West Africa Magazine, 20th May - 3rd June 1990, p 899.
82 ibid. p902.
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The final element that makes for effective leadership of a supranational 
organisation is its ability to cultivate support from coalitions and alliances among 
individuals, groups and organisations from the member national systems. Individuals 
would include opinion formers, and preferably substantive decision makers. In democratic 
societies where political decision makers change with elections it is relevant to have 
prominent opinion forming politicians backing integration, but in places such as West 
Africa the situation might be quite different. In such instances the absence of elections, 
closed nature of decision making and the largely illiterate population means that a very 
small elite made up mainly of the ruling government and their lieutenants are the ones to 
cultivate.
As has been mentioned above the changing nature of politics might change all these 
characteristics if the regional organisation survives long enough. It however demands a lot 
of political acumen from the Executive of the Secretariat.
In addition to supranational actors, national actors also play an important role as 
leaders for the regional organisation. Such potential and actual leaders must occupy 
authoritative roles at both the collective and national levels. Gowon of Nigeria and 
Eyadema of Togo played such a role during the formative years of the organisation. Since 
such leaders in performing their gate keeping functions are in a position to determine what 
is decided at the regional level. Such support facilitates the growth and survival of the 
process especially when they are willing to convince their compatriots from other states. 
This is even more salient in West Africa where intra-regional politics has been, and still is
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so highly personalised. It is also important because high power political position is 
essential to break through the invisible anglophone/francophone barrier that hinders 
co-operation within the region.
Nigeria’s role as a state actor was essential to the formation of ECOWAS. As was 
detailed in chapter three, it was also important in resolving difficulties such as Senegal's 
insistence that Zaire ought to be a member of the organisation. It was also instrumental in 
providing accommodation for the organisation and made substantial contributions to the 
organisation especially under the Gowon regime.
The situation changed, however, under the Buhari regime when the Federal 
government refused to host the Summit meeting of the organisation.83 It had earlier 
expelled Community citizens. These have made it difficult for that country to symbolise 
the regional ideology that it had embodied in the early years of ECOWAS. The reasons 
for changing attitudes in Nigeria include the deteriorating economy and the large balance 
of payment deficit faced by the country. It also was a result of the relative lack of benefit 
derived from regionalism compared with the large sums of money it gave. Finally, it could 
also be suggested that Nigerians do not feel as insecure as they did immediately after 
Biafran civil war and hence do not see the stabilisation of the immediate external 
environment as a top foreign policy priority.
ECOWAS has not as yet evolved an effective leadership either at the supranational 
or state level. Difficulties with funds, personnel and a closed political system make it very
83 Bach, op. cit.
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difficult for the Secretariat to function effectively or build coalitions and support in 
member countries for the organisation.
National actors are also lacking for reasons which include the autocratic decision 
making style in member countries. Pressure groups, and interest groups are not 
sufficiently informed about ECOWAS to be influential either the organisation or member 
governments. Additionally the links for effective communication between the organisation 
and such groups are minimal hence making it difficult for groups to operate on a 
permanent basis with the regional organisation.
States themselves (because of their preoccupation with domestic affairs) have 
where they were initially enthusiastic become apathetic or at best lukewarm as changes in 
government have brought in new rulers whose attitude toward the organisation is different 
from those who started it. National outlook has tendered to be inward looking. This has 
depended very much on the government in power. As is normally the case no national 
government has elevated the regional decision making system over national decision 
making in any issue area or at least given it equal status. This really challenges the 
rhetorical pronouncements that leaders make about regionalism being indispensable to 
development.
6.7 Conclusion
Our analysis of the activators that determine whether a regional organisation would 
grow, stagnate regress or even disintegrate show that ECOWAS at best will continue to be 
very marginal to the development strategies of the participating countries given the 
political environment the organisation is functioning in.
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Demands have not emanated from the member states, and the process has been 
propelled mainly by the Secretariat which is depending mainly on the Treaty's provisions. 
The implication is that national governments are formulating their development strategies 
independently of the process envisaged in the collective ethos of ECOWAS.
It also means that governments are not as committed to programmes as they would 
be if they had requested the pursuit of programmes themselves. The energies they devote 
to persuading other governments and offering side-payments and using package deals are 
low because of their relative apathy in view of the rather high hopes they usually express 
from the regional organisation and the type of integration that is needed to achieved the 
multidimensional goals of ECOWAS.
Resources are also inadequate for processing demands or pushing forward the 
process timetable. The reasons as detailed above are essentially because of the low level 
of co-operation that existed prior to the formation of ECOWAS. They are also due to 
fragility of the institutional framework of ECOWAS itself. The difficulty of exacting 
compliance with regional decisions and implementation of projects results in low support 
because the benefits that would otherwise result and would reinforce the favour with 
which the regional organisation is viewed is lacking.
Leadership is also weak at the supranational level and the national level because of 
the style of decision making and personalised politics in the region. Additionally, Nigeria
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by its actions and changing financial fortunes has been unable to sustain its position as the 
prime mover of regional integration.
As has been noted changing politics at the national level may change the working 
of ECOWAS as its relation with member states is altered with transformed decision 
making styles and structures.
Whether that necessarily makes ECOWAS a viable institution depends on the exact 
role the organisation is expected to play. Role definition may change with changing 
post-Soviet ideological orientation as neo-colonialism becomes an archaic political jargon. 
As state/society interaction becomes one that is open, and more and more people are 
incorporated into the formal economy, government decisions will come more and more 
under public scrutiny while governments become sensitised to the extent of ensuring that 
they implement ECOWAS projects and comply with decisions.
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Summary and Conclusion
The thesis started with a discussion of the rationale behind regional integration among 
developing countries. The arguments have centred on structuralist descriptions of international 
economic relations which take as their starting point the division of the world into 
developed/industrialised countries and developing/primary goods producing countries. From 
this dichotomy, the assertion is made that the former gain unfairly from international trade 
whilst the latter are disadvantaged because of the widely fluctuating prices of primary goods 
on the international market, the deteriorating trend in the terms of trade of primary goods and 
the desirability of industrialisation as an end in itself and as a means of overcoming all of these 
problems.
The problem however is that most of the developing countries lack the internal market that is 
required to support efficient utilisation of industrial capacity, both in terms of income per 
capita and effective demand, and in terms of total population. Apart from markets, the 
individual countries in the developing world lack the capital and the other factors that are 
needed for a sustained programme of industrialisation. To overcome the problem of small 
markets and low availability of capital, development economists advocate a combining of 
national markets and a pooling of capital within the context of regional integration as the 
answer to the problems. By pooling their capital and rationalising their industrial programmes, 
these countries, so the argument goes, will be able to develop their industrial capacity. Their 
combined markets will be large enough to absorb the outputs of the industries. Economies of
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scale will be derived as a result of the market size thus reducing overall cost of import 
substituting industrialisation.
Regional integration is therefore based on an acceptance by the participating countries that 
they are individually unable to develop industrially, or that industrialisation will be faster if 
they combined their efforts.
The need for collective action is usually buttressed by an underlying feeling of being 
disadvantaged in international economic relations and as a consequence in international 
political relations also. This disadvantage, it is believed, plays an important part in their 
continuing underdevelopment. We saw in chapters one, three and six, that this perception of 
disadvantage has been one of the main reasons given by West African countries for the need to 
integrate. It validates the empirical generalisation cited at the end of chapter two concerning a 
region and the external world; mainly that the perception o f disadvantage by a subsystem in 
its interaction within the system may be a strong motivating factor in the formation of  
regional integration among developing countries.
The basis of such perceptions may or may not be valid. As we saw in the first chapter, though 
fluctuating prices and deteriorating term of trade may affect government revenue from 
exports, and thus make strategic planning difficult, there is no evidence that it is the cause of 
the slow growth in the region. Evidence suggests that most of the countries within the region 
were able to maintain their real earnings despite falling prices. Where revenues fell it was 
usually because quantities exported could not compensate for falling prices. Such falling 
quantities of exports were usually a result of government policies, such as diversification
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programmes and overvalued currencies. Though it is true that the countries have to export 
more to maintain their levels of real revenue, the fact remains that there was no sustained 
growth even in instances where revenues were improved. As we saw in chapter one, though 
Nigeria's terms of trade improved by 232 per cent for 1974-79, by 483 per cent for 1980-81 
and 426 per cent for 1982-85, based on 1974-79 as the base years, such substantial increases 
did not translate into tangible economic development.
However whether the arguments were valid or not, the countries within West Africa, 
particularly the English speaking ones, saw themselves as being victimised by the global 
system and were therefore motivated toward integration as a means of'getting out from 
under'. The common cementing element that united the countries was the belief that they were 
disadvantaged by the structure of international society.
For economic integration to enable these countries to extricate themselves from their 
perceived common predicament, the a priori claims made by economists concerning 
economies of scale, accelerated development, increased bargaining power and efficiency 
would have to be realised through the implementation of joint decisions taken at the regional 
level by national governments. This is a political process which determines, in our view, 
whether regional economic integration will be successful or not. This is because it provides the 
broad framework within which economic integration functions. We therefore set out to show 
that regional economic integration will not succeed unless the political and social structures of 
the region are taken into account when the prospective economic gains of the process are 
being considered.
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This view was based on the empirical evidence that since the formation of ECOWAS, the 
timetable has had to be reviewed several times because of the lack of political will to pursue 
decisions through to implementation.
The basic assumption of the hypothesis was that the political and social structures provide 
opportunities but also act as constraints on regional collective decision making. Both 
domestic, and foreign policy of the individual countries have implications for the desire to 
work together. By concentrating on nation building and national economic development 
governments tend to pay less than adequate attention to regional objectives despite rhetoric to 
the effect that regional policies hold the key to national development. At the same time the 
overwhelming desire of governments to be seen by their citizens as doing something about 
development makes it possible for them to participate in integration without excessive 
nationalism. Thus regardless of the actual motives of governments, the national interest both 
provides opportunities and constrains regional integration.
This paradoxical situation however results in a situation where each country seeks to extract 
maximum benefits even before they start to accrue to the group. The fear of Nigerian 
preponderance in a region wide organisation by the francophone countries and the formation 
at France's instigation of CEAO as a countervailing organisation to curb such influence is a 
case in point. This together with other factors such as the high proportion of tariff revenue in 
the total income of governments tend to result in early politicisation of the integration process. 
This again validates another generalisation in the West African context. It is that actor
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expectations tend to be prematurely politicised thus preventing incremental bargaining on 
relatively non controversial shared objectives,
Intra-regional relations also determine how willing governments are to work with each other 
to solve common problems. The foreign policy orientation of individual countries and the 
ideology of governing elite determine whether they will co-operate. In chapter three we saw 
that ideological differences between the Pan Africanist and socialist oriented regimes on the 
one hand and the more conservative and pragmatic regimes on the other made it difficult for a 
region wide organisation to be formed. These together with the differing view of dependence 
on external factors make it difficult to agree on common policies for reducing dependence. 
This conflict between radicals and conservatives affected interaction and the desire to 
associate with each other. This also validates the generalisation that: ideological ties, where 
they exist, are helpful to integration; ideological cleavages are most divisive and cannot be 
overcome by shared economic aims.
Though this was especially the case in the period before ECOWAS was formed integration 
between francophone and anglophone countries could only be formed after pan Africanism 
had ceased to be an important issue in intra-African relations.
As we saw in chapter three, apart from the common colonial heritage, West African countries 
are divided along linguistic lines, their political ideologies differ, and their attitudes toward 
external involvement in the region are not compatible. Whilst the French speaking countries 
are highly dependent on France, the English speaking countries see such dependence as
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undesirable. The different attitudes toward extra-regional actors makes it difficult to agree on 
whether dependence itself was good or bad. As we pointed out earlier, the fact that France 
was able to convince her former colonies to form CEAO as a countervailing organisation to 
check Nigerian preponderance in ECOWAS suggests that countries in the region are 
sometimes more willing to succumb to external suggestions than they are willing to co-operate 
to do something to reduce the influence of such actors on regional and domestic politics. In 
such an instance external actors become important in the success or failure of regional 
integration. In addition to the influence that is exerted on the francophone countries, the 
formation of ECOWAS itself was very much facilitated by the signing of the Lome 
Convention.
These two issues also show that the generalisations made about the external impact on 
regional integration holds true for West Africa also. These are that: (1) a single state (or its 
elite) may be seen as the extra-regional force which hinders or aids integration; (2) 
another regional counter system may be the extra-regional force which explains 
integration or disintegration.
More importantly, the different attitudes toward the desirability or otherwise of dependence 
on extra-regional actors tends to impede ECOWAS decision making. The dependence of the 
francophone countries on France for economic, financial and political support, and of the 
region in general on international markets and finance, makes an ideology of de-linking 
difficult to pursue. Thus the assertion that perceptions o f dependence on extra-regional 
systems may i f  it is pervasive act as a disincentive to integration holds true in the region. In
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the relationship between France and the francophone countries of the region, the 
generalisation that an extra-regional state with hegemonic tendencies may undermine 
regional integration through its payoff capacity also holds true as is evidenced in our detail 
of the role of France in chapter three and its impact on regional integration in chapter six.
The social structure of the region on the other hand affects regional integration in two ways. 
The diverse ethnic composition of countries within the region means that nation building 
becomes very salient. Though the nation, in its political sense, is developing, the desire to 
progress to the position where the nation coincides with the state, among other things, 
concentrates the minds of national governments on nation building rather than regional 
processes.
At the same time the straddling of tribes across borders has both negative and positive 
repercussions on regionalism. Tribes across borders provide territorial continuity where 
political boundaries have undermined it. Interaction is therefore extensive at the informal level. 
Since such interaction, both social and economic is facilitated between countries by such 
straddling, ethnicity could have a positive effect on integration.
However because the straddling of tribes across borders makes the international boundaries 
porous, governments are fearful of its effect on the territorial integrity of their states. As we 
have shown the straddling of the Ghana and Togo border by the Ewes has created difficulties 
for both countries. The relatively low level of national integration therefore places limitations 
on regional integration. The frequent closure of borders makes interaction and trade difficult 
and at the decision making level creates animosity between the governments concerned. Again
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this proves in the West African context that countries that are poorly integrated internally 
make poor partners in a regional integration because o f the reluctance o f leaders to 
further undermine their control at home.
From the above we can see that almost all the generalisations made about third world 
integration hold for West Africa also.
A question that arises therefore is whether regional integration is a viable strategy for national 
economic development? Two other related questions are: why despite the failure of integration 
schemes they continue to attract such high following; and would ECOWAS members consider 
dismantling the regional organisation if it continues to be such a pooor performer?
Before we can answer the first question we need to know how effective ECOWAS has been in 
achieving its objectives.
When the organisation was formed in 1975, it was stated in the Treaty that a custom union 
should be formed within 15 years after the definitive entry into force of the treaty. As we have 
seen in chapter five, though ECOWAS has achieved a lot in terms of providing a common 
forum for West African countries to discuss economic, social and political issues, little has 
been achieved in terms of the substantive development goals set out in the Treaty. The 
timetable for trade liberalisation is running seven years behind schedule, and little has been 
achieved industrially.
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To its credit the organisation has enabled the member countries to move from a position of no 
decision making among them prior to 1975, to a position where as many as 17 issue areas had 
been discussed by 1990. In addition: ECOWAS has for the first time since independence 
created a fairly permanent forum for collective decision making which incorporates all 
francophone and anglophone countries; substantial physical infrastructures have been built and 
research centres set up; there has been a rationalisation of separate francophone and 
anglophone research centres; official interaction at the regional level has increased 
substantially; there are also the beginnings of West African countries taking responsibility for 
security issues arising in the region as is exemplified by the ECOMOG peacekeeping efforts of 
the organisation in Liberia.
The achievements are more political than economic. However these political achievements are 
superficial. Paradoxically, political difficulties have been responsible for non achievement of 
economic objectives. As pointed out in chapters three and six the dilemma of having to ask 
those from whom they want to be independent for the means of such independence plagues 
ECOWAS countries. Financial difficulties make them dependent on financial support for 
projects. Dependence has however had a more debilitating effect. It has made it difficult to 
pursue policies that would make the members less dependent on the West.
The more important reason though is that the members lack the will to implement policies 
because of the fear of dislocating their economies. Eliminating tariffs means loss of revenue for 
member countries. Without an adequate compensatory scheme trade liberalisation will be 
ineffective.
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These constraints, coupled with other domestic and foreign policy orientations and goals make 
implementation difficult. Thus though many issues are discussed, very little gets implemented. 
Those discussions that are effectively implemented are foreign financed. Going back to the 
question asked earlier about the viability of ECOWAS, the answer would be that based on 
evidence so far it has not been able to achieve its aims and has therefore not been viable if 
measured against the provisions of the Treaty. Whether it is a viable strategy depends on the 
time frame within which it is expected to begin to yield results. So far the timetable has been 
too tight given the low level of co-operation prior to the formation of the organisation. As we 
pointed in chapter two, political integration as Deutsch et al. pointed out in their historical 
study takes anything between 60 years to 150 years. If that is accepted then we can at least 
assume that regional economic integration would also take a fairly long time.
As has been pointed out the institutional framework required for the type of integration 
needed by developing countries must be elaborate, even more so than that found in the EEC. 
This is an unrealistic proposition because of the resources required to set it up and run it. If 
ECOWAS and its treaty provisions cannot ensure trade liberalisation, industrialisation, provide 
compensation and redistribute resources within the region as well as help in overcoming 
dependence then it is unlikely to fulfil the desires of overcoming the disadvantaged position of 
these countries in international relations.
The change in emphasis from trade liberalisation to industry in the revised treaty continues to 
assume a regional cosmopolitanism, which does not exist, and a dirigiste approach to 
industrial development which contradicts the readjustment and restructuring programmes that 
are currently going on in almost all the member countries. The falsification of the Soviet model 
of development has also severely undermined this approach. Involvement of government in
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manufacturing in West Africa has been disastrous for the economy of the countries, whilst 
co-operating to set up industries have not been very successful either as the CIMAO project 
under which clinker would be produced jointly by Togo, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire has shown. 
Thus the theoretical assumptions of cosmopolitanism and dirigisme are not compatible with 
the West African experience and situation.
Our suggestion would be that for short term to medium term goals of industrialisation 
ECOWAS countries ought to take advantage of the preferences that they have under the 
Lome Convention's trade concessions and more generally pursue the advantages they have 
under the General System of Preferences. ECOWAS countries do not face any barriers for 
their industrial exports to the EEC which is an existing market where purchasing habits are 
geared toward industrial goods as opposed to the more basic needs orientation of West 
African markets. Non-tariff barriers are faced by the South East Asian countries but they have 
been able to penetrate the European market to the extent that barriers are now being imposed 
under the GSP. Even if governments in the EEC were to remove the barriers consumers will 
have to be aware of the goods and shops willing to stock the goods. Quality and marketing are 
therefore essential for penetration of export markets.
A more gradual development of ECOWAS without too high an expectation and an emphasis 
on functional co-operation will provide the framework for a more elaborate integration 
scheme. Efforts ought to be concentrated on creating the legal, economic and political 
framework for private investment, whilst at the same time pursuing an export promotion 
programme to both regional and external markets. As we saw in chapter six, the building of 
infrastructure has been one of the areas where ECOWAS has been most successful. Actual 
projects therefore ought to concentrate on building transport and telecommunications network
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between the countries of the region. Actual co-operation in production ought to be left to joint 
ventures between entrepreneurs.
This research has indicted a low level of achievement of regional integration in West Africa 
relative to the goals set in the Treaty. This failure is an addition to the list of other documented 
failures and poor performance of other integration schemes among developing countries, such 
as the East African Community, and those in Latin America. This indicates that the economic 
and political frameworks are not suitable for developing regions and need to be re-examined.
From the case study we can conclude that regional integration in developing regions, such as, 
West Africa face two related problems; 1) a theoretical misfit between an economic 
proposition and its framework and process mechanism, and 2) an economic, political and 
social environment which make it difficult for regional collective decision-making.
Why integration continues to attract such wide following is a more difficult question to 
answer. One reason is that there seems to be very few alternatives to choose from. If  the 
desire of developing countries is to be less dependent on the markets and finance of the 
developed countries, then the only way open to them is through greater interaction among 
themselves. The framework that commits countries to achieving greater interaction is regional 
integration. Other forms of co-operation tend to rely too much on intentions. Integration on 
the other hand commits members to fixed timetables and programmes.
A second possible reason is that the a priori postulations are still taken for granted by many 
of those who advocate such schemes. There is the tendency to believe that the causes of
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failure in other regions can be avoided. However, as we have tried to show, there are certain 
theoretical difficulties that need to be addressed if integration is to be viable among developing 
countries. Until that is done, failure cannot be attributed to background conditions alone.
Whether ECOWAS members would consider dismantling the organisation if it continues to 
fail to achieve its goals, is a question for there are no obvious answers. In the first instance, the 
present level of failure is to a certain extent a result of the exaggerated expectations that 
members have for regional integration. The time frame, as has been pointed out, is too short 
for any substantial trade links to have developed among the members of the organisation. The 
institutional framework has also not developed sufficiently to enable it to play the role it ought 
to play in collective decision making. Thus the question is from a theoretical point of view 
premature. However, judged against the Treaty's aims the question is important. It does 
highlight the need for a more realistic approach to goal setting and a realisation that regional 
integration in not a panacea to industrial development. It is a method that should accompany 
others.
If, however, we were to assume that the time frame set out in the Treaty of ECOWAS was 
realistic, it is unlikely that the organisation would be dismantled. Sunk cost considerations 
make it difficult for organisation to be dismantled once they have been set up. The vast 
amount of resources already spent make it very difficut to contemplate such action. 
Additionally the oportunity cost of disbaning would be the absence of a firm commitment to 
forge south-south trade relations. Even though we advocate a more functional co-operation 
method of co-operation, this ought to be within a legal framework that commits members to 
more than just ad-hoc co-operation.
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As we have also indicated the political achievements of the organisation might make it 
difficult, indeed unwise, to wind down the organisation. As the new draft Treaty of the 
organisation shows, the organisation is being deepened, with a proposed economic and social 
council, and an extension of the authority of the secretariat. Thus contrary to the question, the 
organisation is being strenghthened rather than streamlined.
Implications for Theory and Practice of Regional Integration
There is a need to reformulate the economic and political framework to fit the level of political 
development if it is to be applicable to developing regions. This may have the possible effect of 
making it difficult to propose overarching general theories for international integration that are 
applicable to all regions. But this may not be such a bad thing if it makes theory more relevant 
to practice.
There is also the secondary need to identify the independent variables that are relevant for 
integration among developing countries.
Thirdly, there is a need to research into the connection between political and economic 
integration more extensively.
At the regional level it is necessary to research into how coalitions for regional 
decision-making are formed. It will also be important within the West African context to 
examine how the structural adjustment programmes are affecting the relevance of integration 
as a tool for development.
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Also at the regional level research will have to be conducted into whether rationalisation of 
prospective industries does not introduce too rigid an industrial structure into the region. Will 
not the siting of industries in region according to comparative advantages be stultifying the 
creation of contrived comparative advantages? What will be the effect of such regional policies 
on the development of national competitive advantage.
The research has from using ECOWAS as a case study, shown that the so-called dynamic 
theories of regional economic integration theory have failed to yield the a priori advantages 
claimed for them. We have also shown that the claims made by classical economic theory that 
developing countries lack the conditions for economic integration has been validated by our 
research.
The reason for this, as we have tried to show, is because of the limitations of the dynamic 
theories of economic integration and the Eurocentricity of international political integration 
theories. It is also because political and social repercussions of economic integration have not 
been sufficiently taken account of in initial proposals for economic integration.
For integration to be viable in West Africa and other developing countries, the underlying 
theories have to be reworked to take account of the failure of trade liberalisation and dirigiste 
industrialisation strategies. It also needs to highlight the interaction between political, 
economic and social variables. The political, economic and social environment of the region 
concerned must also be very carefully considered and theory tailored accordingly.
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Appendix 1 
Protocol on Non-Aggression
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES
CONSIDERING that the Economic Community of West African States, (hereinafter referred 
to as the (’’Community”), set up by virtue of the Treaty of may 28, 1975, cannot attain its 
objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among the Member 
States of the Community;
RECALLING Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter which provides that all Member 
States shall refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or independence of any State, or any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.
RECALLING Article 3 (3) of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity which provides 
for the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and its inalienable right 
to independent existence;
RECALLING the Resolution of the Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government of 
the Community held in Lome on 5 November, 1976 regarding the signing of an Annexed 
Protocol on non-recourse to force by Member-States of the Community,
AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
Member States shall in their relations with one another, refrain from the threat or use 
of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of 
the United Nations and the organisation of African Unity against the territorial integrity of 
political independence of other Member-States.
ARTICLE 2
Each Member-State shall refrain, from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of 
subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity of the other Member-States.
ARTICLE 3
Each member State shall undertake to prevent Foreigners resident on its territory from 
committing the acts referred to in Article 2 above against the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of other Member-States.
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ARTICLE 4
Each Member-State shall undertake to prevent non-resident Foreigners from using 
their territory as a base for committing the acts referred to in Article 2 above against the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Membe-States.
ARTICLE 5
1. Member States pledge to respond to all peaceful means in the settlement of disputes 
arising among themselves.
2. Any dispute which cannot be settled peacefully among Member States shall be referred 
to a Committee of the Authority. In the event of failure of settlement by the aforementioned 
Committee the dispute shall finally go to the Authority.
3. The composition of the mandate of the Committee referred to in the preceding 
paragraph shall be decided upon by the Authority.
ARTICLE 6
(1) The Protocol shall come into effect provisionally on signature by the Heads of State 
and Government, and definitively on ratification by at least seven signatory States, in 
conformity with the constitutional regulations of each Member-States.
(2) This Protocol, as well as all the Instruments of Ratification, shall be deposited with the 
Executives Secretariat who shall transmit certified true copies of the Protocol to all 
Member-States informing them of the dates on which the Instruments of Ratification have 
been deposited. The Protocol shall be registered with the Organisations approved by the 
Authority.
(3) Any Member State may accede to this Protocol and the instrument of accession shall 
be deposited with the Executive Secretariat.
(4) This Protocol shall be annexed to and form an integral part of the Treaty.
The Protocol was signed on the 22nd of April 1978.
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Appendix 2
PROTOCOL RELATING TO MUTUAL ASSISTANCE ON DEFENCE
PREAMBLE
THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES.
RECALLING Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which calls upon all Member-States to 
refrain in their international relations from resorting to the use of threats or force either against 
the territorial integrity or the independence of all States in any manner that is incompatible 
with the aims of the United Nations or from interfering in the internal affairs of other States.
RECALLING Article 3 of the Charter and of the Organisation of African Unity which calls 
upon Member States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and its 
inalienable right to an independent existence;
MINDFUL of the Treaty setting up the Economic Community of West African States;
RECALLING the Protocol on Non-Aggression signed in Lagos on 22nd April 1978 in 
accordance with which Member States resolved not to use force as a means of settling their 
disputes;
CONVINCED that economic progress cannot be achieved unless the conditions for the 
necessary security are ensured in all Member States of the Community;
CONSIDERING that Member States belong to the same geographical area;
CONSCIOUS of the serious risks that the presence of foreign military bases on the African 
continent may constitute as support forces to external aggression;
FIRMLY RESOLVE to safeguard and consolidate the independence and the sovereignty of 
Member States against foreign intervention.
CONSCIOUS of the fact that external defence of their states depends entirely on each 
sovereign state, and that such a defence will be more effective with the co-ordination and 
pooling together of the means of mutual assistance provided by respective Member States 
within the framework of this Protocol;
DESIROUS of maintaining the ties of friendship existing amongst Member States and of 
strengthening their cooperation in all fields on the basis of equality, mutual interests and 
respects;
HAVE AGREED as follows:
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CHAPTER 1 
DEFINITIONS
Article 1
Within the context of this Protocol
"Treaty " means the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States;
"Community" means the Economic Community of West African States;
"Authority" means the Authority of Heads of States government as defined in Article 
5 of the Treaty;
"Member States" or "Member States" means a Member State or Member States of the 
Community.
"Executive Secretary" means Executive Secretary of the Community as defined in 
Article 8 of the Treaty;
"Aggression" means the use of armed force by any State against the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State or by any other manner 
incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and OAU;
"Assistance on Defence" means all military aid ( material, technical and personnel).
CHAPTER m
Article 2
Member States declare and accept that any armed threat or aggression directed against 
any Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community.
Article 3
Member States resolve to give mutual assistance for defence against any armed threat 
or aggression.
Article 4
Member States shall also take appropriate measures such as specified in Article 17 and 
18 of the present Protocol in the following circumstances:
(a) In case of armed conflict between two or several Member States if the settlement 
procedure by peaceful means as indicated in Article 5 of the Non-Aggression Protocol 
mentioned in the Preamble proves ineffective;
(b) In case of internal armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported 
actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire 
community. In this case the Authority shall appreciate and decide on this situation in 
frill collaboration with the Authority of the Member States concerned.
CHAPTER in  
INSTITUTIONS
Article 5
The institutions for the implementation of this Protocol shall be:
The Authority
The Defence Council
The Defence Committee
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SECTION I - THE AUTHORITY
Article 6
1 The Authority on the occasion of the annual ordinary meeting of ECOWAS shall 
examine general problems concerning peace and security of the Community;
2 The Authority may also hold extra-ordinary sessions on defence matters when 
circumstances so require;
3 The Authority shall decide on the expedience of military action and entrust its 
execution to the Force Commander of the Allied Forces of the Community (AAFC);
4 Decisions taken by the Authority shall be immediately enforceable on Member-States.
4 Decisions taken by the Authority shall be immediately enforceable on Member-States.
SECTION n  - THE DEFENCE COUNCIL
Article 7
1 A Defence Council shall be established by the Authority.
2 It shall consist of Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of Member States. 
However, in cases of crisis, the Defence Council shall be enlarged to include any 
other Minister from Member States according to the circumstances. The Executive 
Secretary and the Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of military matters shall be in 
attendance at the meetings of the Council.
Article 8
1 The Defence Council shall meet on the convocation by its Chairman to prepare the 
item of the Agenda of Sessions of the Authority dealing with defence matters.
2 In an emergency, the Defence Council shall examine the situation, the strategy to be 
adopted and the means of intervention to be used.
Article 9
In case of armed intervention, the Defence Council assisted by the Defence 
Commission shall supervise with the authority of the State or States concerned, all 
measures to be taken by the Force Commander and ensure that all necessary means for 
the intervention are made available to him. The actions of the Force Commander shall 
be subject to competent political authority of the Member State or States concerned.
Article 10
At the end of the operation, the Defence Council shall write a factual report to be 
addressed to the Authority.
SECTION m  - THE DEFENCE COMMISSION
Article 11
1 The Defence Commission shall be established by the Authority and shall consist o f a 
Chief of Staff from each Member State.
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2 A Defence Commission shall be responsible for examining the technical aspects of 
defence matters.
3
The Defence Commission shall establish its Rules of Procedure especially in respect of 
the convening of its meetings, the conduct of the business and the implementation of 
duties as assigned to it by the Defence Council.
CHAPTER IV 
ADMINISTRATION
Article 12
1 The Defence Council shall appoint a Deputy Executive Secretary (Military) at the 
Executive Secretariat for a period of four years renewable only once.
2 The Deputy Executive Secretary (Military) shall be a senior serving military officer.
3 He shall be in charge of the administration and follow-up of the decisions taken by the 
Authority and in accordance with the present Protocol and under the authority of the 
Executive Secretary.
4 He shall update plans for the movement of troops and logistics and initiate joint 
exercises as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 13 below.
5 He shall be assisted in the discharge of his functions and personnel as determined by 
the Defence Council.
6 He shall prepare and manage the military budget of the Secretariat.
7 He shall study and make proposals to the Executive Secretariat in respect of all 
matters relating to personnel and equipment within his jurisdiction.
CHAPTER V
MODALITIES OF INTERVENTION AND ASSISTANCE
Article 13
1 All Member States agreed to place at the disposal of the Community, earmarked units 
from the existing National Armed Forces in case of any armed intervention.
2 These units shall be referred to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC)
3 In order to better realise the objectives set forth in this Protocol, the member States 
army organise, from time to time, as may be approved by the Authority, joint military 
exercises among two or more earmarked units of the AAFC.
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Article 14
The Allied Armed Forces of the Community shall be under the command of the Forces 
Commander appointed by the Authority on the proposal of the Defence Council. He 
shall be entrusted with powers that are conferred upon him by the Authority. He 
together with the Chief of Defence Staff of the assisted country, shall be the joint Chief 
o f Defence Staff of the Allied Armed Forces and shall be responsible for the 
implementation of armed intervention and assistance as decided by the Authority. He 
shall have at his disposal all the necessary means of defence.
Article 15
1 Intervention by the AAFC shall in all cases be justified by the legitimate defence of the 
territories of the Community.
2 It shall therefore be carried out in accordance with the mechanism described in Articles 
16, 17 and 18 below.
Article 16
When an external armed threat or aggression is directed against a Member State of the 
Community, the Head of State of that country shall send a written request for 
assistance to the current Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS, with copies to other 
Members. This request shall mean that the Authority shall decide in accordance with 
the emergency procedure as stipulated in Article 6 above.
Article 17
When there is a conflict between two Member States of the Community, the Authority 
shall meet urgently and take appropriate action for mediation. If need be, the Authority 
shall decide only to interpose the AAFC, between the troops engaged in the conflict.
Article 18
1 In the case where an internal conflict in a Member State of the Community is actively 
maintained and sustained from outside, the provisions of Article 6, 9 and 16 of this 
Protocol shall apply.
2 Community forces shall not intervene if the conflict remains purely internal.
CHAPTER VI 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
Article 19
The implementation of this Protocol shall be supplemented by additional Protocols. 
Article 20
1 Undertakings devolving from the provisions of this Protocol shall not be interpreted to 
as being against the spirit of Conventions or Agreements binding one member State to 
another third State or States; provided each Convention and Agreements are not in 
conflicts with the spirit of this Defence Assistance.
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2 Nonetheless, a Defence Agreement concluded with some other State shall be 
denounced by the Member State or concerned as soon as such other State shall have 
been identified by the Authority as an aggressor against a member State.
3 Member States shall undertake to end the presence of foreign military bases within
their national territories as soon a the Community is the position to meet their
requirements in matters relating to defence.
CHAPTER VH 
GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 21
1 Any Member State which accedes to the Treaty automatically accedes to this Protocol
and to the Protocol of Non-Aggression signed in Lagos on the 22nd April, 1978.
2 On the other hand any Member State signatory to this present Protocol and having
ratified it, or having acceded to it, becomes party to the above-mentioned 
Non-Agression Pact.
Article 22
1 Any Member State may submit proposals for the amendment or revision of this
Protocol.
2 Any such proposals shall be submitted to the Executive Secretary who shall 
communicate them to other Member States not later than thirty days after their receipt 
o f such proposals. Amendments or revisions shall be considered by the Authority after 
member States have been given one month's notice thereof.
Article 23
1 Any Member State wishing to withdraw from the Protocol shall give to the Executive 
Secretary one year's written notice. At the end of this period of one year, if such notice 
is not withdrawn, such a State shall cease to be a party to the Protocol.
2 During the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, such a Member 
State shall nevertheless observe the provisions of this Protocol and shall remain liable 
for the discharge of its obligations under this Protocol.
Article 24
1 This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally at the signing by Heads of State and 
Government, and definitively after ratification by not less than seven (7) signatories, in 
accordance with the Constitutional Laws of each Member State.
2 This Protocol, as well as all instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 
Executive Secretariat which shall transmit certified true copies to all Member States 
and notify them of the dates of deposits of the instruments of ratification and shall 
register it with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), as well as the United Nations 
(UN) and any other organisation as the Authority shall decide.
3 The Present Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form an integral part of the Treaty.
Done at Freetown on 29th May 1981.
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